

She has published "This is Africa. Its place in World Affairs. Its Relations with Argentina" in 1986, "The relations between Argentina and South Africa from "the Junta" to Menem [1976-1994]" in 1995, "Argentina and Africa in Brazil's mirror" in 2006, and organized the book on "The Afro-American and African Studies in Latin America. Heritage, presence and visions of "the other" in 2008, as well as "Politics and social movements in an hegemonic world. Lessons from Africa, Asia and Latin America" in collaboration with Atilio Boron in 2005, and "Afroargentineans Today. Their lack of visibility, their identity and social mobilization" with Marta Maffia in 2009, among other works.

The comprehensive research, analysis and information included in the book written by Professor Gladys Lechini is without any doubt, a contribution to the bilateral and multilateral relationship between the two regions in general and between Argentina and South Africa (including also the interregional relationship through Mercosur and SACU) in particular. Professor Lechini is not only "the" authority in this dimension of the international relations but is also doing an unique work in taking stock of a growing qualitative and quantitative relationship between the regions in the context of the South-South policy framework and guided by the TCDC Plan of Action. Besides, her work goes beyond the book. She teaches and trains students at postgraduate levels on African matters contributing in this way to highlight the potential of collaboration between the two regions. The bilateral relationship at inter-governmental levels, and how is reflected in all the different sectors of the civil society, will not be complete without its academic dimension that has the unique capacity of placing it in a medium and long term perspectives in the international relations arena. And, certainly, Prof Lechini, with this book contributed immensely to this endeavour.

R. Carlos SERSALE di CERISANO,
Ambassador of the Argentine Republic to South Africa.

Professor Gladys Lechini's path-finding new book, "Argentina and South Africa facing the Challenges of the 21st Century-Brazil as the Mirror image" is both opportune and long overdue. Professor Lechini has established herself as one of Argentina's foremost Africa experts and scholars. With her new work, she has translated her scholarship into an easily accessible, multi-dimensional review of the most important trilateral relationship between three of the giants of South America and Africa. This book is of equal importance to policy practitioners, business entrepreneurs and academics. It represents the first synthesised attempt to place on record the rich and evolving relationship between the countries in the Southern cones of both continents. And, as her conclusion indicates, we are only now beginning to unlock the deepest potential of this relationship. I have no doubt that Professor Lechini's new book will be an important benchmark in advancing the understanding between the governments and peoples of Argentina, South Africa and Brazil. The South African Embassy in Buenos Aires is proud to be associated with this project.

Tony LEON,
South African Ambassador to Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay


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Gladys Lechini ARGENTINA and SOUTH AFRICA - FACING THE CHALLENGES OF THE XXI CENTURY - Brazil as the mirror image

Gladys Lechini

ARGENTINA and SOUTH AFRICA

FACING THE CHALLENGES OF THE XXI CENTURY

Brazil as the mirror image

Gladys LECHINI holds a PhD in Sociology (Faculty of Philosophy, Literature and Human Sciences, University of São Paulo, Brazil) and a Master's Degree in Social Sciences, with special mention on Political Science (Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences -FLACSO). She has graduated in Political Science and in International Relations (Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, National University of Rosario –UNR).

Currently she is Professor of International Relations at the National University of Rosario, Senior Research Fellow of the National Council for Scientific Research (CONICET), Director of the PHD Programme on International Relations, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations (UNR), Director of the Programme on South-South Relations and Cooperation (PRECSUR); Coordinator of the African Department at the International Relations Institute, National University of La Plata.

Prior to her current positions she was Coordinator of the South-South Programme of the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO) 2003-2007 and Director of the School of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, UNR, 1994-2003.

Since she graduated she has worked hard to promote and develop African studies in Argentina and Latin America. Her main areas of scholarly interest are International Relations, Foreign Policy, Argentina, Brazil and South Africa, South-South Cooperation, Latin America and Africa's Relations, African Studies. She has worked in Brazilian and African Academic institutions, and has written articles in specialized international journals and many book chapters.


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Argentina and South Africa facing the challenges of the XXI Century

Brazil as the mirror image

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Brazil as the mirror image

Gladys Lechini

Lechini, Gladys

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To my son and daughter, Ramiro and Jimena, for their patience and love

To Edgardo, my companion along this journey, for his love, support
and understanding

To my parents, for creating a comfortable environment to be myself.

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This book is the result of the revised doctoral dissertation presented at the University of São Paulo, Brazil and updated with a new chapter. The main theme of both the book and the dissertation has been the object of long elaboration –at times explicit, at times underlying– which grew all along my life as researcher at *Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas de Argentina* and as lecturer at *Universidad Nacional de Rosario*, institutions that contributed to my professional training and which I feel most indebted to.

The concern with the unstable and impulsive characteristics of Argentina's foreign policy constitutes the backdrop to this book, the result of different contributing sources and impulses which arose as years went by and which reflect the different geographical spaces that the successive stages of its elaboration marked. I am indebted to professors Fernando Augusto Alburquerque Mourao, Luis Beltrán and Jose Maria Nunes Pereira, to my Argentine colleagues and friends from CERIR in Rosario, those from Buenos Aires, from Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in Brazil, and from South Africa and Africa, who at different times took the trouble of reading my notes. Their discussions and comments contributed greatly to clarify my doubts.

The reason for the above general acknowledgment is due to the fact that after carefully revising the numerous contributions received over all these years, I might be unfair and fail to mention some names. This is also the reason why I can only thank more explicitly the patient work done by Julieta Cortés, Gisela Pereyra Doval and Carla Morasso, who over different periods gave me support during the writing process and helped me with the elaboration of tables and figures.

Finally, my thanks to the Government of South Africa –through its embassy in Buenos Aires– to the Argentine-South African Chamber of Commerce and the Standard Bank for their generous financial support for the publication of this English edition.

Prologue

ALTHOUGH THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS has remained little developed in the social sciences of Latin America, the analysis of the different links between the countries in the region and their African counterparts reveals even a more worrying deficit. Since the mid 1990s, the *Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales* (CLACSO) began to encourage initiatives aimed to modify such absence of knowledge between two continents united by significant blood ties and cultural bonds. It was President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva who stated that his country, Brazil, hosted the second African descent group on the planet; the figure, ascending to over eighty million people, is only outnumbered by the population residing in the largest African country, Nigeria. With his words, President Lula reasserted the validity of a historic claim on the part of Brazil, and once again underlined the continuity of the salient lines in the foreign policy of Brazil, in overt contrast with the erratic meandering path exhibited by Argentina.

In the mentioned context, the African studies in Latin America and the Caribbean constitute a rare exception. It is within this framework that the publication of Gladys Lechini’s book must be considered; her merits are many and of very diverse kinds. Firstly, she ventured into a very little explored territory such as Argentine - African relations, a contribution that fills a gap concerning not only the ill-famed quality of our academic life but, and more seriously yet, because it unfolds the incoherence and the improvisation prevalent in Argentina’s foreign policy with respect to a continent of the importance of Africa. Secondly, she focused this study from an enriching comparative perspective while establishing a didactic counterpoint between Brazil’s African policy and the series of policies and approaches attempted by Argentina.

The writer, a lecturer at *Universidad Nacional de Rosario*, Argentina, a CONICET researcher, and former coordinator for CLACSO’s South-South Program, is one of the most important African Studies analysts of Latin America and the Caribbean; she enjoys a long career in the teaching profession and in research work and possesses personal knowledge of a large part of the African Continent. The book that we are pleased to introduce originated in the doctoral dissertation that Lechini presented at the University of São Paulo in Brazil. The original text has undergone revision and has reached the final updated version the reader is now in capacity to enjoy.

This book starts with a general discussion of the Argentine foreign policy, the main feature of which –certainly paradoxical– has been its discontinuity, its persistent unpredictable performance, from the second half of the previous century on, with its traditional erratic fluctuations and its ever hesitant strategy of international insertion. In the short span of a couple of decades, Argentina went from disdaining the Non-Aligned Movement to adhering to it enthusiastically after the Malvinas/Falklands War broke out. Later, it blatantly proclaimed unconditional alignment with the United States of America, in the name of the sadly regrettable doctrine of “carnal relations” with the hegemonic power. Finally, it cautiously returned to the Movement, during Néstor Kirchner Presidency, but as “observer” and not as a full member of the organization. Amid such dizzying succession of changing priorities and reactions, the Africa policy fell prey to the meanderings of the official policy.

After the return of democracy and with the ascent of Raúl Alfonsín to power, the relationship with the African countries played a more relevant role on Argentina’s foreign relations agenda. The most prominent feature of this period was, undoubtedly, breaking relations with the racist government of South Africa, which, during the military regime between 1976 and 1983, had enjoyed special treatment. However, the “openness to Africa” by *Palacio San Martín*, limited to mere diplomatic initiatives and gestures (not solid enough in terms of deeper commercial, political and cultural relations), and the radical reversal in the foreign agenda implemented by Carlos Menem Administration, may be held responsible for the near banishment of the African countries on the Argentine foreign policy agenda. In the current century a policy based almost exclusively on commercial prospects and foreign trade superavit was instrumental to maintain in the foreign policy agenda the relations of Argentina with the North African countries and South Africa

Lechini’s book shows the existing contrast with Brazil, a country which, since the 1960s, adopted and maintained a policy of deepening commercial, political and cultural relations with the African countries. Already in the 1990s, in spite of his rhetoric extolling the need to unconditionally side with the United States as a condition to guarantee the “entrance” to the First World, Menem established diplomatic relations with the new De Klerk transition government in South Africa, but neither this nor any of the other African countries were able to draw the attention or the interest of the *Casa Rosada*.

From a historical viewpoint, Lechini demonstrates that the Argentina-South Africa relations started in the 1960s followed three stages. The first one, between 1960 and 1983, when relations responded to sporadic impulses dictated by rather strict commercial interests and, toward the end of this period and in the context of the military regime, for strategic-military reasons. The second stage began when Argentina broke off with the racist Pretoria regime, and was extended over up to 1991, when the Argentine government gave recognition to the new African counterpart; nevertheless, as pointed out by Lechini, such recognition was not enough to substantially modify the approach to South Africa or to the African Continent at large in the eyes of the temporary occupants of Argentina's Foreign Relations Ministry. Yet, in the last decade bilateral macro relationships experienced an improvement, largely due to the renewed activism of both Argentinean and South African embassies and the creative role of an expanding network of social actors on both sides of the Atlantic that help to keep alive and growing the relations at the micro level.

After reading this book one can wisely conclude that Argentina has not yet been able to elaborate a serious, realistic and responsible foreign policy agenda. Not only toward Africa but also in the case of other regions of equal or even greater economic and strategic importance, like the Middle East, the Pacific Rim and the Far East. These shortcomings constitute serious failures which, at large, are very dearly paid for this country. Improvisation and constant fluctuations, unpredictably redefining national priorities, strategic alliances and preferred partners did not fail to undermine the capacity of Argentina to find its place in the world, to take advantage of its immense possibilities and also to foresee its current dangers. Thus, the country oscillated between the naïve dreams to become a full member of the First World –a major blunder that led to the 2001 crash– and to the loud but ineffectual “Third World” rhetoric of these days with the known consequences. I am convinced that this book will help to find out the reasons for such instability and, among so many hindrances; the possible ways for the elaboration of a foreign policy suited to the defense of the national interests and the construction of a more equitable and fair international order.

Atilio A. Boron

Dedicatory

I am writing to a friend, because there is nothing left for me to say or to request from the academician.

I congratulate, admire and I am grateful to her -in this order-, and I am sure whosoever reads this book will undoubtedly agree with me. She has summarized with absolute clarity and exhausted all possible resources to describe the most recent history of the relations between South Africa and Argentina, as well as the reflection of Brazil, that mirror that we undoubtedly require. And so I congratulate her.

Brave as usual, clear in her concepts. Precise in her convictions. Persistent and tireless. And for this I admire her.

For those of us who appreciate South Africa in its true dimension, not only for what it was and what it is but for what it will undoubtedly be, her work will enable a greater and deeper understanding on the part of those who have not yet discovered this marvellous country. It has also helped me, a businessman associated with South Africa not only with trade –but also to a certain degree with its academic, diplomatic and cultural aspects– to understand this relationship in even greater depth. And for this reason I welcome this publication.

My last message is to all South Africans who will undoubtedly appreciate its contents, that also opens a door to this, our country, which shares with them the southernmost of both continents.

My heartfelt thanks, Gladys.

Oscar Hansen
Presidente Cámara de Comercio Argentino-Sudafricana

Introduction

IN MY EARLY APPROACHES to the study of Argentina's relations with the African countries, there always appeared an African policy developed by Brazil as comparative reference. The implementation of that policy since the independence obtained by the African countries, with successful designs and strategies, offered a contrast with Argentina's so-called "lost opportunities" in Africa.

Upon first considerations, Argentina seemed not to have either designed a policy or taken any action, while Brazil had developed a consistent African policy; but, as I went further into my research work, it was possible to observe the case was not so linear as it first appeared. Argentina had also established embassies in African countries, as well as sent missions and developed some trade relations with Africa. Over the eighties –a decade after Brazil– it defined an African policy, broke relations with racist South Africa, progressed in matters of technical cooperation and, to a certain extent, reached the desires of the 1960s, as was expressed in a first plan for Argentina's presence in Africa. This gave way to a Brazilian academician to state that Argentina, even without the *samba*, was able to celebrate Carnival.

The situation reverted in the nineties, when the Argentine foreign policy agenda showed a lower interest in Africa. Nevertheless, the positive changes that took place in South Africa could anticipate Buenos Aires would regain interest in the area. It was assumed Brazil and Argentina enjoyed similar positions to start a promising approach. But on this occasion, again Brazil implemented active diplomacy while Argentina displayed formalities without much consistency.

In this context, some of the following queries arose. Firstly, I wondered why the actions taken by Argentina in Africa since the independence of the African states lost importance and remained unnoticed in Argentina's foreign policy. Secondly, I analyzed why it was necessary that Argentina cut diplomatic relations with South Africa in order to prove its intentions concerning the African countries. Thirdly, why the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Pretoria was so abrupt and did not bring about the expected results. Finally, I wondered why Brazil, who

have developed an African policy, did not break relations with Pretoria, and even with the advent of democracy in South Africa, it increased ties.

The initial trend, methodologically linear, would have suggested to follow the traditional comparative analysis of foreign policies both in Argentina and Brazil, in line with the studies of the eighties in the program *Relaciones Internacionales para América Latina* (RIAL) (International Relations for Latin America). The inclination to use such comparative methodology with Brazil, a neighbor country, partner in MERCOSUR, is strong not only in academic studies but also among policy makers and Argentine foreign policy practitioners.

As my research progressed, it was made clearer that the mentioned approach would not be the most appropriate one according to my objective of concentrating efforts on the causes, the development and the results of the Argentine foreign policy toward African countries, especially South Africa, my main concern.

Marginalizing Brazil would have meant being deprived of a theoretical conceptual framework that served as the mirror instrument contributing to clarify the central issue of this work. Hence, I decided on Brazil as the “witness case”, easing the way for a systematic analysis to control the central hypotheses (Skocpol and Somers, 1980). Including Brazil as reference led me to use the mirror image, without attributing its African policy any ideal or exemplary connotation.

Brazil’s repositioning also allowed the “relocation” of Argentina’s foreign policy toward the African countries to discuss not only what had been done but also how things had been done. The aim was “to rethink” Argentina’s foreign policy according to some criteria which allowed me to organize my research. Thus I could be able to describe and explain the approaches toward the African countries, which I called “impulses”, because the South-South issues enjoyed a very low profile on the foreign policy agenda and because the domestic political instability affected the continuity of priorities and styles of international insertion. Consequently, the actions implemented were barely additional, bringing about a model of relationship which can be labeled spasmodic, well beyond any fluctuation pattern.

Although the characteristics of the new South Africa may have justified a shift over to a special relations model, Argentina’s foreign

policy toward Pretoria continued to follow impulses, caught in the traditional network of the Argentina-Africa foreign relations pattern.

A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Being Argentina's African policy –with Brazil as the main reference– the unit of analysis, I resorted to the theoretical approaches in international relations because such approach offered the right instrument to deal with foreign policy analysis.

The “macro” theories in international relations generally analyse the international system, but those theories are insufficient to explain the foreign policy of the countries of the South, their decision-making processes and the incidence of domestic variables, particularly when the country or state which is the object of analysis is not the hegemonic power dictating the rules of the game, or an actor in condition to modify the international system. On the contrary, the “micro” approaches offer different theoretical instruments for the study of Latin American foreign policies. For example, the bureaucratic policy has proven useful to explain significant decisions in the foreign policy of countries like Argentina and Brazil. Similarly, the leadership variables may probably be more explicit in Latin America rather than in other parts of the western world to explain the center stage role played by presidents and by the respective foreign offices in the decision-making processes.

Puig (1975, 1980), from a systemic standpoint, struck a balance between domestic factors and contextual variables, a significant theoretical-methodological contribution to understand foreign policy and the decision-making context. From an analytical point of view, the distinction between national and international sources proves to be helpful, although the domestic themes are being internationalized and the external factors have grown ever more influential in domestic politics, particularly in Latin America, over the 1990s.

On the other hand, the modernization and democratization processes in Latin American countries have expanded the decision-making process, traditionally in the hands of few individuals. The high centralization and concentration levels of power, usually linked to Latin American presidential systems, have not prevented bureaucratic disputes between rival entities

holding their own perceptions and values. Therefore, the president assumes the role of umpire.

Similarly, at Executive level, there are a growing number of ministries, agencies and other offices that seek to wield influence in foreign policy areas to satisfy their own interests, as do the different lobbies and other pressure groups. In Argentina, the military also were essential actors in matters of foreign policy associated to national security interests. These interests were often considered in such a wide dimension that they involved all policy issues. Also, the non-governmental actors, like political parties, business associations, the press, the NGOs and the financial groups, among others, have increased participation in foreign policy decision making.

Over the nineties in Argentina, the theoretical contributions made by Carlos Escudé with his “peripheral realism” are quite appealing but not helpful enough to analyze relations “with levels of horizontality”: a great amount of his work is referred to designing and conducting the Argentine foreign policy in its relations with the hegemonic power (USA), taking into consideration the cost/benefit analysis. However, his distinction between “macro” and “micro” bilateral relations is very useful to study Argentinean relations with South Africa (Escudé, 1992). The “macro” relations constitute the global framework of the links with another country, in association with the set of values connected to foreign policy, which may be shared and act as binding elements in the relationship; the “micro” relations are articulated around a plurality of particular problems in charge of numberless individual public and private actors and small bureaucratic groups.

Keeping all the elements mentioned in mind, I consider foreign policy as the result of a combination of domestic and international variables, which influence a country’s international performance and decision-making process. The international system is a variable that affects foreign policy by placing restrictions or by offering opportunities. Also important factors are the domestic conditions linked to a regime’s orientation, political stability and the rulers’ perceptions of the country’s international insertion.

Consequently, this work intends to reflect the complex interrelation between endogenous and exogenous factors in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy; the connection between the domestic

and the international, the “intermestic” variable (a concept coined by Manning, 1977); an international context –imposing restrictions to State action or making some responses more probable than others– and domestic circumstances which turn certain responses more feasible.

The incidence of two contextual or referential variables is recognized in the relations with the African countries, and especially with South Africa. The systemic variable includes the Cold War and the changes occurred in the international system at the end of this period. The other one is the “political system” variable, operating in Argentina and South Africa. In the former case, it can explain Argentina’s political instability and the incidence in its international behavior; in the latter, it refers to the Apartheid system and the South African democratization process as from the multiracial elections of 1994.

It is now necessary to define some key concepts which will appear further on, such as foreign policy, decision-making process, adjustment and change. *Foreign policy* means a public policy, comprising three analytically separate dimensions (political-diplomatic, economic and strategic-military), which is projected abroad and encounters a wide range of actors and governmental and non-governmental institutions both on the bilateral and on the multilateral levels (Russell, 1990). Distinguishing those dimensions is necessary to clarify the analysis: when implementing foreign actions, it is well known that a State generally combines them according to the interests at stake and, in many cases, to intra-bureaucratic rivalries.

This analytical desegregations can be explained following Dallanegra (1998: 10): “the three pillars of world relations are constituted by the economic axis, which serves the material needs of society and has its ‘own material power’, granted by finance, trade, industry and scientific and technological capacity; the strategic-military axis, which provides the necessary defense and security and also possesses its own material power rendered by arms, armies, strategies and alliances and the political axis, which enjoys power of influence but does not possess its own separate material power. To obtain material power and accomplish its aims, it must be linked to one of the other two axes. Nevertheless, the political axis is the planning axis that establishes the rules and guidelines the system follows, the values and the beliefs, and is related to the decision-making process associated with foreign policy formulation”.

Therefore, in this work I prioritized the political-diplomatic dimension, in accordance with the main hypothesis, although the analysis of the other two dimensions has not been neglected, to the extent that, following the interests of this study, they have been strongly combined. Then, with respect to the trade dimension, I will show how trade with Africa increased; the fluctuations in such relations with South Africa will be dealt with and also the trade share over Argentina's and Brazil's total trade. The trade variations have not been explained because they extend beyond the scope of this work and because the specific requirements of such research would demand a different empirical methodology with a different resulting thesis.

The above mentioned dimensions are developed within the framework of both the bilateral and multilateral relations of a state actor. In this work, political-diplomatic bilateral relations have been prioritized. The multilateral spaces where the African countries participated, such as the United Nations General Assembly, the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries and the Southern Africa Development Community, were also considered.

Other important aspects to be incorporated to this analysis are the different levels of discourse and action. The discourse level is based on what the representatives of a political society declare gives support to foreign policy, arguing and justifying their actions. The structuring axes are contained therein and they are linked to the foreign policy aims. The discourse level involves the orientation followed by the governing elites when they plan the international insertion of the state and elaborate the foreign policy agenda; the foundations that structure a country's international projection at a given moment are thus determined (Miranda, 1988).

As stated by Gelson Fonseca Jr. (1998: 267-268): "in the official discourse, we can find enough material to delineate what is known as thought. In fact, by nature, rather than other State policies perhaps, foreign policy is founded on explicative procedures because it is also fed by symbolic attitudes which seek to express ideologically the totality of the national interests. The fragility –which is typical of the legitimacy and legality mechanisms at the international system– forces governments to systematically 'justify' their elections".

The level of actions, instead, is the visible concrete result of a state action, the very substance of foreign policy. The material of the actions dimension is undoubtedly empirical, may be singled out, located and dated; it may be methodologically objectified. The comparison between both levels is important because there may be and, in fact, there frequently are, differences between them. Consequently, in the domain of discourse, I have included the statements issued by presidents, foreign affairs ministers and officials who are directly related to the matters here dealt with. At action level, I resorted to the diplomatic missions sent and welcomed, to the signature of agreements and, broadly, to all documents, conducts, diplomatic signs or data allowing to perceive or infer a policy toward any State of Africa.

As is widely known, any foreign policy is the result of a *decision-making process*, understood as a temporal sequence which starts at a given moment, when the combination of different domestic and external stimuli demand decision making, until a decision is taken. In this process, domestic and foreign governmental and non-governmental actors participate and exercise influence by means of different mechanisms, although the degree of this influence varies according to countries, periods and issues. For a case study, in this process it is necessary to distinguish between formulation and execution of a decision in foreign policy matters, because in the execution stage there is also an intra-bureaucratic negotiation process, and because the initial objectives may be altered when arriving at a decision.

It must be kept in mind that the final decision is made by a decision structure which Charles and Margaret Hermann (1989: 362) calls “the ultimate decision unit”. This structure is integrated by one or several domestic governmental actors who possess the capacity to commit a society’s resources and preclude the decision taken from being easily reverted.

On the other hand, the decision making process is inscribed in a decision framework feeding and conditioning the process; it may be disaggregated analytically in the stimuli and the domestic and foreign conditioning factors, the domestic macro-political context –comprising the characteristics of the political system of the country under study and of its foreign policy features– and the specific context of the particular decision (the decision micro level).

As it develops, this process may be subject to change and adjustments. A *change* means abandoning or substituting one or more ordering criteria of the foreign policy and the variations in the content or the forms of implementing that policy. There may be substantial changes either in the ordering criteria or in content, and also in the procedures, the institutions and instruments, in the structure and in the decision-making process (Russell, 1990). The concept of *adjustment* refers to the variations produced in the intensity of the effort (bigger or smaller) and in the adequacy to the objectives before a wide range of different issues on the foreign policy agenda. The changes are qualitative and the adjustments are rather quantitative (Hermann, 1990).

METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS

In the course of analyzing Argentina's foreign policy toward the African countries, my attention has been focused on the relation with the states of Sub-Saharan Africa; they constitute a group which is different from the Northern Africa states; also, when considering the treatment they receive from the Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship Ministry (MRECIC), which places them together with the Middle East countries. The countries from North Africa have been considered mainly when dealing with the commercial dimension, according to their importance in Argentina's trade with Africa.

Regarding to the sources consulted, when circumstances permitted, different interviews were held with diplomats and government officials in order to guide the research, indicate new sources and clarify doubts. The Foreign Affairs Ministry Annual Reports (from 1945 to 1981), the State of the Nation Annual Reports (from 1982 to 2010), and the reports presented by Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (MRE) have been consulted. In both countries, I also resorted to the Presidential speeches, and to the speeches delivered by Foreign Relations Ministers, Heads of Africa Offices, and other related officials as well as all documentation held pertinent, newspapers and different media publications included. In order to broaden the perspective on the other side of the Atlantic and obtain firsthand data, since 1991 I traveled on different occasions to visit the African countries and, particularly, South Africa. The *in situ* research helped me to contrast my hypotheses and to reformulate some of my ideas.

This work is complemented with tables which I produced to reflect the density of the relations Argentina and Brazil have maintained with the

African countries, particularly, with South Africa. This survey, which has never been done before in either country, is aimed at contributing to a deeper study and understanding of bilateral relations. When, in a parallel manner, I collected the data to produce the tables for Argentina and Brazil, I met different constraints. Data gathering was then, a slow process not free of difficulties depending on whether the information concerned Argentina or Brazil. The tables have been grouped into two large areas according to two analytical dimensions: political-diplomatic bilateral relations and trade bilateral relations.

In relation to the political-diplomatic dimension, I have included the different missions sent by Argentina to Sub-Saharan Africa and those African ones welcomed in Buenos Aires. I have selected only those with representatives of the highest level, like Heads of State or government and also, Ministers of Foreign Relations, chronologically listed and following the different successive governments in office in Argentina. In the process of my research, I followed up the Argentine-African and Brazilian-African relations since the seventies, gathering all the possible known data which has been listed here. Regarding to the agreements signed by the Sub-Saharan Africa countries, the information appearing on the web page of Brazil's Ministry of External Relations (MRE) and of Argentina's Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship Ministry (MRECIC) has been included.

Concerning the trade dimension, the tables are the result of my own elaboration based on official sources. The Argentine-African trade figures were obtained from the data supplied by the *Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos* (INDEC) (National Institute of Statistics and Census). In the case of Brazil, I used the statistics from the Chamber of International Trade (CACEX, *Banco do Brasil*) covering up to the 1990s; after that date, the information was supplied by the Development, Industry and Foreign Trade Ministry. The North African countries –Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia– have also been included in the tables to show their relevant share over total trade of Argentina and Brazil with Africa, although they are not the particular object of this work.

It is also worth noting that in this book I have only incorporated tables of foreign trade between Argentina, Brazil and the African countries concerning the last ten years (2001-2010). A complete comprehensive version including the years 1960-2000 could be found in Lechini (2006: 267-279).

METHODOLOGY OF THE APPROACH

In Chapter I, I start by reflecting upon Argentina's African policy in the general framework of the Argentine foreign relations over the last forty years of the XXth Century, a period marked by the domestic political instability which caused discontinuity in the international insertion models. But also the changes at systemic level and those related to the domestic economic model over the 1990s produced significant modifications in the Argentine foreign policy designs. It is in this historical context that the impulses can be explained.

As mentioned in Chapter II, until the Alfonsín Administration, the Argentine approaches to the African states were characterized by impulses originated mainly in Buenos Aires, with a marked trade inclination. During the Alfonsín Administration, the impulse showed different characteristics: as the political-diplomatic approaches to Africa increased, without neglecting the commercial aspects, diplomatic relations with South Africa were broken. A new period of Argentine-African relations had been started, but it was soon truncated with the advent of Menem, when the role of the African countries and the South-South relations abruptly descended on the foreign policy agenda, as explained in Chapter III.

In the case of Brazil, although the African continent was not a priority, a more important policy was being developed, which brought about a greater density in the intra-South Atlantic relations in the framework of an international insertion design that lasted over to the 1990s, as has been explained in Chapter IV.

The analysis of a concrete case (relations with South Africa) helped me to articulate the development of my research work, focusing attention on the 1990s, keeping in mind the democratic transition of South Africa and the first official visit of an Argentine president to a Sub-Saharan African country in the framework of bilateral relations.

The analytical break in the nineties is justified by the different converging conditions: the changes at systemic level which had their incidence in the countries' domestic and external dimensions, and the changes that took place in the Argentine foreign policy in general. With respect to relations with the African states, it meant a lower profile for them but a repositioning of South Africa in particular.

In the study of the Argentine-African relations in Chapters VI and VII, three periods are dealt with: firstly, a dual policy and ambiguous relations between 1960 and 1983, when relations with the racist South Africa were held following mutual impulses, with strategic-military and trade purposes (Chapter V); secondly, a period of policy definition toward the racist South Africa, cutting diplomatic relations during the Alfonsín Administration, along with the start of a design for the rest of the African states (Chapter VI); and finally, a period of “Menemist” impulses (Chapter VII), based on the President’s personal preferences and interests rather than on policy design.

In Chapter VIII the mirror image with Brazil is resumed. At the start of the 1990s, Brazil and Argentina structured their approach to South Africa in terms of the new democratic conditions and of the weight of this country as a possible engine for the development of the Southern region of Africa, in spite of the selectivity in the election of partners and the lower consideration the African continent was given on the list of foreign priorities in both Latin American states. However, over the decade, Brazil implemented a strategy with Pretoria while Argentina again lagged behind.

Chapter IX is a new updated work which takes stock of a growing qualitative and quantitative relationship between Argentina, South Africa and the countries north of the Sahara, in the context of South-South Cooperation. Brazil is again present with its huge disembarking in Africa, showing a great compromise and interest, either at the governmental level or at the private sector.

After a general reference concerning the division by chapters to clarify the central issues, the bibliography used –never complete though– includes the main works published in the period under study both in Argentina and in Brazil, and constitutes a contribution to the continuity of this kind of research on both sides of the Atlantic.

Chapter I

An Approach to Argentine-African Relations (1960-2000)

A REVISION OF THE EVOLUTION of the Argentine-African relations over the past four decades, since the independence of the African states, shows that Sub-Saharan Africa has enjoyed a low profile among Argentina's foreign priorities, with limited relations and without continuity over the different Argentine governments, either in strategy design or in the actions implemented. A combination of peculiar factors relating to Argentina's political instability, to its foreign policy stance, along with changes in the international scenario and the special situation of African countries have conditioned Argentina's poor and erratic ties with those countries.

In this chapter, some characteristics of Argentina's foreign policy together with the priorities of Argentine governments help to understand the limited weight given to the African states in Buenos Aires. In this sense, the importance assigned by Argentina to Africa can be understood if it is examined in the context of its participation in the Non-Aligned Movement; such a space was a significant component of the "look to the South". The approach to the African states in terms of bilateral relations took the form of impulses, the result of a spasmodic policy which was maintained during both democratic governments and military regimes.

ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN POLICY FRAMEWORK

To go further into the analysis of the Argentine-African relations, it has been considered relevant to briefly show the Argentine foreign policy framework with respect to relations from 1960 to date, to explain the low profile and the discontinuity of the actions implemented.

The incidence of the domestic variables in Argentina's foreign policy must be kept in mind. Consequently, the political-institutional instability Argentina lived through during the first twenty years of the period under study was one of the causes for the discontinuity in the designs and policies implemented by the different governments as from 1960, along with the variations in the emphasis given to the priorities. Even though the

domestic variables meant an important factor, they are not enough to trace a direct relation between type of regime and foreign policy. The succession of *de facto* and constitutional governments, which almost equally shared the period, conditioned Argentina's foreign policy.

Following the conceptualization by Miranda (2001a: 174), this stage of the Argentine foreign policy can be taken as the result of the combination of anemic and sudden insertions¹. Additionally, political instability caused foreign policy fluctuations and, at the same time, created the necessary conditions for the development of a swinging type of diplomacy. Sudden changes of positions did not contribute to consolidate or give international consistency to foreign policy implementation.

When domestic instability was combined with changes abroad, Argentina remained more exposed to the decisions and objectives of other actors, because there was a reduced capacity and not enough political resources for diplomatic and trade negotiations, and because Argentina was not strong to compete internationally. The negative consequences were, therefore, neglect towards Argentine diplomacy, no political credibility and the label of hazardous actor in international relations (Miranda, 2001a: 186).

The perceptions of the world and the diplomatic behavior have either a direct or an indirect connection with national politics. The political-institutional instability not only diminished the credibility of the discourse and the external actions of the Argentine foreign relations but also led foreign policy makers to superficial or biased interpretations of the international relations and of the characteristics of the changes.

If political instability is combined with the fact that many of the foreign policy formulations –more particularly, the foreign policy actions implemented– are the result of impressions related to what has been taking place in the world, the Argentine foreign policy of this period may be called unpredictable.

1. Miranda introduces three types of insertion: excluding, anemic and sudden. The anemic one is derived from a domestic absence of sociopolitical cohesion, thus facilitating the impulse of the objectives and the interest of foreign actors. An insertion policy with instability makes the insertion anemic. The sudden insertion is produced when the policies are formulated according to perceptions or feelings that lead to hastened conjunctural decisions which generally incur in contradictions and in unpredictability, in particular in a scenario of changes (Miranda: 2001a).

Foreign policy may be labelled “impressionistic” when it becomes contradictory and may generate negative results. Speeches are made and actions are taken whose effects cause third parties confusion and lead to an inconsistent short-lived insertion which, paradoxically, becomes a routine practice.

Political instability is of help to explain the discontinuity and variations in the design of the different governments in office. If this was the case with the insertion projects, less clarity and more discontinuity are found in the approaches related to marginal areas of Argentina’s foreign policy. In this context Argentina’s policy towards Africa is a clear example of a policy guided by impulses

In the same way as political instability had an incidence in discontinuity over almost forty years of Argentina’s foreign policy, it also affected the decision-making process characteristics. This shows power concentration in the hands of the Executive, with a strong influence of the political power in office, which led to or was a consequence of the weaknesses of the bureaucratic policy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Argentina enjoys a political tradition of accumulating decision power in the hands of the President, who exercises control over all and each of the stages in the decision-making process. Such control exercised by the President –in terms of the political power in office– reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with an incidence in the traditions and guiding principles, bringing about the well-known politicization of foreign affairs. This explains the institutional weakness of this Ministry, and the difficulties to consolidate policies and actions throughout the different successive administrations.

Although there are institutional memories that have been accrued throughout time and preserved by the professional diplomatic corps, along with each change of government, usually substantive conceptual redefinitions took place, as each new generation of government officials comes across few institutional constraints (Arbilla, 1997).

However, as explained by Miranda (1994), the foreign policy designs implemented by the different governments –with Perón (Justicialista), Frondizi (Developmentalist), Illia (Radical) and even the military– coexisted with some values upheld by the traditional foreign policy style. This was so because the different social groups linked directly or indirectly

to the functions and responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had appropriated a bureaucratic culture which the governments had to pay attention to, in order to conduct the country's international affairs. One of the values mentioned was diplomatic neutralism, which became the highest asset of the bureaucratic policy of the Ministry.

Likewise, Paradiso (1993) states that during the *de facto* governments the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was dramatically reduced, but the professionalism of many of its members helped "to make things less difficult than they might have become". Russell (1996a) coincides with this idea when he asserts that, although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs filled a marginal role, it was able to act as a moderating factor in the decision-making process.

The Argentine foreign policy, then, upheld certain principles and values, derived from the tradition of the ministry concerning the policy implemented in bureaucratic matters, which underlay or coincided with the line of thought of the power in office. In this way, some degree of coherence and regularity was achieved by the positions defended, especially before multilateral organizations; in fact, this could explain Argentina's stance concerning the Falklands and some principles dear to the African countries, which constitutes a topic to be dealt with in the next chapter.

In spite of the concentration shown by the decisions, along with the development of the decision-making process there were conflicts of interests between different state agencies with convergent incidence in the definition of the policies adopted. This was clearly the case between the Economic and the Foreign Affairs Ministries when dealing with international economic policy or between the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning frontiers and the national territory. For example, finding and opening markets to place the agricultural products ruled the economic foreign policy of Argentina since the beginning of the seventies because it was necessary to compensate for the loss of the European Common Market, which had become self-sufficient concerning agricultural and farming products. Alternative markets were a fundamental requirement to sustain the economy and were the central point on the agenda "imposed" by the Ministry of the Economy on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latter was usually more active at international organizations because of the priorities given to territorial issues and their legal defense.

Such divisions and intra-bureaucratic disputes could be more clearly observed in the foreign policy implemented by the military regime that took over power in 1976. The economic foreign policy or “economic diplomacy” was the result consistent with the objectives and group interests underlying the economic plan staged by Martínez de Hoz². This foreign policy was a governmental policy functional to the interests of the local economic groups (with a high degree of concentration and vertical integration), of diversified transnational companies settled in the country, and of the flight capitals seeking financial markets with high interest rates (Vázquez Ocampo, 1989). During the military years the foreign policy was directed to the defense of the national territory and of the Western values in the East-West conflict in accordance with the National Security Doctrine. This context explains Argentina’s lower profile among the countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (many of which were seen as the allies of the USSR) and the possibility of eventually withdrawing from the group; it also explains the approach to the African states with the aim of gaining new markets.

The mentioned struggle between Economic and Foreign Affairs Ministries went on until the arrival of Cavallo as Foreign Affairs Minister during the first Menem Administration. The dispute concerned the development and implementation of foreign policies linked to the need of finding new markets or to the international trade policy. The result was, in most cases, intra-bureaucratic disconnection and isolated overlapping actions. But the situation changed when the new Minister moved the Foreign Trade Office –operating in the Economics Ministry– to *Palacio San Martín*, the site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, producing a concentration of foreign policy decisions related to this issue.

With respect to Argentina’s foreign policy conditioning factors, it may be said that no matter the variations resulting from domestic variables, some degree of continuity is observed concerning the foreign insertion model of Argentina until 1990. However, it must be taken into account that the case was the insertion of a peripheral country in the global world context of post-World War II, during the Cold War years. For such

2. At the start of 1980, when the Carter Administration imposed Moscow an embargo on grains in response to the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan, the Argentine authorities refused to accept the American initiative alleging disagreement with economic sanctions as a political retaliation instrument. Maintaining good trade relations with Moscow prevailed even though alignment with the West was strongly defended.

reasons, the Argentine foreign policy also reflected external or systemic conditioning and offered relative margins for maneuvering.

From this point of view, it was held pertinent to resort to some models that explain this conditioned insertion according to a reality determined by the East-West conflict and by the need to implement a national development strategy, following Raúl Prebisch's ideas and those of the Economic Commission for Latin America. This way, the Argentine insertion revolved around the principles of the "globalist paradigm"³: non-alignment with the USA, which did not imply alignment with the other bloc; a high profile for peace, disarmament and East-West détente at international forums; the rejection of international organizations and regimes which tended to freeze world power distribution, particularly as concerned the development of sensitive technology; opposition to establishing supranational organisms that may have curtailed Argentine development and autonomy; the support to Latin American integration, from a gradualist perspective; the implementation of a development strategy oriented to imports substitution at national and regional levels as the main way to overcome the vulnerabilities of the traditional model based on primary exports; the reforms in the international economic and financial system, which would contemplate the interests of the developing countries; the diversification of international trade partners with no ideological barriers. However, different government administrations showed variations. Both in the leftist and rightist factions of the political spectrum there were attempts to favor alternative paradigms: that of the preferential relations with the USA (Revolución Libertadora 1955-1958, José María Guido Administration, and the period before the Malvinas/Falklands War, under Leopoldo Galtieri), or the paradigm of heterodox autonomy⁴ during the brief time when Héctor Cámpora was in office.

3. A term used by Russell and Tokatlian (2002), who mention three international insertion models historically followed by Argentina: the model of special relations with Great Britain (from the turn of the XIX Century to 1930), the "globalist" paradigm from the mid-forties to the end of the Cold War and the "pragmatic acquiescence" strategy started at the beginning of the nineties to date.

4. Following Juan Carlos Puig (1984:78), the then Foreign Relations Minister, "a heterodox autonomist will not accept to be dogmatically imposed, in the name of the 'bloc', political and strategic appreciations which only concern the vested interests of the hegemonic power, interests which, in most cases, as a matter of fact, reflect the aspirations of certain pressure groups or domestic power factors".

In the context of such general assumptions, the preference for actors and issues may be inferred. Within the framework of an international scenario determined by the East-West conflict, an inclination to favor relations with the USA and the developed countries can be observed along with the concerns about the regional context and Latin America, while the rest of the countries in the South played a marginal role and only appeared in the context of issues linked to development.

However, it may prove more pertinent to this work to analyze the space occupied by the South-South relations during this period. In this context, the analysis is directed to the role played by the Non-Aligned Movement and the African countries, which gradually joined this movement as they reached independence. Therefore, from the Third Position ("*Tercera Posición*") coined by former president Peron, "Third Worldism", "Developmentalism" or a position in favor of Non-Alignment, Argentina's foreign policy –without an active role and with varying emphasis– objected the international order asymmetries and the interventionist policies of the great powers; reforms to the international economic order were proposed and the priority was given to horizontal relations with neighboring countries. In spite of this discourse, until the eighties arrived, such intentions were many times outweighed by power politics approaches which stressed the East-West conflict.

It is within this general framework that a brief reference will be made to the role the countries of the South played during the governments between 1960 and 2000 in order to be able to identify Africa's place in Argentine foreign policy priorities

With Arturo Frondizi, the objective of the Argentine foreign policy was to transform the agrarian country into an industrial one, establishing preferential relations with the USA, essentially to strengthen foreign capital investment. Although Argentina supported the strategic position of the USA, in the world and in the region, relations reached an antagonistic point because Frondizi's adherence to the West did not mean renouncing universality (Puig, 1984). In accordance with such ideas, the President tried to deepen relations with countries beyond the hemisphere: he toured Europe and Asia; in India he emphasized the neutralist trend; within Latin America, he privileged relations with Brazil. His foreign policy though, institutionally unstable, showed a pronounced weakness, as evidenced in the agreements with Janio Quadros –concerning the coordination of

common international actions before the powerful central countries and the international forums– or when he met Che Guevara.

With Arturo Illia, Argentina tried to profit from the political and economic emerging multipolarism of the 1960s and the rise of new independent states in the South, which showed the world's growing structural inequalities.

The perception of Foreign Minister Zavala Ortiz was based not only on the recognition of multipolarism but also on the assumption that this international category was advantageous for the developing countries. With the stress on Latin America (García del Solar, 1996), different approaches to the South were attempted. Argentina participated as observer country in the Second Conference of the Non-Aligned in Cairo, in October of 1964. It searched for coincidences within the commodities producing countries in the framework of the UNCTAD and the Group of 77, and it privileged relations with the South Cone countries.

Nevertheless, as stated by Miranda (2001a: 184), this foreign policy was threatened by the clash between the inclination to expand autonomist conducts and the pressure to unconditionally subscribe to relations with the West and the logic imposed by the Cold War. Argentina was unable to separate the different foreign policy dimensions and to resume the project of becoming an industrial country, because of domestic impotence, as from 1958; since 1963, the country was also unable to broaden international relations with new interlocutors, for similar reasons. Institutional instability levels reduced Argentina's capacities and possibilities.

The military that took over power in 1976 favored the aims of an Argentina committed to national and continental security as established in the Security and Development Doctrine; they had perceptions and methods different from the former government of the Radical Party in matters of foreign policy and opted for alignment with the West to counterbalance Marxist influence.

The successive military governments (1966-1973) did not represent a monolithic position. On the one hand, as pointed out by Puig (1984), there were two periods of a well-defined foreign policy. The first one, with Juan Carlos Onganía in the Presidency, showed a clear alignment with the USA and the so-called *Christian Western World*. The second, with Marcelo Levingston and Alejandro Lanusse, offered a meaningful attempt to

overcome Argentina's isolation through the quiet development of an open policy –leaving aside ideological frontiers, as was shown by the meeting of Lanusse and Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1971. Other examples are the recognition of the Popular Republic of China and the approach to Latin America– and of trade openness with the Eastern countries, especially the USSR. It should be noted that at that time the USA and the USSR had already begun the policy of Détente, while Latin America headed toward the Cold War. At the same time, the Argentine foreign policy was divided between the bureaucratic policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the specific policy concerning the military project.

The third Peronist Administration (1973-1976) stressed the autonomist tendency of the former military regime, but this time as part of an integral strategy. As Foreign Minister of Héctor Cámpora, Puig (1984:149) assumed “a new heterodox autonomist project was implemented”. President Cámpora announced his foreign policy project in his speech before Congress and based it on the *Third Position* engineered by Juan D. Perón in the forties. The idea of an international relations diversification was introduced, understanding that it would offer broader “margins of manoeuvre” to support the autonomy of Argentina. This way, foreign policy privileged relations with the countries in the region while relations with the USA were kept as usual, but relations with Cuba were re-established and relations with the German Democratic Republic, North Korea and North Vietnam were started. Relations with Europe and with different African and Asian countries turned more dynamic (Puig, 1984). It was just the relations with the latter that pushed the decision, in September 1973, at the Meeting in Algiers, in favor of Argentina joining the Non-Aligned Movement as full member when the movement was enjoying maximum prestige.

According to Paradiso (1996: 171), enrolling with the Non-Aligned was seen as a way to reduce dependency, favor development and restore past national glories. It reflected the idea of joint action in order to demand of the industrialized nations a more fair international economic order. It was the opportunity to explore South-South cooperation possibilities, considered at that time as another alternative to achieve development.

With Perón, the same general lines were carried on, but the style changed (Vázquez Ocampo, 1989). His death led to a gradual reduction of the dynamism of this policy; the priorities set in 1973 were forgotten; the

third world approach was ever more rhetorical and unclear relations with some Arab countries were favored.

Jorge Videla and the other military that overthrew María Estela Martínez de Perón in 1976 proposed to maintain good relations with the USA –according to the National Security Doctrine still holding in this period– and showed their refusal to automatically aligning with Washington (with the exception of Galtieri before the Falklands/Malvinas War). However, they found themselves conditioned by the human rights violation reports during the Carter Administration. Meanwhile, the Economic Minister Martínez de Hoz considered that consolidating good overall relations, as well as expanding and strengthening transnational and transgovernmental relations with the USA was required for the success of the economic plan.

The liberalism of the Economic Minister might match with the national authoritarianism of the military ideas, so that, both sectors had a great influence in foreign policy, to the extent of exercising relatively autonomous management and power. However, they were subject of the intra-bureaucratic struggles, mainly caused by the role of “super- minister” that Martínez de Hoz played.

In this context, a low profile was held in the South-South relations. The military leaders estimated that Argentina was a country that enjoyed great wealth and that its inhabitants were “so white” that they should not be regarded as part of the Third World (Russell, 1996a). The ideological, historical and socio-cultural differences locked the political approach to the underdeveloped countries on a multilateral basis, considering that participation in the Non-Aligned Movement was inappropriate and not advisable. Consequently, the possibility of withdrawing the country from the group was even considered.

These positions were strengthened after the Havana Conference in 1979, presided by Cuba. However, many understood that the cost of withdrawing could be much higher than the cost of remaining. Paradiso (1996: 177) asserts:

Already before 1976, Argentina showed “limited participation”, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs performed in a discreet way and the only aim was to obtain benefits from the support that the member countries of the Movement could offer in relation to the Falklands/Malvinas issue, particularly in the UN Decolonization Committee.

and added:

As concerns the speeches, and to distant themselves from positions like Cuba's, the Argentine diplomacy had taken special care to condemn the attempts "to align the non-aligned", and declared adherence to the founding concepts of the Movement, which, on the other hand, could only be appreciated in depth by few.

The government remained in the Non-Aligned, despite their opposition to the philosophy and objectives of the movement, in order to avoid deepening of international isolationism. With a low profile, the military restricted their participation to obtaining or assuring the support of the member countries concerning some of Argentina's traditional claims (sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas, the right to develop autonomous nuclear power and independent technology, for instance), and other more conjuncture issues: the Argentine position on shared natural resources (because of the conflict with Brazil for the hydroelectric plants) and, particularly, human rights.

With Roberto Viola and Oscar Camilión, foreign policy was reoriented, in another phase of the military process: improving political relations with the USA and Western Europe, promoting fluent relations with Latin America, as well as a more genuine presence with the Non-Aligned and maintaining economic pragmatism. In Oscar Camilión's own words, "our unique policy as concerns trade is to sell to the best bidder"⁵.

When Leopoldo Galtieri displaced Viola as the head of government, he announced the decision to put an end to the gray zones of foreign policy and to fully adhere to the global and regional strategic objectives of the Reagan Administration, lowering further the already low profile with the Non-Aligned. But the Military Junta's decision to invade the Falklands/Malvinas⁶ ruined those ideas and the military were forced to reformulate alliances and resort to those who would provide the needed support. Paradoxically, when the military seemed more inclined to leave the Non-Aligned, they had to make them the privileged forum of a diplomatic counteroffensive aimed to counteract the military defeat of the Falklands/Malvinas. This turn of events was clearly observed in Havana, 3 June of

5. *Clarín* 1981a (Buenos Aires) April 24th.

6. The attempts made by the USA to involve the Argentine military in an anti-communist alliance rendered the Generals an exaggerated sense of their importance and led them to some very costly miscalculations relating to international loyalties.

1982, at the Meeting of Ministers, where the Minister of Foreign Affairs Nicanor Costa Méndez, compared Argentina's battle over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands with those fought by Algeria, India, Cuba and Vietnam to achieve independence. He also compared Guantánamo and the Isle of Diego García with the South Archipelago, harshly condemning South Africa and Israel⁷.

The defeat of the Falklands/Malvinas forced a re-orientation of Argentina's foreign policy which did not raise credibility. President Reynaldo Bignone's stated at the 7th Conference of the Non-Aligned in New Delhi –“Argentina is fully identified with all the ideals of the movement, the destiny of which is shared and whose growing presence in world politics constitutes one of the greatest guarantees to reach peace, justice and development”⁸–. It was hard to believe as it was the idea of Argentina participating in the South, politically and strategically⁹.

With the return of democracy, the legacy of the military years meant a fundamental variable to explain and understand the high diversified-profile of the Alfonsín Administration's foreign policy. Since 1983, foreign policy was aimed to conclude the country's international isolationism, which was the result of the military government's human rights violation and the Falkland/Malvinas Islands defeat. In other words, the image the country cast abroad needed to be revised and the transition process to democracy had to be consolidated.

In this context, Alfonsín modified most of the policies of the former military governments: he partly changed the profile in the relations with the USA, displacing the assumptions of the East-West model; a high profile was acquired in Latin America, in contrast with that of the military years; and also a pragmatic position was held in international economic relations. Given the country's structural belonging with the developing world, Alfonsín reformulated the approach to the Non-Aligned and those issues concerning the North-South relations, where Argentina was called to perform an active role along with the rest of Latin America.

7. *Clarín* 1982a (Buenos Aires) June 4th.

8. *La Nación* 1983 (Buenos Aires) March 11th.

9. “The Argentine Republic and all the members of this movement, for geographic, political, economic and strategic reasons, also belong to the South” (*Clarín*, 1983, Buenos Aires, March 11th).

One of the main assumptions of the Alfonsín Administration was that Argentina should become an *ethical power* (Caputo, 1986). To this end, he proposed to separate the country from the East-West tensions, to maintain the principle of non intervention and to expand diplomatic participation in the different international forums, in particular the Group of Six (along with Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania) concerning disarmament. Beyond ethical considerations, there were practical matters associated with the profound world economic asymmetries threatening global security.

According to Russell (1996b), foreign policy acted as a local democracy protective shield. It is in this context that the re-orientation of the Argentine participation with the Non-Aligned took place, a more genuine position not inspired by opportunism. To justify the higher profile, it was argued that the main banner was “to join efforts to prevent our territories from becoming the stage of foreign conflicts but, very especially, from becoming a strategic confrontation scenario between the superpowers”¹⁰.

Contrary to the military, who had stressed the differences between Argentina and the countries in the South, Alfonsín stressed the objective coincidences that resulted from the underdevelopment conditions and the shared perception of the inequality of the prevailing order in the region. In this way he aimed at strengthening South-South relations with the support of different cooperation schemes, agreements and selective integration to confront common problems. However, a government weakened by the loss of domestic consensus and by the pressure executed by the international agents, conditioned the possibility of achieving a new “realistic turn” closer to the USA (1987-1989), which should be interpreted as “pragmatic”.

International changes¹¹ –the end of the Cold War and the expansion of the economic globalization model and of democracy as a form of government– were taking place as Menem was sworn in for his first term in office. Although domestically democracy appeared as having been recovered and subordination of the armed forces to civilian power was observed, the hyperinflation crisis of 1989, the social demands and several political pressures had Alfonsín step down before the end of his term.

10. *La Prensa* 1985 (Buenos Aires) September 8th.

11. In 1985, the end of the Cold War saw its beginning in Reykjavik. In 1989, occurred the fall of the Berlin Wall and took place the Washington Consensus; in 1991, bipolarism came to an end. These international changes were profound and can explain the differences between Alfonsín and Menem concerning views and subsequent insertion models.

Menem defined the national interest in terms of economic development and Argentina's foreign policy according to economics and trade. The economic priorities determined the definition of a first circle of preferred countries: the USA, the member countries of the EU and the MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) countries, including Chile and Bolivia.

The foreign policy of the Menem Administration¹² was strongly related to the change of political-economic model implemented in Argentina¹³, influenced by the personal presidential approach to state matters and to designing and implementing foreign relations. As stated by Busso and Bologna (1994), very often the mistakes in his personal style even conditioned the content of Argentina's foreign policy: his overacted performance and the priorities in his interpersonal relations –from President to President– gave way to unclearly defined lines between diplomacy and foreign policy.

With reference to the content in this new design, confrontation with the USA was left behind and full “blind” realignment was opted for, in line with the domestic economic constraints and the new interpretation of the international economic and political system that resulted from the end of the Cold War. In this respect, the linkage between the domestic economic reforms and the approach to the USA, to give Buenos Aires support in the negotiations with multilateral credit institutions and private capital, brought new credits and international financing to both the public and the private sectors. Foreign policy, helped to implement domestic changes with a view to economic restructuring and market stability.

Over the early years, foreign policy helped to reach excellent relations with the USA; a large portion of Argentina's foreign agenda remained subject to such relations. As from the end of 1991, four areas were observed as privileged in political speeches: the USA, Latin America, Europe and Japan, introducing different timetables for the different approach strategies. The “multilateralism of the South” was held inappropriate and irrelevant in the new post-Cold War scenario.

12. For a thorough study of this period, see the works published by CERIR (1994, 1998 and 2001).

13. Strict application of the Washington Consensus of 1989.

Among the most important changes were: the relations with the USA; the Falklands/ Malvinas issue; the end of the traditional Argentine neutrality (when ships and troops were sent to the Persian Gulf); the turn in the nuclear policy and the approach to the non-proliferation position (advancing with Brazil and ratifying Tlatelolco); the missiles policy and the dismantling of the C3D project (showing the costs of the alignment); the abrupt withdrawal from the Non-Aligned in 1991 (although not from the Group of 15) and the shift in voting at the UN, rather in line with the USA stance (in particular, as concerns human rights violation in Cuba).

With Latin America, a greater continuity can be seen in the deeper joint actions in defense of democracy and human rights at regional level. Progress can also be observed in the sub-regional integration process, with the inauguration of MERCOSUR since January 1 of 1995, with an imperfect Tariffs Agreement. This process showed a first stage which, along with the coincident expansion of the Brazilian and Argentine economies, was characterized by the speed and ambition of its objectives. By the middle of the decade, with the resulting crisis in both economies and the American pressure for an alternative project related to the Free Trade Zone for the Americas (FTAA), the integration process entered a period of stagnation. The partners began to be more dependent on the generation of defense mechanisms *vis-à-vis* the crisis in the neighboring countries rather than redefining the aims of the MERCOSUR with a view to the future.

Considering other aspects of Argentina's international insertion, it has been deemed convenient to introduce some comments in relation to its abrupt withdrawal from the Non-Aligned Movement in September 1991, keeping in mind the relevance this matter had enjoyed during the Alfonsín Administration and the change of direction implemented by Menem. This decision can only be explained as a political gesture with a clear symbolic meaning, with no interests attached (economic or political) or external pressures. This Movement did not mean, in the post-Cold War years, a source of concern for the USA, and Argentina's participation enjoyed reasonable consensus among the main political parties¹⁴.

On the electoral agenda of the political party (*Partido Justicialista*) that took Menem to power, it was announced that "Argentina must

14. A thorough treatment of this matter, this author entirely agrees with, is found in Arbilla (1997).

absolutely continue to adhere to the Non-Aligned Movement” (Paradiso, 1996: 198). But when the President attended the summit meeting of the Movement, in Belgrade, September 1989, in his speech he was already announcing the change of position, when he appropriated the ideas the countries of the North would usually put forward to underestimate the reasons held by the South. This is to say, that “the sufferings of the peripheral countries were the result of their own errors”. The same arguments were used by the Foreign Affairs Minister Di Tella (1996) to justify the exit from the movement.

The changes and the continuities in Menem’s foreign policy were developed in agreement with the new economic and political model and putting aside the old model based on imports substitution. This is how the domestic and the foreign policies were linked, resorting again to pragmatism as the way for political action.

Russell and Tokatlian (2003) define this as the period of “pragmatic acquiescence”, but trace a clear difference between the pragmatism of Brazil and that of Argentina¹⁵. These authors think that the responsible pragmatism coined by the Foreign Affairs Minister Azeredo da Silveira in 1974, was quite different from Menem’s pragmatic acquiescence. Brasilia chose a gradual strategy of disengagement with respect to Washington, while Buenos Aires decided on absolute alignment. Brazil showed a flexible moderate conduct while Argentina privileged overacting and rigidity. Brasilia aspired to a greater projection in multilateral contexts, with a more ecumenical spirit but Argentina adopted a firm position in favor of the West. Brazil persisted in strengthening and granting the State a crucial role; Argentina thought that the markets would automatically give the country a significant place in world affairs. Russell and Tokatlian conclude that, even pragmatically, Argentina’s foreign policy over the nineties was as ideological as any; the cost to write off the condition of Argentina as a country with a high political risk did not parallel the non-political benefits the country expected to obtain.

15. They have stated that “the idea of pragmatism in foreign policy contains different connotations: the existence of a policy devoid of principles or alien to the defense of basic principles; an *ad-hoc* policy caused by circumstances; a practical policy, instrumental or utilitarian; a policy centered on reasons of convenience; a policy oriented to ‘problem solving’; a policy relying on the truth of what is imposed...”.

LOW PROFILE RELATIONS WITH AFRICA

The manner the different successive governments designed foreign policy and the relative relevance given to the South-South relations molded the low profile of the Argentine-African relations both in discourse and in actions¹⁶.

This erratic relation was permanently haunted by the ghost of the good relations held by the different Argentine governments with the racist government of South Africa, around variables of commercial and strategic order, which will be dealt with further on. From the moment relations with South Africa were defined, by breaking diplomatic relations during the Alfonsín Administration, the most important instance in the Argentine-African relations arrived. It brought about the expected approach to the African states and the start of a design for the region.

It is interesting to remember the general panorama characterized by Moneta (1978: 91), who maintains that, the perception of the role of Africa in the Argentine foreign policy looks confusing, stereotyped and unilaterally oriented. Management is limited to a reduced number of diplomatic and economic officials, to a number also limited but important of national and transnational capital, and to the Navy's high officers. There is domestically a certain polarity in the trade and diplomacy sectors as concerns preferences. The former, although wishing to trade with the whole continent, if confronted with only one option, they were divided into pro-Black Africa and pro-South Africa position. As far as the diplomats are concerned, they hold attitudes favorable to the new African countries, with the exception of those who have acted in South Africa and returned as enthusiastic propaganda agents in favor of Pretoria.

The little interest in Africa is explained by the strong vertical relations with Europe and the USA. Argentina enjoyed a strong tradition of relations with Great Britain and, after World War II, with the European countries and with the USA, the intervening variables in the hemispheric issues, which conditioned both the Europe-centered conception of Argentina's foreign policy and its relative isolationism.

16. Similarly, and consistently, together with the low profile, the references to relations with the African states in the academic literature on Argentine foreign policy are virtually non-existent.

The low profile of Argentina's relations with the African states may well be extended over to other bilateral relations. For example, with Japan, China, Eastern and Central Europe, the Middle East and South East Asia, where also the absence of a design and of the development of continued or marginal actions is observed as well as biased considerations and the prevalence of actions that responded to vested interests¹⁷.

However, it should be noted that, in spite of "looking North", a review of Argentina's colonial history shows that there were intra-South Atlantic relations toward the end of the XVIII and beginnings of the XIX Centuries, referred to slave traffic and also to administrative relations between the then Spanish Colonies. As documented by Rizzo Romano (1991), from the recently created Vice-Royalty of Rio de La Plata were administered, during a certain number of years, in the name of Spain, the Isles of Fernando Poo and Annobon (today part of the present territory of Equatorial Guinea, a former Spanish Colony), which had been handed over by Portugal in virtue of the San Ildefonso Treaty of 11 October 1777, in exchange for the Sacramento Colony and the Island of Saint Catherine in Spanish America¹⁸.

On the other hand, the population of African extraction in Argentina cannot almost be counted today¹⁹, which adds to the denial of Black African contribution to the Argentine culture. This is explained by the

17. As pointed out by the authors dealing with Argentina's foreign relations (CERIR, 2001).

18. As cited by the author, "in the records of '*División Colonia, Sección Gobierno, Isla Fernando Póo*' (Colonial Division, Government Section, Isle of Fernando Póo), there are five large packets with documents corresponding to the 1778-1794 period, referred to the Administration, from Buenos Aires, of those African territories (lists of troops, liberated blacks hired, funds collected, accounts approval by the *Tribunal Mayor y Audiencia Real de Cuentas del Virreinato* [High Tribunal and Royal Account Supervision of the Vice-Royalty])".

19. At present, among the Afro-Argentine population found in the country –not always easy to identify by color– may be counted the descendents of the first slaves residing in small communities in Chascomús, Santa Fe, in the outskirts of Buenos Aires (Palermo, Munro, Morón, Liniers) and in La Plata. Also, there are the Cape Verde members who arrived between the end of the 19th and the start of the 20th centuries, settled in the Province of Buenos Aires, in Avellaneda, La Boca and in Ensenada; finally, since 1990, a recent immigration wave mainly from Western Africa. This is accounted for in the recent edition by Picotti (2001) and the successive Maffia (1986, 1994, 1995, and 2000) publications on Cape Verde immigrants in Argentina. This latter author, in an interview in La Plata in November of 2001 declared she had recorded around eight thousand Cape Verde members, including those born in Cape Verde and fifth generation descendents.

prevalence of the “Europe-inclined civilizing model”, and also by offering very little “visibility”, due to gradual fadeout and to mixing with the natives, the Creole and the immigrants.

Although at the time of the Declaration of Independence (1816) the African descent population of Buenos Aires threw considerable numbers²⁰, they faded out with the passing of time, the different epidemics, the independence wars²¹ and the European immigrants arriving in the country in different waves since the mid XIX to the start of the XX Centuries. This accounts for the little relevance of the African component in Argentine history and marks a substantial difference with the Brazilian case. Nevertheless, since the sixties there have been attempts to approach the study of Africa at academic levels²², which have somehow coincided with the swinging Argentine interest in Africa.

THE POLICY BY IMPULSE

Together with this short conceptual and contextual revision, I characterize the foreign policy toward Africa as a policy ruled “by impulses”, which varied in intensity according to periods, governments and international insertion projects. Accordingly, before the absence of visible strategies toward the region in Argentina’s foreign policy design, the African states are not mentioned in the foreign policy discourse; they only appear in particular references in specific situations, the impulses, which will be developed next.

By impulses, I understand external and usually discontinuous actions which have accounted for rapprochement with the African states for brief

20. According to Francisco Morrone (2001), following the population survey ordered toward the end of the XVIII Century by Viceroy Vertiz in a territory equivalent to today’s Argentina, in the Argentine Northeast there were some 45% African males in Tucumán and some 64% in Santiago del Estero, and in Buenos Aires, at the time of the British Invasions (1806-1807), some 30.1%. The most relevant data though is shown by the second national census of the end of the XIX Century (1895), where it can be read that the black population amounted only to 0.13%. About the African origin population, in the XIX Century see Andrews (1990), the works of the historians Marta Goldberg and Silvia Mallo (1994) and Guzmán (2000).

21. It must be noted that the slaves and the liberated former slaves played a very important role in the Army, since their inception in the militias –created in 1590, only thirty years after Buenos Aires was founded– and until the end of the XIX Century, when blacks took part in all battles.

22. The first survey was conducted by Anglarill (1983), and more recently by Vela (2001).

periods. Such impulses were linked to a particular need or to an incidental occasion, either direct or indirect, which constituted the support to the mentioned approaches.

Consequently, the particular aim being pursued would become the content of political action. It may be said the impulses were markedly ideological, political or commercial in terms of the opportunities and needs associated with the agents responsible for such actions. The political purposes sought the favorable African vote at the United Nations concerning the Falklands/Malvinas conflict and, over the eighties, to improve international insertion within the Non-Aligned. The economical objectives were centered in the need of new markets for the Argentinean exports, while the strategical ones, were related to establishing alliances to combat communism.

Depending on the African state selected, two different criteria can be deduced which pointed the direction for the impulses to follow: the country chosen should enjoy weight in the region or it should offer trade opportunities. The North African states received special attention as well as some of those on the Atlantic coast, Ethiopia for being the seat of the OAU and South Africa.

Impulses may be measured in terms of certain indicators, such as opening embassy offices, sending or receiving diplomatic and trade missions, signing agreements, even the sharp variations in the balance of trade with a given country; these are points to be discussed in the following chapter.

This jerky impulse-driven policy also shows a *particular decision-making process*. Owing to the low priority held by African states in the policies implemented by successive Argentine governments, both civilian and military, the decisions made by impulse were regarded as “routine” procedure at *Palacio San Martín* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Given the low profile mentioned, many bilateral or multilateral initiatives (within the framework of the Non-Aligned and the United Nations) were taken thanks to the goodwill or to the imagination of the officials in charge in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs²³ or in the Foreign Trade and Industry Secretary

23. Among the bureaucratic areas are found: the International Economic Relations Secretary, the Bilateral Economic Relations Bureau, Exports Promotion Support Bureau, the North Africa and Middle East Office, the Sub-Saharan Africa Office, the International

of the Economics Ministry, who were able to find the way to encourage some actions or missions; however, within a disaggregated structure, they did not always act coordinately or as part of an organized design based on rational elements and long-term opportunities. Also, the impulses may have occurred thanks to the recommendations of the Argentine representatives before the United Nations, to the energy of some Argentine ambassadors in the African countries –who often had to struggle against the inertia reigning in Buenos Aires– or to the pressure and activism of some businessman with chances of closing deals in Africa.

With the African states not being part of the foreign priorities, the free management leeway left helped to give way to initiatives that turned out to be isolated because the rotation of positions in the Foreign Ministry²⁴ prevented the follow-up and continuity of the “low profile” actions, or because of the economic and political instability of the possible partners on the other side of the Atlantic.

The foregoing comments show some degree of “personalism” in a decision-making process²⁵ that evolved thanks to the insistence of officials at different levels and that made its way up the decision-making pyramid insofar as the action should not be “costly” in political or economic terms.

Within this rationale framework, numerous valuable reports and recommendations made by officials accredited to African states or Buenos Aires were lost in the intricacies of *Palacio San Martín*.

The impulses reflect, with rare exceptions, the different rapprochement initiatives with African states. In intensity, they were conditioned by the object and content which also determined their importance in the decision process. If the content of the impulse agreed with the government’s policy, its intensity would grow and the decision would be taken at the highest levels. If the impulse or the interest was minor, the decision would be taken at the middle tier of the bureaucratic hierarchy. The relation between the intensity of the impulse and the decision-making levels depended on where the issue in question was placed in the overall picture.

Organizations Bureau, the ExportAr Foundation and the Argentine Foundation for Technical Cooperation (FoAr).

24. In accordance with Decree 2707, April 10 of 1963, by virtue of which the Foreign Services Institute was created and regulated.

25. Personalism: meaning personal commitment.

Most decisions would join a routine dynamics. The most remarkable exception was the breaking-off and resumption of diplomatic relations with South Africa, which shows that such decisions fell within the overall policy design and were therefore taken at the highest level. The aim, however, was not exclusively South Africa *per se*, but to reach other targets regarding issues seen as relevant in the strategies deployed at the time.

Chapter II

From Policy Impulses to Policy Outlines (1960-1989)

IMPULSES CHARACTERIZED the Argentine approach to the African states within the framework of a discontinued foreign policy in which the weight of the South-South relations and the role played by the African states were marginal and uneven conditioning their low profile. This is helpful to explain the absence of explicit strategies or designs in the general foreign policy formulations can be explained. This chapter deals with the different impulses conducted from Buenos Aires by way of the three interrelated dimensions of foreign policy: political-diplomatic, economic-commercial and strategic-military.

THE POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC DIMENSION

One of the first references made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with respect to Africa dates back to 1951, when the “British Commonwealth, Asia and Africa Undersecretary” was created as part of the Ministry. Sub-Saharan Africa was part of the area while North Africa was included as part of Europe and the Near East; but, in 1962, a division for Africa and the Near East was opened which covered all the countries that had recently obtained independence on the African Continent.

The first instance showing the political signs of approach was in 1960, when the Argentine Ambassador before the United Nations, Mario Amadeo, was sent to Zaire (July 1 and 2) and Somalia (July 5 to 8) Independence Celebrations²⁶. The *first impulse* toward Africa was then started with the elaboration of the “Argentine Presence in Africa Plan”, which already in 1961 (when only 27 African countries were independent) advised on the Argentine approach toward Africa. The reasons were:

- Argentina’s interest to carry on with its tradition of universality in foreign relations with the international community and especially with the new countries reaching independence;

26. In an interview held by the author of this work with Ambassador Mario Amadeo in Buenos Aires in 1978, this diplomat had also paid private visits to Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Cairo.

- The weight the new nations would bear in future in the international organizations, where their votes could be decisive; therefore, it was necessary to maintain the most polite relations with them if the interest of Argentina was to have access to prestigious positions in the UN specialized organizations;

-The economic prospects the African markets offered Argentina not only as raw material producers complementary to Argentina's own productions but also as a potential market for the Argentine manufactured and natural-origin products. Although the economy of those countries still continued to be closely related to the European nations, especially to those they had been dominated by, it was also the case that the trend in the new states to enlarge their trade areas offered the Argentine exports wide opportunities in Africa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, 1961).

Considering relations that can be held erratic, the importance of this plan lies in the fact that these objectives, introduced early on, appear as underlying almost all impulses. The aims mentioned inspired the mission of Juan Llamazares, who visited eight African countries²⁷ between 14 March and 24 May 1962. The main purpose of this special mission was:

To promote trade and to spread information about Argentina, communicating to the authorities and the different representative sectors of the visited countries the interest of Buenos Aires in a greater political and economic approach to the African countries and informing on Argentina's productions and their characteristics. The special mission must take into account that it implements a general policy already pointed out by His Excellency the President of the Nation with the aim of intensifying and enlarging trade with all the countries of the world [...] The mission will also communicate to the authorities in the countries visited Argentina's stance on the self-determination of peoples, against colonialism and for legal equality of all states (Llamazares, 1962).

The *second impulse* took place in 1965, under President Arturo Illia, with the appointment of Carlos Alberto Leguizamón as ambassador to preside another special mission to the African continent, by Decree 1226 dated January 17, 1965. When these two initiatives of the 1960s are

27. It was the first official mission requested by President Arturo Frondizi to demonstrate Argentina's interest in closer political and economic approaches to the African countries and to examine the possibilities and convenience of possibly establishing diplomatic representations (Interview with ambassador Juan Llamazares, head of the mission, Buenos Aires, May 20, 1990).

analyzed, the only criterion observable in the choice of the countries to be visited is that such countries were seen as potentially important in Africa (see Table 1). It was in this sense and in this context that different embassies were created in South Africa (in 1960, where already there was a delegation since 1950), in Morocco (1961), Nigeria (1963), Ghana (1963), Algeria (1964), Senegal (1964), Liberia (1964) and Ethiopia (1968)²⁸.

Those initiatives remained isolated attempts until 1974, when Juan Domingo Perón was President and the Secretary of International Economic Relations of the Economics Ministry sent a commercial mission headed by the Counselors Ramiro Arias²⁹ and Rodolfo Potente; this was the *third impulse*³⁰. Argentina's participation as full member in the Non-Aligned Movement since the IV Conference of 1973 held in Algiers, and the "Third Position" declared by the above-mentioned president, shaped this decision. Also at the start of 1974, the Welfare Minister José López Rega headed a mission to Libya, with commercial purposes. The former was followed by another mission, but this time under President María Estela Martínez de Perón, in the context of the so-called "Libya Project", later on very much objected to³¹.

During the military years, with the self-denominated National Reorganization Process (*Proceso de Reorganización Nacional*) (1976-1983), the *fourth impulse* took place. The trade missions sent signed the first cooperation agreements with countries from Sub Saharan Africa, except for the agreements signed with Gabon in 1977. The dominant preoccupation of the Argentine foreign policy of those days was the closure of traditional markets due to the protectionist policy of granting subsidies, which was implemented by the European Economic Community. Africa was, therefore,

28. The Ghana and the Liberia embassies were closed in 1968 and 1969, respectively.

29. The Counsellor Ramiro Arias, as representative for the Trade Secretary, had escorted Ambassador Llamazares in the 1962 mission.

30. According to the report elaborated by the Counsellors, "the results may be held satisfactory; economic and trade relations with the visited countries will undoubtedly be widely improved; there are good prospects to celebrate trade contracts and sign economic and technical cooperation agreements with most of the governments of the countries visited by the mission" (Arias-Potente, 1974).

31. The contracts for the sale of agricultural and automotive products and the purchase of Libyan oil "masked overprices that were transferred illegally to the private accounts of López Rega and other members of his group. With the exception of the oil purchase, the greater parts of the remaining transactions were not concluded or were partially concluded" (Moneta, 1977: 47).

considered an alternative market³². Decree 2126/79 may be held evidence of the growing commercial interest: it authorized opening economic and commercial offices in South Africa, Algeria, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Morocco and Nigeria.

The different missions (1978, 1979, 1980, 1981) concentrated attention on the North Africa Arab countries and on the African countries of the West Coast. This approach formed part of the so-called economic diplomacy, different from the bureaucratic and the military diplomacies implemented between 1976 and 1983, as previously mentioned in Chapter I.

In this period, the mission headed by Curá –from October 9th to November 1st, 1980– was the most important one, in terms of the strategic, economic, political and general objectives and because of the results obtained. It was integrated with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Economics Ministry and the Central Bank of Argentina, and the objectives were to bridge the gap between Río de la Plata and the Gulf of Guinea in order to spread all possible forms of cooperation our country could offer [...] this bridging would help to consolidate the existing friendship and to develop a political as well as a technological, cultural and commercial role [...] But, in addition to the possible market opening, the prestige gained by means of the cultural, technical and financial cooperation and assistance may render our country benefits in an area very little exploited and even excluded from the current cooperation and trade channels³³.

According to the final report on the mission, the result was estimated as highly positive in various aspects. From a political perspective, it showed presence in the Black Africa countries which had been neglected or where relations were very weak, “which make up the natural Atlantic

32. For example, in the trip of the Undersecretary of International Economic Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was made with the explicit aim of “increasing economic relations with the countries in the area to place Argentine goods on those markets” (*La Nación*, 1978a (Buenos Aires) March 14th). “The African Continent offers indeed interesting prospects as far as economic and social issues are concerned. This is a promising opportunity for Argentina to gain valuable consumer markets, and to place not only agricultural and farming products, but also a wide variety of manufactured goods” (*La Capital*, 1978 [Rosario] March 14th).

33. Interview with Minister Mario Quadri Castillo, member of Curá Mission. Buenos Aires, 10 November, 1980.

counterpart of South America and enjoy doubtless strategic significance to keep the balance in the Southern Area of this Ocean” (Minister of Foreign Relations and Worship, 1978). From the economic perspective, solid bases were established to increase trade relations and cultural, financial, technical and scientific cooperation. Different commercial and technical, cultural, scientific cooperation agreements were signed in the visits to the African countries (see Table 2).

However, in spite of the recommendations in the mentioned report on the course of action to be followed, among which the efficient follow-up of all actions taken or to be taken was advised, the efforts made were lost because of a lack of coordination among the different bureaucratic agencies. Efforts were also wasted because the successive missions did not carry on nor go deeper into what had already been accomplished. This could be confirmed when, over the same year, a second mission was sent, which was headed by the Trade Promotion National Director along with representatives for the public, the private and the academic sectors³⁴ (see Table 1).

In 1982, after the Malvinas/Falklands conflict, the African countries, which had previously been regarded as marginal in the Argentine foreign policy, welcomed different goodwill political missions and Heads of State were invited to visit Buenos Aires to the effect of obtaining their support at the General Assembly of the United Nations when the Falklands/Malvinas issue would be treated³⁵. This *fifth impulse* turned the African countries into an object of “diplomatic use”.

The formerly cited low profile was confirmed not only by such isolated actions but also by the fact that, until democracy returned in 1983, Argentina had not sent the African countries top-level representatives

34. The discontinued non-related condition between those missions was observed by the author of this work, who was part of the group in the second mission taking place between 23 November and 7 December, 1980. It must be noted that, although the latter mission was clearly commercial, it was the first time that Argentine university representatives had been included.

35. Interview with Ambassador Iván Villamil Morel, who, in August 1982, led a goodwill mission around different African countries to inform on the position to be assumed by Argentina at the UN with respect to the Falklands/Malvinas issue. This interview was conducted in Buenos Aires in April, 1983.

(President or Minister of Foreign Affairs)³⁶, while the African counterpart could exhibit the trips made by the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo, in 1977, and by high officials of Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon (see Table 1).

Regular diplomatic practice shows that African votes and markets were both subject to impulses; similarly, another issue can be regarded as a constant (to be dealt with separately given its specific content) until the 1980s: what I call the South Africa *dual policy* and the *ambiguous policy* toward the African countries in relation to South Africa's apartheid (Lechini, 1995: 35-108).

The *dual policy* consisted in keeping a discourse and multilateral actions against apartheid while preserving good bilateral relations with the White South Africa government. The *ambiguous policy* tried not to incur in radical attitudes in relation to Pretoria and to overlook the African claims to break all relations with the White South Africa government, an ever present topic on the foreign agenda of those countries.

THE ALFONSÍN ADMINISTRATION (1983-1989)

Over the eighties, the democratization process provided a promising context for re-dimensioning relations with the African countries; the most intense and fruitful impulse was then staged, which meant a rather systematic attempt to delineate a policy design. Since 1983, both President Raúl Alfonsín and President Carlos Menem chose to structure –from opposite perspectives– a more clearly defined policy with Pretoria on the one hand, and with the African countries on the other. Until the time when diplomatic relations with the racist South African government were broken, 22 May 1986, the successive Argentine governments had maintained an “ambiguous” policy of apparent “equilibrium” toward the countries in the so-called Black Africa and South Africa, when, in fact, there were strong ties with the white government, especially during the last military government in power in Argentina. The equilibrium was rendered

36. The technical stops in Kenya in 1980 and 1983 by the Presidents Jorge Videla and Reynaldo Bignone in their respective trips to China and India cannot be regarded as official visits.

possible by the sporadic missions sent to the North Africa countries or to those countries on the West Coast of Africa.

In the Alfonsín Administration there was a period of closer approach to Sub-Saharan Africa, linked to recomposing the Argentine foreign policy and to re-dimensioning the role of the Non-Aligned. The Argentine government believed an alliance with the South countries was possible –the African countries among them– as the way to gain some power on the basis of cooperation and agreement policies.

The priorities of the Argentine foreign policy were the USA, Latin America and Europe; but strengthening and broadening international relations with developing countries and participating actively in the North-South issues was also considered an important objective. This decision was the result of defining Argentina as a “western non-aligned developing country, three basic elements of our national reality on whose basis our relations with the world are built” (Caputo, 1986). Following Ricardes (1986), Argentina had lost presence in the international community and needed the support of the developing world to enlarge its juridical, moral and political legitimacy for the defense of its own objectives and interests; the weaker a State becomes, the more a multilateral active diplomacy practice is required.

When the military were in power, they maintained a low profile in their relations with the underdeveloped countries and in issues concerning the North-South and the South-South relations on the foreign policy agenda. As a consequence of the Falkland/ Malvinas Islands conflict, in order to obtain the support of those countries, a shift was implemented in the earlier ignored multilateral forums, but the resulting discourse did not prove reliable. This turn made an authentic change in the Argentine perception of the role of the Non-Aligned in the North-South context difficult to prove for the new democratic government. When a State is regarded as unpredictable, or barely reliable, the type of government is not taken into consideration.

The Alfonsín Administration had proposed active participation in the Non-Aligned Movement “because we entirely share the principles they are inspired by”, the kind of non-alignment that “must recover its ideas and its fundamental conceptions [...] active..., whose objective must be to prevent global conflicts invading the national communities” (Caputo, 1986). Accordingly, in this context, there was a fresh dimensioning of the

role played by the African countries; the need to elaborate a sustained approach strategy based on scientific and technological cooperation was analyzed.

THE PLACE OF AFRICA: DISCOURSE AND ACTIONS

In re-directing foreign policy, the Alfonsín Administration aimed at enhancing the profile of Argentine participation in Africa, especially in the Southern region, and at speeding an Africa policy design. In this period, the Foreign Ministry made substantial progress to improve political relations with the African Continent.

Although those countries did not appear on the priority list of the foreign agenda –as proven by the discourses on global foreign policy, in which they were not mentioned– they had a place in the framework of Argentina’s international re-insertion strategy. The government’s growing interest in Africa may be shown by means of specific discourses and actions.

At the General Assembly of the United Nations, 25 September of 1984, in a multilateral context, President Alfonsín³⁷ stated:

Africa is the brother continent to Latin America, whose aspirations and claims we share [...] for this reason Argentina shows concern about the very serious present economic situation of some regions of Africa, caused by a persistent drought and by the absence of the indispensable resources to reach self-sustainable growth and development. Africa must receive the joint support of the whole international community to overcome this crisis of unforeseeable consequences [...] Today, we cannot but express our most profound preoccupation about the situation in Southern Africa, where colonial and racial discrimination structures still continue to be, in violation of international law and ethics [...] Namibia must become independent once and for all. The unjust system of apartheid must be written off forever. Those who suffer it will continue to have the support of the civilized world³⁸.

Similarly, when the President of Zaire visited Argentina, Alfonsín asserted: “Africa represents a challenge to the Argentinesans [...] for this

37. Alfonsín was the second Argentine president who addressed Argentina’s international policy in a plenary session of the United Nations Organization. President Arturo Frondizi had participated in the General Assembly of 27 September, 1961.

38. *La Nación*, 1984a “El discurso de Alfonsín en las Naciones Unidas” (Buenos Aires) September 26th.

reason our government has struggled to modify this state of affairs and in this effort are inscribed the steps taken by Argentina in the past years". With respect to the Argentine position concerning South Africa, the President said that "the elimination of colonialism in all its forms and of the apartheid regime are the clear objectives of Argentina's foreign policy, participating actively within the international community in order to reach the mentioned goals" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1987a).

The Foreign Minister, Dante Caputo, had started the design of an African policy that included the particular characteristics of the region, giving relevance to the increase of political relations in both the multilateral and bilateral contexts as necessary condition for a selective growth of the commercial relations³⁹. This interest was also manifested in a press interview in December, 1986. When asked about the failures committed when he was in office, he declared he wished he had laid more emphasis on relations with Africa; he anticipated that in future he would endeavor to attain closer relations with that continent⁴⁰. The following year, he again said that "the Argentine foreign policy would further emphasize relations with Sub-Saharan Africa"⁴¹.

Parallel to the improvement of political relations with Africa, the expectations of increasing commercial relations within the framework of South-South cooperation rose; they appear as very well defined by the Director of the Africa and Near East Office:

Our policy is aimed at achieving three main objectives: to maintain friendship and cooperation with all countries, to expand markets to place our traditional and non-traditional products and to coordinate our positions with those countries in international forums concerning all the issues in which we have common interests⁴².

The government's will to give an image in accordance with the discourse level was manifested especially when diplomatic relations with

39. According to a report of 1986 by the Africa Office of the Foreign Ministry, "Africa offers a wide range of possibilities to the productive sectors of Argentina".

40. *La Nación*, 1986a "Caputo trató la tensión en Centroamérica" (Buenos Aires) December 17th.

41. *La Nación*, 1987a "Reestructuran el área de Africa en la Cancillería" (Buenos Aires) June 2nd; *La Nación* 1987b "Argentina aumentara sus vínculos con Africa" (Buenos Aires) July 27th.

42. Interview with Vicente Espeche Gil, ambassador in charge of the Africa Division, Buenos Aires, April, 1987.

South Africa were broken; a stance long demanded by the African countries and the Non-Aligned was defined. Additionally, an interest to develop diplomatic action was also shown through the missions sent to Africa, the new embassy offices opened⁴³, the agreements signed, food donations⁴⁴ and the scientific and technological cooperation activities (see Tables 1 and 2).

Considering the Argentine visits at presidential and ministerial levels, mention must be made of President Alfonsín's trip to Algeria in October 1984 –it was the first official visit of an Argentine Head of State paid to Africa– and the occasion when he attended the summit meeting of the Non-Aligned in Zimbabwe (Harare, September, 1986). Also, Caputo was the first Foreign Minister who had been to Sub-Saharan Africa between 8 and 23 April 1988, when he visited Angola, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Gabon and Cape Verde. The Minister gave political importance to the African countries concerning bilateral and multilateral instances. He visited Algeria (December 1984) and Morocco (1985). He went to Angola (1985), for the preparatory meeting for the summit of the Non-Aligned and also to Harare (1986). He spoke on behalf of the G8 in Addis Ababa, on the anniversary of the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 25 May 1988, before all the delegates of the African continent. Although the last two visits were closely related to his candidacy to the presidency of the General Assembly of the United Nations, they were definitely positive in contributing to improve the Argentine-African relations⁴⁵.

To counterbalance, five presidents visited Buenos Aires: the President of: Algeria, Chadli Benjedid (1986); Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko (1987); Cape Verde, Arístides Pereira (1987); Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano (1988), and Mali, Moussa Traoré (1989). Also the Secretary

43. The Argentine Embassy in Zimbabwe was opened in 1985. The opening of one in Angola had been thought in an attempt to maintain a more active presence in Southern Africa, although it was not possible because of the civil war in that country. Also in 1986 diplomatic relations with the Seychelles were established.

44. The Argentine government made the following donations of wheat: in 1985, to Mozambique; in 1986, to Botswana, Lesotho and Zambia; in 1987, to Mozambique, Zambia and the SADCC countries.

45. The two African visits made by Caputo in 1988 aimed to add votes to win the Presidency of the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1988, and not breaking diplomatic relations with South Africa -as some analysts would claim-. Nevertheless, given such a particular voting system, the positions of some of the African countries cannot be confirmed but only imagined.

General of the OAU (1988), a prominent leader of the SWAPO, Adimba Toivo ia Toivo (1985), Foreign Affairs Ministers and other high ranking officials visited Argentina (see Table 1).

Institutionally, considering the complexity and diversity of the African continent's problems, in 1987 the Africa and Near East Office became the North Africa and Middle East Bureau (DANMO as initialed in Spanish) and Sub-Saharan Africa Bureau (DIASA in Spanish) in the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship. Also, in the same Ministry, the Undersecretary for International Cooperation was created with the aim of encouraging South-South cooperation. This cooperation, conceived as complementary to the already established channels in the North-South cooperation, would offer the possibility of developing relations between the countries in Latin American and Africa. The objective was to activate technical cooperation with the African countries to make approaches viable for opening non-traditional markets and giving incentives to technological exchanges in the not yet explored fields (Weiner, 1986).

Consequently, the Argentine Foreign Relations Ministry signed an agreement with the United Nations Development Program to send and receive scientific and technological cooperation missions:

...considering the need to promote, develop and strengthen technical and economic cooperation between Argentina and the African countries in the technical cooperation context between developing countries, and also considering that the democratic government of Argentina, which took over in December of 1983, as one of its foreign policy main objectives has set to strengthen bonds of technical and economic cooperation with other developing countries; and that, from this perspective, the Technical Cooperation between Developing Countries (TCDC) is regarded as an integral part of the State's Foreign Policy, not only as an additional mechanism to help with technical cooperation (Weiner, 1986).

Therefore, scientific and technological cooperation missions were sent and welcomed. In 1986, two cooperation missions were sent to the African states, five in 1987 and two in 1988. Between 1987 and 1988, four Argentine-African seminars were held in Argentina –in Buenos Aires as the central axis but also involving other regions in the country– in order to encourage technical cooperation in specific areas, with the support of highly trained national organisms as the *Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria* (INTA) (National Institute of Agricultural Technology) and the *Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Industrial* (INTI) (National Institute

of Industrial Technology). These seminars had been organized with the purpose of offering horizontal technical cooperation with specific aims. The first of such aims was targeted to agricultural cooperation, designed for English-speaking countries and officials of the South Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), thus including Angola and Mozambique. The second, also concerning agricultural development, was directed to Francophone countries⁴⁶. A third objective⁴⁷ was aimed at spreading the use and maintenance of agricultural machinery, appealed to Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries, which participated in the last seminar, concerning demographic techniques⁴⁸. High-ranking officials with the capacity to make decisions on technical cooperation and agricultural and forestry developments were the guests.

With the change of administration in 1989 and the ensuing modifications in foreign priorities, it is regrettable that the follow-up of this type of cooperation was abandoned and such appealing initiatives were made to fade out.

It is worth recalling that Caputo's African policy did not escape the traditional practices in the decision-making process. Although the design had been elaborated at the highest level, the basic coincidences between the Economics Ministry (Secretary of Industry and Foreign Trade and Argentina's Central Bank) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning priorities, the selection of countries and exports financing to Africa have not been observed. Intra-bureaucratic connections were absent, which was also reflected in the lack of fluency in vertical and horizontal relations between all the agencies linked to African matters (although this situation is not particular and can be found in a great deal of the Argentine decision-

46. The aim of both was to make the high-ranking officials from the Agriculture Ministry and Agencies of African countries are aware of the technology available in the Argentine public and private institutions linked to agricultural production and to rural research and extended services organisms.

47. To inform on the work done by the government and the Argentine private institutions concerning research, use, maintenance and the related services linked to agricultural machinery, so that a first impression of the industry sector could be gathered. Also, to improve the ability of the African technicians devoted to training extended services personnel in the use and maintenance of agricultural machinery.

48 To train participants in the management of basic concepts and application of the adequate techniques of demographic analysis, to profitably use the socio-demographic data available in the countries concerned and / or make possible the development of new sources fitted to the social organization of the represented countries.

making structure). Therefore, different degrees related to the role and the relevance of Africa are perceived in the political and economic areas of government; also, this is the case concerning policy decision-makers and middle management cadres. The strategies and the actions implemented were conditioned by the profile of the African continent in the context of the foreign priorities at that time.

THE MULTILATERAL DIMENSION OF POLICY

Multilaterally, the position of Argentina in the period under study followed the general lines of the so-called “globalist paradigm”, and, in this context, this position was maintained in accordance with five basic principles: the universality of diplomatic relations, respect for self-determination, non-interference in domestic matters, support to decolonization processes and refusal of any form of racial discrimination. There were no impulses in multilateral relations; impulses were characteristic of bilateral relations.

Argentina’s position at the General Assembly of the United Nations will now be briefly discussed and reference will be made to some issues relevant to the African states –when they were in need of support– and to the Falklands/Malvinas conflict –when Argentina sought the African collaboration and constantly claimed sovereignty over the Islands, until the Menem Administration–. This test case is used because the cited multilateral context enjoys especial relevance as political and permanent meeting space with the African states representatives. In this world forum, the problems affecting the African Continent –colonialism, racism and underdevelopment⁴⁹– were debated and possibly resolved although not always successfully.

At the General Assembly, the position adopted by Argentina followed the general lines of the Latin American group with respect to colonialism and underdevelopment. Latin America meant a significant support for the Afro-Asian group as it not only backed the group’s national liberation processes but also served as the communicating link between the colonial

49. Concerning Argentina’s African policy at the UN, the speeches by the different Foreign Affairs Ministers and those by the permanent representatives before the UN, or their delegates, in the Plenary Sessions of the General Assembly have been taken, and the following documents have been consulted: Permanent Mission before the United Nations (1946-1980); and United Nations (1946-1978).

powers and Africa. The Africans have often relied on Latin America's inclination to adopt more radical positions; they themselves would have adopted less defining positions if there had not been understanding between sectors that were essentially divided (Ruda, 1967).

As far as colonialism is concerned, in the early years of the United Nations, Argentina explicitly supported admission of new members, especially those who had gained independence as a consequence of the positive work done by the Trusteeship Council. It was said that the new states in process of consolidation, seeking to conquer total political sovereignty and economic independence, had the right to participate in the international organization in equal sovereignty conditions (United Nations, 1953: 189).

Over the centuries, with the General Assembly Resolution 1514 on Decolonization, Argentina was proud of its traditional position contrary to colonialism, a tradition whose roots can be traced back to the very origins of its independence (United Nations, 1956: 234). Nevertheless, it exhibited a moderate attitude when condemning the colonial powers (if Argentina's special traditional bonds with Europe are brought to mind). Although it appeared as the advocate of principles of free self-determination and against colonialism, it manifested its recognition of the noble attitude of France and the United Kingdom which, in fairness, helped with the adoption of such formulas (United Nations, 1956: 17). This was the idea maintained whenever the decolonization process was debated, admitting that the metropolis had been worried over solving problems in the new states in the early stages of their independent life since

“they found themselves before the skeleton of social administrative organization, before a very serious problem of shortage of money and of prepared officials and technicians because, along with emancipation there usually occurred the flight of capital, of former residents, of metropolitan officials afraid of chaos, which may take place along with the emancipation movements” (United Nations, 1962: 174).

Argentina also held a conciliatory position between the colonies and the metropolis –keeping detached from any form of radicalism– when there was a pronouncement ‘against those that use the occasion of access of a new country to independence or to incorporation to the United Nations, to launch a violent diatribe against the colonial regime or against the former metropolitan power in that country’ because ‘the transition

from colonialism to independence takes place without opposition or, furthermore, with the close cooperation of the dominant power because the former colony's technical and economic development, on many occasions requires that the friendly ties between the parties be continued' (United Nations, 1960: 145).

Either in the General Assembly As or as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, Argentina praised the role the United Nations played in the Congo Operation, which was a sensitive and very much debated issue at this international organization, but 'hope that these issues may be resolved in future within strictly regional contexts to exclude any possibly attempt at foreign interference in the legitimate interests of the African Continent' (United Nations, 1960: 142).

Similarly, with an already advanced decolonization process, the Argentine representatives more forcefully remarked on three particular cases: the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea (at present, Guinea-Bissau) as being colonial situations not evolving favorably toward independence. This emphasis probably was related to the low profile of the relations with Portugal and with the general international criticism against Lisbon and the remnants of colonialism. The illegal Rhodesia regime⁵⁰ was also included as well as the Namibia's continued occupation, outside the resolutions of the General Assembly, 'which illegally occupies said territory' (United Nations, 1968: 12); the Argentine government informed South Africa that 'the Argentine Republic did not officially recognize any South Africa authority concerning Namibia' (United Nations, 1971:5).

This was the way to explicit that

"...this active solidarity of the Republic has been shown in the different international forums and has determined the recognition of new states and the establishment of diplomatic relations with numerous countries in all latitudes. This is eloquent testimony of our will to expand to the maximum our international panorama and to build a constructive dialogue in all geographical and political spaces, definitely overcoming the ideological schemes and divisions or omissions of the past" (United Nations, 1975).

50. In Rhodesia the majority were oppressed by the minority. The government had not obtained international recognition, not even by the former metropolis. This situation found resolution in 1980, with the independence of Rhodesia, since then known as Zimbabwe.

With reference to racism⁵¹, the Argentine government regarded the fact that the international community had not yet been able to eradicate racial discrimination in any of its forms as a true remnant of the past. The ‘anti-racial discrimination’ discourse would, then, become one of the issues mentioned by all foreign ministers at the General Assembly, exhibiting a true concern with the situation in Southern Africa –Namibia, Rhodesia and South Africa– since

“The practice of apartheid in Southern Africa incorporates to colonialism one of its most condemnable manifestations: its inhumane and obsolete racism which was given institutional hierarchy. This is the way the government of South Africa looks down on the most elementary of human rights, which this organization of world nations has consecrated since its origins.

Then,

“the Argentine government in solidarity with the thousands of human beings who were made the victims of apartheid and with whom it strives to eradicate, will in all necessary instances provide evidence of its will to cooperate actively with the international effort aimed to put an end to this situation” (Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1973: 144).

It did not prove easy for the successive Argentine governments to obtain the African vote at the General Assembly in favor of vindicating the Falklands/Malvinas. Although until 1973 the abstentions had come from the Western European countries, when Great Britain sparked off conflict with their first negative vote in 1976, the African countries –with strong ties with their former metropolis– also began to abstain.

However, until the armed conflict of 1982, there had been only five African abstentions (Gambia, Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leona and Zaire) but no negative votes. Instead, as from that moment the number of abstentions, absences and negative votes of the African states grew; they expressed their general opposition to colonialism but also opposed the use of force. Behind these statements, the pressure of Great Britain and of the then European Economic Community (EEC) may be observed. The most notable abstention was that of Mauritius; this country had suffered a similar colonial situation because in 1968 the people of the Chagos

51. The specific position concerning the South Africa issue will be dealt with in Chapters V and VI

Archipelago were transferred by force by the British because the USA leased the Isle of San Diego to install a military base.

COMMERCIAL ASPECTS

The possibility of finding new markets was also present as part of the approach to the African states, as can be inferred from the trade missions sent. Improvisation was also present in the organization of the missions and not much was done to promote exports, but it was widely admitted that the protectionist agricultural policies of the EEC were pushing Argentina to explore new opportunities to place its agricultural products. However, a direct relation between the diplomatic or commercial impulses and the Argentine-African foreign trade fluctuations cannot be established; they rather responded to the needs or particular opportunities and the activism of the transnational or national private actors. For example, although the energy crisis of the seventies barely affected Argentina –as an oil-producing country– Buenos Aires purchased the African production which offered a type of oil that was not extracted in the country.

The initial Argentine trade experience with the African states was started with those countries in the North of Africa and with South Africa, and later with the Sub-Saharan countries as they obtained independence; this is why over the sixties the figures were not meaningful⁵². During the seventies, Argentine exports to Africa averaged almost 4% over total exports, reaching a maximum 6.23% in 1975. If 1970 is taken as reference, the growth over the decade is outstanding: from \$US19 million to \$US296 million; that is to say, they multiplied by 15. With respect to imports, they showed an average 3% over total imports, with a maximum of almost 8% in 1974. Although far more erratic than exports, if 1970 with \$US11 million is taken, the amount reached \$US278 million in 1974 and decreased to \$US63 million in 1977, while \$US290 million was the figure in 1979.

In the eighties, the exports to Africa averaged some 4% over the total, with a maximum of 5.4% in 1983, keeping the amounts rather constant. Imports instead diminished; they did not reach 1% on average, with a

52. The Argentine-African foreign exchange figures have been provided by *Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos* (INDEC). The main countries considered were those with figures over the one million US dollars, at least over two years, for both imports and exports. See Lechini (2006).

maximum of 1.40% in 1980 and much more erratic figures. Alfonsín's African impulse was not reflected in substantial increases in the trade volume.

The evolution of the Argentine trade relations with the African states over this period invites some remarks. Firstly, the incidence of the Argentine-African trade in Argentina's total trade was minimum, with an increasing trend. The amounts fluctuated and showed a budding relationship, with very low absolute value and levels and dynamism rather below the Brazil-Africa trade. Secondly, the balance of trade, in equilibrium during the first two decades, was more favorable for Argentina over the eighties. There were more exports to North Africa than to the Sub-Saharan area; and there were more imports from South Africa than from the rest of the African countries. Concerning exports, meats and processed products and grains were the main goods exported, although a rather shy increase is seen in relation to the food industry: refrigerating machines, agricultural machinery, industrial baking equipment, etc. The exports amounts showed a marked discontinuity, but analyzing Argentina's total exports in terms of percentages, the variations were not so abrupt. Until the eighties, African imports were dominated by oil (almost 80% from Gabon, Congo, Angola and Nigeria) and metallurgic minerals (mainly from South Africa, Tunisia, Zaire –Democratic Republic of the Congo today– and Zimbabwe); in lower volumes, also timber was imported (Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast, Republic of Central Africa and Zaire). South Africa remained as the main African exporter. Finally, there was a great difference between the big African exporters and the rest, with significant ups and downs, mostly derived from the fluctuations in oil and aluminum imports.

Argentina has not enjoyed a strongly backed trade impulse as Brazil has; nevertheless, between 1970 and 1980, there were different reports, mainly by private actors, which attempted an explanation for the problems appearing in the trade approach to the African states. These difficulties were similar to Brazil's, as a result of a limited South-South contact. Then, as drawbacks are mentioned the strong vertical ties with the former metropolis, related to the competitiveness of the European exports; the efficiency and regularity of North-South transportation and financing facilities; there was no adequate commercial information spread nor mutual acquaintance; no convertibility of foreign currencies; difficulty in communications and rivalry with Brazil.

In the same period, a few Argentine companies approached the African countries to offer their consultant and technical assistance services upon the request of the African official institutions and with the help of international financing organisms (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development –IBRD–, African Development Bank –ADB–). The best known case is the consultant LATINOCONSULT, with important experience in Latin America; it decided to start working in Africa as from the seventies and elaborated reports on the feasibility and establishment of agricultural and cattle raising facilities in Ivory Coast, Senegal, Zaire, Liberia and Guinea, on the installation and management of a slaughterhouse and cold-storage plant in Nigeria as well as a water supply system and energy plant in Zaire. The most important of all was the draft and executive projects and the construction management of the Abidjan Central Hospital, which, for domestic political reasons in Ivory Coast, could not be completed (the draft project had been financed by *Banco Central de la República Argentina* (Central Bank of Argentina)).

In those years, Argentina received new technologies and adapted them to its own economic and cultural conditions. Therefore, technical knowledge was developed locally and many business companies offered other countries their production capacity and services⁵³. Accordingly, in 1975 the Argentine government accepted to join the African Development Fund (ADF)⁵⁴ on the occasion of the visit payed by the President of ADB (African Development Bank), Abdelwahab Labidi in Buenos Aires; however, Argentine membership took place later in 1978, when the Economics Ministry ordered the required budget to be fully included⁵⁵.

53. The accumulation of intermediate technology was the result of the assimilation of the knowledge provided by the foreign companies, the incorporation of technologies from the developed countries, the innovative businessmen and the cadres and skilled labor with highly intelligent technical abilities. However, in the transactions conducted with Western Africa, “the absence and the insufficient marketing, transport and financing facilities” were made evident; it was also observed that such activities could not be compared with those conducted by Brazil in the region (CARI, 1980: 25).

54. *La Capital*, 1975 (Rosario) January 30th.

55. Act 21787, May, 1978, authorized Argentina to join the ADF with US\$ 2,222,222 for “geopolitical, commercial and financial reasons, which make joining the mentioned organism convenient and urgent for our country; on the one hand, to avoid the unfavorable consequences derived from non-participation in it and, on the other, to obtain the maximum benefits from the advantages that joining such institution imply” (*La Nación*, 1978b).

THE STRATEGIC-MILITARY VARIABLE

The security issue acquired substantial weight during the military governments in power in the period under analysis, particularly between 1976 and 1983, with the “National Reorganization Process”, when militarization of the Argentine foreign policy took place (Lechini, 1995: 24) by way of the so-called military diplomacy based on radical anti-communism. In this context, geopolitics and anti-communism helped to identify allies and enemies inside and outside the country (Russell, 1996a: 79). A nationalist anti-communist ideology was used to legitimize the means to reach the ends. The world was perceived as the place where a borderless global war was being waged between two ways of life with incompatible values.

The South Atlantic was seen as the space where the East-West conflict could be staged, a fundamental scenario to reach world hegemony given its essential strategic importance and its extraordinary economic value. The developments in the countries of the west coast of Africa had to be closely followed, both inside and outside the country, as revealed by the words delivered by the then Foreign Minister Montes. At the General Assembly of the United Nations he said:

“This universalist position has been forced upon by the fact that we share with the African continent not only common problems but also an ocean that means the required route of our economic potential; then, it is the objective of our foreign policy to fend off conflicts in the area as we cannot remain indifferent to what may occur in Africa” (United Nations, 1977: 68-70).

In Buenos Aires, he stated:

“The changing situation on that continent can undoubtedly affect the geopolitical area of sensitive interest to Argentina as is the Atlantic Ocean. Then, our efforts are aimed to encourage, by all means possible, the new African countries to become stronger and better consolidated *vis-à-vis* the hegemonic aspirations of the extra-continental powers” (Montes, 1977)⁵⁶.

Consequently, the idea of a security agreement in the South Atlantic to avert the communist threat and the inclusion of South Africa was most

56. Montes Oscar, 1977 “*Política Internacional Argentina, regional y mundial*” dissertation in the *Instituto Argentino de Ejecutivos de Finanzas*, in *La Nación* (Buenos Aires) December 3rd.

cherished by the military in power, in particular when the Navy –according to a division into areas– was in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, this idea never saw the light of day, given the Brazilian refusal, mainly. But relations with South Africa enjoyed very fruitful circumstances both commercially and also at the level of bilateral political-diplomatic relations, which will be further discussed in Chapter V.

Brazil not only turned down the idea of a South Atlantic security agreement; in the eighties, it reached success with the proposal of declaring the South Atlantic a Peace and Cooperation Zone by Resolution 41/11 of the United Nation General Assembly, 27 October of 1986. As pointed out by Mourão (1987: 1)

“The resolution is, doubtless, an act of will of the Brazilian diplomacy who, in the long term, aims to implement a horizontal co-operation system that may contribute to equilibrium and peace in the region and, on the maritime aspects proper, to the eventual signature of specific treaties”.

The Peace Zone is part of certain comprehensive systems which, although not yet completely defined by international law, may be conceptualized as follows:

“A geographical region –thought of in terms of the same elasticity and relativism as the concept of region related to regional nuclear arms bans– in which the states therein, according to the characteristics of the region, reaffirm their commitment not to resort to force to resolve possible conflicts, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the present International Law, whereby the arms race should be slowed down, the use of arms of mass destruction and of nuclear energy for non-peaceful purposes is prohibited, and the powers external to the region express commitment not to use that Zone for their own war purposes, directly or indirectly, especially by eliminating military bases and any other activity which may mean a permanent armed presence (Gros Espiell, 1988: 7).

The creation of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA)⁵⁷ aimed to gather the South Atlantic countries to prevent the growing militarization of the region, because toward the early eighties

57. The member states are: Argentina, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, São Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leona, South Africa, Togo, Uruguay and Zaire.

the South Atlantic had become the scenario of some of the conflicts in which the extra-regional powers had participated. On the Western Coast, in 1982 the historic conflict between Argentina and Great Britain over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands grew into an armed conflict of large proportion.

On the African coast, the Angolan civil war showed the direct and unmasked involvement of the two superpowers. The white racist government of South Africa also was the center of permanent instability and raised fears of a possible Soviet expansionism on the South Atlantic; it was suspected of having nuclear capacity and was adamant to granting Namibia independence and implementing the changes for a domestic democratization process.

The declaration supported the position of keeping the South Atlantic out of the East-West confrontation by not militarizing the region; it urged the important military states to reduce their military power, to eliminate nuclear presence and to define mechanisms to intensify cooperation, security, peace and development, considering them inseparable related matters. In these circumstances, the end to racial discrimination and the independence of Namibia were held essential conditions to guarantee the South Atlantic peace and security.

After the Resolution was passed, there were meetings requested by the UN Secretary-General in order to advance with the numerous cooperation possibilities and to give substance to the original resolution. At the same time, the General Assembly adopted resolutions that incorporated the decision made at the meetings. This way, Brazil was host to the next meeting in 1988. Argentina, already under the Alfonsín Administration, supported with its vote the Brazilian initiative.

Finally, to close this period, it may be concluded that in spite of the low profile of the African states in Argentinean foreign policy designs, the successive governments took some isolated initiatives that failed to build the kind of strategies required to generate a relevant critical mass of links. The impulses were born mostly in Buenos Aires, during both civilian and military governments with political-diplomatic, commercial and strategic-military purposes.

Politically, the approach was associated with the need to add votes to defend the Argentine position concerning the Falkland/Malvinas Islands or to join efforts to form a group of countries that could exercise pressure in

favor of a more just and fair world order that would take the developing countries' interests into consideration. There were political decisions –after the principles of the universality of foreign relations– that led to the gradual creation of embassies –located in countries not on the list of the foreign priorities– which were later left to the goodwill and initiative of the officials in charge; valuable opportunities to promote closer bilateral relations were wasted.

Commercially, the aims were present in almost all the impulses as the result of the Argentine need to obtain new markets. However, the missions sent were not part of any strategies nor they were integrated in a trade promotion policy; they overlapped and showed a marked disconnection and wasted efforts. The ups and downs in trade relations were the outcome of the actions implemented by private actors, not by an established trade policy. The strategic objectives formed part of the Cold War scheme and were promoted by the different military governments that prioritized relations with South Africa, without objection to the apartheid regime.

The most intense of the impulses with political-diplomatic and trade purposes occurred during the Alfonsín Administration. It was a design whose implementation started but later died out as the result of the discontinuities present in Menem Administration.

Chapter III

The Politics of No Policy (1989-1999)

THE EVOLUTION OF THE international system and the problems in Africa help to identify the changes in the Argentine-African relations during Menem's first term in office. Between 1980 and 1990, the international context was modified and bore a negative influence on the African countries at large, but the influence was positive concerning domestic reforms in South Africa.

An alliance with the countries of the South was still possible in the eighties as a means to reach relative power in terms of cooperation and agreement policies. It was believed that the achievements of the Third World over the 1970s –the oil shock, the creation of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties approved by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974– could be repeated and that the foreign debt could be managed by way of multilateral agreements. This early optimism would soon fade as different conditions evolved: the external debt bilaterally rescheduled between creditor and debtor countries, the end of the Cold War, and the adjustment policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund showed the limits to South-South coordination. The African countries, sunk in their own political-economic, ethnic, religious and social crises, the so-called “African pessimism”, missed the opportunity provided by the East-West strife, and had to find their own ways to confront their problems without much outside assistance.

MENEM'S FOREIGN POLICY

The changes in the post-Cold War international order and the domestic economic circumstances conditioned Menem's foreign policy. Political-diplomatic relations followed an economic pattern while the strategic-military issues were envisioned within a more comprehensive security concept that involved the idea of cooperative security. The Minister of Foreign Relations, Domingo Cavallo, speaking about the main points in the new Argentine foreign policy, said:

“This is realism. Our country has lost not only economic positions but also political presence around the world. Essentially, and because of economic failure, instability and stagnation, in my opinion, our foreign policy has not been realistic [...] we have not adequately oriented our foreign policy to solving the economic and social problems that beset Argentineans. I believe the new foreign policy will contrast with the past trend; our presence in world discussions will not be often felt relating to our own national issues; we will be seen more concerned with those relations with the rest of the world that may help Argentina with its economic integration to the world economy, obtaining capital investment and simplifying the very serious problems that worry our people” (Cavallo, 1989: 275).

Along the same lines, his successor, Di Tella (1996: 384-385), asserted:

“Other aspects that have been encouraged have been the economic, financial and trade aspects of foreign policy [...]. Foreign policy does not mean 90% politics and 10% economics. I should not dare state the opposite, but proportionately, it should be over half put to the service of an economic policy [...] The creation of the International Trade Service in the Ministry of Foreign Relations shows the new entirely pragmatic emphasis on foreign relations [...] I dare say foreign policy is a *sine qua num* condition, but not enough to meet the aims of economic policy”.

It is in this framework that the design implemented by the Alfonsín Administration to improve relations with the African states was ruled out and South Africa as preferred partner was chosen.

AFRICA'S LOWER POLITICAL PROFILE IN THE FIRST MENEM ADMINISTRATION

When the priorities on the foreign policy agenda were revised, in contrast with the former administration, the decision was to lower the profile of Argentina's participation in the multilateral organizations such as the General Assembly of the UN –where traditionally the Foreign Ministry had implemented the kind of diplomacy designed to gain support in favor of the Argentine sovereignty claim over the Falklands/Malvinas - in order to prioritize direct negotiations with Great Britain and get free access to European markets for the Argentine goods. Exit from the Non-Aligned Movement was also decided upon, 19 September 1991; it was held an obsolete multilateral instance in the post-Cold War world. Nevertheless, Argentina continued to participate in the G15, which had

emerged at the IX Summit in Yugoslavia, 1989, for consultancy and assessment concerning economic issues among developing countries⁵⁸.

Initially, the Menem Administration kept on along the lines of the former administration with respect to the Argentine commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement. In spite of subscribing to the moderate group, which claimed positions should be updated, in accordance with the new international order conditions, the Argentine government gradually reduced its participation. With Di Tella as Foreign Minister, toward the end of 1991, some new measures were implemented with the aim of completing the “turn” given to the foreign policy inaugurated by former Foreign Minister Cavallo; among those measures was the exit from the Non-Aligned Movement (Arbilla, 1997). Di Tella first announced Argentina would withdraw in April, 1991; but the decision was finally made after the Accra Meeting of the Movement in September of that same year. Although participation in the Non-Aligned Movement was discussed throughout that year by the members of the governing political party and by the opposition, the Minister’s ideas prevailed; the profile of the Argentine delegation attending the Accra Meeting was very low and was already foretelling the exit.

It must be noted that Di Tella announced Argentina’s exit before leaving for New York to attend the UN General Assembly, in a clear message of alignment with the first world countries. According to what he said (1996: 389):

“When we decided to leave the Non-Aligned Movement because we thought it was growing meaningless after the end of the East-West conflict, we might have done so by lowering the representation level, sending the closest ambassador or turning a blind eye and letting the issue die out so that in ten years nobody would notice whether we still were part of the group [...] We have been definite, we have tried not to cause anybody any offense, but have also been accurate and have shown where our primary interests lie”.

In the Minister’s consideration, Argentina did not agree with the final report of the project at the Non-Aligned Meeting on some key points:

58. Between 5 and 7 November 1995, Buenos Aires hosted the V Summit Meeting of the Group; Minister Di Tella exchanged opinions with the representatives of the different African countries in the Group: President Mugabe from Zimbabwe; Prime Minister Habib Thiam of Senegal, Nigeria and Algeria. A joint document was issued, “International Economic Co-operation for 2000 and beyond”, and the Investment, Trade and Technology Committee was launched to promote greater contact among the fifteen members.

“This text reflects a confrontational position incompatible with our constructive objectives for the Movement. In fact, it expresses a yearning for the cold war which is clearly opposed to the superior interests of humanity [...] This attitude leads to confrontation with the developed world and is the antithesis of the cooperation we foster in the Movement and which is the basis of our own policy”⁵⁹.

It was said that the amendments introduced by Argentina concerning human rights, political pluralism and freedom of the press at the Accra Meeting had been turned down. Following Argentina’s new position, preserving those values could not be subject to the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention⁶⁰. But, the NAM had made a relevant updating effort over those years. The Accra Meeting issued two documents, the first of which, “A World in Transition, from Minor Confrontation to Major Cooperation”, in sixteen points picked up many of the arguments upheld by Argentina. Accordingly, it may be said that Argentina withdrew from the Non-Aligned Movement as a way to please Washington rather than because it was asked to do so. Lowering its profile might perhaps have sufficed to guarantee a consistent foreign policy without having to assume the exit cost (Busso, 1993).

In such political circumstances, also the role played by the African countries shrank; they were regarded as marginal at international decision-making level, without the financial capacity to invest in the privatization process just starting to be implemented in Argentina. The former administration efforts with respect to increasing multilateral relations with the African countries were held of no avail because it had brought about no economic benefits; in fact, it was not so because the balance of trade with Africa had thrown a surplus for Argentina throughout the eighties. However, the multilateral relations policy was left aside and selective relations were concentrated on countries with which trade relations could be improved.

At the same time, in the first Menem Administration, new multilateral participation modalities were being developed between Argentina and the African Continent in the form of peacekeeping missions by the United Nations and the White Helmets. The above-mentioned participation was justified as part of innovative diplomatic actions in accordance with the

59. *La Nación*, 1991 “*Posición Argentina ante la reunión de los No-Alineados*” (Buenos Aires) September 1st.

60. *Clarín*, 1991 “*Las razones de hoy para dar el portazo*” (Buenos Aires) September 22nd.

new forms of international insertion and activism in the post-Cold War days; it can also be interpreted in the context of the new international scenario as the way to join the developed countries, as understood by Menem, and not as a strategy to maintain presence in Africa, *per se*. Brazil, as will be discussed in the next chapter, performed very differently.

There was absence of an African policy strategy on the part of Argentina; the profile in the policies concerning the Third World and the Non-Aligned was low; the lines introduced by the Alfonsín Administration were, consequently, brushed aside. Not paying attention to the African continent may, then, be interpreted as “the politics of no-policy”. In the framework of the so-called “carnal relations” with the USA, good relations with the hegemonic power may have implied not only a clear message of who the allies were but also the need not to upset Washington. In this respect, not having policies for Africa was yet another indicator showing the new direction Argentina’s foreign policy was following, in marked contrast with the former administration.

A shift in emphasis is also noted in the limited bilateral relations held, from a political approach conducted by Alfonsín to an economic one in which trade selectivity was added to a now general diminished importance of the African countries. The priorities, the means and the strategies had been changed. Diplomatic relations were restricted to those countries with which Argentina had kept constant trade contact in considerable volumes, or with countries with a great potential, like Nigeria, South Africa or others in the Southern Africa region. A direct link was kept between the political-diplomatic and the pragmatic approach, with a trade balance in favor of Argentina.

AFRICA AND DISCOURSE

Given the irrelevance of the African countries on the foreign agenda, only a few references can be found in specific speeches, in which the African countries were associated to trade opportunities. For example, when at the end of May 1990, on a trip to Kuala Lumpur to attend a G15 meeting, President Menem and his Foreign Minister Cavallo informally made a stop in Kenya, they discussed with the local authorities the possibility of increasing bilateral trade relations and informed the press that “the African continent means a very interesting opportunity for our country because it offers a market for the agro-industrial products, the

health sector, pharmaceuticals and the possibility of transferring intermediate technology”⁶¹.

In this same respect, on the occasion of self-assessing his own performance and when Argentina had not yet withdrawn from the Non-Aligned, Cavallo stated, with reference to Sub-Saharan Africa:

“The countries in that region deserve close consideration because they constitute a geographical and political area offering new perspectives. In particular, economically, the possibility of increasing bilateral trade has been stressed; with this purpose, new lines have been set so that diplomatic performance in that region may help to better identify the right ways to raise Argentine exports, and, for our national companies, to participate in the development and infrastructure projects already being implemented”.
(Cavallo, 1993:27).

Accordingly, in 1990, the Sub-Saharan Africa Office, among other foreign policy objectives for the region, proposed to develop bilateral relations and trade opportunities in those countries with economic growth prospects in the short term, in order to encourage the participation of Argentine businessmen in development and infrastructure projects (Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1990).

The next and second Foreign Minister in the Menem Administration, Guido Di Tella, when asked about relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, answered:

“This relation must be viewed as a concrete interest, not as a generic principle. With some African countries, we can have very concrete interests, but such interests are not related to obtaining votes at the United Nations. I should think the answer to your question is rather vague because it depends on the countries with which we have or can have substantial trade relations. We are keen on Nigeria, for instance; it is a country we can have trade possibilities with”⁶².

This press declaration implicitly referred to former Foreign Minister Caputo, his African policy and his criticized “propagandistic activity” to win the United Nations General Assembly Presidency in September 1998.

61. *La Nación*, 1992 (Buenos Aires) May 22nd.

62. *La Nación* 1991 “*Di Tella: la prioridad comienza con EEUU*” (Buenos Aires) January 9th.

AFRICA AND ACTIONS

The considerations related to Argentina's "concrete interests" were reduced to formal opinions if compared with the actions implemented. At bilateral policy level, a diplomatic relations reduction strategy can be observed in the decision to close five embassies in Africa, with the excuse of budgetary constraints. The Executive announced, 10 January 1991, the proposal by the Foreign Ministry to close the embassies in Tanzania and Ethiopia. Three months later, 19 April, the Ivory Coast Embassy was being closed. According to press reports, over the first semester 1992, the authorities at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been discussing the possibility of closing twenty five delegations abroad before the end of that year; among them, eight embassies and sixteen consular offices. In Africa, Gabon, Libya, Senegal, Tunisia and Zimbabwe⁶³ were being considered, although by then only Zaire (1992) and Gabon (1993) were actually closed. Southern Africa, then, kept the embassies in Zimbabwe and South Africa, and the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa continued to enjoy the diplomatic missions in Senegal, Nigeria and Kenya. The embassies in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Egypt were maintained in Northern Africa.

Closing embassy offices meant a reduction of political-diplomatic relations, which does not appear as the most adequate criterion to follow in consideration of a continent with more than fifty countries⁶⁴. Although it could be perceived as irrelevant in global terms, it is not advisable to maintain a diplomatic structure beneath the minimum required for the appropriate management of foreign relations. With technological advances in communications, some of the traditional functions of diplomatic representatives abroad may have been left obsolete, but it is also a fact that a well-conducted embassy with the required resources can contribute to increasing bilateral and trade relations between two countries. Among different factors, exports chances depend on foreign exchange rates and on currency convertibility as well as on the decisions made by private national and transnational actors; but the performance of diplomatic representatives abroad to promote exports cannot be left aside⁶⁵.

63. *La Nación*, 1992 (Buenos Aires) May 22nd.

64. Eritrea became independent, 24 May 1993, and obtained the immediate recognition of the Argentine government.

65. A clear example is observed in the activity carried out by the then Argentine Ambassador in Nigeria and the success reached, which drove the Foreign Minister to say Argentina was interested in Nigeria.

To counterbalance the decline of the Black Africa political profile, mention must be made of the important re-establishment of diplomatic relations with South Africa, 8 August 1991, and the re-opening of the Argentine Embassy, which clearly shows the choice made by the government in Buenos Aires concerning relations with the African Continent (to be dealt with as the main topic in Chapter VII). Therefore, in spite of the “good intentions” as manifested in discourse, bilateral relations with the countries in the region were scarce during the Menem Administration. The generalized perception that all the African states were marginal and held armed conflicts led to the idea that they should occupy a place only in “formal diplomacy”, quasi “non-existent” in the designs, and residual in actions.

North Africa received greater consideration than the Sub-Saharan region; it may perhaps be explained by the “automatic alignment” with the USA and by the implication of the region in the Middle East conflict, a relevant issue to Menem in his search for international center-stage position. The Washington allies meant a priority in this area; then, the Algeria profile was lowered, while Morocco and Egypt climbed up on the agenda. In this context, President Menem made two trips to the Middle East, both in 1992: on the first, he visited Tunisia and stopped in Egypt upon the invitation by President Mubarak; on the second, he visited the countries that had had participation in the second Gulf War and also included Egypt.

As regards Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of South Africa, only the visit paid by the Head of the Sub-Saharan Africa Office in August 1993 can be mentioned, in compliance with the ordinary annual visits those agents had to pay to the regions they were in charge of⁶⁶. Some agreements were signed at that time, but the joint commissions responsible for implementation never met.

On the other hand, different visits to Argentina took place, such as that of the President of Guinea Bissau, João Bernardo Vieira, 21 October 1991, when some agreements were signed (see Table 2). The ex-President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, arrived in Buenos Aires toward mid-June 1991, as part of a tour around Latin American countries to promote the

66. The aims were the following: to establish contacts and talks with the parties involved in the South African process, to visit the Argentine Delegation that was part of the Peacekeeping Operations in Mozambique (42 Argentineans were working in a mobile hospital provided by the Argentine Air Force, 20 km from Maputo, the capital), to make official contact with the government of Zimbabwe and to participate in a seminar on mining in South Africa.

recommendations of the Non-Aligned Movement in the report called “The Challenge of the South”. The figure of the African leader deserved better treatment, but the position Argentina would adopt in three months’ time concerning relations with that movement conditioned the welcome circumstances. This and other visits were rather the ripple effects linked to what Caputo had done when he was in office, such as the delegations of Senegal and of the Republic of Central Africa to reschedule debts extended during the Alfonsín Administration.

There was an exception: as the result of the actions implemented by the Argentine Ambassador in Lagos, relations with Nigeria grew more dynamic, which is shown by the political and business visits different Nigerian delegations paid to Buenos Aires between 1990 and 1992 (see Table 1), and the increasing commercial exchanges and technical co-operation.

During the first Menem Administration selective trade-inclined bilateral relations, the re-assessment of South Africa and the reduction of political-diplomatic relations with Sub-Saharan Africa were the priorities. Nevertheless, there were differences between Cavallo and Di Tella from the point of view of policy implementation; the latter stressed the “pragmatic approach”, and relations with Sub-Saharan African reached their lowest point when embassies were closed and Argentina withdrew from the Non-Aligned Movement, the forum of especial importance to the African countries.

Perhaps Minister Di Tella was only the executor of a packet of measures that had been decided on during Cavallo’s administration. In that case, it may be interpreted as the continuity and intensification of the same trend. This is an opinion based on the low consideration that former Minister held for the African countries. As he had declared to the press, “the African countries cannot constitute a nation because fifty dialects are spoken there. They are tribes”⁶⁷.

SECOND MENEM ADMINISTRATION (1995-1999)

Toward the mid-second term of Menem in office, the Argentine-African relations showed some modifications as compared with the first

67. *Clarín*, 1993 “*Cavallo versus Surrouille*” (Buenos Aires) September 21st.

term, in particular with respect to Southern Africa, which received more attention in view of the positive changes taking place in that region.

With North Africa, the relative weight of the relations was due to the considerable balance of trade highly favorable to Argentina⁶⁸. Diplomacy supported the “commercialist option”, as demonstrated by the issues dealt with in the mutual visits of the top-level government officials, when Menem visited Morocco (1996), President Ben Ali was in Buenos Aires (1997), Minister Di Tella traveled to Tunisia (1994) and, in turn, the Tunisian Minister visited the Argentine capital (1997).

With Sub-Saharan Africa, isolated actions still persisted, with commercial purposes, with a rather selective erratic inclination and low profile. Over the last years of Menem in office, there was a certain re-activation in the approaches to Southern Africa, but even so it was again an impulse raised by the synergy resulting from the work of some officials in the Foreign Ministry, not the decision originated in the formulations made by the Minister or by his task group. In a seminar organized in Buenos Aires to deal with the Southern Africa-MERCOSUR dialogue, Di Tella said strategies with the African countries were being thought out. This was a discourse devoid of substance aiming at a given audience, although intended not to hinder possible actions if cost was not implied⁶⁹.

This second term of Menem, though, deserves some analysis; in the context of spasmodic very low profile relations, some details may be noted which point to selective actions derived from different criteria at middle management level of the Foreign Ministry; this is to say, some traditional criteria persisted and new ones, more pragmatic and linked to the business sector were born; for example, relations were somehow kept with Nigeria, Senegal and Kenya (there were Argentine embassy offices in the three countries), with Equatorial Guinea and with the Southern Africa countries.

With Nigeria, relations were justified because of the oil resources and the relevance of the Nigerian market for Argentine exports. With Senegal, in the eyes of the *Palacio San Martín* officials, this country meant an important contact with the United Nations and the Third World at large,

68. For a comprehensive data concerning the Argentina- Africa trade (1960-2000). See Lechini (2006: 267-279).

69. These remarks are made by the author, who participated in the mentioned seminar in Buenos Aires, 13 to 15 May 1998.

because the multilateral sector was more important than the bilateral one in the Senegalese Foreign Ministry. Kenya was the seat, among others, of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP); Equatorial Guinea was the only Spanish-speaking African country where Argentina could mediate in the quite deteriorated relations with Spain.

Technical assistance was given to Senegal⁷⁰ in 1998, within the framework of the FoAr, in areas where Argentina enjoyed comparative advantages: agriculture, cattle raising, health, State reforms and privatization. With Kenya, in 1996, the required phyto-sanitary certificate was obtained to export fresh beef, frozen and/or refrigerated boned beef, offal and horse meat. Cultural relations between Argentina and Equatorial Guinea were encouraged when representatives of the Ministry of Culture and Education of Argentina traveled to Bata and Malabo on a book donation and fellowship program to grant twenty students the subsidies to study in Argentine universities as from 1996. Nevertheless, this initiative, as reported unofficially, was not born in Buenos Aires but was the response to the express request of the Spanish authorities Argentina meant to please. This approach explained the visit to Buenos Aires, in September 1998, of the appointed Ambassador Pastor Micha Ondo Bile to present his credentials⁷¹.

The good relations with Nigeria during the first term were incidentally upset because of the domestic conditions in that country linked to an unfinished democratization process and human rights violation. November 10, 1995, the Nigerian military government executed Kenule Saro Wiwa –human rights activist and intellectual– together with other ten Ogoni (ethnic group) Nigerians after an irregular trial. Notwithstanding the international claims (the Commonwealth suspended Nigeria, and different western countries withdrew their ambassadors in Lagos), the government of that African country considered this was international interference in their domestic affairs.

Argentina's Foreign Ministry sent a press communiqué dated 13 November 1995 in which it expressed its concern and said that:

70. It must be kept in mind that in December 1993, 75% of the debt that country owned Argentina was cancelled in favour of a UNICEF program to assist Senegalese children. That same year, April 6, a Reciprocal Investment Promotion Agreement was signed; in 1995, conversations were started to export breeding livestock.

71. He was welcomed by Ambassador Eduardo Airaldi, Foreign Policy Undersecretary, and by Justice Minister Raúl Granillo Ocampo.

“It had summoned Nigeria’s chargé d’affaires in Buenos Aires, Rufus Akeyu, to inform him on their point of view vis-à-vis the regrettable events, and asked that country, without delay, to resume respect for law and order by restating institutional order”⁷².

Argentina was one of the supporters of the Nigeria Human Rights Resolution, approved by absolute majority at the General Assembly of the United Nations. Nigeria’s political situation was the topic of bilateral conversations between Argentina and other countries, conversations which centered on the delays in the transition process to reach democracy. Nevertheless, the vested interests concerning oil and other economic sectors determined the limits to external pressures⁷³.

In the case of Argentina, within the framework of a foreign policy with commercial inclinations, different actions were implemented to sell commodities to the Nigerian market⁷⁴, according to the new economic and trade opportunities related to agriculture and livestock and the conformation of joint-ventures between Argentine and Nigerian businessmen to find insertion in the Nigerian market. Between 31 May and 4 June 1998, representatives of Nigeria’s Public Utilities Presidential Office visited Argentina. The following year, in October, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Relations of Nigeria, Duben Onyla arrived in Buenos Aires and met with the Undersecretary of International Economic Affairs; on this occasion, he was handed the Reciprocal Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement Project. In 1999, a Bilateral Agreement for Co-operation on Drug-Trafficking and Crime was signed.

Because Sierra Leone was in critical conditions⁷⁵ and needed support to restore democracy, Argentina helped with food assistance equivalent to

72. Argentina’s accusation did not mean the removal of Ambassador Norberto Basso from Lagos; the Foreign Ministry thought it convenient to maintain diplomatic relations at maximum level to exercise pressure on the Abacha government and speed up the democratization process. Had this happened at the time of the Alfonsín Administration, the measures taken might have probably been different.

73. Shell, the anglo-dutch giant that extracts half of its daily oil production from Nigeria, manifested profound concern about the executions, but did not suspend operations in the area.

74. In 1996, different actions were taken to obtain the certificates to export fresh beef, frozen and / or refrigerated boned beef, offal and horse meat; also to sell bone powder in bulk and liquid egg, yolk and refrigerated and frozen pasteurized liquid albumin.

75. In May 1977, a coup d’état overthrew President Ahmad Cava, who had been chosen democratically in 1996. The severity of the situation called for the intervention of a peace

one million dollars, 14 May 1999, through the World Food Program. The intention was to help palliate food demands in the short term and to show the Argentine capacity to meet other development requirements in the longer term.

In these circumstances, African countries sent top-level representatives. From the point of view of Argentina's foreign policy at that time, they represented irrelevant states –with the exception of Nigeria– and received bureaucratic routine treatment on the part of the Foreign Ministry. Over the first five years of the 1990s, the Argentine Foreign Ministry had very much lowered the profile of relations with Africa, in opposition to the former Alfonsín Administration; there were no impulses and the mentioned visits may be regarded as repercussions of the former administration. It should also be observed that there had been very few visits by top-level African representatives before Alfonsín started an “Africa design”, which shows a sharp contrast with Brazil where an African policy was being built. Since Alfonsín stepped in, African officials crossing the Atlantic visited Brasilia and Buenos Aires, a dynamic that might have well been continued in the form of residual effect during the Menem Administration.

A different interpretation may be valid. By that time, Argentina appeared as the “model to follow” in the eyes of the USA, a model of compliance with all the structural reforms stated at the Washington Consensus. In that condition, Argentina provided “its experience” to all other countries following the same path: the aims pursued by some of the visits to Africa proved it.

Argentina received the President of Mali⁷⁶, Alpha Konare, who held meetings with the Argentine President and other officials between 13 and 14 July 1998. As a result, in June 1999, two projects on reciprocal protection and promotion of investments and economic and trade cooperation⁷⁷ were sent to the Embassy of Bamako in the USA.

The Reconstruction Minister of the Republic of the Congo, Lekoundzou Itihi Ossetouma, paid a visit 5 June 1998; when he met Vice-

corps from Western African countries headed by Nigeria. In 1998, constitutional order was re-established.

76. There is no Argentine Embassy there and bilateral trade is minimum.

77. That same year, between 24 and 26 June, the Prime Minister of Mali, Ibrahim Keita, came to Argentina to attend a Summit of the Socialist International in Buenos Aires.

President Ruckauf, he handed him a letter from his President, General Dennis Sassou N'Guesso and also held a work meeting at the Foreign Policy Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry. Three months earlier, between 6 and 11 March, a trade mission presided by Mrs. Amira Yoma had traveled to that country with the purpose of participating in the privatization process started after the end of the civil war.

The political changes in ex Zaire⁷⁸ were clearly perceived when the Adjunct Director of the Cabinet of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georges Buse Falay, arrived in Argentina, 1 November 1988, to deliver a letter by President Laurent Kabila. Relations with that country were established after different treaties had been signed over the eighties, when President Mobutu visited Argentina.

With Sub-Saharan Africa, relations continued with a selective commercial approach; but Southern Africa and, especially, the most important country, South Africa, deserved attention.

SOUTHERN AFRICA: AN INCREASINGLY RELEVANT AREA

Toward the mid-1990s, the former turbulent Southern Africa was gaining stability as the result of the independence of Namibia, the consolidation of the multiracial democracy in South Africa, the end of civil war in Mozambique and the complex pacification process in Angola. The new conditions and the economic potentialities generated expectations of an economic development that placed those countries as possible partners of Argentina increasing trade.

According to the classical geographic-regional criterion, Southern Africa is made up of the following states: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In this work, the wider geopolitical and economic area of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is considered; also included are Tanzania, Mauritius and Seychelles –on East Africa– and the present Democratic Republic of the Congo (former Zaire) and Angola –in Central Africa–.

78. In 1997, Zaire became the Democratic Republic of the Congo by decision of its new president, Laurent Kabila, who, after seven months of civil war, had replaced Mobutu Sese Seko.

This region, which further on will be referred to as Southern Africa/SADC, acquired some consolidation and unity after the end of apartheid in South Africa, which had meant a dividing line, a regional cleavage, between friends and foes. This region suffered acute political crises to be associated, on the one hand, with the decolonization process, and, on the other, with the tensions brought about by the two superpowers in search of influential areas. The apartheid regime implemented by the White South African government was the axis around which the alliances were defined.

Over the nineties, the end of the Cold War and the end of apartheid in South Africa together with the end of destabilization and wars orchestrated by the racist Pretoria regime, implied profound socio-economic and political transformations. The countries in this region were swinging from authoritarianism and post-independence Afro-Marxism to economic liberalism (with structural adjustment programs) and to democracy (by means of a political reform process), with attempts at new cooperation forms.

By this time, Sub-Saharan African cooperation did not stand many chances of success given the disparities and economic imbalances between the African states and their natural inclination to solve out problems separately. But the new model of “open regionalism”, showed integration as the alternative to reach economic re-insertion in the international order of the turn of the century. The Southern Africa /SADC countries, according to their history and potentialities, appeared in condition to combine their different capacities so as to compete internationally and to bring welfare to their peoples.

A brief reference to the regional integration processes must be made now. Historically, Southern Africa has been subject to different integration experiences which followed the fluctuations of regional political instability either in favor or against South Africa. The Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) meant the only process in which racist South Africa participated. In the other agreements, the exclusion of Pretoria and the interest in struggling both against its racial dominance system and against

the dependence on South Africa that most of the economies in the region suffered⁷⁹ were made clear.

With access to multiracial democracy in South Africa in 1994, expectations were raised concerning its inclusion in the region because it meant a development engine and its participation could be of great benefit. Nevertheless, there also persisted in the region the fear of continuing with the former economic pattern of dependency.

Among the mentioned co-operation initiatives are found: SACU, with Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa (1969); SADCC, created in 1980 by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, following the idea “For Economic Liberation”, joined by Namibia in 1990 after obtaining independence from South Africa; and Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA), signed in 1981 by Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Somalia, Uganda, Djibouti and Zambia⁸⁰.

Over the nineties, following the re-assessment of the role of regionalisms, such processes were updated according to new modalities. In 1992, as a result of the annual consultative conference of the SADCC in Maputo, a document with recommendations on economic integration as the adequate development instrument for the member countries was issued, bearing the name “SADCC: For Economic Integration”. Following it, in Windhoek was created the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the heir to the SADCC, also integrated by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In 1994, South Africa; in 1995, Mauritius and in 1997, Seychelles and the Democratic Republic of the Congo⁸¹ joined the organization.

79. Traditionally, these economies have been linked by the historic dependency those countries maintained and still maintain on South Africa as developmental pole, by way of trade, infrastructure, communications and migrant hand labor.

80. By 1986, Angola, Burundi, Lesotho, Mozambique, Rwanda, Swaziland, Sudan, Tanzania and Zimbabwe had been integrated. This process, mainly originated in the Eastern Africa states (only Malawi and Zambia, from Southern Africa, participated initially), gradually increased its members to include all the countries in both regions.

81. The objectives are: to introduce a self-sustained integration process for the use of regional resources; to establish co-operation and harmonize the policies of the member states concerning food supply, land and agriculture, infrastructure and services, industry, trade and

In 1993, the Eastern and Southern African States signed a treaty for the creation of a Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) which gathered together 15 of the 18 members integrating the Preferential Trade Area.

Although the disparities and the asymmetries among the members and the withdrawal of some of them have conspired against reaching significant achievements, the central theme in the Southern Africa/SADC has been the role played by South Africa from the perspective of the South African government's intentions and from the angle of the regional partners' perceptions.

One of the most intricate matters to be resolved is the "Big Brother" syndrome⁸², because the role played by South Africa has given way to controversies and mixed opinions among the Southern Africa/SADC states and in countries like Argentina and Brazil still wishing to approach the area. In this context, two questions arise: To what extent is South Africa concerned with hegemonic power? Is it not a giant with feet of clay?

In the case of Argentina, re-establishing diplomatic relations with Pretoria and the visit of President Menem brought along a closer approach to the countries in the region. South Africans offer their country as the entrance gate to the rest of Africa since the African continent is the main destination for their exports, which shows they know how to sell and also possess well oiled mechanisms to that end. However, most Africans suggest they would rather avoid Pretoria since it generates dependency.

This could explain why the timid Argentine approach was not made exclusively via South Africa; there was a certain parallelism between focusing efforts on the new democracy and on other countries in the region. It is also interesting to notice that the multi-sectoral mission that visited Africa did not include South Africa on the agenda.

The case of Brazil appears clearer still, if the importance of Angola in the Brazilian policy is considered. As mentioned by Mourão (2000: 299):

financing, development of human resources, science and technology, natural resources and the environment, social welfare, communications and culture, politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security.

82. To be interpreted as the justified fear of a South Africa hegemony in a region with very vulnerable economies.

“the growing predominance of Angola on the regional scenario of Central Africa, which is now regaining importance, cannot but be noticed”. And he adds that it participates in the Economic Community of Central Africa States (ECCAS), mainly in the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa; and could play an important regional role (Mourão, 2002: 8).

Similarly, for Melo (2000a: 315, 317),

“our policy towards Africa does not require intermediaries [...] our main trading point with Africa is Angola, not a South Africa that has been assisting Savimbi for 24 years [...] Let us leave trade with South Africa to the multinationals, as has always been the case. But, we must have a trade policy to increase commerce with the neighbors of South Africa”.

South Africa will be dealt with in the next chapters. Argentina’s relations with the Southern African States will be discussed now as the region received the only foreign policy impulse implemented during the two terms Menem was in office.

ARGENTINA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA /SADC

Over the second half of the nineties, contacts with Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe were increased. Although there was no Argentine Embassy in Luanda, Angola, the relations cultivated from the Embassy in Zimbabwe showed the growing relevance of that country. The head of the mission in Harare was present as observer 20 November 1994 when the Lusaka Protocol was signed –Argentina was a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council then–; also present was the representative for Brazil. This document ordered a cease-fire between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and proposed national reconciliation⁸³.

The delay in the peace process constituted a factor that did not allow the cultural, economic, scientific and technical agreements already signed in 1992 to make much progress. However, over 1995, a few important deals related to non-traditional exports in the private sector were closed;

83. It was only in 1997 that this agreement bore fruit, when on 12 March the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) stepped in during the Presidency of José Eduardo dos Santos (MPLA), and four ministers for UNITA were incorporated.

for example, the case of an Argentine company, printers of checkbooks and currency bills with sales of around US\$ 40m, which was able to displace the to-that-date established German suppliers. It was, then, in August that the Economics and Finance Minister Augusto da Silva Tomás along with a delegation integrated by the Cabinet Secretary, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and other top-level officials paid a private visit to Buenos Aires. Despite its character, they were welcomed by the then President Menem, who invited Angolan President Dos Santos to visit Argentina on an agreed date. The mutual interest in developing bilateral relations in the political, economic, cultural and scientific areas was in this way demonstrated.

Toward the end of 1995, again top-level Angolan representatives⁸⁴ paid a visit to discuss the way to improve the co-operation Argentina could offer in the diplomatic, informatics and agricultural areas. The following years showed a relative decline in political-diplomatic activities: in 1996, there was only one recorded visit, by the Angolan Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, João Miranda, as special envoy of President Dos Santos. In May, 1999, a multisectoral Argentine mission visited Luanda to make contacts with officials, businessmen and academicians.

In the context of the Argentine participation in the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), at the beginning of November, 1994, Foreign Minister Di Tella made a short trip to Maputo, the first one ever that a Cabinet member had made to Mozambique, to visit the mobile hospital set up by the Argentine Air Force. He held interviews with President Joaquín Chissano and with the Foreign Affairs Minister Pascoal Mocumbi, and they discussed technical and agricultural co-operation mainly.

To reciprocate, in 1997 Argentina welcomed Leonardo Santos Simão, the Minister of Foreign Relations and Cooperation of Mozambique, who was escorted by other government officials⁸⁵. Already in March, a delegation from that country had visited Buenos Aires to gather information related to the privatization process being implemented in Argentina. Other

84. They were Vice-Minister of Foreign Relations Miranda, the Cabinet Secretary and other three officials, who were welcomed by Ambassador Guillermo González and the President's Private Secretary Alberto Kohan.

85. Filipe Chidumo, Director of International Organizations and Conferences; and Alberto Augusto, chargé of the Americas Division of Mozambique's Foreign Ministry.

agreements were also discussed; 12 March 1999, that country presented an alternative proposal to the project “Reciprocal Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement” sent by Argentina. Maputo also received the mentioned multisectoral mission which in 1999 had visited Angola, and it was welcomed by Minister Santos Simão.

With respect to Zimbabwe, it must be said that in November 1994, the Undersecretary for Regional and International Cooperation of the Foreign Relations Ministry and other three officials attended a course on the development, installation and execution of computerized systems and government officials training. Consequently, the Zimbabwe Foreign Ministry in 1995 adopted the computerized system developed by Argentina; the second phase was completed in 1996, when Argentine specialists visited Zimbabwe⁸⁶. The President of Zimbabwe⁸⁷, Robert Mugabe, also visited Buenos Aires between 12 and 15 September 1999, as part of a tour around Latin America; different economic-commercial, scientific-technical and veterinary cooperation agreements was signed. Finally, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and two delegations of Tanzania arrived in Buenos Aires to study privatization of the railway and port systems.

THE NEW IMPULSE

The contacts with Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe aimed at increasing trade relations and scientific and technological co-operation; they were mainly the result of the African interest most probably cultivated at the Harare and the Pretoria embassy offices.

The political-diplomatic contacts were part of the bureaucratic policy routine of the Foreign Ministry, and of the actions that resulted from the initiatives introduced by the officials interested in promoting the approach to those countries. Mention must be made of the success achieved by the Argentine Ambassador in Pretoria in establishing diplomatic relations with two African countries in the region⁸⁸.

86. Also under consideration is an agricultural cooperation project with the technical participation of INTA.

87. There is an Argentine Embassy in Harare, but trade is very small. Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe since its Independence in 1980, is still in power although his legitimacy is doubted.

88. In New York, 11 March 1999, a Joint Declaration was signed with Malawi by the respective permanent representatives before the United Nations; with Lesotho, 19 May, a joint communication was subscribed by the Argentine Ambassador in the Republic of

At the end of an administration characterized by a low political profile and the development of cooperation and trade aimed at achieving concrete results, a new impulse was about to be born in Buenos Aires, as indicated by participation in two seminars in Africa and a multisectoral mission. In May 1998, top-level officials participated in Harare in a seminar on State reform and privatization in Southern Africa, including Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. On the same trip, between 17 and 19 May, in Windhoek, Namibia, they attended the Southern Africa Economic Summit, a joint initiative by the World Economic Forum and the Secretary of SADC. The purpose was to offer a meeting point for the regional and international business communities, the international organizations and the government representatives.

With the creation of the ExportAr Foundation, trade promotion in the commercial sections of the embassies received a certain institutional support from Buenos Aires; within the framework of the activities planned by the above-mentioned institution, the proposals made by the ambassadors in Zimbabwe and South Africa were included. One of them deserves special attention: a multisectoral trade mission which, although it had been planned for 1998, it could finally be implemented in 1999. The weight of this mission lies more in the intentions than in the achievements as this was the only impulse with such characteristics in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa throughout the Menem Administration. The mission visited Angola and Mozambique and also the Ivory Coast; it was headed by the Undersecretary of International Economic Relations, Ambassador Eduardo Sadous. Also Argentine businessmen from the food, pharmaceuticals and sea transport industries as well as academicians from the state universities of Quilmes and Rosario⁸⁹ integrated the mission.

These initiatives, the two seminars and the multisectoral mission that shaped the impulse to the region were conceived as a quasi-personal project by Ambassador Sadous in Buenos Aires in collaboration with the ambassadors of Zimbabwe and South Africa; there was no opposition on

South Africa and by the High Commissioner of the United Kingdom of Lesotho in South Africa.

89. Additional to the official meetings with political authorities, there were sectoral encounters with businessmen and university authorities. As representative for the Universidad Nacional de Rosario, the author was able to observe the growing African interest in carrying forward inter-university cooperation; different agreements were discussed which are still being negotiated.

the part of the Foreign Minister. The participation of businessmen in the multisectoral mission must be remarked: the companies that already possessed experience in the African market and wanted to increase their scope and explore new possibilities, as well as those that were new horizons *vis-à-vis* the difficulties the Brazilian market was introducing with the devaluation of their currency, the real, formed part of the mission. In fact, they were the result, not the causes, of the impulse for the declaration made by the Director of the Sub-Saharan Africa Office during her speech at the international seminar “Society, Politics and Economics in Sub-Saharan Africa” (conducted in Buenos Aires, 20-21 April 1998, and organized by the CEI-UCA, CERIR, CINU and the UNHCR), and according to which Foreign Minister Di Tella had given precise instructions to redimension the foreign actions implemented in Southern Africa in accordance with the positive changes occurring in the region.

An *ad hoc* interpretation must be made of “those positive changes” in the sense that they should be seen as the “door to new opportunities” to do business with the states in that region; different areas of interest, in most cases, were in demand of the Argentine know-how. Among them: privatizing the economy and State reform, especially economic stabilization, monetary reform and the privatization model (Angola, Mozambique, Zambia); gas and oil exploration (Angola and Mozambique); road, health and communications projects (Angola); communications, transport and ports (Mozambique); re-establishing electricity networks (Mozambique) and railways (Democratic Republic of the Congo); agricultural development and machinery (Angola, Botswana, Zambia); irrigation systems (Democratic Republic of the Congo); artificial insemination and improving cattle breeding (Angola); privatization of railways (Mozambique) (Insausti de Aguirre, 1998).

CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC AND SECURITY DIMENSIONS

After the end of the Cold War, the traditional view of security limited to the ideological-military aspects was gradually broadened to cover aspects related to democratic stability, economic development and a safe environment. As mentioned earlier on in this chapter, in Menem Administration, the strategic-military relations formed part of a new concept of cooperative security which, in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa, aimed to strengthen relations across the South Atlantic. According to the Foreign Minister, “we are persuaded the time has come for all the countries concerned with establishing actual cooperation mechanisms in

this important sea-space. The South Atlantic is one of the few areas in the world on which there are no specific agreements” (Di Tella, 1992: 76). This was the background to the Argentine multilateral participation in peace missions, the White Helmets, and in the ZPCSA.

PEACE MISSIONS IN AFRICA AND THE WHITE HELMETS

The main objective of the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) was to stop armed conflicts or to prevent them and create a safe atmosphere for the negotiations that would eventually lead to resolving the conflict. The end of the Cold War established new parameters and eased many political tensions which had reduced the scope of peace operations. It also brought about a reduction of interstate conflicts while increasing intra-state ones. A new generation of United Nations military operations was born in order to meet the commitments of a Security Council with wider consensus. More varied functions were now being covered, from conventional observer missions and peace and prevention operations to supervising ceasefire between irregular forces, assistance to help maintain law and order, protection to humanitarian aid delivery and securing the free movement of people, to controlling sanctions were actually implemented (Mackinlay, Chopra, 1997: 180). For this second generation of peace-keeping operations, a wider group of collaborator countries was required; Argentina was among them.

The White Helmets were also part of a new protagonist spirit, proposed by President Menem in 1993 and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1994, with the support of the African countries. The White Helmets aimed at fighting off poverty and assist people in emergency situations by multiplying the available human and material resources. In this context, Argentina promised to participate actively in different world operations sponsored by the United Nations; among them, on the African continent, in Western Sahara, Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique and Equatorial Guinea.

In Western Sahara, Argentina integrated the United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). In 1991, there were seven military observers; but in mid-1995, they had been reduced to two and in 1996 to only one. However, the most important aspect to consider was Argentina’s intervention in the Western Sahara conflict under the supervision of the International Red Cross. It was part of the humanitarian mission to free 185 Moroccan prisoners of war in the hands of the Popular

Liberation Front of Saguía el-Hamra and Río de Oro (*Frente POLISARIO*), in Tindouf, Algeria. This rescue mission had been secretly organized by the Argentine and the American Ambassadors before the United Nations during a mission in Algeria in June 1995⁹⁰. It took place in November, using a Boeing 707 of the Argentine Air Force and an American Hercules C-130.

Argentina also participated in the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) from November 1994 to December 1995. In 1996, before the crisis in the then Zaire, the result of the Great Lakes conflict, President Menem declared his will to contribute to the multinational forces proposed by the Security Council. As there was a change from intervention forces to humanitarian aid, 4 and 5 December 1996, by request of the United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees (UNHCR) in that country, the Argentine Air Force sent an aircraft with a load of blankets, water potabilizers and biscuits to Rwanda to assist in the emergency. Ambassador Frigerio, the Head of the White Helmets, traveled to that country with a delegation and visited the refugee camps in Kigali and Karese. Frigerio held different meetings with the UNHCR representative in Kigali and evaluated the White Helmets participation in the refugee rebuilding project and the resettlement of displaced civilian's inspection project⁹¹.

Concerning Angola, Argentina participated in the United Nations Angola Verification Missions (UNAVEM I, II and III): in the first mission, from 1988 to 1991, with six military observers; in the second, UNAVEM II, with two military observers and three gendarmerie officers. UNAVEM III was approved by Resolution 976 of the Security Council, 8 February 1995. Argentina sent two military representatives to join the Brazilian group. The previously announced three light motorboats and limited military forces were not sent because of budgetary constraints⁹². Also in 1996-1997, a group of White Helmets were sent to Angola to assist with a German co-financing project destined to demobilize and reinsert the

90. Interview with the Argentinean Ambassador in the United Nations, Emilio Cárdenas, in March, 1998.

91. Mention must also be made of the humanitarian action conducted by an Argentine NGO, *Médicos en Catástrofes* (Catastrophe Doctors), in Rwanda, in a refugee camp operated by the UNHCR.

92. In May, that same year, Commander Aguirre from the Gendarmerie Forces was the target of a fatal attempt when he was patrolling the streets of Luanda with other United Nations members.

vulnerable victims of civil war. The White Helmets coordinated registry and logistics in the recruiting areas of Jamba and its surroundings, Mavinga and Cavaleca, and resettlement of the Jamba vulnerable groups. During 1997-1998, the White Helmets technically helped one of the regional brigades to clear minefields, and supervised demining by the Angolan sappers (Head Cabinet Office, 1998).

Argentina was present also in Mozambique, with the UN Peace Keeping Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), with military observers and a mobile hospital equipped with forty members, from April 1993 to the start of 1995, when the mission came to an end. Buenos Aires sent observers to the electoral process that concluded successfully in November 1995.

The especial cooperation with Equatorial Guinea deserves mention; it was part of the White Helmets Initiative to provide the educational authorities with assistance and advise to train permanent teaching staffs in the new teaching methods; the basic teaching materials were supplied by Argentina.

SOUTH ATLANTIC CO-OPERATION

As mentioned in Chapter II, in 1986, during the Alfonsín Administration, Argentina had supported Brazil in its initiative to create the ZPCSA. Since then and until the nineties, there were five meetings of the member states: in Brasilia (1988 and 1994); in Abuja, Nigeria (1990); in Sommerset West, South Africa (1996); and in Buenos Aires (1998). At the same time, the General Assembly adopted resolutions that incorporated the decisions made at the meetings⁹³.

The ZPCSA went through two periods, the result of both systemic changes and domestic political and economic processes taking place on both sides of the Atlantic. The most important shift occurred after the meeting in Nigeria, after the end of the Cold War. The changes on the

93. Res. 41/11 of 27 October 1986 (the ZPCSA was defined as the Atlantic Ocean region located between Africa and South America); Res. 45/36 of 27 November 1990 (political, economic, scientific, technical and cultural co-operation was reaffirmed); Res. 47/74 of 14 December 1992; Res. 48/23 of 24 November 1993; Res. 49/26 of 2 December 1994 (South Africa joined in); Res. 50/18 of 27 November 1995; Res. of 14 November 1996 (117 votes in favor and one abstention: the USA).

international scenario and the end of the East-West conflict removed the major reasons that had given way to the creation of the zone.

The initiative was virtually abandoned because the South Atlantic lost the strategic-military relevance it had enjoyed during the Cold War and because the zone did not offer a legal institutional framework. In 1992, Brazil was again responsible for revitalizing the idea, modifying the priorities and objectives. The changes in the region, such as the successful inclusion of Namibia's independence process, the negotiations in South Africa for a democratic non-racist society, the coordinated efforts to end the Angolan conflict and resuming diplomatic relations between Argentina and Great Britain created the favorable conditions to encourage co-operation among the countries in the zone.

The change of perception –the menace at sea ceased to be traditionally military– had already begun to be reflected in the United Nations Resolution of 1990, which revised the initial ZPCSA objectives and reaffirmed that peace and security were inter-related to development⁹⁴. South Africa, given its geo-strategic position, introduced the idea of “building bridges across the South Atlantic”, by increasing relations between the ZPCSA members and the countries on the Indian Ocean, the SADC and MERCOSUR⁹⁵, enlarging the South Atlantic agenda to reach wider South-South cooperation.

Although Argentina had supported Brazil with the initiative and the revitalizing of the ZPCSA, it was into the nineties that greater commitment was observed in relation to the development of negotiations with Great Britain over the Malvinas/Falklands⁹⁶. At the inaugural session of the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations Assembly, 23 September 1996, Foreign Minister Di Tella expressed his wishes for the start of a “new era in the South Atlantic”, based on co-operation and tension relief, and mentioned the delay in solving the dispute over sovereignty of the Falklands/Malvinas, the Georgias and Sandwich Islands and the surrounding waters. Di Tella stressed that:

94. See Resolution 45/36 of 27 November 1990 of the United Nations General Assembly.

95. South Africa presentation before the United Nations General Assembly, 14 November 1996. Data supplied by the South Africa Embassy in Buenos Aires.

96. It is worth mentioning that, although the Falklands/Malvinas is not discussed in this work, it is present directly or indirectly in all South Atlantic issues related to Argentina's foreign policy.

“The natural interest of Argentina in the South Atlantic is reflected in the participation in the peace and co-operation zone [...] The member states of the region have committed themselves to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity and to encouraging democracy, human rights and civil liberties as well as joining efforts in favor of nuclear non-proliferation and bans, and co-operation in the struggle against drug trafficking [...] Argentina is firmly convinced that a new era must be started in the South Atlantic, an area free of tensions, a place for the encounter of the diverse cultures committed to humanistic ideals and the shared wish for welfare and progress”⁹⁷.

The renewed interest in multilateral relations led Argentina to offer to host the 5th Meeting of Ministers of the ZPCSA, held between 22 and 23 October 1998. Top-level representatives of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay met their peers from Africa’s West Coast: Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Sierra Leona, South Africa and Togo. The presence of the South African Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo was important; he handed over the Presidency Pro Tempore to Argentina and also held meetings at the Foreign Policy Undersecretary⁹⁸. Argentina wished to revitalize the issues shared by the countries in the zone, linked to peace and security, maritime environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, foreign trade promotion, investment and economic co-operation; also, co-operation related to crimes like drug-trafficking, inclusive of money laundering. At the meeting in Buenos Aires, a Final Declaration and an Action Plan were agreed on. The Declaration stated the will to increase co-operation in areas of common interest, while the Action Plan was a document adopted for the first time in such meetings with the purpose of implementing the measures agreed upon in the Declaration. To carry out implementation, the traditional dynamics of the relations among the countries in the zone was expected to work; in each meeting, negotiations improved with the encounters –formal and informal– of the permanent representatives before the United Nations in New York. Since the meeting in Buenos Aires though, in spite of the attempts made by the Argentine representatives, the problems harassing the states on both sides of the Atlantic froze negotiations. There were serious difficulties to turn words into deeds, especially when the co-operation agenda was so overarching.

97. *Clarín*, 1993 (Buenos Aires).

98. In spite of the discourse in favor of the South Atlantic, the absence of the Foreign Minister showed Argentina’s priorities in the region.

TRADE DIMENSION

Notwithstanding the low political-diplomatic profile, which I have called “the politics of no-policy”, over the nineties, trade with the African states grew considerably in volume, with figures never before seen and, in some years, reaching triple the highest figures as compared with the former decade: in exports, from US\$421 million in 1983 to US\$1255 million in 1997; in imports, from US\$147 million in 1980 to US\$445 in 2000. If the positive figures of the Argentine-African trade are compared with the total Argentine trade balance, it can be seen that some of the African states appear as attractive markets that could help offset the maladjustments caused by the Argentine imports from other regions. However, the imports and exports volume with Africa show fluctuations due to the ups and downs of the African economies or to some independent conditions, like political unrest or droughts.

Analyzing Argentina’s trade relations with Sub-Saharan Africa and considering the total exports to the member states of the Southern Africa/SADC, the figures throw similarities with the Argentine exports to North Africa, which shows a polarization of exports to the African continent. Although in the nineties exports doubled, they maintained almost the same share over Argentina’s total exports as in the former decade, given the increase of global exports. North Africa concentrated around 50% of the African imports, South Africa 25% and Nigeria 4%, with very erratic amounts⁹⁹. The main buyers in North Africa were Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, with an important share of Argentine agricultural products (soy cake and residue, soy, sunflower and cotton oil, wheat, beef, tobacco leaves, vegetables, milk and cream) and a relative incidence of industrial products (steel tubes and profiles, rolled iron and steel sections).

The Argentine government had made the effort to maintain reasonable political-diplomatic relations with those buyers by sending different diplomatic trade missions.

Exports to Sub-Saharan Africa were somewhat below half of the African imports, with important concentration in South Africa (with amounts more or less constant, between 22% and 28%), followed by Nigeria, with around 4%. South Africa bought soy cake and residue, sunflower and cotton oil, gold, wheat and chemical wood paste. Nigeria

99. In spite of the “noises” in the political-diplomatic bilateral relations, Nigeria was the second buyer in the Sub-Saharan region, but way behind the first partner.

bought steel tubes and profiles and rolled iron and steel sections, wheat and polymers of propylene. Exports to other countries in the region were not constant, varying significantly over the period and distributed among Angola, Ivory Coast, Mauritius and Kenya, who bought cereal flour, soy and sunflower oil, corn, chocolate, steel tubes and profiles and rolled iron and steel sections.

With respect to imports, with amounts relatively low between 1989 and 1990 (US\$ 21 million), they quintupled the following year, to US\$ 113 million; a sustained period was started which lasted until the year 2000, with US\$ 445 million. Nevertheless, the share over the total Argentine imports was about the same as in the previous decade, with a 1% average. The economic policy applied since 1991 with the Convertibility Act and the measures implemented to open the economy, international trade deregulation and reduction of import duties, for example, caused a sustained increase of global imports until 1998. The goods imported, mainly capital goods came from the developed countries –European Union and NAFTA– and from Brazil, the main partner in MERCOSUR. In this context, only South Africa showed relevant percentages as imports from Africa grew parallel to the increase of Argentina's total imports¹⁰⁰.

Imports concentration in a few African countries was a great deal higher than in the case of exports. But the regions were inverted: Sub-Saharan Africa sold three quarters of the total Argentine imports from Africa, with a major partner, South Africa; a long way away, with erratic figures, followed Nigeria and Ivory Coast. South Africa, occupying the first place in Argentine exports to Sub-Saharan Africa, also kept that position as seller, with almost half of the continent's imports with constant amounts (fuels, mineral oils, cast iron, steel and iron, paper and carton).

With the exception of South Africa, Argentina mainly imported oil. Nigeria showed completely erratic exports (oil). Ivory Coast was an important seller in the second half of the decade, with negative balance for Argentina as from 1997 (cocoa paste). With Angola (oil), trade was variable and erratic. Argentina's imports from North Africa consisted in oil and derivatives, cork, mineral fertilizers and olive oil.

100. Imports from Africa quintupled between 1990 and 1991 and tripled between 1991 and 1997. In the same periods, Argentina's global imports doubled and tripled, respectively.

The above information shows that, although there were no strategies related to the African continent given its low profile in the priorities of the Argentine foreign policy, bilateral trade grew due to the interest of the national and transnational private actors. The kind of goods traded –raw materials, mainly food and agricultural products and oil– may explain this process, to the extent that marketing such products was managed by the large transnational corporations planning their buying and selling strategies in global terms, with little consideration of national frontiers and giving relevance to market opportunities.

Although the Menem Administration introduced a foreign policy economically biased and, consequently, relations with the African countries were approached accordingly, no well-defined trade promotion strategy or policy can be identified despite a certain consistency in the selective actions. In other words, the density of the political-diplomatic relation was in direct relation to the level of commercial operations. The North Africa countries and South Africa were the interlocutors and the object of reciprocal official and unofficial visits; they were also the main commercial partners. Diplomacy supported pragmatism, which, in this case, may well be interpreted in business terms.

Chapter IV

The Mirror Image: Brazil's African Policy (1960-2000)

SINCE the sixties, Brazil slowly built an African policy, with its ups and downs, in the context of a global international insertion strategy. Contrary to Argentina, Brazil had a common colonial history full of intra-South Atlantic contacts¹⁰¹. However, during the XIXth Century, according to the terms in the 1825 Independence Treaty, with England operating as guarantor, Brazil was not allowed to develop relations or accept any possibility of controlling the Portuguese territories in Africa. This was imposed by Portugal, who was afraid of Brazil advancing on its African Colonies.

Nevertheless, the African heritage became part of the Brazilian social corpus, such as described, among other numerous works, by Rodríguez (1961) and Costa e Silva (1989). Following Mourão (1994: 150), “the African influence in Brazil is highly relevant from the ethnic, cultural and linguistic point of view ...If the Amerindian and the European legacies were added; the three-dimensional characteristic of the Brazilian culture would be shown”.

As can be seen, for Brazil independence meant an involuntary detachment from Africa, which started to revert in the XXth Century, since the 1940s, when a gradual relations re-composition process began with the Atlantic neighbors. Finally, along with the independence of the African countries, President Quadros inaugurated a period of closer relationships which, despite the interval of the two military governments that followed, helped to construct an African policy.

The approach to Africa occurred almost simultaneously in Brazil and in Argentina. The characteristics of the approaches were different. Argentina demonstrated initiative capacity during the Frondizi Administration, with the

101. Saraiva and Gala (2001:1) sum up this period: “in the conformation of the modern world, between the XVth and XIXth centuries, the two sides of the “dark sea” were involved in the logic of slave-trafficking, ideas and goods exchanged in the Atlantic. Africa occupied a center stage in shaping the society and the economy of Brazil. The African slaves in Brazil, for most Brazilian historians, constituted the engine that drove social organization of the Portuguese Colony in the American Tropics and was the amalgam for the organization of the Imperial State in the XIXth century”.

design of the first plan of an Argentine presence in Africa and the Llamazares Mission; soon afterwards, though, it became intermittent and spasmodic, impulse driven, in the low profile framework that the South-South relations and the African Continent had among the foreign agenda priorities. The impulses were mainly related to the need for new markets rather than to building the kind of approaches that could help different interests converge in order to defend shared positions.

Mourão and Oliveira (2000: 332) think that “instead of speaking of an African Project, we prefer to speak of a long-run process during which, more or less emphatically, a political-diplomatic action could be formulated”. Despite the fact that the cited authors believe there was no “extreme rationality”, this diffused process –as they have called it– acquires greater consistency when compared with the Argentine impulses.

Although in the case of Brazil the idea of impulses could also be used to analyze its African policy, they were cumulative. As time passed, the political-diplomatic actions brought about a remarkable strength in the relations on both sides of the Atlantic; it is, then, possible to speak of an “incrementalist” policy.

Contrary to Argentina, where mostly the impulses came from the middle management levels of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the case of Brazil the political-diplomatic approach was linked to presidential-insertion strategies, where Africa was included; the incidence of the political power in office was smaller in the decisions made at Itamaraty, which maintained greater continuity in foreign policy designs. In Argentina, political instability increased as the political-institutional changes doubled over the same period.

Even though the main agent contributing to the formulation and implementation of Brazil’s foreign policy actions towards African states were the Foreign Relations Ministry together with the President¹⁰², there was also varying participation on the part of the military sector and businessmen, congressmen and academicians¹⁰³.

102. According to Mourão (1986), “if close attention is paid to the evolution of Brazil’s international relations with the African countries, it is clear that the understanding shown in our century undoubtedly is the result of the actions implemented by the Executive Power, particularly, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”.

103. As stated by Gelson Fonseca Jr. (1998: 263), “in Brazil, the official institutions dominated, to a large extent and at least until the 1970s, the central foreign policy formulations [...] Both Itamaraty and the Armed Forces ‘think’ in terms of their interests, according to a view of their role as permanent bureaucracies”.

In the Brazilian case, as pointed out by Arbilla (1997: 102-103), the especial characteristics of the diplomatic corps, in particular, its strong identity as a self-contained body, with an institutional definition of its own, perpetuated by way of socializing its officials and the monopoly of its positions at Itamaraty, encouraged the continuity of such points of view and of the concepts elaborated and sedimented over time.

According to a “diplomatic style” emphasizing caution and continuity as the excellency measures of that body, the conceptual innovations tended to be filtered or interpreted in ways more compatible with the so-called “diplomatic heritage”, so that “Itamaraty, then, has become the depository of diplomatic traditions”.

In this chapter, a three dimensional analysis of Brazilian foreign policy with the African states will be dealt with; the differences and the similarities with Argentina will be remarked (although a foreign policy comparative analysis is not the pretension as it deserves a different methodology).

POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC DIMENSION

Irrespective of the particular nuances of each government’s foreign policy, continuity is observed both in the design and in the implementation of Brazil’s international insertion model while preserving its connection to the domestic development project (national development through imports substitution)¹⁰⁴. As pointed out by Mourão and Oliveira (2000: 314), “we should consider foreign policy as a slow process reflecting not only the international but also the domestic conditions”.

In this context, the African states occupied a special place although the countries involved varied depending on the circumstances; there was substance and continuity in the African policy, built throughout time, with its own ups and downs. The approach to Africa, or rather the renewed approach, as Mourão y Oliveira (2000) called it, was the consequence of a process with some emblematic moments. It took place in a context with difficulties both domestic and foreign; it was started with English and French-speaking African countries, which helped with learning how to

104. The analysis by Cervo (1992) throws light on this matter.

conduct relations until finally the Portuguese-speaking countries were reached.

Brazil's political designs towards Africa were reflected in the implementation of political actions. This is to say, there was a greater concentration in actions, marked by the profile and the number of visits paid¹⁰⁵ and received and by the signature of many and varied co-operation agreements. Consequently, Itamaraty sent Africa its best diplomats, such as Alberto Costa e Silva, Ovidio Andrade de Melo, Geraldo Heráclito Lima and Affonso de Ouro Preto, among others. It was not like the case of an "unwanted destination" in the Argentine style, whose diplomats preferred the capital cities of the developed countries.

There was a diplomatic engagement and actually there were policies when before there had not been. As building diplomacy advanced, a cultural discourse and trade were used to mobilize civil society and to justify diplomatic actions, as information on Africa was not available. Since Brazil had been severed from the African continent for over a century, the knowledge of Africa and its cultures had to be encouraged by means of the creation of research centers¹⁰⁶. The common roots and the African legacy in Brazil were not enough to have the knowledge of Africa required in the second half of the XXth Century; Brazilian diplomats had little reference except for a few contacts at the UN, which were used in the approach to African countries.

For Mourão (1994: 152), those contacts were part of the *cultural diplomacy* in the manner of a "substantive vector in the field of diplomatic approaches", if the weight that the cultural factors bear on international relations is considered. Saraiva (1996: 89) adds another component to the civilizing explanation given by Honorio Rodríguez (1961), on Freyrean

105. Also former instances must be considered in the analysis: the first official mission of a Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Africa was in 1972, while Argentina's was in 1988. The first visit of a Brazilian President was in 1983; the first one of an Argentine Head of State was in 1986 to attend the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, a multilateral meeting that was eventually organized in Africa; therefore, the first official visit finally took place in 1995.

106. The Brazilian Institute for Afro-Asian Studies (IBEAA) was created in Rio de Janeiro, in 1961; the Center for Afro-Oriental Studies (CEAO) in Bahia, in 1959; in 1963, in São Paulo, the African Culture and Studies Center which in 1986 became the African Studies Center (CEA); in 1973, the Afro-Asian Studies Center in Rio de Janeiro (CEAA). To better appreciate the evolution of the academic centers, see Beltrán (1987).

basis¹⁰⁷: the use of a culturalist discourse that emphasized acquaintance and a common history on both sides of the Atlantic¹⁰⁸. Notwithstanding the African presence in the construction of Brazilian culture, the approaches to the African continent were mostly the result of a highly positive perception on the part of the diplomats. It was Itamaraty that gave continuity and support to such approaches in democracy as well as during the military governments.

Domestically, at the beginning the military regimes in Argentina and Brazil over the period under study did not enjoy similarity in the perceptions concerning the international scenario or the African countries' role. The Argentine military, or rather the economic diplomacy implemented during most of the military governments, wanted to find new markets in Africa; therefore, an increase in trade relations was sought out. In the Brazilian case, according to Mourão y Oliveira (2000: 316) "the approach to the new African states was, no doubt, a political act".

Concerning the South-South-relations, Brazil felt it belonged to the Third World but was not in favor of a Third World position. It was not for this reason that it never intended to become member of the Non-Aligned – although, as observer, a Brazilian representative always attended the meetings– nor did its foreign policy intend to influence or use the Movement, as sometimes Argentina did under both civilian and military governments. Brazil's policy was articulated around the three "Ds" – disarmament, economic development and decolonization– as announced by the Minister João A. De Araujo Castro in the 18th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1963 (FUNAG, 1995: 163). The Brazilian elites aspired to participate in the emerging multipolarism by increasing its international responsibilities, through the underlying idea of Brazil as a middle power. Accordingly, the approach to Africa was, then, a matter of principles to

107. Gilberto Freyre, in his culturalist scheme, was the first to formulate the idea of Brazil as part of an Atlantic world in which Africa is an unavoidable component; he perceived the strength of the African presence in Brazil's social composition.

108. Note that the rhetoric of the African component has a domestic and an international dimension. Abroad, Brazil was regarded as a Western Africanized country, mainly as an African country second to Africa itself. Domestically, the Brazilian society showed contradictions as it did not grant a well-defined place to the disorganized Afro-Brazilian communities claiming against domestic discrimination. This gave rise to criticism on the part of the African countries with the argument that the so often declared racial miscegenation had not brought about racial equality.

promote solidarity among the countries “of the South”. Also the idea was to guarantee an international presence that would further the influence of Brazil on global issues by way of greater foreign relations diversification and alliances –both political and economic– with the new South states.

Relations between Brazil and Africa were part of a diplomatic project which maintained certain continuity from its inception in the 1970s until the mid-1980s. This explains why Africa, from discourse to praxis, played a relevant role to help Brazil to strengthen its weight abroad and the relevance of the continent itself in world issues. As Oliveira (1987: 318) believes, the idea of having an African policy seems to have been reinforced by the difficulties to establish a common project with Latin America, because of regional rivalries, mainly with Argentina.

Because Brazil’s African policy was a policy of “what was possible”, it had external conditioning factors, in particular in its relations with the African Colonies of Portugal, a country with which Brazil held a very especial relationship. There were ambiguities in the relations with Africa’s Portuguese Colonies and there also were ambiguities with South Africa, given the fact that the fluctuations shown by Brazil were related to particular interests, as will be seen in Chapter VII.

The way the African policy was built will be dealt with next, following the different governments in Brazil –two democratic administrations, five military regimes¹⁰⁹ and one democratic transition– until the 1990s is reached, when, because of different domestic and foreign conditioning factors, the mentioned policy was carried on but in a more selective manner, in terms of a new insertion model and more limited resources. The special focus on the 1990s has been introduced because this is the period which provides the framework chosen for the analysis of Argentina’s foreign policy.

ADVANCES IN THE FORMULATION OF AN AFRICAN POLICY

In March 1961, Jânio Quadros, following the so-called “*Independent Foreign Policy*”, formulated an African policy for Brazil in his message before the National Congress. It made Itamaraty responsible for it and created the Africa Office, and, in the reports submitted by the Ministry, a chapter on African matters was added. The new office would include Brazilian diplomats involved in African matters at the United Nations during

109. Visentini (1998) deals thoroughly with this period.

the 1950s¹¹⁰. Despite Quadros' short term in office, for the first time there was a global strategic policy for Africa. Without doubt Quadros "was responsible for establishing a new profile in the diplomatic relations with Africa" (Mourão-Oliveira 2000: 313), which included opening embassies in Accra (Ghana), Lagos (Nigeria) Nairobi (Kenya) and Dakar (Senegal). Both Quadros and Goulart would later find serious difficulties for their African policy, derived from the narrow margin allowed by the international system conditioned by the East-West conflict, and because of Brazil's domestic dimension of the new foreign policy. For example, the military resisting the new approach would later implement their ideas after the military takeover by Humberto Castello Branco (1964-1967) and its *Automatic Alignment with the USA*. By then, Itamaraty had lost relevance for the military linked to the Military Academy: in this period, the prevailing line of diplomats was associated with the liberal project and with an exacerbated westernized spirit. However, other diplomats related to the Africa Office and the Trade Cooperation Office preferred a less ideologized but more pragmatic interpretation in their consideration of Brazil's African policy; they were able to send the first exploratory missions to the new African states.

The mentioned "westernizing" approach would not last for long. With Arthur Costa e Silva (1967-1969), Itamaraty conducted the objectives of *Prosperity Diplomacy*" and the African policy was redefined. In October 1967, the Africa Office, related to the General Undersecretary for Eastern Europe, was included in the new Africa and Near East Secretary. The government of Costa e Silva meant the transition from an absence of certainties to new convictions shaping Brazil's foreign policy over the 1970s. In this context, the diplomatic relations with the new African nations were maintained and the Brazilian presence increased by opening embassies in Abidjan and Kinshasa.

With Emilio Garrastazu Médici (1969-1974, and *the National Interest diplomacy*) the national security concept was redefined to stress the national interest. At the same time, the geopolitical perception of the Atlantic declined and the African policy was redimensioned, keeping the Brazilian influence through trade. The scholars who analyzed this period coincide that there was no consensus on the role played by Africa in defining strategies, in the context of the intra-bureaucratic disputes. For the powerful Economic Minister, Delfim Netto, the natural co-operation area should be South

110. The Rio Branco professors started to teach new generations of diplomats from the viewpoint of the new Brazilian interest in Africa.

Africa; agreements with Portugal should be reinforced to have access to the Portuguese Colonies in Africa and the European market. For the Foreign Relations Minister, Gibson Barboza, foreign policy should consider the gradual inclusion of the Black African countries without overlooking the strategic weight of relations with South Africa. To prove his ideas, Barboza presided, in 1972, the first mission that visited different West African countries, which was the foundation of the later African policy development¹¹¹. The delegation was made up of numerous members and it started off an intense dialogue with the African countries; the Minister was a key figure and delivered around eighty different speeches. This first mission was also useful to appreciate the reaction of the African leaders to the Brazil's approach and to perceive how they considered Brazil's relations with Lisbon concerning the Portuguese Colonies in Africa. In this way, Brazil acquired a closer knowledge of Africa and its aspirations, and strengthened direct diplomatic contact with the new nations.

In broad terms, both Médici and his successor Geisel held a foreign policy destined to reducing Brazil's dependency by redefining its international role and foreign relations diversification, without ideological barriers. It was an ever more flexible and pragmatic foreign policy. At that time, the pragmatism conceptually formulated by Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979, *Ecumenical, Responsible Pragmatism*) became an instrument for the implementation of Brazil's foreign actions. At Itamaraty, the activism of Italo Zappa, Head of the Africa, Asia and Oceania Department, helped to build this new emblematic moment in Brazil's African policy, whose climax was the definition of the stance before the independence of the Portuguese Colonies.

After an ambiguous period, when the government of Brazil had to confront the domestic pressures of the Portuguese community and those of Lisbon not to support the decolonization process of the Portuguese Colonies, on one hand, and the domestic demands of the pro-Africa groups, the external pressure of the African and Arab countries to define a position in their favor, on the other, Itamaraty recognized the independence of Angola

111. This mission was described in detail by the Minister himself in his book (Barbosa, 1992), published twenty years later. By reading it, the marked underlying coincidences can be appreciated on both sides of the Atlantic between the Brazilian and the African cultures; the former unthinkable understanding of the respective government officials would now be possible.

(11 November 1975), and other colonies¹¹². Consequently, the automatic alignment cycle of the Portuguese and Brazilian in Africa came to an end, and preferential relations were started with independent Angola.

Following Camargo and Vázquez Ocampo (1988: 48-50), “the recognition of the government of Agostinho Neto on the part of Brazil was immediate, the result of a difficult decision made at top level by the President of the Republic along with Itamaraty and the civilian and military authorities gathered at the National Security Council”. The Brazilian Foreign Ministry took into consideration what could prove more favorable to the political and commercial interests of Brazil¹¹³, despite both national and international pressures, particularly from the USA. A recent work by the retired Ambassador Ovidio Andrade de Melo renders account of his stay in Luanda and of the process for recognition of Angola’s independence. This work means a significant contribution to understand the fluctuations of Brazil’s African policy and the role Melo played as “faithful executor of a policy made by the Presidency and Itamaraty” (2000b: 345), in which the Foreign Minister Antonio Azeredo da Silveira occupied center stage.

It is now interesting to reflect upon Brazil’s decision to recognize Angola’s independence and on Argentina’s breakoff of diplomatic relations with South Africa; both were very clear relevant political-diplomatic acts, with similar weight in political intensity, which left an important mark on their respective relations with the African states¹¹⁴.

In both cases, the decisions were made to improve relations with the African states. In Argentina, there was the attempt to remove the African distrust concerning the bilateral policy Buenos Aires had implemented with Pretoria. Brazil’s case may be held similar, due to the former relations between Brazil and Portugal and the ambiguous policy Brazil had implemented with respect to the independence process of the Portuguese Colonies. Melo (2000b: 347) thinks this way when he justifies his own activities as special envoy in Luanda and because of the reduced insufficient knowledge we had of Black Africa, in particular, of Angola; the distrust both the MPLA and the FRELIMO naturally experienced toward the Brazilian

112. Guinea Bissau acquired its independence on 18 July 1974; Mozambique, 25 June 1975; Cape Verde, 5 July 1975; São Tome and Príncipe, 12 July 1975.

113. The comments by former Minister Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro (1992: 188-190), the then General Secretary at Itamaraty, help clarify this matter.

114. The Angolan issue was studied by Saraiva (1985) in his master’s degree thesis, updated in 1988.

policy, because of the not concealed support given to Portugal over time.

Brazil's decision with respect to Angola could well have influenced its relations with the rest of Africa. In Melo's own words (2000b: 384),

“According to the Angolans, relations with Mozambique and even with Africa depended on the firm attitude that now Brazil would exhibit in defense of the recognition of Independent Angola. It was so much so that Brazil's attitude toward Angola allowed diplomatic relations to be established with Mozambique, 15 November of that same year”.

As also stated by Abreu (1988: 78),

“It was undoubtedly a triumph for Itamaraty. This way, it was possible to diminish the distrust the African leaders felt for Brazil, which had been a *sine qua non* condition to reinforce relations with the Black African countries”.

However, there are important differences between these two cases as Brazil gave early recognition to Angola's independence, almost in solitude, hoping to develop relations with this young nation and to regain the time lost, while Argentina decided to stop relations. There was a price Brazil paid for in terms of the pressures suffered; Argentina paid almost no price but instead was received praise because it was flowing along with the international trend. Finally, it could be said that for Argentina the decision was part of its global agenda while for Brazil it was incorporated to the regional agenda.

With President Geisel it may be said that ten years of very good relations with the African states were started. As stated by Mourão and Oliveira (2000: 326-327), his foreign policy “is situated at a given moment in a process in which there was definite insertion of Brazil in Southern Africa”. Learning to build relations with the African countries was a stage left behind. Itamaraty now possessed a critical mass knowledgeable of the African issues, and society at large began to show an interest in African matters, which increased the trade flows, mainly with Angola.

In this period full of contacts, the density of the political-diplomatic relations can be seen in the new embassy offices opened, the high level of the visits paid and the missions sent across the Atlantic, and in the signature of bilateral technical and trade cooperation agreements; trade voyages across the Atlantic increased as well as investments in development projects.

During the Geisel Administration, there was concentration in the hands of the state, associated to a rising internationalization of the productive system. The so-called “Trade Promotion Plan” developed by the Foreign Relations Ministry in 1973 was a central element in the strategy of intertwining exports, government and diplomacy representatives in Africa. As mentioned by Minister Antonio Azeredo da Silveira (1976),

“Relations between peoples go far beyond relations between foreign ministries. The latter may help build a scenario more or less favorable to the development of said relations. But they cannot substitute for the agents forming part of the relations: businessmen, politicians, cultural representatives and national technicians. It is only with the co-operation of such sectors that it can be possible to set Brazil’s relations with Africa at the level of its potentialities”.

However, since the 1970s there started the first objections to the imports substitution model, the result, partly, of the 1973 and 1979 oil crises and of the 1982 foreign debt crisis. Over the 1980s, the stress was rather laid on the economic-financial aspects of the international negotiations. Itamaraty began to incorporate responsibilities that traditionally had not belonged there, and explicitly decided to hold not only political and foreign trade negotiations but also Brazil’s economic relations with the international system (Camargo and Vázquez Ocampo, 1988).

Even with João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo (1979-1985) there was emphasis on the African policy, derived from the basic principles of “*Universalism*” implemented by Foreign Minister Saraiva Guerreiro. According to the twofold insertion in the West and in the Third World through South-South cooperation, the underlying idea was to add strategies, not to exclude antagonistic areas. In his message to the National Congress in 1980, the President was clear: “As concerns the African Continent, whose peoples hold so very many important common traits with the Brazilians, a new stage is now seeing the light in our relations ...Now, we must swiftly make our relations operative” (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1980: 4).

As mentioned by Saraiva Guerreiro (1992: 191), “during the Figueiredo Administration, we carried on and expanded relations with that continent and I believe we have dissipated the remnants of distrust”. In that way, the Head of the Africa, Asia and Oceania Office at Itamaraty defended the idea that it would be through the action in Africa rather than in Latin America that Brazil would be able “to change the status” among the world power hierarchies (Pereira, 1985: 83).

It may, then, be asserted that political relations between Brazil and Africa during the Figueiredo Administration reached a high density level. The visits paid by Minister Saraiva Guerreiro to the “Front Line States” in 1980, Nigeria and Senegal (1981), Ivory Coast, Gabon and Guinea Bissau (1983) and Congo and Zaire (1984), had the main purpose of reconfirming the principles guiding Brazil’s Africa policy and paving the way to the next-to-come visit of the Head of State. The first visit of a Latin American and Brazilian President to Africa’s Portuguese, French and English-speaking countries took place between 14 and 21 November 1983; it meant the best Brazilian interest endorsement to the African countries and a climax construction of the Africa policy. This visit was important not only because it may be interpreted as legitimizing that policy but also because, according to Minister Saraiva Guerreiro, it meant the response to the sectors that under the crisis argued, although temporarily, relations with the African continent should be brushed aside (Oliveira, 1987).

All over this period, Brazil was paid numberless visits by African Foreign Ministers and Heads of State in witness of the mutual Afro-Brazilian interest. Toward the end of the Figueiredo Administration, diplomatic relations were being held with 43 out of the 52 African countries, with 21 embassies in Africa and 13 African embassy offices in Brasilia.

For Mourão y Oliveira (2000: 328), “Figueiredo’s was a continuation of Geisel’s foreign policy, an in-depth quality of Brazil’s relations with Africa”. According to an interview those authors had with Saraiva Guerreiro, relations were “predominantly political rather than economic; thereby the relative difficulty in explaining the approach to Africa [...] Of course, we are always keen on enlarging trade. But those are also poor countries”.

The term of office of the President José Sarney (1985-1990, *Diplomacy of Results*), favored by the democratic atmosphere installed by the New Republic, followed along the lines of an African policy already traced within the limits imposed by negotiations over the foreign debt and by the domestic economic instability. The conceptual and pragmatic continuity of Brazil’s African policy over the 1980s was, then, the expression of the continuity of the national-developmental foreign policy.

As international conditions changed, relations with Africa spaced out and became more selective following the reduced resources availability. In this context, Selcher (1984) stated that the Brazil-Africa case showed the possibilities generated by intercontinental relations between countries of the

Southern Hemisphere; but, very clearly, the limitations were also shown because those states were very vulnerable to the negative trends of the international economy. But even when the mentioned limitations were more evident, during the Sarney Administration, Minister Sodré among his objectives included “intensification of the relations with Africa, along with our refusal of the apartheid system” (Sodre, 1996: 289).

The closer approach to Angola and Southern African countries, added to the increased tension in South Africa, led the President to adopt a more critical position *vis-à-vis* Pretoria, as shown in practice and in the speeches delivered at the UN. Concrete measures were taken; for example, the so-called Sarney Decree, which will be dealt with in detail in Chapter VIII. Also the presidential visits to Cape Verde and Angola and the visits Minister Sodré paid to five African countries in 1986 confirmed the legitimacy of Brazil’s Africa policy. The reciprocity took shape in a series of meaningful visits, many of which also included Argentina under President Alfonsín.

THE NINETIES: THE ADVANCE OF SELECTIVITY

Already into the second half of the eighties, there was a lower profile of Africa among Brazil’s foreign priorities. The domestic economic-financial variables linked to the economic development model and the international insertion modality were some of the influential factors to consider. Such issues caused a relative loss in the sphere of influence by Itamaraty concerning foreign policy making. As it is well-known, the main problem at that time was rescheduling the foreign debt, which was being pushed by the Minister of the Economy. However, curiously enough it was a diplomat, Ambassador Jório Dauster, not an Economy official, the main negotiator. Additionally, changes in the international conditions (end of the Cold War and triumph of the liberal economy model) and the domestic economic problems (both in Brazil and in Africa) were the causes for lowering the profile of the relations held between Brazil and the African countries¹¹⁵.

As domestic vulnerability increased, Brazil made adjustments to readapt to the prevailing circumstances with more limited resources. The

115. These changes affected the role of the State, which was dwarfed and began to operate as administrator. Foreign policy was being more conditioned by economic variables linked to the economic-financial world scenario. Many of the corporations doing business in Africa were no longer “state-protected”.

purpose continued to be the diversification of international relations in order to reach greater protagonism and participation on the world scenario; but the stage varied: from the Third World and Africa, it was moved to other contexts, among them Latin America and the MERCOSUR and, especially, to multilateral trade organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Brazil, then, responded to the systemic changes.

The changes can be explained because the alliances, as legitimate instruments to increase power in a country, are contingent, in terms of the issues at stake and upon how such issues might affect the Brazilian interests. Sardemberg (1980: 19-20) said: “international policy is not an adhesion contract; it is a permanent area of reciprocal negotiation and adaptation of positions”.

The so-called “Africa cost” should be also considered; that is to say, the recurrent political and economic instability in most African countries¹¹⁶, which reduced interest in the continent and prevented the African countries from receiving capital investment. The number of diplomats in Africa decreased, trade diminished, there were currency convertibility problems, difficulties in the forms of payment and, very importantly, the African countries defaulted on Brazil. The cooperative dreams gave way to Afro-pessimism. Consequently, the Africa policy was carried on, but selectively, with priorities and objectives oriented to domestic needs and to Brazil’s own “country design”, i.e., in favor of the country’s national interest. Although cultural diplomacy¹¹⁷ continued to be implemented, bilateral relations became quite precise with those countries in condition to respond to Brazilian needs, including the idea of cooperation between regional associations if it was deemed politically necessary. South-South cooperation over the seventies and eighties was turned into “strategic associations” (Ministry of External Relations, 1998: 10).

Brazil’s options for the African continent were the result of a thirty year experience with the African states; in the nineties, an African policy reduced to a few countries and issues was made evident: the increasing importance of South Africa, Angola and Nigeria, and co-operation with the countries in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), in some specific cases

116. See Mourão (1994) for a brief but thorough analysis of the political crises and conflicts of the African states in the 1990s.

117. In 1996, Lampreia told the African ambassadors: “our commitment to the Brazil-Africa relations is a firm one. Africa is a privileged irreplaceable space in the Brazilian diplomacy” (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1996).

under the umbrella of the MERCOSUR, the Portuguese Language Community (PLC) and the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA).

For Pimentel (2000: 17), although selectivity was part of the African policy: “the natural appeal to South Africa, Angola and Nigeria did not exclude co-operation with other countries, generally established as an anchoring project or an idea force”¹¹⁸. The Director General of the Africa and Near East Office at Itamaraty justified it by saying that “also in Africa our resources must be used judiciously. Selectivity does not mean disinterest in the great common causes of all Africans... It denotes pragmatism in the application of limited resources” (Pimentel, 2000: 6-7).

Consequently, the presidential visits and those of top-level officials pointed to the options: in September 1991, Collor de Melo visited four countries in Southern Africa: Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The Foreign Minister in the Itamar Franco Administration, Celso Amorim, attended the Inaugural Ceremony where Mandela was invested as South Africa’s President. Minister Lampreia visited South Africa in three opportunities (1995, 1996 and 2000) and went to Angola (1998) and to Mozambique for the Third Meeting of the Portuguese Language Community (PLC), accompanying the President. President Cardoso’s visit to South Africa and Angola, in November 1996, was strongly supported diplomatically, commercially and academically.

On the African side, the visits to Brasilia confirmed the Brazil’s priorities. With respect to South Africa, Mandela visited Brazil in 1991 during a trip around Latin American countries to promote solidarity against the apartheid system. An international re-insertion process was started since 1994 with the new democratic government in South Africa. In this context, in October 1995, Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo reciprocated the visit by Lampreia and was welcomed by Cardoso. In September 1997, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki travelled to Brasilia and to Buenos Aires, with the Trade and Industry Minister, Alec Erwin. Mandela returned to South America in 1998, visited Brasilia and Buenos Aires and attended the Presidential Summit of MERCOSUR in Ushuaia. Finally, and this time as the new President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki was in Brasilia in December 2000. The following African Presidents visited Brasilia: the President of Guinea Bissau, João Bernardo Vieira, in 1997, and in 1999, the

118. Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Congo Brazzavile, Equatorial Guinea, Mali and Namibia.

President-elect of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo¹¹⁹ and the President of Namibia, Sam Nujoma¹²⁰. Also the President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, went to Brasilia and Buenos Aires in that period. Special mention must be made of the frequent visits to Brazil paid by the Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos, whose first official visit was in 1995, and the trips made by the Foreign Ministers of Mozambique, São Tome and Principe, Cape Verde, Namibia and Kenya.

In the nineties, different agreements were signed with South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, São Tome and Principe and Nigeria; this was an indication there were certain preferences to consolidate relations with those states. With South Africa, without previous relations, the political will to develop and strengthen ties was shown in facts.

Concerning multilateral relations, as will be seen further on, Brazil participated in the Peace Operations in Africa, encouraged and revitalized with new objectives the ZPCSA, and contributed to build the Portuguese Language Community created in 1996 as a cooperation mechanism embracing the Portuguese-speaking countries.

Regarding these issues a question arises: In which context the African policy diminished while advancement of selectivity occurred? Over the nineties, while Collor de Melo was in power, in an attempt to meet the challenges of the Third Industrial Revolution, a liberal modernization program was started which aimed to strengthen relations with the First World and to redirect relations with Latin America and the MERCOSUR, with the signature of the Treaty of Asuncion, 26 March 1991. In this context, Africa was practically irrelevant. For some Brazilian academicians, such as Saraiva (1996), MERCOSUR replaced the strategic-economic meaning that relations with Africa had enjoyed in the seventies and the eighties.

With Itamar Franco, neo-liberalism was attenuated and there was a return to national development concepts and to go deeply into “*Strategic Associations*”. This process took place along with intense debates between the “nationalists” and the “neo-liberals” with respect to the orientation that

119. Shortly before stepping in, this visit shows the mutual interest at a moment when Nigeria was returning to democracy. Because of the Abacha abuses, which pushed corruption and drug-trafficking, the Brazilian air company Varig had suspended the Rio de Janeiro-Lagos flights. However, in 1998, Braspetro had granted two joint-venture contracts for oil exploration in the Niger Delta.

120. This was the third visit; the former ones had been in 1987 and 1995.

should be given to Brazil's foreign policy, which at that time had been qualified as "vague"¹²¹. In his government, there was a lukewarm return to an African policy; but selectivity can already be perceived: the Portuguese speaking African countries and the Southern Africa region were prioritized, with central attention on the current democratic multiracial South Africa.

When Cardoso was Foreign Minister, he had announced that

"It is necessary to broaden the debate over the Brazilian foreign policy, not only as regards its participants but also as concerns its purpose [...] The new international conditions stimulate pluralism of partners and economic models [...] Foreign policies seek to be the faithful expression of a multiplicity of national interests in the diverse areas of international coexistence"¹²².

When thoroughly revising concepts, he thought Brazil had made a mistake when choosing Africa during the Geisel Administration, although in his discourse he said that "in Africa, we hold important interests and cultural affectionate ties of great relevance, above all with the Portuguese speaking countries"¹²³.

Before this "re-positioning" of the role of Africa, there arose criticism coming from Itamaraty itself –mainly from Ambassador Italo Zappa¹²⁴– and from some businessmen, academicians and African ambassadors credited in

121. São Paulo, Jose Casado de (1993) "Uma política externa ainda indefinida" in *Gazeta Mercantil*, February 19th. See also Folha de São Paulo (1994): under the subtitle "A diplomacia brasileira entra na era da globalização econômica e começa a trocar o terceiro-mundismo pelo discurso internacionalista", the opinions of President-elect Cardoso, of the ambassadors and Itamaraty officials Italo Zappa, Flecha de Lima, Celso Amorim, Roberto Abdenur, Jorio Dauster, Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, researchers, among them, Guilhon Albuquerque and of specialized journalists were introduced.

122. Cardoso, Fernando H 1993 "*Riscos e oportunidades*" in *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro) January 12th.

123. Cardoso, Fernando H 1993 "*Riscos e oportunidades*" in *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro) February 10th.

124. Italo Zappa, a diplomat, the executor and defender of the African policy, criticized that "it is fashionable to speak of foreign policy as an instrument to promote trade in different countries: diplomacy is not meant for salesmen [...] The Itamaraty officials must defend the country's global interests. Businessmen know too well how to take care of their business". Concerning the intention of Minister Cardoso of closing some Brazilian embassies in Africa, Zappa argued: "this is too bad for Brazil because it is based on a very poor idea, that only trading justifies embassies, [...] The main function of the Foreign Affairs Ministry is to assist the President of the Republic in the formulation of foreign policy and its implementation" (Gryzinski, Vilma 1993 "Italo Zappa: *Não somos mascates*" in *Veja* [São Paulo] March 3rd).

Brasilia¹²⁵, who objected to the declarations made by the Minister of Foreign Relations. As a consequence, the Minister had to go back on his words and he pointed to selectivity in a publication where he introduced re-appreciation of Africa:

“In Africa, our presence is already an established tradition, which we cannot deny if we do not want to ruin the invaluable capital of goodwill built by our experience in that region [...] 18 years ago we clearly opted for Africa, and this option has not and must not be changed. In this sense, the African dimension in the Brazilian foreign policy shows a great continuity in spite of the well-known domestic difficulties to obtain financing and other operative means [...] The most recent Brazilian diplomatic actions show that the attention we give Africa is still living [...] Brazil’s African policy has come of age and indeed will adapt to the variations of an international context that introduces an unprecedented load of challenges and opportunities. Adaptation does not mean stepping back but going deeper, based on a reflection supported by the continuity and maturity of our experience on that continent”¹²⁶.

In accordance with the Minister’s line of thought, the Itamaraty diplomats held that Brazil had given innumerable signs of its options in favor of Africa by siding with the African countries at the UN¹²⁷, maintaining the seventeen embassy offices when the European countries had closed theirs, and by given continuity to establishing diplomatic relations with Madagascar, Chad, Comoros and the Republic of Central Africa.

It was during the Itamar Franco Administration, in the context of selectivity, that the idea of a Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPSC) was born, associating Brazil with Portugal and the former Portuguese Colonies in Africa. Although the Minister Cardoso did not agree with the idea of the Brazilian ambassador in Portugal, José Aparecido de Oliveira, who had to go forward with negotiations with the Portuguese Speaking African Countries¹²⁸.

125. The ambassadors of fifteen African countries gathered in Brasilia showed concern over the fact that Africa was not listed among the priorities of Brazil’s foreign policy. The complaints were referred also to the absence of joint binational commissions and financing for the Brazilian exports. The embassies demanded Brazil should assume its historic responsibility for Africa (*Gazeta Mercantil*, 1993).

126. Cardoso, Fernando H 1993 “*A Africa e o Brasil*” in *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro) March 18th.

127. Making reference to the then Ambassador Sardemberg.

128. Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tome and Principe, Angola and Mozambique.

In his speech, Minister Cardoso¹²⁹ asserted: “Brazil’s foreign policy toward Africa shows the particularity of a constant concern for the Portuguese Language African Countries”. The CPSC as the initiative of President Itamar Franco confirmed:

“The diversity of options of our diplomacy, after a universalist tradition [...] Forums and co-operation mechanisms are not exclusive but indeed complementary. There is no incompatibility between the political stimulus to the cooperation resulting from a common identity because of shared language and culture and the economic and commercial obligations from relations with other groups [...] The CPSC enjoys a clear vocation for agreements and political consultancy, destined to give our countries an additional instrument to coordinate their positions concerning the issues on the international agenda”¹³⁰.

The Minister justified the privileged treatment the CPSC received within Africa and the preference for Angola when he remarked that “the strong Brazilian presence in Angola is reflected in important works, such as the construction of the Capanda hydroelectric dam, oil and diamond exploitation, and the important infrastructure projects”¹³¹.

During the Cardoso Administration, when Minister of Foreign Affairs Lampreia travelled to Luanda, the Head of the Africa II Office at Itamaraty¹³² reported: “Brazil means to keep Angola on the international agenda and the recommendation of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso is that Angola be a major partner and that we must continue to help pacify that country”¹³³.

129. Cardoso, Fernando H 1993 “*A Africa e o Brasil*” in *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro) March 18th.

130. Cardoso, Fernando H 1993 “*A Africa e o Brasil*” in *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro) March 18th.

131. Also the press reported that the Brazilian company Avibrás would sell rockets to the MPLA. As *Veja* (1993), close advisor of President Itamar Franco, reported, “Selling rockets was approved by the President after being informed that Itamaraty, the Army, the Joint Chiefs of the Armed Forces and the Department of Strategy and Logistics had given their favorable opinion.

132. *Jornal do Brasil*, 1999 “*Lampreia em Luanda pedira paz*” (Rio de Janeiro) May 29th.

133. Angola was held a strategic area to broaden Brazilian’s interests in Africa because of its reserves in diamonds and oil. At that time, Brazilian public and private companies had 1.2 billion dollars invested in the former Portuguese Colony. Braspetro, Furnas Centrais Elétricas and Odebrecht were the main investors, with business in oil distribution, hydroelectric power transmission systems from Capanda, and also with basic sanitary infrastructure and housing. Angola still owes 1 billion dollars to Brazil, 45% of which are annually rescheduled and paid for with oil.

Mozambique welcomed the first Brazilian peace corps as part of the ONUMOZ in July 1994, authorized by President Franco, at an estimated cost of \$US 40 m. Similarly, Brazil supported the democratization and pacifying process in that country and strengthened technical co-operation.

According to the permanent representative before the UN, Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg:

“Brazil played an especially relevant role in the negotiations on Angola and Mozambique. The Brazilian viewpoint, in line with the strong historical ties binding the two countries, was crucial for the Security Council to reach a decision in accordance with their local situation and with the interests in favor of peace and democracy”¹³⁴ (Sardenberg, 1994).

The second Foreign Minister of President Franco, Celso Amorim, followed along the same lines:

“We have endeavored and made our relations with the African Continent modern and realistic. For a long time, these relations were rather related to the demands of history and a generous impulse, although not always well approached concerning those countries with strong ethnic and cultural affinity with us [...] The idea of a Portuguese Language Community means not only a re-appreciation of our ties with Portugal, today part of the powerful European Union, but also a natural twofold priority we have always given the African continent [...] a new space for political consensus [...] On this basis and on the geographical axis that binds us to the South Atlantic, the Brazilian diplomacy also means to give special attention to the other countries in Southern Africa, where are found the continent’s largest natural resources, a suitable services infrastructure and a significant concentration of economic, trade and financial interests”¹³⁵.

With Cardoso as President, the traditional “developmentalist” approach of the Brazilian foreign policy was substituted by new neo-liberal ideas not free of criticism by the “nationalist” wing that defended the State and were not enjoying their best moment. The new president, like Collor de Mello, planned to lead the country in the direction of the developed world. The Third World approach was regarded obsolete and anachronistic. The president also announced his intention to personally involve in foreign

134. Sardenberg, Ronaldo Mota 1994 “*A diplomacia brasileira tem participação ativa na ONU*” in *Folha de São Paulo* (São Paulo) December 18th.

135. Amorim, Celso 1994 “*O Brasil e a África*” in *Jornal do Brasil*, February 2nd.

policy, starting a period that was qualified as *Presidentialist Diplomacy*¹³⁶. According to Lampreia,

“The function that the President has reserved for diplomacy is derived from his own idea of Brazilian development and the role that his own term in office must play in consolidating economic stability and the recovery of growth. When he was in Itamaraty, he said that it was not possible to separate foreign policy from domestic policy, that greater integration was necessary with other governmental areas, with civil society, with unions and with businessmen so that all and everybody can have more participation in formulating foreign policy”¹³⁷.

Then, Africa does not appear among the priorities of the new administration¹³⁸. Only a few countries are occasionally mentioned, with accurate selective criterion. Although Africa was absent in foreign policy discourse, there were references made in specific circumstances; for example, when the African ambassadors gathered to celebrate Africa Day – 25 May, the day of the creation of the Organization of African Unity– or during reciprocal presidential or ministerial visits. Selectivity, therefore, advanced; discourse did not match deeds, cultural diplomacy was continued and there was an appeal to the commitment of the private sector on both sides of the Atlantic.

The above-mentioned idea is clearly perceived in the position adopted by the Foreign Affairs Minister under President Cardoso, Luiz Lampreia, in 1996, which sums up Brazil’s stance. Following, two quotes *in extenso*:

“Africa is a privileged irreplaceable space for Brazilian Diplomacy. We are a global actor in international relations and have a strong presence in Africa –a most solid one among the developing countries outside the region– and a busy agenda for the Continent [...] We are more adequately equipping some of the diplomatic missions in Africa, restructuring embassy corps for greater efficiency and establishing diplomatic relations with seven African countries with which we held no relations before [...] We are approaching the OAU with the determination to more closely support the political reality and cooperation on

136. Lampreia, Luiz Felipe 1995 “*Calendário da diplomacia presidencial em 1995*” in *O Globo* (Rio de Janeiro) March 11th.

137. *Jornal do Brasil* 1995 “*Ação global*” (Rio de Janeiro).

138. “Among our priorities, there certainly are the consolidation of MERCOSUR, relations with our Latin American neighbors and the hemispheric integration process, relations with the three poles of the world’s economic power, Asia/Pacific and the three continental countries, implementation of the WTO, human rights and the environment, the reform of the United Nations and the protection of Brazilians abroad” (Lampreia, Luiz Felipe 1995 “*A política externa do governo*” in *Jornal do Brasil*, January 8th).

that continent, and better know the forms of regional and sub-regional interaction” (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1996).

“An African policy that exhibits political, economic and cooperation results is based on numerous identity factors between Brazil and Africa and on the cultural and ethnic contribution of the African continent to our background as a sovereign independent nation –not to mention the material wealth built by the African labor– [...] Our diplomatic actions reflect it with facts [...] Through the Brazilian Cooperation Agency and the participation of the Brazilian private sector we endeavor to promote more active cooperation with some African countries [...] We have given the African countries cooperation to extent our possibilities allow it –which, quite honestly, differ greatly from those prevailing over the seventies and start of the eighties, when objective conditions permitted to offer various African countries subsidized credits–. Today, conditions have changed both in Brazil and in Africa. We must face up to reality. We wish to have associations binding both parties in a common creative effort to develop relations; we want associations that encourage governments and the economic agents on both sides, because international relations at present necessarily entail a considerable degree of private initiative”¹³⁹.

In spite of the promising speech by Minister Lampreia, Brazil’s economic and financial constraints meant a severe limitation that reduced actions in Africa to a few countries, using the existing opportunity niches. This is why Itamaraty tried to privilege political approaches with the proposal of a South Atlantic denuclearization and environmental protection treaty, in the context of the ZPCSA, as a creative practical form of keeping Africa on the foreign policy agenda.

At the same time, *cultural diplomacy* continued to permeate all official manifestations. Good examples are the words pronounced by Minister Lampreia, when a stamp celebrating Africa Day was issued in May 2000¹⁴⁰. On this occasion, the Minister repeated that Brazil was “one of the countries with the largest African descent population in the world” and remarked the value of the mutual contributions since “Africa is part and parcel of our history, because those Africans who came to Brazil brought with them a past which now is also ours and accounts for us as people and country”. The Minister treated the Brazil-Africa relations as

139. Lampreia, Luiz Felipe 1996 “Uma diplomacia afirmativa na Africa” in *Correio Brasileiro* May 11th.

140. Mention must be made of the political *beau geste* of printing a stamp celebrating the thirty-seventh anniversary of the Organization of African Unity and associate it to the same month of May when Brazil abolished slavery.

“The two essential dimensions of an irreplaceable permanent political project: the domestic one, reflecting the justified growing interest of the Brazilian society in Africa, while appreciating the Afro-Brazilian cultural matrix and roots; and the external dimension, which leads us to update and revitalize relations with the African countries from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, from Cape to Cairo” (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2000).

Notwithstanding the cultural diplomacy resorted to in his discourse, during his term of office, Cardoso had to answer the constant claims from different sectors concerning the absence of Africa in the foreign policy designs. At the Africa Day Celebration Seminar¹⁴¹, 25 May 1995, organized by the President of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, the participants were sorry there were no official or private contributions for the consolidation of exchanges between Brazilians and Africans¹⁴².

In turn, the following year, the African representatives credited in Brazil told Minister Lampraia about their concern because risk was run of “confining relations to very limited space, brushing aside areas of extreme significance as culture, technology transfer and even sports”¹⁴³.

Inviting the private sectors to participate in foreign matters and the return to democracy in Brazil were changes that favored the African descent communities and the pro-Africa groups which had had a say with Sarney and had claimed the end of diplomatic relations with South Africa. Evidence of this was the creation in 1996 of the Afro-Brazilian Businessmen Group¹⁴⁴ (*Coletivo de Empresários e Empreendedores Afro-Brasileiros –CEABRA–*), and in 1999 of Brazil-Africa Parliamentary Front (*Frente Parlamentar Brasil-África*) after a meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Task Force for reappraisal of the black race. Despite governmental selectivity, different

141. Senator Benedita da Silva, the President of the Brazil-Zaire Chamber of Commerce, the Head of the Department of International Agreements and Organisms of the Central Bank and the President of the Brazil-Africa Chamber of Commerce were present.

142. *Jornal do Brasilia* 1995 “Parceria com a Africa é elogiada pelo chanceler” (Brasilia) May 26th.

143. At that time, Prof. Nunes Pereira stated: “I do not remember any other moment in our history when there has been, as today, no Africa policy at all” (*Correio Braziliense*, 1996 “Embaixadores pedem explicações [Brasilia] May 5th).

144. The CEABRA set Maison Du Brasil (The Africa House) in Dakar the following year as a business bureau. “That association means to find opportunities and be a reference for businessmen, who wish to expand or start off their business” (*Correio Braziliense*, 1997 “O caminho mais curto para o Senegal” [Brasilia] May 18th).

groups interested in formulating an Africa policy began to be organized; Lampreia was then enabled to say that “the formulation of an Africa policy is being democratized and has extended beyond Itamaraty” (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2000).

TRADE DIMENSION

Although the approach to Africa may have meant a political strategy, the commercial dimension¹⁴⁵ was not absent; in fact, it was the most visible. According to Ambassador Saraiva Guerreiro (1992: 192), Itamaraty “always held excellent relations with the African continent, without underestimation of the potentialities of trade relations with Africa”.

As pointed out by Oliveira (1987: 32), at the beginning of the sixties, any commercial relation with the African continent was a project for future days, taking into account the almost non-existing trade with Africa¹⁴⁶. To that date, exports went to Northern Africa and the Republic of South Africa. But over that decade, a relative growth in exports is observed, with Northern Africa and South Africa as the main customers. This growth was more evident in the case of imports from Africa.

In the seventies, Africa appeared as a potential market in the framework of the rising South-South co-operation and Brazil’s international insertion strategy, characterized by diversification of interstate relations and a greater integration to the world economy¹⁴⁷. International trade grew more important in terms of the economic development model implemented, which demanded oil and equipment be imported. The Brazilian energy vulnerability meant a

145. The work by Altemani (1987) and the statistics supplied by the CACEX and the Foreign Trade Secretary of the Ministry for Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (SECEX) have been used. D’Adesky (1985) was used to complement data.

146. The trade expansion strategy materialized in July 1996 when Itamaraty decided to implement the foreign trade policy laid out by the Foreign Trade Council. In November 1966, Decree N 59067 separated two fundamental areas of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: participation in the international negotiations concerning foreign trade and the organization and implementation of trade promotion abroad. By keeping and enlarging the competency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this area, the conditions were created for Brazilian trade relations to be implemented not only economically and commercially but also to be present at the moment of negotiating political and diplomatic interests.

147. Brazil endeavored to show it was different from the industrialized powers and that it could become an advantageous partner, with an economic model to follow and a tropical-characteristic industrialization process that offered the proper intermediate technology and techniques to be shared, culturally closer to the African experience (Selcher, 1984).

stimulus to approach the oil-producing African countries. While trade relations were highly concentrated in a few countries, the relations with other countries did not reflect mutual interest.

In this decade, Brazilian exports to Africa showed a significant increase, from US\$60 million in 1970 to US\$692 million in 1979, with an average 40% share over total Brazilian exports. At the start of Médici's term, exports travelled to Northern Africa and South Africa. During Geisel's term, South Africa was less important concerning exports while Gabon, Congo and Angola began to develop their own share. There was a marked difference in exporting patterns to the African Continent, dominated now by manufactured goods because Brazil was interested in placing an industrial production way above domestic demand¹⁴⁸.

Also in this decade, especially when Médici was in office, imports turned more significant than exports in terms of the African share in oil imports (Algeria, Libya and Nigeria): from US\$ 77 million imported in 1970 to US\$ 679 million in 1974. Over these ten years, the trade balance favored Brazil only 1973, 1977, 1978 and 1979.

Relations were not confined only to trading; they were also related to selling services, technology and capital goods destined to infrastructure: hydroelectric dams' construction, highways, railways, sanitary installations, telecommunications, agriculture, and even technical staff training.

The Trade Promotion Department of Itamaraty and the Chamber of International Commerce (CACEX) had a remarkable performance in Angola and Nigeria. The creation of the Chamber was an instrument to support the African policy and the likelihood of doing business on the other side of the Atlantic. In 1978, the Afro-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce had registered 243 Brazilian companies connected with Africa. To ease export financing transactions, the Bank of Brazil opened offices in Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Gabon and Angola. Since 1977, it purchased 48% of the West Africa International Bank (WAIB) in association with the European Union of Swiss Banks. In 1978, Banco Real do Brasil set up an agency in Abidjan (Oliveira, 1987).

148. Arms' selling was very little studied for being such a sensitive information area. Brazil was one of the largest arms suppliers of Africa in the 1970s and part of the 1980s. Nigeria was the largest buyer, but –as Saraiva (1996) noted– also Gabon, Morocco, Sudan, Togo, Alto Volta and Zimbabwe bought arms.

By the 1980s, notwithstanding early opposition to the Brazilian development model, and possibly as a result of the actions implemented, the figures continued to rise and showed an average 5% in exports (with maximum 6.7% in 1985) and 6% in imports (with maximum 13.2% that same year). Between 1979 and 1980, exports to Africa doubled and continued to grow to reach a peak of US\$ 1,778 million in 1985; it later went down to half of it toward the end of the decade. Imports from Africa showed similar performance but tripled until 1985 to later went down sharply¹⁴⁹. Pereira (1985: 88) notes that by then Africa had become a services supply market, which gave impulse and consolidated goods exports and encouraged technology transfer. He also quotes the “introduction of countertrade” with Nigeria and Angola as further novelty over the period; that is to say, exchanging African oil against Brazilian goods or services, especially engineering and agricultural services. During those years, the Finex Program of the Central Bank gave financial support, administered by the CACEX. The Brazilian contribution to the Africa Development Fund (ADF)¹⁵⁰ helped the Brazilian companies to participate in public biddings and projects financed by the ADB or by both entities.

Until Figueiredo’s term, foreign trade with the African states grew significantly, with higher percentages than in the five earlier years and a positive trade balance in favor of Brazil, with exception of 1981. But with the New Republic, a contraction is observed both in exports (which went down to levels below 3% in 1988 and 1989) and in imports (which also were 3% in 1989). Brazil’s development model vulnerability and the foreign debt crisis, which affected not only Brazil but the African states as well, were reflected in the trade with Africa. As the Brazil-Africa trade flows diminished over the last years, Brazil’s African policy was objected and it was associated with a Third World without progress (Pereira y Borges, 1992).

Fasciolo (1998) thinks that cooperation, technical assistance and services supply projects were encouraged in order to compensate the falls in foreign trade; at the same time, financing contracted and funds and cooperation

149. Also it is interesting what Pereira remarks when he analyzes the Brazilian-African trade growth incidence in the context of Brazil’s total international trade. Between 1979 and 1984, the rise was 170.6%, while with the USA it was 61.9%; with Eastern Europe it was 46.4%; with Asia, 40.3%; with the Middle East, 14.8%; with the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), 6.1% and with the EEC, 1.3%.

150. As pointed out by Amegavil (1975), Brazil was one of the founding countries, with initial participation in 1975.

recipients did, too¹⁵¹. Selectivity became more evident when, in 1987, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency was created, a body that was the executing branch of the technical cooperation policy of Itamaraty; planned actions were chosen from integrated projects, and the priorities were established: the PALOP (African Portuguese Speaking Countries) and those in Southern Africa.

The efforts made were not enough though to avert the gradual decline of trade relations over the second half of the 1980s; more particularly, into the 1990s. Among the difficulties that had to be faced up, the preferential relations of the African States with Europe (Lome Conventions) were decided on transportation routes¹⁵²; the non-convertibility of African currencies; the difficulties in the balance of payments of most African countries; the oligopoly in the imports structure of those countries; market diversity and Africa's varying consumer capacity as well as the low industrialization level. The very structure of the Atlantic trade, i.e., trading commodities and oil for manufactured goods, showed an asymmetric relationship not free of criticism because of its typical colonial characteristics¹⁵³.

Over the nineties, the share of international trade with Africa dropped considering Brazil's total world exports, with an average 3.05% for exports and 3.55% for imports (see Table 14). The mentioned drop—which shows constant percentages over the decade—did not correspond with the exports figures: after a fall between 1985 and 1986, they gradually recovered to reach the values of the start of the 1980s; a high degree of partner concentration (South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Morocco) was also observed, while Angola threw erratic figures.

Two regions were active in trade relations: North and Sub-Saharan Africa. With the former, there was concentration of imports in Egypt, with an average 17.6%, although the region gradually reduced its share over total

151. Pereira and Borges (1992: 13-16) said that the Exports Promotion Program (PROEX-*Programa de Estímulo a las Exportaciones*), which replaced FINEX (Exports Financing Program) was not as “generous” in its role of technical organism.

152. Transportation was a serious problem until regular air and sea routes were established. In June 1962, Lloyd Brazil inaugurated a direct line to Africa (Lagos) upon a request by Jânio Quadros; in 1968, regular sea connections with Dakar, Monrovia, Tema, Takoradi, Lagos, Luanda and Lobito were established. Over the seventies, there were different lines to South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and West Africa. However, the absence of return cargos raised freights.

153. Calcagnotto (1980: 78-79) shows this trade as a replica of the North-South relations, with Brazil playing intermediary and acting in the interests of the North.

African trade since 1996, with 40.53% in 1990 and 13.42% in 2000. As concerns Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa, Nigeria and to a lesser extent Angola, they concentrated over 30% imports from Brazil. Over total exports, industrialized goods meant over 80% of total exports to Africa. Imports from Africa reduced their share over Brazil's total imports to almost a half and the percentages fluctuated more than with exports, which kept constant. Although the African share over the total Brazilian imports dropped, the amounts did not, and there was a recovery over the last four years of the eighties. If 1990 is taken, it may be seen that the figures quintupled over the decade. There was higher concentration of selling agents than in the exports case. The partners were virtually the same –Algeria, South Africa, Angola and Nigeria– with erratic percentages. The same as with exports, since 1996 the North Africa countries reduced their share over total imports over the decade, with 42.72% in 1990 and 5.27% in 2000.

When examining the performance of the CPSC, it may be seen that except for Angola and its oil exports, trade was scant. This is relevant data as in the nineties those countries were the target of a multilateral political cooperation diplomacy on the part of Brazil, but without economic-commercial purposes.

As regards the SADC countries, with a probable association with MERCOSUR as part of the Brazilian and South African discourse toward the end of the decade, the figures were not significant, with the exception of those already quoted for South Africa and Angola. The region was more relevant as purchaser than as seller, with relatively important erratic figures in Mozambique, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

To conclude, it may be interesting to resume the words of Ambassador José Vicente de Sá Pimentel when he spoke about the difficulties to increase trade with the African States. In his opinion, there are generic problems that the corporations of all countries involved have to face, and also the specific problems of the Brazilian companies in their effort to compete with international firms (Pimentel, 2000). The former refers to the recurrent political and economic instability in most African countries, i.e. the “Africa Cost”¹⁵⁴. The specific problems of Brazilian businessmen were linked to

154. This is referred to the extra investment cost required to solve structural deficiencies, such as insecurity, poor financing, health and transport and communications systems, low productivity of the local human resources and the high levels of corruption. Also, the

subjective issues such as mutual disinformation and the African preference for the European companies and their products, the few direct connections between Brazil and Africa, incorrect practices (protectionism, subsidies and market preferences) to the detriment of Brazilian companies and the deficient credit and insurance mechanisms for exporting Brazilian goods and services.

In this respect, it should be noted that the difficulties mentioned by the Director General of the Africa and Near East Department, Pimentel, were the same already pointed out before the nineties. This shows that there had not been substantial changes in the relations with Africa and that trade did not appear to be the only *leit motiv* of the Brazilian approach. However, a growingly relevant area in intra-South Atlantic relations, such as the services selling sector, has not been deeply analyzed probably because of the difficulties in finding statistics that may reflect the overall dimension of the situation.

Some comparisons can now be established with Argentina, whose impulses were aimed mainly to increase exports. Concerning the trade amounts with the African states, important differences can be found between Brazil and Argentina, among 1960 and 1990, although the eighties showed higher figures in both cases. However, these differences were not so relevant if Africa's share over global trade in both countries is measured.

With respect to exports, the Brazilian amounts were higher and even more erratic in the eighties. From 1973 to 1985, the growth was constant and multiplied almost ten times, showing the highest figures between 1980 and 1985. Argentine exports fluctuated less and a marked increase was started in 1974 –in coincidence with Brazil–, which was sustained over the 1980s. The period throwing the highest amounts coincided with that in Brazil. But, the difference between Brazil and Argentina in imports was much bigger than in exports. Imports growth in Brazil coincided with its exports increase. Argentina's imports were reduced and showed erratic figures, with some remarkable cases in 1974 and 1981. The kind of goods traded is also a relevant feature. Brazil bought mainly oil from Africa and increasingly sold manufactured products, while Argentina bought and sold commodities (oil and metallurgic minerals were imported and meat and grains were exported).

reduction of foreign assistance –incapable of responding to the investment needs on that continent and the impossible to- repay heavy foreign debt–, among other reasons, because income from traditional exports fell due to the deterioration of the price of commodities.

Finally, in the nineties Brazilian and Argentinean trade with the African countries increased although in the case of Brazil its world trade percentages did not. Exports were rather uniform while Brazil differed from Argentina in the imported amounts (see Tables 1 and 2), which was reflected in the balance of trade. Since 1996, Brazil showed a growingly negative balance while Argentina's was positive. With South Africa, conditions were similar, with negative balance for Brazil one half of the decade but reverted over the last two years. Argentina threw only a negative balance in 1993.

The African partners had been basically the same ones with Brazil and Argentina, but North Africa was more important as seller to Brazil (Algeria's oil) and as purchaser from Argentina. In other words, South Africa was more important for Argentina than it was for Brazil as exporter, even considering general trade with Africa, regardless of the amounts, which were higher in Brazil.

In both cases, there was higher partner concentration in importing than in exporting. Concerning Brazilian exports, North Africa bought some 30% and the rest went to Nigeria and South Africa (with percentages around 17%). Argentina sold about 50% to North Africa and the rest to South Africa (25%) and Nigeria (3%). As regards Brazilian imports, Algeria threw a relevant share, between 30% and 40%, and the remaining 40% was distributed among Angola, Nigeria and South Africa while Argentina bought mainly from South Africa.

STRATEGY AND SECURITY DIMENSIONS

Along with the emergence of an African policy in Brazil, the security dimension played a role in Quadro's "*Independent Foreign Policy*". The Brazilian presence on the Atlantic Coast of Africa may have offset the Soviet influence in the region; it was a unique opportunity for Brazil to fill the vacuum left by the colonial powers (Saraiva, 1996: 65). But the 1964 coup d'état and the particular perspective of the military sector, especially the Navy's one, laid stress on the geopolitical dimension of the Atlantic and prioritized the "white" Atlantic, i.e. South Africa and the Portuguese Colonies, because Black Africa was vulnerable to the communist influence. At the same time, the idea of an Afro-Portuguese-Brazilian community settled in, with the participation of the Portuguese Colonies in Africa as the way to increase Brazil's power.

This stage, however, lasted as long as Castello Branco was in power. With Costa e Silva, Itamaraty returned to the objectives of “*the Diplomacy of Prosperity*” which stressed the nationalist aspirations of self-sustainable development.

The geopolitical perceptions were redirected in order to maintain the Brazilian influence on the Atlantic through peaceful political means, without interference of foreign powers or collective security agreements, and economically by not neglecting trade and the vested interests.

The conversations concerning the possibility of creating a South Atlantic Treaty Organization did not reach a happy ending, especially because of the opposition of Admiral Flores. However, such a vacuum in the Atlantic area would be filled with the idea and later creation of a Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic. As was remarked in Chapter II, the ZPCSA was a Brazilian initiative in the 1980s to prevent growing militarization of the South Atlantic given the participation of extra-regional powers and the increasing conflicts in South Africa. Following the Foreign Minister:

“The ZPCSA aimed to keep the South Atlantic a zone free of nuclear arms, tensions and conflicts derived from the East-West confrontation, preserving the region as the permanent axis of peaceful union and cooperation between the Latin American and the African countries” (Sodre, 1996: 321).

Mourão (1988: 56) thought the objective was:

“A search of the South Atlantic identity as a region; a political identity which would help to promote, intensify and extend the existing cooperation and political ties, to further economic and social development, environmental protection, the conservation of resources and preservation of peace and security in the region”.

Although this project had been thought out in the context of the Cold War, at the time of the East-West conflict, it was different from the proposals of the former decade, with respect to the creation of a military force for defense. In the 1980s, with democratic governments now in power in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, the proposal attempted to transform the South Atlantic into a “non-nuclear zone”¹⁵⁵. Nevertheless, the concern with

155. Very good sources at Itamaraty said that Brazil did not intend to transform the resolution into a treaty. It only wanted the UN to give support when the Secretary-General reported on

military security in the South Atlantic region was not the only *leit motiv* of the Brazilian initiative. Itamaraty needed to give new impetus to its Africa policy and thought it had to take innovative economic measures, in order to neutralize the disadvantages of being located so very far away from the main economic centers, with greater intra-regional trade as compensation.

In the nineties, the changes on the international scenario and the end of the East-West conflict did away with the main reasons for the creation of the mentioned zone. Because the South Atlantic had lost the strategic-military relevance that it had enjoyed during the Cold War, and the zone lacked the legal institutional framework required, the initiative was virtually abandoned.

It was in 1992 that Brazil gave new impulse to the idea and backed cooperation across the Atlantic, in the framework of an updated ZPCSA. Consequently, naval cooperation made progress with the Navy's activities and there was relevant participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. According to Foreign Minister Cardoso, the Brazilian initiative for the ZPCSA was launched again because, although international circumstances had changed since it had been created, "the zone enjoys different purposes which can and must be stimulated for the benefit of the original objectives: protection of the sea, the celebration of a nuclear ban treaty, cooperation in sports, and trade expansion"¹⁵⁶.

As can be inferred, that was the agenda suggested for the Meeting in Brasilia in 1994, where the South Atlantic Nuclear Ban Declaration, Protection of the Sea, and the South Atlantic Trade Co-operation Declaration were adopted, and a Permanent Commission was established. But, as usual with this kind of organizations with such ample scope, there was a considerable gap between the governments' words and deeds.

At the Sommerset West Meeting in South Africa in 1996, the flaws mentioned were introduced by the representative for Brazil, Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, who urged governments to make decisions. The ideas introduced in Brasilia to further economic cooperation, combat drug-trafficking, introduce protection of the sea and illegal fishing controls were more deeply dealt with. In Buenos Aires, in 1998, Sardenberg again insisted

the South Atlantic situation. It was also clearly manifested that neither would it be transformed into a military alliance between the countries in the region.

156. Cardoso, Fernando H 1993 "A Africa e o Brasil" in *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro) March 18th.

on the need to make progress and overcome the drawbacks of the previous years:

“The principles and the ideals that motivated the creation of the ZPCSA still hold. There is an enormous cooperation potential between our countries, which has remained with us no matter the incidental difficulties that must be faced [...]. Realistically and without raising too many expectations, we must find the ways to give cooperation in the zone more substantial support” (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1998).

Notwithstanding the good intentions and the marked interest shown by Brazil in favor of South-South cooperation, this agenda was so very wide and varied that common activities were required with respect to well-defined objectives, which should be limited to what was feasible, while the political support of the governments of the member states should be obtained.

Bilaterally, the Navy promoted the development of activities with the African states of the West Coast:

“It is clear that the efforts to strengthen relations with the Navy of the other countries on the Atlantic Coast would grant a reasonable capacity for collective deterrence and a certain degree of control to prevent the misuse and overexploitation of the natural resources. The maintenance of close naval relations could also contribute to general development in the region and to help reach the common objective shared by the countries that ratified the UN resolution on the ZPCSA” (Da Silva, 1995: 226).

Counter-Admiral Miguel Angelo Davena¹⁵⁷, the Strategy Vice-Chief of the Joint Chiefs of the Navy Staff, made the concrete actions explicit; he also remarked that such activities were part of the Navy’s budget, according to the instructions given by the Ministry of Foreign Relations.

Concerning peace-keeping operations, Brazil demonstrated its commitment to help pacify Angola with the three missions sent over the 1990s –UNAVEM I (United Nation Angola Verification Mission); UNAVEM II and UNAVEM III– with military and police observers, medical equipment and medical care from the Army, observers to electoral

157. “Brazil has naval attachés in the region; there is exchange of officers and support to sailing; along with participation in the UN peace-keeping operations, Angolans were offered different courses and fellowships in Brazil; the Navy had a support program for developing the Navy of the Namibia Defense Forces and a Sea Training Program related to the Merchant Navy with students in the professional and advanced training cycles” (*Centro de Estudos Estratégicos* 1996: 8).

processes and engineering companies¹⁵⁸. Additionally, between July 1977 and June 1999, a medical mission was sent to the United Nations Observation Mission in Angola (MONUA) to supervise and execute the pending tasks stated in the Peace Protocol of Lusaka. Also, there was collaboration with military observers and medical units in the United Nations Observation Mission in Uganda and Rwanda (UNOMUR) between June 1993 and September 1994, in order to check the illegal circulation of people and goods on the frontier between the two countries, and in the observation mission of the UN in Liberia (UNOMIL), among September 1993 and September 1997, to monitor and execute the tasks foreseen in the Cotonou Peace Agreement of 25 July 1993. On the other hand, during December 1992 and December 1994, they also participated in the United Nations Mozambique Operations (ONUMOZ)¹⁵⁹ to implement the General Peace Agreement of Rome, 4 October 1992; a civilian mission with eleven observers to electoral processes was sent to South Africa, the United Nations Observation Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA), to help monitor elections in April 1994¹⁶⁰.

Brazil developed important peace-keeping operations in Africa and sent Angola one of its largest contingents in forty years. Quantitatively and qualitatively, this display of forces can be contrasted with the much publicized Argentina's missions who, although diversified, were more limited.

It may be stated that Brazil held an incrementalist policy with the African countries, which was developed over time and gained in experience until a limit was met in the nineties because recourses were not enough and domestic problems in the African countries persisted. It was a pragmatic policy linked to the national interest as guiding principle in the framework of global designs. As earlier on there had not been relations with these new states, the required conditions had to be created by way of different

158. 240 Brazilian military of the Brazilian Engineering Company and Peace Corps sailed to Angola on two vessels on 24 August 1995 to perform a diversified job: "a group will build a highway between Rwanda and Ulige, another will be responsible for clearing the minefields" (*Jornal do Brasil*, 1995 "Brasil vai enviar nova força de paz à África" [Rio de Janeiro] August 9th).

159. In July 1994, Brazil sent the ship "Ceará" with 120 parachutists from the Army; the Navy Frigate "Defensora" with sailors escorting it and the tanker ship "Gastão Motta" (*O Globo*, 1994, Rio de Janeiro, July 4th).

160. See the interesting work by Fontoura (1999) for a study of Brazil and Peace-Keeping Operations.

aggregated political actions. Africa, for Brazil, meant a political rather than a business partner, except in particular cases when conditions were favorable; for example, with Nigeria.

In the nineties, policy continued to be pragmatic but also began to be selective; according to the new international conditions, trade diplomacy was also developed. With the CPSC states, except for Angola, there was a continuation of political diplomacy. With South Africa, the new relationship combined both political and commercial interests.

In Argentina, the impulses did not accompany a global strategy; they were mainly connected to the need for new markets, and an active trade policy was not implemented. The closest relations with the African states exhibiting a policy design occurred during the Alfonsín Administration, but they were also later reduced to an impulse with the incoming administration. Over the nineties, there were no policy designs for the region, except with South Africa; they were again linked to the economic and commercial interests and brought about some results.

Chapter V

Argentina and South Africa: Dual Policy and Ambiguous Relations (1960-1983)

ARGENTINA-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS did not exactly correspond with the relations pattern predominant in Argentine-African relations. Although South Africa, like the other African states selected, was the object of impulses originated in Argentina –especially the trade impulses, and always as an important partner in this respect– there were fluctuations concerning the political dimension, and the strategic-military area acquired special importance. Consequently, the South African policy adopted by Argentina until the Alfonsín Administration varied according to the vested interests and the ideological orientation of the groups in power over the periods under consideration.

Additionally, in this particular case, there were mutual impulses, as far as many important initiatives originated in South Africa and were welcomed in Buenos Aires. As Moneta (1983) pointed out, domestically the military sector and part of the diplomatic corps and private exporting sector showed empathy with the South African regime.

In spite of the apartheid regime in Pretoria, the ideological dimension, overlapped with the strategic-military aspects, conditioned the relations of the successive military governments in Argentina, inclined to pay attention to the South African proposals without consideration of the domestic variables.

In this chapter, after a very short reference to the South Africa context, the most fruitful moments of bilateral relations between the South African apartheid and the military regime in power in Argentina between 1976 and 1983 will be dealt with, and the security dimension will be prioritized. After examining the Alfonsín Administration, the bilateral trade relations which were not connected to other dimensions will be approached within the broader framework of the period 1960-1989.

THE SOUTH AFRICA CONTEXT

The central problem in South Africa and, therefore, the central problem for the development of relations with Pretoria was its racial discrimination policy. During the colonial period, and after the defeat of the Boers toward the end of the XIXth Century, the first discriminatory laws¹⁶¹ arrived with the British. When the parliament of the recently created South Africa Union (1910) began to legislate with discriminatory criterion, the first black response was organized; the South African Native National Congress was created in 1912 and in 1925 it was re-named African National Congress.

After World War II, the South Africa Union, which had fought alongside with the allies, was welcomed by the international community and participated in the creation of the UN. The South African Prime Minister, General Ian Smuts, had remarkably helped found the organization and was one of the co-authors of the Preamble to the Charter of the UN (Vilalva y Gala: 2001).

With the victory of the National Party, in 1948 the South Africa Union started the construction of a new racist-institutional-juridical architecture¹⁶², based on the apartheid doctrine¹⁶³, which advocated the supremacy of the white race and segregation of the native populations and the Indian-origin communities. Apartheid was against the clock of history because it consolidated at the same time that the decolonization process was starting. The African continent, formerly in the hands of the British, French, Belgium and Portuguese, now turned into a group of new independent states. As racial discrimination deepened, domestic tension increased and, along with it, the international isolation of Pretoria, with varying intensity according to the periods in the East-West conflict.

The successive South African governments were concerned with justifying and implementing a political development pattern around racial discrimination. This policy caused greater external pressure, despite certain

161. The 1913 Black Land Act and the Black Urban Act of 1923.

162. The main legislation referred, in 1949, to the prohibition of mixed marriages and, in 1950, to the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act along with other complementary laws organized work constraints and kept jobs and preferences for the white.

163. The Apartheid system created by the nationalist Afrikaners was the result of a combination of European political colonial tradition, Calvinist theology, some patriarchal ideas and pretended technical and cultural advantages that a White South Africa was entitled to.

oscillations linked to the evolution of the international order. The South African policy reflected a challenge-response dichotomy: as the domestic and the external challenges to the prevailing order grew more important and the crisis turned deeper, the Pretoria government was forced to make adjustments and, finally, to change radically (Lechini, 1994).

The mentioned pressures also forced Pretoria to modify the arguments, from emphasis on racial superiority to the rights of the different groups involved, remarking the rights of the white to a separate identity and control over their own destiny. In order to stress the “South African mutinationalism”, in the 1970s, the homelands or Bantustans¹⁶⁴ were implemented, on the one hand; on the other, self-governed independent states were created¹⁶⁵.

It was in this context that South Africa’s foreign policy was strongly subject to the survival of the “white” State with the limitations set by an international order conditioning the country’s international insertion to domestic policy changes. The government of the National Party saw South Africa as part of the western hemisphere, its values, its economic system and its security concerns. South Africa would, then, become the bridge between Africa and the West, as the stronghold to ward off communist advance in the region. Although this position did not get the expected international support, South Africa was allowed to join the international economic system through growing trade flows, capital and technology. The industrialized nations tried to distinguish between economic and political relations and adopted positions closer to a combination of caution and political detachment from Pretoria, with a low profile and, since 1985, imposing limited sanctions.

Because the anti-apartheid groups considered such a position lukewarm, they sought for adherents to their cause in the international organizations where the Third World countries represented the majority. For the first time in the UN in 1952, racial discrimination in the South Africa Union was reported; it had been the Arab and Asian countries that had introduced the issue. But it was in the 1960s when the increasing international isolation process started, as the new independent African and

164. The homelands were structured around Black South African nations. Between 1960 and 1985, three and a half million blacks were relocated in ten different Bantustans with their own governmental institutions, parliament and constitution.

165. Transkei, Ciskei, Bophutastwana and Venda (TCBV) were not given recognition by the international community as independent states.

Asian nations joined the UN and demanded sanctions to be implemented. Consequently, South Africa was separated from the Commonwealth but continued to be a member of the United Nations; in 1974, the General Assembly turned down the credentials of the delegation sent by Pretoria. Therefore, international pressure and sanctions grew, especially since the mid-1980s. In Chapter VI, this issue will be discussed more specifically when dealing with the foreign and domestic contexts President Alfonsín had to face and decided to break diplomatic relations with South Africa.

Increasing international isolationism led South Africa to be regarded as a “pariah State” and made the apartheid government seek alternative forms of international insertion. It was during that period that South Africa was brought near the military-governed Latin American countries, with no respect for human rights and inclined to interpret the world in terms of the East-West conflict.

ARGENTINA AND SOUTH AFRICA: PREFERENTIAL PARTNERS?

President Alfonsín government marked the first turning point in the relationship between Argentina and South Africa, when diplomatic relations were broken. Until then a dual and ambiguous policy was implemented.

The dual policy is referred to the differences exhibited between multilateral and bilateral fields. Internationally, Argentina backed condemnation of apartheid, but, at the same time, held regular bilateral relations with the Pretoria government. According to Archibaldo Lanús (1984: 389), “multilaterally, Argentina’s attitude has been to condemn apartheid with energy, but it did not support measures that might harm the sovereignty of states; domestically, it sought out understanding between the parties”. Since the 1970s, Argentina gave support in favor of condemning South Africa: the measures concerned breaking political, diplomatic and trade relations, in particular, arms selling, and stopping cultural and sports relations.

The mentioned proclaimed position did not agree with bilateral relations, which occasionally enjoyed fruitful instances. There was “conviviality” with South Africa, raising or lowering the profile depending on the various perceptions of the different governments in office. In general terms, the orientation of the regime moderately conditioned the bilateral relations profile. With the military governments, bilateral relations with South Africa improved, while dual policy was stressed with democratic

administrations. But breaking relations with Pretoria was never a point of discussion.

The first contacts between South Africa and Argentina can be traced back to the Boer War (1899-1902), when Argentina supplied the British troops with meat (Fig, 1979). Trade was maintained until 1907, when a South African company involved in business in Argentina sold its shares to an American company. The second contact was by way of the Afrikaners that emigrated and settled in Patagonia after the defeat of the British. To make their return possible, a consular office was opened in Buenos Aires in 1938; ten years later that representation was enlarged and in 1960 the embassy was created, and an ambassador appointed. Between 1947 and 1960, formal diplomatic relations were strengthened; they were established 10 September 1947 in Washington by way of the exchange of notes by both representatives. The representation settled in Pretoria since 1950 was granted the category of embassy, 30 November 1960, by Argentina.

During the 1960s, with growing international isolationism, South Africa designed its outward policy, which included a change on how South Africa considered Latin American countries. This may be explained in terms of the relative failure concerning the European and American response with respect to South Africa's self-attributed role as anti-communist stronghold and main ally of the West in Africa. At that time, the political evolution of many Latin American countries toward authoritarian regimes raised expectations in Pretoria, which favored those countries which could contribute to the defense of the Atlantic coast of South Africa. South Africa not only considered the strategic variable; it also considered Latin America in relation to markets and investment opportunities, to neutralize the increasing isolationism. Therefore, the strategic and trade dimensions converged in the South African offensive oriented to South America and Argentina.

According to Leysens (1992), it was the composition of the Embassy Staff in Buenos Aires that evidenced the key role the South African interests played in Latin America. With the diplomatic corps, there was also a defense attaché; another for agriculture; trade, mining and information counsellors; and a third secretary for trade issues. In this context, the South Africa Minister of Foreign Relations, Hilgard Muller, and the Trade and Industry Secretary, Kotzemberg, visited Argentina in July 1966. The military takeover that overthrew constitutional President Illia had already taken place in Buenos Aires, and General Juan Carlos Onganía was now the new president. Muller

expressed they had been pleasantly welcomed because both sides enjoyed anti-communist credentials.

The year 1969 was rich in relations. In May, the South African Foreign Minister returned to Buenos Aires and met Argentina's Defense Minister. They held conversations about the common threat both had to confront on the South Atlantic, which justified the need for an Atlantic alliance¹⁶⁶. This visit was reciprocated that same year by the Chief of the Argentine Navy, Admiral Pedro Gnavi, and by the Minister of Information and Tourism, Federico Frischknecht. The 1960s gradually consolidated relations between the respective Navies¹⁶⁷, a very important aspect in bilateral relations in terms of continuity, at some moments explicitly and at others in an underlying manner. On the other hand, relating to trade, in September 1997, an Argentine mission presided by the International Economic Relations Secretary, Alberto Fraguío, went to South Africa.

This initial enthusiasm of the military government faded out over the three years of democratic administration (1973-1976), when pressure was exerted to reduce relations with Pretoria and there was a comeback of duality and ambiguity. Resolutions against South Africa were supported over those years as far as multilateral relations were concerned; the political profile was lowered, but tourist and trade relations were encouraged while the military interests remained untouched. The Argentine discourse held that the political profile had been lowered in the relations with South Africa and activities related to back the regime were not encouraged. In 1973, Resolution 3.151 G establishing economic, commercial, diplomatic and financial measures to make South Africa remove apartheid was voted for; but at the same time Aerolíneas Argentinas inaugurated regular flights Buenos Aires-Cape Town and South African Airways set up business in Buenos Aires. That year, Argentine exports to South Africa reached 24.38% over total exports to the continent, in the second place, while imports stood for 16.13% over total imports from Africa, also in second place.

In 1973, Argentina joined the Non-Aligned as full member and it was intended that relations with the African countries should improve. In 1974 the Foreign Affairs Ministry announced that the Embassy in Cape Town

166. The idea of a South Atlantic Treaty –perhaps because Great Britain had abandoned Simonstown base– had been formulated by the then South African Prime Minister John Vorster, with the purpose of patrolling the Cape route.

167. According to Hurrel (1983), in 1966 an exchange of Argentine and South African Navy Staffs was agreed on.

would remain under the direction of an “ad interim *chargé d'affairs*” but it was remarked that this decision would not affect the economic interests of the country. It was also pointed out that “the objectives of the Armed Forces are always taken into consideration as far as the defense of the South Atlantic is concerned” (*Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto*, 1976: 90). Together with the signature of the Convention on Elimination and Punishment of Apartheid, 4 June 1975, tourist and sports relations with South Africa became more frequent¹⁶⁸.

The ambiguous policy concerns Argentina’s absence of definition when it was pressured to define a position between Africa and South Africa. In spite of the manifested interests of Argentina in favor of Sub-Saharan Africa, to a certain extent consistent with the “dual policy”, Buenos Aires implemented a policy of evasion with respect to the African states. This policy meant not defining any drastic position toward Pretoria and ignoring the African demands of breaking any and all relations with the white South African government, an issue ever present on the African countries foreign agendas.

To understand this position, suffice it to remember that Argentina was not the only nation that supported this ambiguous policy, which, with different nuances, became the most generalized form of relationship with the African countries. Brazil also developed an ambiguous policy which took shape since the mid-1970s, as relations with the African nations were strengthened. Chile¹⁶⁹ and Paraguay, under military rules, were stable reliable partners for Pretoria. The main developed countries proceeded according to their global interests, combining their economic-commercial aspirations with their strategic perception of the East-West conflict.

DEEPER BILATERAL RELATIONS DURING THE LAST MILITARY REGIME IN ARGENTINA

It is no surprise that the most fruitful moment in bilateral relations, the most intense impulse, took place during the last military government in power (1976-1983). Coincidences with South Africa were important: both

168. In violation of the United Nations Resolution 2775 (XXVI), 29 November 1971, which, among other resolutions, established a sports boycott on South Africa. At about the same time, a woman official from the Mining Department traveled to Johannesburg to exchange technical information.

169. Muñoz (1986) offers a very interesting analysis of the Chilean-South African relations.

governments were internationally isolated because of their policy against human rights (the “dirty war” in Argentina and Apartheid in South Africa), and both thought of themselves as advocates of the western values in the South Atlantic region *vis-à-vis* a common enemy: international communism.

During the successive military governments over this period –except for a short time when Viola was at the helm, with Foreign Relations Minister Oscar Camilión– in general

“the formulation of a comprehensive vision of the country’s external interests which could link the foreign policy components to a global strategy was absent; it was perhaps the result of a predominantly reactive attitude before the events that had taken place, and not of the generation of international conditions favorable to the country” (Peña, 1983: 146).

It was the kind of foreign policy connected to geopolitical and national security issues, decontextualized from the new international order conditions, in a world more interdependent and complex. It subscribed to the West and to western values; belonging to the Third World and to the Non-Aligned remained pure formality, only to be found in diplomatic speeches.

Together with the militarization of foreign policy, three separate action and decision levels were designed: the first level related to military diplomacy, in charge of the corresponding commanders-in-chief; the second was reserved to the Minister (not the Ministry) of Economics; the third one, residual in content, to the Foreign Relations Ministry, displaced from the central role it should play since it was the pertinent area for dealing with foreign issues foreign (Pérez Llana, 1984).

This context favored the governmental as well as the private flows with South Africa; the military relations were consolidated with the shared purpose of fighting off international communism. The response to the South African approach was encouraged by the Argentine military governments, with whom South Africa found “minimum tactical and strategic coincidences, potentially capable of establishing cooperative action around specific points” (Moneta, 1980: 103). Consequently, “high Navy officers predominantly participated in determining the political line to be followed concerning South Africa; the geopolitical variable, then, became more relevant” (Moneta, 1983: 133).

Former Minister Caputo had already pointed out that “during the de facto government that came to an end in 1983, relations with South Africa

were of considerable importance not only from the point of view of trade but also politically,” and “the rulers of those days maintained close relations with the South African government, in view to the creation of what at that time was known as the South Atlantic Treaty”¹⁷⁰.

A common enemy was reason enough to develop bilateral cooperation, especially as concerned the Armed Forces, in particular, both Navies. Suffice it to remember that during the first stage of the military regime (1976-1978), the Navy had control over the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Argentina. Ministers César Guzzetti and Oscar Montes belonged to that force and, of course, gave priority to their loyalties. On the other hand, as mentioned by Russell (1990), Admiral Massera intended to use the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the launching pad for his own political ambitions and as instrument to broaden the power of the Navy, implementing a parallel diplomacy.

Nevertheless, despite this new military bilateral impulse, dual policy continued to be implemented. Multilaterally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs persisted in its racial discrimination criticism, supported the international organizations resolutions and defined its position in the national press broadcasts. For example, when the “Military Process” was in full power, in Buenos Aires it was announced:

“On the International Day for Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Argentine government once again wishes to reaffirm its traditional position against any form of racial discrimination, in conformity with the present constitutional principles, the international practice maintained since the birth of independence and the declarations and resolutions of the United Nations”¹⁷¹.

It may be noted that in this declaration there did not appear any explicit allusion to South Africa, which reveals great care not to interfere with the rapprochement policy being carried out by the military diplomacy.

Accordingly, it may well be understood why, during the last military government, political and strategic relations with South Africa overlapped, very often giving priority to the latter. This explains why the initiative for the creation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) was so very appealing to the military in power. In Buenos, 9 April 1976, a meeting of

170. *La Razón*, 1985 “*Caputo calificó de sumamente delicado el tema de una posible ruptura con Sudáfrica*” (Buenos Aires) August 17th.

171. *La Nación*, 1978 “*Posición Argentina sobre discriminación*” (Buenos Aires) March 21st.

American, Argentine and Brazilian top-level Navy officers took place (Moneta, 1980). This project aimed to defend the South Atlantic from the communist threat by gathering together the naval power of its members. Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, South Africa and, eventually, Chile, would form part of a common front to face up Soviet penetration in the South Atlantic, which was supported by the booming marxist regimes on both African coasts. Soviet presence in the African continent and the proliferation of Soviet fishing boats in the Atlantic and South Pacific waters meant a concern for the Navy forces in the South Cone countries.

After the above-mentioned meeting, to consolidate the idea and discuss the logistic implications of a possible future cooperation, a joint Argentine-Brazilian naval delegation visited the naval base in Simonstown, South Africa. More suggestive still was the presence in Argentina and Brazil; in September of that same year, of the South African Navy Chief, Vice-Admiral James Johnson, when the UNITAS training operations were taking place (Leysens, 1992).

With respect to SATO, the de facto Argentine government found in the foreign ideological enemy the right justification for their repressive actions. The Soviet menace to the South Atlantic was used by the Navy to increase its domestic political weight –especially *vis-à-vis* the Army, which was in command of the Executive Power–. It was also used to account for the financial resources demanded –for domestic and eventually, foreign purposes– to boost battling capacity. It may well have helped to justify other objectives, as, for instance, to help wield negotiating power before Washington in order to reduce friction and favor the supply of battle ships and equipment (there were tense relations at that time because Buenos Aires resisted the human rights policy of the Carter Administration); also, tensions with Brazil may have diminished by obtaining naval agreements with Chile (which had shown interest in this respect) and with Great Britain, eventually in favor of negotiations over the Malvinas/ Falklands¹⁷².

As far as South Africa¹⁷³ is concerned, participation in the SATO would give the white government certain legitimacy; it would be part of a long wished-for alliance with pro-western countries and could provide a reliable mechanism in case of an eventual consolidation of a black revolution. Notwithstanding, its aspiration to participate in the Atlantic alliance in practice

172. See Moneta (1978 and following years) for a more detailed analysis of the Argentine aim to participate in the SATO.

173. For South Africa's strategic vision and its support to the creation of SATO, see Leysens (1992).

became quite difficult if it is recalled that its Navy had merely been performing as coastal guards, incompatible with the role South African self-appointed before the Soviets.

Although the South American military regimes shared the ideal of defending the West from the communist advances, they tended to strengthen the hypothesis of conflict with the neighboring countries, by giving priority to the national over the regional interests. Therefore, the SATO did not appear as priority. However, the main drawback was the Brazilian refusal, the reason why the treaty never materialized. Even when these countries had military governments, an alliance between the South Cone and South Africa was always precarious, little credible or non-reliable.

In spite of the above-mentioned reasons, the impulse started in 1976 lost force; Leysens (1992) reports the return to the idea, in a meeting that took place in Buenos Aires in May 1981, under the auspices of the Council for Inter-American Security. Upon the request of the American (R) General Vernon Walters, with Reagan as President of the USA, there was a meeting gathering high officials from Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, the USA and South Africa “to discuss the possibility of wider naval cooperation in the South Atlantic”.

But the 1980s would not be very auspicious for South Africa and its project of an intra-South Atlantic alliance. The re-emergence of democracy in South America did not help to strengthen relations with South Africa. They had ceased to be pariah states just at the same time as the international community was displaying maximum hostility toward South Africa.

Nevertheless, the impossibility of participating in a defense alliance did not seem to affect relations between the Argentine and the South African Navy Forces, which were solidly maintained. The South African minister Botha himself admitted that “between the two countries, there is understanding in military issues which consist in periodical naval training operations and exchange of military education and training”¹⁷⁴. On the other hand, according to Roger Gravil¹⁷⁵, South Africa meant a good shelter for the Argentine officers who had participated in the repression after 1976, most probably in

174. *Clarín*, 1982 “*Sudáfrica es neutral*” (Buenos Aires) April 24th.

175. According to Gravil (1988), that was the reward for many who participated in the “dirty war”; for example, Rubén Chamorro, the Armed Forces Attaché in Pretoria, from 14 June 1979, and followed by Jorge Perren and Alfredo Astiz.

connection with the ESMA and the South African Navy¹⁷⁶. However, the South African government denied Captain Astiz a stay visa, alleging possible domestic and international implications. Before the Falklands/Malvinas War, although not recorded, Astiz formed part of Argentina's Navy Representation in South Africa¹⁷⁷.

Notwithstanding the good relations, there was some friction caused by the suspicions concerning the attitude of South Africa in relation to the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. Although Prime Minister Botha explicated his country's neutral position, 8 April 1982, paradoxically both Argentina and Great Britain took him to be on the opposite side. Thus, the British Defense Minister in the House of Commons accused South Africa of giving Argentina naval assistance; he may have granted credit to what the Sunday Times of Johannesburg published, revealing the existence of a secret defense treaty between South Africa and Argentina which had been signed toward the end of the 1960s¹⁷⁸. Quite probably, the British expected more political support on the part of South Africa and used the supposed refusal to allow them to use the port of Simonstown as pressure in their favor¹⁷⁹.

Argentina's Foreign Relations Ministry denied both that such secret agreement existed and that there was any South African naval assistance¹⁸⁰. As reported by the press, a Uruguayan DC 8 plane had been used during the armed conflict to transport military equipment from South Africa to Argentina. When asked, an executive officer from the carrier company confirmed there had been an only trip from Johannesburg to Buenos Aires on 7 April 1982; but, he stated, "it only carried cargoes and parcels"¹⁸¹.

At that moment, there were many rumors in South Africa¹⁸² confirming the military cooperation: in the military circles of Johannesburg it was said

176. Leysens (1992), with reference to the South African press, details the presence of those Argentine naval officers in South Africa, which raised complications in bilateral relations

177. *Clarín*, 1983 "Sudáfrica negó la visa al Capitán Astiz" (Buenos Aires) March 4th.

178. *Clarín*, 1982 "Un pacto secreto" (Buenos Aires) April 12th.

179. In fact, the mentioned base was not functional, because distance to the operations zone was equivalent to that to the base in Asunción used by the British, and because for the fleet operative conditions and logistic support were not advantageous; the fleet used the calm waters of the fiords of Saint Peter Island, in the South Georgia Archipelago.

180. *La Prensa*, 1982 "No hay ningún pacto secreto" (Buenos Aires) April 13th; and *La Prensa*, 1982 "Desmiente Argentina que reciba asistencia militar de Sudáfrica" (Buenos Aires) May 25th.

181. *Clarín*, 1982 "Aclaración sobre un envío sudafricano" (Buenos Aires) May 26th.

182. See Leysens (1992) for an academic analysis of the South African viewpoint.

that although South Africa was neutral, it may have honored supply agreements from former days. Also, South African press sources insisted on the especial relations with Argentina linked to the anti-terrorist and military information programs¹⁸³.

Additionally, South African academic sources also mentioned trouble in the South Africa-Great Britain relationship under the suspicion, not officially confirmed, that the Argentine Exocet that had destroyed the Sheffield may have been a side issue of the Argentine-South African military cooperation. This could also explain why an official from South Africa's Foreign Ministry needed to make clear that his country had given word not to sell Argentina the lethal French Missile Exocet¹⁸⁴. But these versions were officially denied by Argentine Army sources when giving information that disqualified them because at that time the South African Navy did not possess that missile; it was only later than 1982 that South Africa incorporated such technology from Israel¹⁸⁵.

Since the Malvinas/Falklands War, beyond any consideration of the relations held between the respective Navies, Argentina tried to get detached from South Africa but closer to the Non-Aligned as part of a policy to gain votes at the United Nations. Foreign Minister Costa Méndez, in a Meeting of Ministers of the Non-Aligned at Havana, denounced an alliance of the USA, Great Britain and South Africa, and he stood against Apartheid¹⁸⁶. But his declaration was part of a little credible discourse because a few months before he had proposed Argentina's withdrawal from the Non-Aligned Movement.

In the final years of the military government, Argentina still maintained a twofold stance: while Ambassadors Carlos Beltramino¹⁸⁷ and Carlos Muñiz¹⁸⁸

183. When examining this matter, it must be observed that the South African press was divided concerning the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. The divided opinions were linked to the different origin in the composition of the South African white group. Although the English and Netherlands descent (Afrikaners) groups coexist in South Africa, a history of intestine fighting for political and economic power has been present in many areas. The Afrikaners, who had lost the Boer War, were in favor of Argentina but did not want to get involved in the conflict, while the British extraction South Africans followed the opinions of the Foreign Office (*La Prensa*, 1982b).

184. *La Prensa*, 1982 "Desmiente Argentina que reciba asistencia militar de Sudáfrica" (Buenos Aires) May 25th.

185. Interview by the autor with high Navy officers, Buenos Aires, 1993.

186. *La Nación*, 1982 "Costa Mendez denuncia una alianza tripartita" (Buenos Aires) June 4th.

187. "We believe precious time has been lost, but we must remember and lay emphasis on the fact that the dynamics of the decolonization process cannot be arrested by the command of those

urged the United Nations to apply all kinds of sanctions against South Africa for its refusal to grant independence to Namibia, from Buenos Aires good bilateral relations with Pretoria were carried on and the South African Embassy there was authorized to organize a symposium on South Africa with political implications¹⁸⁹.

On the other hand, the press publications¹⁹⁰ from the final years of the military in power are a faithful reflection of the pro-South Africa position some sectors held, partly fed by an important press campaign conducted by the South African Embassy in Buenos Aires¹⁹¹.

who, especially South Africa, maintain conditions already rejected by the civilized consciousness of nations”, declared the ambassador in an emergency session concerning Namibia (*Clarín*, 1981 “*Fuerte crítica a Sudafrica*” [Buenos Aires] September 9th).

188. *Tiempo Argentino*, 1983 “*Muñiz pidió sanción a Sudáfrica*” (Buenos Aires) May 27th.

189. *La Prensa*, 1983 “*Simposio sudafricano en Buenos Aires*” (Buenos Aires) July 3rd.

190. Among the most radical reactions were the protests against having denied South African rugby players the visa to enter Argentina. The Foreign Ministry was criticized for saying Argentina was following international commitments; i.e., United Nations resolutions passed “in accordance with the majority of the Third World under the pressure of some African countries whose policy, the same as in the Soviet Union, has been to isolate South Africa in order to promote a Marxist, social, racial revolution” (*La Nueva Provincia*, 1980, Bahía Blanca, august 14th).

191. Among them, the charges raised by Tothill, the South African Ambassador in Buenos Aires, who argued that his country was the target of a campaign that used the human rights issue to spread lies about South Africa. He added he understood the problems faced by Argentina in international forums over human rights.

Chapter VI

Defining the South African Policy: The Alfonsín Administration (1983-1989)

AS MENTIONED in Chapter II, with the return of democracy, the Alfonsín Administration introduced changes in foreign policy which tended to reinsert Argentina internationally. Among other decisions, the approach to the Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement was the option, with the underlying idea of gathering strength for common causes. The definition of the relations with South Africa was peremptory: if the aspiration was to be in line with the Non-Aligned and show a strong commitment to this cause, the dualities and ambiguities characteristic of the former governments had to be put an end to. Moreover, the military regime before Alfonsín had reinforced ideological and strategic relations with the white government of South Africa, along with the increase of bilateral trade.

Different factors contributed to shape the decision. Foreign Minister Caputo was repeatedly demanded to break diplomatic relations by the representatives of the Non-Aligned countries at the Ministerial meeting in Luanda. The last events in Southern Africa had generated a crisis before which the democratic government of Argentina did not want to remain passive. Along with increasing domestic repression, the apartheid regime had implemented punishing raids into the neighboring countries and had caused growing regional destabilization; consequently, the international pressure was demanding the end to such abuses. The democratic values defended by the Alfonsín Administration and the need to keep political consistency between domestic and foreign policies in favor of human rights meant a strong influence on the decisions to be made.

In this chapter, a short description of the worsening situation in South Africa and Southern Africa will be made, and the response given by the international actors will be discussed. The purpose is to show the international context which pushed the decision of breaking diplomatic relations with South Africa; the breakoff, then, ended a period of dual and ambiguous policy. Further on, the decision-making process and the political, strategical-military and commercial consequences are analyzed.

SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

While the return to democracy was taking place in Argentina in 1983, in 1984 in South Africa a new constitution was enforced which persisted in excluding the black population from the political institutional life. This meant breaking away from Westminster and establishing a Tricameral Parliament with three separate Houses: White, Indian and Coloured.

The new constitution gave origin to new domestic complications. With the creation of the United Democratic Front (UDF), black opposition was restructured and broadened its activities and uprisings were organized throughout the South African territory –even in small rural villages–. Because the former movements had been declared illegal in 1960, the UDF became the most important force against apartheid in South Africa. The armed forces were, then, led to join the police to maintain law and order, setting emergency regulations to suppress mobilization. In turn, the white rightist groups also felt unhappy with this new Fundamental Law not only because the Indians and the Coloured would sit in Parliament but also because they objected the excessive concentration of power in the Executive. This brought about the division of the National Party in government and the creation of the Conservative Party.

To the extent the neighboring countries –Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola and Mozambique– from abroad supported the black population mobilization and the domestic crisis transcended South Africa's frontiers. The South African Armed Forces made punitive incursions in those countries with the pretext of eliminating the bases of the ANC, thus interrupting the status quo in Southern Africa.

Internationalization of the conflict –pressures, disinvestment, more sanctions, political isolation of Pretoria and its choice of aggression beyond its frontiers– was accompanied in South Africa by various phenomena such as a qualitative modification in the struggle against apartheid carried over to a higher level. Also contributed to this situation the electoral reinforcement of a white ultra-racist current that seemed to lag behind time, the irrecoverable dismemberment of the traditional white power ideological apparatus (Broederbond and the Dutch Reformist Church) and the increasing decisional power in the hands of the National Security Council (Pereira, 1987: 2). Businessmen began to vindicate social reforms to meet the demand for black skilled manual labor.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND SOUTH AFRICA'S CRISIS

The international repercussions of the South African and regional domestic issues was immediate. On this occasion, the international community took a hard standard to pressure South Africa since "the foreign image of a country gets better or gets worse to the extent its foreign policy coincides or contrasts with the prevailing international trends" (Muñoz, 1986:14). The greater the contrast, the deeper the deterioration of that country's international image and viceversa.

From a global viewpoint, it was the most difficult moment for the white government; pressures increased qualitative and quantitatively. Not only international organizations and state representatives left South Africa; private banks and transnational companies did it, too. Civil society also mobilized in the western countries, encouraged by the anti-apartheid activists. Then, the position of the most important governmental actors with interests in the region will be analyzed next in order to deal with the economic sanctions context (Lechini: 1987).

Since 1985, the developed western states began to modify their reticent attitude by supporting some sanctions although many of them were only symbolic or inefficient¹⁹². However, the changes introduced by the USA (Congress, public opinion and corporations) and by France were important as concerns the role they played, internationally in the former case, while limited to Africa in the case of France.

Regarding the USA, the White House and the Congress disagreed with respect to the sanctions to be applied against South Africa. President Reagan backed the policy of a "constructive engagement", which held no sanctions should be implemented against South Africa; in his geo-strategic conception of the East-West conflict, South Africa was regarded as a stronghold for the West. However, for the first time in the history of the USA/South Africa relations, the Executive had to accept limited economic sanctions after important confrontations in Congress. Congress had passed a draft, 2 October 1986, to implement strong economic sanctions, showing the American people's opposition to Pretoria's racist policy. Notwithstanding, the presidential position was maintained at the United Nations –through the directives that the State Department gave its representative– by using the

192. Note the increasing role played by Japanese, German and Italian corporations concerning the withdrawal of the American companies from South Africa.

veto power the USA enjoyed as concerned all resolutions that could imply economic sanctions against South Africa.

France, who traditionally had opposed economic sanctions, changed its mind since the South African domestic crisis of 1985, and even proposed the Security Council the voluntary implementation of economic sanctions. This turn of events may be understood as a choice made by the Palais de L'Elysée in consideration of the wide range of relations and interests France held with Africa. Great Britain remained faithful to its tradition of not applying sanctions, arguing they would not change the domestic situation in South Africa and would harm the black population it was meant to help. As a matter of fact, the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was protecting the British investments¹⁹³ in South Africa, in an attempt to save jobs at home which might have been lost if radical sanctions were applied. The Soviet Union, consistent in its criticism of western capitalism for their collaboration with the Pretoria regime, did not hold any relations and had applied global sanctions against South Africa since the 1950s.

It was among the international governmental organizations that pressure increased. In this case, also, the effectiveness of the sanctions proposed depended on the political will of the countries involved, on the one hand, and on the other, on the characteristics of the body that made the decision. Despite the gap between approving the sanction, implementing it and later monitoring it, it is also certain that, as pressures grew, the main states involved set the limits to South Africa's international position, making it a "pariah State".

Two separate trends were observed at the United Nations. The General Assembly, democratically composed, kept its traditional condemnation through sanctions that ranged from placing an oil embargo to breaking diplomatic, cultural and sports relations, but only by way of recommendations which, given their intrinsic nature, were not mandatory. On the other hand, the Security Council, with fewer members but with the power to implement sanctions, only decided on an arms embargo (Res. N 418, 1977) because of the vested interests of two of its permanent members: Great Britain and the USA. The rest of the measures were voluntary sanctions that did not imply equal commitment on the part of the other member states of the organization¹⁹⁴.

193. At that time Great Britain owned 50% of the foreign investments: US\$ 18,000 million.

194. The mandatory arms embargo deserves special attention. In its first stages, the Carter Administration conducted a more open Black Africa policy which was more critical of South

The European Community had developed a gradual pressure policy through the adoption of a moderate economic sanctions package, giving its member states freedom to implement other measures¹⁹⁵. The different interests reflected the divided positions. Great Britain and Germany considered those measures maximalist and thought no member of the EEC should go beyond them. On the contrary, Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Greece and Italy claimed for a more drastic attitude should be adopted toward the South African regime. The Commonwealth also favored moderate measures¹⁹⁶, although Great Britain had refused to apply sanctions and incidentally was left aside by the community Great Britain herself had created. The Scandinavian countries¹⁹⁷ increased pressure by coordinating their South African policies with the purpose of terminating all relations with the racist government.

As far as the “actors in the South”, for the Non-Aligned Movement, since it had been created, the elimination of the apartheid regime in South Africa was one of its main objectives; it proposed total boycott on Pretoria. At the Harare Summit, 6 September 1986, as crisis worsened in Southern Africa, the AFRICA Fund was formed to reject Invasion, Colonialism and Apartheid, with the purpose of strengthening the economic and financial capacity of the Front Line States to fight against apartheid and to support national liberation movements in South Africa and in Namibia.

The Organization of African Unity coincided with the Non-Aligned in relation to imposing broad mandatory sanctions against the apartheid regime but in favor of the independence of Namibia. In its Charter, the commitment of its members to fighting off apartheid and all other forms of racial discrimination on the continent had already been made clear. The inclusion of

Africa, which explains why the USA did not use their traditional veto power. Despite the embargo, South Africa continued to be supplied from abroad, which showed that many countries did not comply with the boycott or that certain international circuits immediately involved in arms trafficking escaped the national checks and controls.

195. At the Meeting of Foreign Relations Ministers in Luxemburg, 10 September 1985, great concern with the South Africa issue was made clear; it was decided that there should be harmonization with respect to certain measures considered restrictive or positive. At the Brussels Meeting, September 1986, fresh investments were not allowed and the embargo placed on iron, steel and gold coins was approved, while more decisive items –coal, gold and diamonds– were not included.

196. Both at the Bahamas Summit, October 1985, and at the Mini-Summit in London, August 1986, trade, loans and co-operation and technology transfer were banned.

197. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

the countries of the SADCC and the Front Line¹⁹⁸ obeyed different reasons: on the one hand, because they had been directly involved in the crisis; on the other, because they would be the first target of retaliatory measures by Pretoria, given their economic dependence on South Africa, if the international economic boycott was implemented. Both groups thought the economic sanctions policy was a crucial instrument to undermine the South African regime, but they requested that an international support policy was adopted to contribute to help their countries' development.

DEFINING AN ARGENTINEAN POLICY FOR AFRICA: BREAKING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

In 1986, the Alfonsín Administration defined relations with South Africa by breaking diplomatic relations, advancing with the design of an African policy that later would be interrupted during the Menem Administration. By then, the Director of the Sub-Saharan Africa Office of the Foreign Relations Ministry remarked that:

“with respect to South Africa, it must be noted there has been a pronounced difference since 1983, when the constitutional authorities took office. This has been very clearly perceived by the countries in that region and even by the OAU, who have acknowledged the now different emphasis of Argentina's foreign policy” (Espeche Gil, 1985: 1).

During the first two years, the Alfonsín Administration decided to keep a very low profile in relation to South Africa, but without upsetting diplomatic relations¹⁹⁹. However, the course of actions –evolution of the situation in South Africa and negotiations with the Non-Aligned– conditioned Argentina's original position. Buenos Aires started by condemning the government in Pretoria and ended by breaking diplomatic relations with South Africa. It was announced 22 May 1986, by communicating that:

“vis-à-vis the official declarations of the South African government [...] which confirm a destabilizing and interventionist inclination on the part of authorities

198. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is made up of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Front Line States include Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

199. Ambassador Elsa Kelly, at that time Secretary of International Relations, denied that the Argentine government was thinking of breaking diplomatic relations with South Africa. She asserted that the Argentine government “would just maintain the statu quo in the relation” (*Clarín*, 1984 “*Desmienten una presunta ruptura con Sudáfrica*” [Buenos Aires] August 15th).

to the detriment of the neighboring countries [...] as a consequence of an institutionalized racial discrimination regime that poses a menace to international peace and security [...] the Argentine government has decided to break diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Africa but, at the same time, it reaffirms permanent friendship with the people of South Africa” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, 1986).

The decision had taken time. On various occasions Foreign Minister Caputo had said that the government of Argentina was indeed concerned with the situation in South Africa, and was examining the diplomatic action to be followed. The Foreign Relations Ministry did not officially hold cultural or sports relations with South Africa, following the United Nations Resolution of 1977, and discouraged relations which, at that time, were considered important²⁰⁰.

The first crucial decision expressing the utter discomfort concerning racial discrimination and the increasing repression exerted by the South African regime was made when the chargé d'affaires in Pretoria, who was the diplomatic representative since 1974²⁰¹ was summoned for consultation, 12 August 1985; this showed that the Argentine Ministry was criticizing the “emergency conditions” declaration of 21 July, which was the governmental response to the revolts against apartheid which had started in September 1984.

200. However, some open meetings were held in Buenos Aires, although as a private nature, organized by South Africans and Argentineans wishing to encourage trade between both countries –such as the meeting at the Claridge Hotel, toward mid-1984–. In 1984, also the participation of three South African squash players in a competition in Buenos Aires was criticized and pressure was applied to prevent Argentinean players from participating in South Africa. But the Argentine Rugby Team “Las Cebras” travelled and also did Argentinean rugby players to participate in the Latin American team “Los Jaguares” (the Argentine “Los Pumas” were the majority). In a note of 14 September, the Ministry warned “it was not advisable that Argentineans were included in the team” and “it would bring about highly negative consequences internationally”. The situation worsened to the extent that 9 October of that same year, the Ministry issued a communiqué by which any South African entering Argentina with a tourist visa was not allowed to participate in sports competitions or sports events (*Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto*, 1984). Responsibility was declined, also, concerning private tours of Argentinean citizens (*La Nación*, 1984 “*Comunicado oficial por la gira a Sudáfrica*” [Buenos Aires] October 26th).

201. According to the press, the political-diplomatic consequences had been discussed at the Coordinating Council of the Foreign Relations Ministry and the implementation was, then, delayed for a week (*La Nación*, 1985). Additionally, “before the Ministry made the decision of summoning the chargé d'affaires in South Africa, the international conditions were examined and it was agreed extreme measures should be postponed –breaking relations– in case the situation in that country worsened” (*La Nación*, 1985 “*La Cancillería expectante*” [Buenos Aires] August 16th).

Breaking diplomatic relations with South Africa was not an isolated action but the final step in a series of governmental measures and communiqués issued by the Foreign Ministry in Buenos Aires, ever stronger as the situation in Southern Africa worsened as the result of apartheid.

It may not be said that the Argentine government had not dealt with the South Africa issue before, but it was evident that in these circumstances it decided to express openly a special concern about the crisis in Southern Africa. The characteristics of the declarations issued since October 1984 showed a position that differed from a dual policy. The declarations, released to the press for publication, expressed Argentina's growing concern over the escalate of violence and repression by the South African government who had violated freedom and minimum guarantees. The liberation of Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners in jail for having fought against racial discrimination was demanded; the permanent opposition to the independence of Namibia was condemned and the opposition to South African aggression committed against Southern African countries was reaffirmed²⁰². This stance coincided with the resolutions voted for Argentina in international organizations, showing a more active participation in the meetings held to condemn the South Africa regime²⁰³.

The worsening of the South Africa crisis and its extension over to Southern Africa by committing abuses in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe in May 1986, an international context even more inclined to apply sanctions, and the USA –the Western power– with Congress pressuring the Executive to adopt punishing measures constituted the international circumstances President Alfonsín had to face.

202. The communiqués issued by the Argentine Foreign Ministry were dated 10/9/84, 10/10/84, 5/9/85, 5/24/85, 7/26/85, 8/12/85, 4/2/86, 5/20/86, 5/22/86, and 8/13/86.

203. Multilaterally, Argentina's participation may be mentioned in the ordinary sessions of the United Nations General Assembly in 1984, 1985 and 1986; at the United Nations Committee Meeting for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in Geneva (1984); at the Extraordinary Meeting of the Coordinating Committee of the Non-Aligned Movement about Namibia, in New Delhi (21 April 1984); at the World Conference on Sanctions against Racist South Africa, in Paris (June, 1986); at the International Conference Pro-Independence of Namibia, in Vienna (July, 1986); at the Seminar on Human Rights in South Africa, organized by the Committee against Apartheid, in Cameroon (1986).

THE DECISION

Breaking diplomatic relations with South Africa was the answer given by Argentina concerning two issues: re-establishing relations with the Non-Aligned countries and the Human Rights defense. The idea was to revert the position that the former military government had held: Alfonsín, ideologically and in his designs for the country, could not have been further away from the military regime. The Argentine government considered it was necessary to break with South Africa to show a better non aligned image and to change the negative feelings the military regime had raised. Although domestically South Africa had started to be in trouble since 1985, Argentina's Foreign Relations Ministry seized the opportunity –South Africa's intervention in the neighboring countries– to give the Non-Aligned a clear sign of the country's position.

On the one hand, this decision was made to draw the attention of the African Continent and the Non-Aligned, with respect to the profound changes occurred in Argentina in relation to the racist government of South Africa. It was the way to demonstrate there were no more ties with Pretoria and it was also the way to show the new concern for Africa and redress the negligence of the former foreign policy. Argentina's international insertion was part of the Alfonsín Administration's foreign policy design which, among other issues, also included obtaining the support to claim sovereignty over the Falkland/ Malvinas Islands, rescheduling the foreign debt and nuclear disarmament.

Along with enhancing the position of Argentina before the Non-Aligned, the defense of Human Rights and their vindication was interpreted by the Alfonsín Administration as an “intermestic” issue²⁰⁴. The apartheid regime applied by the South Africa's white rulers was seen as a violation of the most fundamental Human Rights, while intervention in the neighboring countries was considered a menace to international peace. The connection this policy had with interrupting relations with South Africa formed part of the Foreign Minister's discourse and other relevant officials of the Radical Party in power. According to Caputo²⁰⁵,

204. Manning (1977) created this theoretical concept.

205. Interview with Dante Caputo, Foreign Relations Minister during the Alfonsín Administration, Rosario, December 1992.

“There are many debatable issues in this world; but, at this time in the history of man’s civilization, it is necessary to be consistent and admit that the rhetoric of not condemning a country that implements exclusion on the basis of the skin color cannot possibly be debated [...] Such flagrant violation of Human Rights as occurred in Southern Africa can not go unnoticed for a government that means to guarantee respect for the integrity of all human beings... Argentina felt the burden of having gone against human values²⁰⁶.”

According to the relevance of that decision and its connection with the design of the important issues that formed part of the Radical Administration, it may be said that breaking off with South Africa was a decision made by the Foreign Minister Caputo in full accordance with President Alfonsín. It was a decision made at the highest level of the Executive, closer to the “model of unified rational actor”²⁰⁷. No other bureaucratic agencies or pressure groups²⁰⁸ intervened, although there are some sources that maintain Representatives Storani and Bordón and Senator Gass had been consulted. The decision was taken following the general characteristic of the foreign policy decision-making process of the Radical Administration: “centralized management of the foreign policy by the Foreign Minister and his reduced group of advisors” and “the President acting as the ‘great decision maker’ in matters crucially important in this

206. The principle defended by the Radical Party was made very clear in all interviews with those who may have been linked to the mentioned decision. For Alconada Sempé, it was “always an activist cause” (interview with Raúl Alconada Sempé, Secretary for Latin America and Vice-Minister of Foreign Relations when Caputo was Foreign Minister, Rosario, 26 August 1992). Senator Gass said: “I always fought for the defense of Human Rights and was in favor of breaking relations with South Africa, although there were difficulties inside the party and the government because, in some cases, there were economic interests at stake with South Africa. In foreign policy, I believe principles cannot be abandoned” (interview with Senator Adolfo Gass, President of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Commission, Rosario, 28 August 1992). For Hipólito Solari Irigoyen, “the foundations of the decision were ethical. I believe in the ethics of international policy and international actions” (interview with Solari Irigoyen, Itinerant Ambassador, Rosario, 9 October 1992).

207. When it was asked whether he had been consulted, Senator Gass answered: “nobody was asked” (interview with Senator Adolfo Gass, President of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, Rosario 28 August 1992). According to Alconada Sempé, “in foreign policy, the President listened to the Foreign Minister and his team”. Naturally, there was empathy of ideas and principles. For Alconada Sempé, “Alfonsín did not influence either in favor or against: when he was offered the solution, he thought it was right and accepted it” (interview with Raúl Alconada Sempé, Secretary for Latin America and Vice-Minister of Foreign Relations when Caputo was Foreign Minister, Rosario, 26 August 1992).

208. In accordance with different consultations with officials of the Industry and Foreign Trade Secretary and the Africa and Near East Department of the Foreign Relations Ministry made in Buenos Aires over that period, the decision was not made in that area. Furthermore, they did not, in general, agree to breaking relations.

stage” (Russell, 1990: 59). In 1985 a similar procedure had been followed when the Argentine chargé d’affaires in Pretoria had been summoned. The press had published that “the decision was adopted after Caputo held conversations with the President of the country on the basis of the reiterated Argentine position made known bilaterally and by public comunicques”²⁰⁹.

However, the Executive was not free of pressures for breaking diplomatic relations, among them Congressmen²¹⁰ and the anti-apartheid non-governmental organizations that, no matter their little weight or little capacity to influence the decision-making process, constituted a relevant opinion for a transition-to-democracy administration; a favorable framework was thus provided²¹¹.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECISION

Domestically, among the very few unfavorable repercussions may be mentioned a group of businessmen afraid of the consequences of the decision concerning trade relations. One of those groups was the Argentina-Southern Africa Council which condemned the decision of breaking diplomatic relations²¹². Also some officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs inclined to keeping a low profile and, naturally, the Pretoria government, through its embassy in Buenos Aires made the Argentine government responsible for the decision²¹³. On the contrary, according to the information supplied by representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the African embassies credited in Buenos Aires, it was known Africa was pleased with the decision. This

209. *La Nación*, 1985 “*El gobierno convocó a su representante en Pretoria*” (Buenos Aires) August 13th.

210. The Senate had ratified, and passed the act, 21 August 1985, related to the Argentine adherence to the International Convention on Repression and Punishment of Apartheid subscribed ten years earlier, 6 June 1975, by the former constitutional government. Among the members of Congress, this measure was considered as a step forward in the deterioration of relations with South Africa but part of a strategy aimed to improving relations with the other African countries.

211. See Lechini (1995) for a more detailed analysis.

212. *La Nación*, 1986 “*Condenan la ruptura de relaciones con Sudáfrica*” (Buenos Aires) June 6th.

213. These opinions coincide with the informal conversations held –during a seminar in Newport, USA, 29 May 1997– between the author and Captain Little, South African Naval Attaché in Buenos Aires, when relations were actually broken. Captain Little stated that “the sudden drastic decision of the Argentine government forced us to find refuge in the South African Embassy in Santiago de Chile, whose government welcomed us” (*La Nación*, 1986 “*La ruptura con Sudáfrica*” [Buenos Aires] May 23rd).

recognition was also present in the discourse of the African delegations that visited Buenos Aires.

Following the measures adopted, the Alfonsín Administration strengthened its anti-apartheid activism nationally and internationally²¹⁴.

The most relevant data showing the determination of the government to continue its critical position in the already deteriorated bilateral relations with South Africa was the request to withdraw the South African Consul in Buenos Aires (in charge of the South Africa diplomatic representation after the breakoff), the withdrawal of the Argentine Consul in Pretoria (a Deputy Consul was left in charge) and the immediate exit of three South African citizens²¹⁵. Those measures constituted the answer to the propagandistic activism that the Consular Office had carried out, with the support of the local business sector with interests in South Africa. The South African officials additionally showed a keen interest in keeping contact with the Argentine press, in an attempt to change the deteriorated image of the South African Government and to explain the apartheid regime.

The decision made by Argentina, however, was not the result of a regional policy consensus, despite the fact that a “concerted diplomacy” was beginning to consolidate in Latin America. Only Costa Rica accompanied

214. Multilaterally, it continued to actively participate in international meetings organized to exercise pressure against the racial discrimination policy of South Africa, and voted in favor of all the resolutions adopted. Still further, as non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, since 1987 it supported resolutions requesting wide mandatory sanctions against South Africa, which were not approved because the permanent veto power of Great Britain and the USA ruled them out. At the United Nations Assembly, it also supported a project of resolution claiming South Africa was excluded from the Antarctic Treaty. This position was defended by Poland and the USSR, who were consultative members of the mentioned Treaty, which did not contemplate a banishment mechanism. Similarly, Argentina attended, as “cooperating” country, the consultative conferences of the SADCC. The activist position against South Africa allowed Buenos Aires to be elected as the host of an international seminar organized by the United Nations to support the immediate independence of Namibia and actual implementation of the sanctions against South Africa from 20 to 24 April 1987.

215. Although they had entered the country with a tourist visa, they spoke at a seminar on Southern Africa 11 August 1988. This meeting –the second with these characteristics held over that year– had been officially organized by the South Africa Consular Office without the authorization of the Argentine government. The Foreign Relations Ministry declared it had not been informed and it was surprised in its good faith, because the meaning given to the visas granted to those three South African citizens in Johannesburg had been flagrantly altered.

Argentina in this decision, as pointed out by Leysens (1992). The USA only expelled the principal defense attaché of the South Africa Embassy in Washington, 23 May 1986, as a sign of protest against the Pretoria attacks on the neighboring countries: “we trust that this measure will make the South Africa government have a clear idea that the USA cannot tolerate neglect against the sovereignty of South Africa’s neighboring countries”, declared the Department of State in a communique containing the measure adopted²¹⁶.

With such a substantial change, Argentina put an end to the traditional dual policy that the different former governments had maintained with South Africa. This measure, taken within the framework of an African strategy, improved political relations with the Non-Aligned²¹⁷. However, in spite of the optimistic opinions of Foreign Minister Gass concerning the support of the Non-Aligned countries to the Argentine cause over the Falklands/Malvinas, there were no significant changes in the African vote after breaking relations with South Africa. In 1986, only Egypt and Sierra Leone had changed their positions over Argentina: from abstention, they voted in favor; Morocco, in turn, changed from being absent to voting positively in 1986 and 1987²¹⁸.

Although two were the aims underlying in the Argentine interest in Africa, voting and markets, at the time of breaking relations, what was actually done for Africa meant a lot more than the rewards obtained

216. *La Nación*, 1986 (Buenos Aires) May 24th.

217. In this context, President Alfonsín was invited to participate, 25 January 1987, in New Delhi, in the creation of the AFRICA Fund, at the meeting of Heads of State or government representatives the member countries of the Fund Committee to Resist Invasion, Colonialism and Apartheid, with the additional participation of India, Zambia, Algeria, Congo, Peru, Yugoslavia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe.

218. See Bologna (1992) in relation to this particular issue. The most significant change among the African countries in favor of Argentina was produced in 1985, not in 1986, as a consequence of breaking relations. At the 1985 voting session, from having earlier on abstained, Chad, Liberia, Mali, Mauritius (who was absent in 1987 and 1988), Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire voted in favor. Djibouti and the Seychelles, from having been absent before, voted affirmatively; Malawi turned from the negative vote to abstention. Gambia, which had voted in favor in 1985, abstained in 1986 and voted negatively in 1987 and 1988. Cameroon, Kenya, Lesotho and Swaziland carried on their traditional abstention position while Mozambique continued to be absent. The changes in the voting preferences of the African countries over 1985 –although the withdrawal of the Argentine charge d’affaires from the Embassy in Pretoria was very recent– may be better explained in terms of the modifications introduced by Argentina to the content of that resolution: the dispute over sovereignty was written off the text and it was announced all aspects related to the future of the Falklands/Malvinas would find a solution.

afterwards; many times, the results of given actions cannot be expected to actually take place in the short term. But, at the United Nations General Assembly, obtaining three African votes in favor of the Argentine position over the Falklands/Malvinas may be considered as an important accomplishment concerning a crucial very difficult issue for Argentina's Foreign Relations Ministry. Having defeated the British candidate in the elections for President of the General Assembly in 1988 may have been the result, among other considerations, of having improved relations with the Non-Aligned countries after breaking relations with South Africa; also the policy implemented by Caputo may have contributed.

INCIDENCE OF THE BREAKOFF IN THE STRATEGIC-MILITARY RELATIONS

The consistency of the governmental position, however, offered some unclear patches concerning the military contacts, which the relations breakoff could not cancel. Although during the Alfonsín Administration the Armed Forces played a marginal role in the decision-making process, they implemented different policies in an effort to re-accommodate and broaden their participation in the decisions involving their professional interests.

The case under study is illustrative. In spite of having broken relations, the Navy sources admitted they had manifested the need to continue relations with their African peer to hold transoceanic communications operations, which had been regularly maintained since the sixties, but principally to control the east zone of the South Atlantic²¹⁹. This request of the Navy was accepted by the government, or, at least, negotiated over, because the Argentine Consulate in South Africa had credited a Navy Captain as Vice-Consul of Navy Affairs, a juridical figure which had been created in those circumstances and was *sui generis*, as regarded by international law²²⁰.

According to Alconada Sempé, when relations with South Africa were broken, the Navy issued a report communicating that it maintained and meant to carry on especial cooperative relations with its South African peer. This was justified by the fact that, after the Falklands/Malvinas War, Argentina had remained relatively isolated in its possibilities to purchase

219. Personal interview with a high Navy officer, Buenos Aires, May 1993.

220. Concerning the South African counterpart, Leysens (1992) says that the Records of the Foreign Relations Ministry of Pretoria for 1988 also included a South African Navy Officer as Vice-Consul for "Navy affairs" in the South Africa Consular Office in Buenos Aires.

military technology, particularly from Great Britain. Good relations with South Africa, to some extent, could be helpful²²¹.

It cannot be stated that these “joint communication exercises”, acknowledged by Argentina’s Navy, were the only kind of relations held between both Navy Forces. Following the newspaper *Folha de São Paulo*, Argentina was negotiating the sale of twenty-seven Mirage planes and two destroyers to the South African forces with the help of Brazilian intermediaries and the participation of Israel. The paper stated that the breakoff of relations had not prevented arms selling, which had started at the beginnings of that year. It also reported that officers from the Argentine Navy had visited South Africa after the breakoff, in June 1986²²². The Argentine Foreign Relations Ministry denied the alleged arms selling, declaring that it had strictly complied with the arms embargo decided on by the Security Council in communiqué 45-86a of 13 August 1986. The Navy, in turn, reported that Argentina was not, at that moment, in conditions to sell any country any equipment. They said with South Africa there was no arms trade. It was the issues related to strategy designs and the control of the sea waters which were mainly dealt with. However, the trip of some officers to South Africa was not denied²²³.

Beyond the truthfulness of those reports and the later denials, the Argentine Navy continued to maintain relations with its South African peer, although with a low profile, for strategic or commercial reasons. This offered a further conflictive area in the already complex relations between the Alfonsín Administration and the military.

TRADE RELATIONS

Argentina’s breakoff with South Africa did not bring about an immediate increase of African purchases. The years 1986 and 1987 showed a drop of the Argentine exports to the African countries, which picked up again as from 1988. But the breakoff did not affect trade relations with South Africa negatively: following the general trend, the Argentine exports also fell between 1986 and 1987, but by 1988 the former figures had been

221. Interview with Raúl Alconada Sempé, Secretary of Latin American Affairs and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 26 August 1992.

222. *La Nación*, 1986 (Buenos Aires) August 11th.

223. Interview by the autor with a Lieutenant Commander of the Navy, Buenos Aires, May 1993.

reached, while Alfonsín was still in power and political relations had worsened still further with the withdrawal of the South African Consul in Buenos Aires.

At the same time, imports from South Africa increased and the variations did not seem to depend on the fluctuations of the bilateral relations policy. This data confirms that, beyond concrete political gestures, in general the Argentina-Africa trade relations, and in particular the Argentina-South Africa commercial flows, were managed separately, almost independently. The lack of articulation between the policy makers and the private actors concerning foreign trade was thus demonstrated.

Over the sixties, the Argentine exports volumes to South Africa were rather constant, except for peaks in 1962 –which doubled with respect to the former year– and 1996 –which almost tripled those of 1965–, with an average share of the Argentine exports to Africa of about 21%. Imports threw fluctuating volumes, with a negative trade balance for Argentina over the last two years of that period. Over the whole decade, the incidence of imports and exports in the total Argentine international trade was around 22%.

Over the seventies, the Argentine exports to South Africa were rather constant, with the exception of 1973 and 1974, when they were remarkably large: for example, from 1972 to 1973, they had quadrupled. However, as from the 1974 peak, the volumes fell substantially, the same as the South African share over the Argentine sales to Africa, which showed a contradiction relating to the impulse during the military government (1976-1983). Meanwhile imports almost quadrupled the figures of the former decade; exports did not follow the same trend so the trade balance was negative for Argentina. After the first four years, the South African share over the Argentine imports to Africa was remarkably high, but it dropped in the following years.

In the eighties, the exports volumes were erratic (from US\$ 15m in 1980 to US\$171m three years later) and did not drop substantially after breaking diplomatic relations in 1986. Even in this second half of the 1980s, the exports percentage average to South Africa over total exports to Africa was around 22%, compared with the 19% of the first half. Imports also fluctuated, although with volumes remarkably lower than exports, with a trade balance favorable for Argentina. In spite of the low volumes, incidence in the Argentine exports share to Africa was high, with percentages above 90% between 1983 and 1986.

The composition of exports to South Africa over the period under study mainly consisted in agricultural manufactured goods (oils and animal and vegetable fats and their derivatives; vegetable products; leather, furs and their side products), while among imports were included metals, mineral products and chemicals and similar goods.

With the above-mentioned data, the independence of trade relations from the variations of the political relation with South Africa may be confirmed. A great intensity in the impulses or the rupture of political-diplomatic relations did not have an incidence either positively or negatively in the increase of the trade exchanges conducted by the private national and transnational actors.

Chapter VII

Menem and South Africa: between Presidential Protagonism and the Return to Impulses (1989-1999)

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS of 1989, when Carlos Menem was elected President, coincided with Frederick De Klerk coming to power in South Africa, 14 September of the same year. Both introduced changes in their respective countries at domestic level and also in their foreign policies, which positively influenced the course of the Argentine-South African relations, which had been suspended during the Alfonsín Administration.

The transition to a multiracial democracy, started by De Klerk in South Africa, was the justification for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations on the part of the new Argentine administration. When Mandela stepped in as President of the new South Africa, the way was paved for the intensification of the political-diplomatic relations. The conditions were ready to help with the development of political cooperation. However, there was actually only one impulse which, although it increased trade relations (carried forward in many instances by transnational actors), was not part of a policy design due to the lack of political will: the Argentine foreign policy priorities were elsewhere. Thus, after the mentioned impulse, relations with South Africa again were the sum total of isolated actions, with increasing density, depending on the good will of the officials in charge in the respective areas, without relevant political consequences.

Accordingly, after knowing the changes in South Africa²²⁴ which justified the decision to re-establish diplomatic relations, how such relations were developed over this decade and the presidential visit that took place in this context will be dealt within this chapter. Following along the proposed lines of analysis, the political-diplomatic, economic-commercial and strategic-military dimensions will be approached; it must be noted that the first two dimensions overlapped, to the extent the first one was embedded in the second, without necessarily giving way to a trade policy.

224. See Lechini (1994: 97-118) for an analysis of the South African transition.

MENEM AND RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA: THE DECISION

As has been already remarked, Alfonsín reappraised relations with the African countries, along with the impasse during which the Argentine-South African relations reached a low point after the 1986 breakoff and the subsequent measures adopted by Caputo. Menem, however, did the opposite: he underestimated relations with Africa and made up relations with Pretoria.

Since the beginnings of the Menem Administration, there were rumors about the President being inclined to re-establish relations with Pretoria. Before making a decision, the Foreign Relations Ministry, therefore, recommended to wait until the changes occurring in South Africa would be more significant. Diplomatic actions accompanied the mentioned rumors, with the purpose of recommencing the governmental contacts, encouraged by the South African government, who expected changes in the bilateral relations given the new political party in power in Argentina. For example, the Governor of Catamarca, Ramón Saadi, visited South Africa in June 1990 to develop an interest among the South African business firms to invest in mining in the Provinces of Catamarca and La Rioja; in October of that same year, members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Lower Chamber visited South Africa.

Two facts in 1990 showed the governmental intention to improve relations with South Africa. The Presidential Secretary, Alberto Kohan, mentioned it “was possible” to re-establish diplomatic relations with South Africa after his return from a visit to that country to “explore” the conditions that would allow to proceed in that direction²²⁵. Toward the end of that year, the Argentine Consular Office in Johannesburg, which was in charge of a Vice-Consul who managed business matters after diplomatic relations had been ended (1986) and the Argentine Consul withdrawn (1988), was given a higher category and a Plenipotentiary Minister was appointed.

For the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

“the South African situation and the political reform program announced by the Pretoria government deserved the closest attention of our government, who in those changes saw the possibility that South Africa reshuffled its political, social and economic structures so that in the shortest possible time they could

225. *La Nación*, 1990 “Mandela” (Buenos Aires) September 6th.

put an end to the apartheid regime and find a solution to the serious problems that have been affecting them; this, in the near future would allow them to join back the international structures and conciliatory conditions” (Cavallo, 1996: 373).

In an interview at the start of January 1991, shortly before taking over, the new Foreign Minister Di Tella considered the apartheid regime in South Africa was repulsive, that its abolition was a *sine qua non* condition to re-establish relations. However, he made clear that “the government was following the evolution of events to proceed at the right time”²²⁶. Although between January and April 1991 there were no substantial new changes in South Africa (abolition of the legal framework of apartheid would not take place until June of that year), already in April the Minister for the first time announced the intentions to re-establish relations²²⁷.

As from that moment, the matter began to be discussed in the Executive Office and to be commented on by the press in Argentina. The idea under consideration was that the decision to re-establish diplomatic relations would be taken according to the changes in the political system of South Africa. Sources in the Foreign Relations Ministry informed that this decision was being delayed because Nelson Mandela was expected to visit Argentina toward the middle of that year. Mandela had been invited by President Menem to visit Argentina in the context of a Latin American tour that included Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil. Quite probably, it was expected Mandela demonstrated his acceptance to re-establish relations; he was the most relevant figure in the South African political situation and a paradigm against racism. But before Mandela’s absence, because his visit could not be, 8 August 1991 was the date when diplomatic relations were resumed by Decree 1514/91, which pointed out that the decision was adopted because “the government of South Africa as from 10 February 1991

226. *La Nación*, 1991 “Di Tella: la prioridad comienza con EE.UU” (Buenos Aires) January 9th.

227. According to an interview with Minister Di Tella, “Argentina will re-establish relations with South Africa most possibly along with Brazil and Uruguay”, which, as interpreted by Di Tella, would be one of the first political decisions of MERCOSUR with respect to third countries. As a matter of fact, there was a mistake: Brazil and Uruguay never broke diplomatic relations with that African country. Also in this interview, Di Tella for the first time announced the withdrawal of Argentina from the Non-Aligned “because there is no reason for us to form part of that organization” (Bellando, Ovidio 1991 “*Relaciones con Sudafrica antes de terminar el año*” in *La Nación* [Buenos Aires] April 24th).

had started a reform program to re-establish a free democratic political system in that country”²²⁸.

As Foreign Minister Di Tella said:

“re-establishing diplomatic relations with South Africa forms part of our commitment to the international pressure to assure the establishment of a democratic and just society in South Africa, based on the principle of ‘one man, one vote’ and on total elimination of racial discrimination” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, 1991:31).

Before officially reopening the Embassy in Pretoria, the name of the rugby player Hugo Porta was already mentioned as the next Argentine Ambassador. Former Presidential Secretary Alberto Kohan was influential in this matter: during his already quoted visit to South Africa, in 1990, Kohan had been quite surprised by the especial recognition that the Argentine rugby player received from South Africans. On his return, he would ask him to lead a trade mission to South Africa²²⁹. It must be noted that the choice of a rugby player was not really the best one if the idea behind it was to give a positive signal to the future rulers: it is football, not rugby, the most popular sport among South Africans. However, the implication could have been to please the white rulers and the most powerful economic groups of South Africa. It may be argued that the choice of an internationally recognized sportsman was in line with the model used *to make politics*, in which certain figures were preferred to build a successful image of Argentina either domestically or internationally. Similarly, the footballer Diego Maradona and the succesful businesswoman Amalia Fortabat were chosen as itinerant ambassadors. The idea of impulses away from traditional diplomacy practices is, then, confirmed, in relation to presidential decisions.

Re-establishing diplomatic relations with the South African government was justified in terms of the important changes introduced in South Africa, oriented to the elimination of the apartheid regime, earlier than other international actors who associated relations with South Africa depending on the adoption of a new constitution and a voting and representation system inclusive of the non-white. The urgency to attract investment from the qualified South Africa’s mining sector and increase

228. *La Nación*, 1991 “*Fue restablecida la relacion con Sudafrica*” (Buenos Aires) August 9th.

229. *La Nación*, 1991 “*Porta, futuro diplomático*” (Buenos Aires) August 7th.

trade with a quite developed country may have been the reason for this measure, a hasty one, in the author's opinion.

The decision to re-establish diplomatic relations –the same as the earlier breakoff– was made at the highest level by President Menem and his Foreign Relations Minister Di Tella. However, there were different opinions at the Foreign Ministry. At the time of the breakoff, there were opinions in favor and against, while with the re-establishing of relations there was wider consensus²³⁰. In particular, the point under discussion was the timing: for some, the decision was made too early while for others, it was made too late.

The Argentine government announced the desire to re-establish diplomatic relations before South Africa abolished the legal framework supporting apartheid; actually, the decision was made after the measures had been taken by the South African government and even after the Americans made their decision: 11 July 1991, President George Bush decided to lift the sanctions which had been imposed, with the exception of the arms embargo. Israel –with important economic interests in South Africa- very soon followed in the steps of the USA; Argentina also followed along the same lines, particularly taking into consideration the especial relationship which was meant to maintain with Washington. In fact, Argentina had not implemented direct sanctions; it had adhered to international decisions and there was no other way but to re-establish diplomatic relations to keep in accordance with the American foreign policy. The idea of subscribing to the developed world position had earlier on been explicitated at the time of withdrawing from the Non-Aligned Movement.

POLITICAL DIMENSION

At the beginning of 1992, the diplomatic delegation in Pretoria was finally set up, after re-establishing diplomatic relations. The Argentine government again asked both President De Klerk and the leader of the African National Congress, Nelson Mandela, to visit Argentina, demonstrating a clear inclination to keep contacts with all political and social forces in the country. According to the course of events taking place domestically, South Africa

230. Carlos Escudé (1992: 36), advisor to Di Tella after re-establishing relations, said it had been an unnecessary decision because “the cost of not re-establishing relations with South Africa was nil, and the symbolic gesture of not re-establishing relations would have granted greater persuasion power to the new Argentine principles, which, on the other hand, were introduced later on. The decision to re-establish relations was made when the new Argentine foreign policy was still *purely pragmatic*”.

was considering to invite the Foreign Relations Minister and President Menem to visit their country.

In Di Tella's opinion

"The particular situation in South Africa is being followed with close attention by Argentina. Both countries share the South Atlantic scenario and will have great possibilities to foster cooperation in the future" (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, 1992: 75).

It is in this new context of situation that governmental and private contacts started during the Menem Administration were intensified. This political approach was part of the pragmatic orientation of the Argentine foreign policy. All the actions that were implemented at that time aimed to consolidate the kind of relations Argentina needed: investments and trade increase. Consequently, the main areas of interest revolved around a twofold technical type of cooperation: mining, professional agricultural training exchanges, investments in forestry to produce pulp, artificial insemination, improved cattle breeding, water resources, dairy industry, solar energy in rural areas, joint Argentine-South African undertakings, small manufacturing businesses, Argentine experience in deregulation and privatization²³¹. The Brazilian approach was different and had the purpose of consolidating political-diplomatic relations to reach a critical mass of intermediate states with enough weight on the international economic negotiations scenario.

Mining was held relevant in the consideration of the Menem Administration officials. A delegation was sent, headed by the Secretary of International Economic Relations, Alieto Guadagni; they visited different South African cities to promote mining investments in Argentina²³². As corollary to this mission, the Mining Secretary of Argentina organized a seminar in South Africa, 17 August 1993, to promote South African mining

231. During 1992, Carlos Ruckauf, Head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives and Eduardo de Zavalía, President of *Sociedad Rural Argentina*, traveled to South Africa to intensify relations in the agricultural area.

232. Guadagni's activities included interviews with the Finance and Public Works Ministers, with Vice-Minister of Foreign Relations and with the Head of Mining and Energy at governmental level; work meetings were held with businessmen leading the private mining sector. This trip was linked to the new regulations concerning mining investments, with concrete proposals related to public fields and deposits, with the acquiescence of the private sectors to discuss the needs of Argentina and even negotiate preliminary agreements (*La Nación*, 1992 (Buenos Aires) May 22nd).

investments in Argentina²³³, which materialized when South African companies opened branches in Buenos Aires and one of them signed agreements with the firm Pérez Companc²³⁴.

From the South African viewpoint, the most important event was the presence in Buenos Aires of South Africa's President Frederick De Klerk and different businessmen²³⁵. The visit, dated 27 and 28 August 1993, took place as part of a general tour around Latin American countries in the South Cone –Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay– to promote reinsertion of South Africa in Latin America. The short two-day stay in Argentina –it was not clear whether it had been an Argentine or a South African decision or simply because of the agenda constraints– did not bring about a concrete political outcome.

At that time, the Argentine Ambassador in Pretoria commented:

“The key role the embassy plays is to show, with its presence, that the Argentine government agrees to the historic change in South Africa [...] Both countries rest on the South Atlantic shores and have many things to defend and develop, especially now when the world is inclined to co-operation by regions”²³⁶.

The year 1994 was crucial in the history of South Africa: between 27 and 29 April the multiracial elections²³⁷ that would make Nelson Mandela the winner took place; the complete reinsertion of that country in the international scenario was accomplished. Foreign Minister Di Tella was at the head of the official delegation that attended the inaugural ceremony of President Mandela, 10 May 1994. De Klerk was now Vice-President and he paid a visit to Argentina 1 November of that same year to participate in a seminar held by a non-governmental organization, the Chief Executive

233. This seminar, Mining Investment Seminar “Argentina: opening the last mining frontier”, was the third one organized abroad to promote foreign investments. The former seminars had taken place in the USA and in Australia.

234. The firm Pérez Companc and the South African company Anglo American, a world leader in gold mining, merged; the consortium Mincor was born and via its local firm Formicruz was twice the winner of public biddings organized by the Province of Santa Cruz to grant exploration and eventually the exploitation of the Cerro Vanguardia mine deposits (*El Cronista*, 1993 “Pérez Companc busca oro con una empresa de Sudáfrica” [Buenos Aires] July 30th).

235. Formerly, in 1992, Dr. Clark, Chairman of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research of South Africa, had visited Buenos Aires; he signed a technical cooperation agreement with Dr. Matera, who was then Secretary of Science and Technology and Chairman of the National Council for Scientific and Technological Research.

236. *La Nación*, 1993 “Hugo Porta: ser embajador es el test match de mi vida” (Buenos Aires) January 4th.

237. Argentina participated as electoral observer in the framework of the UNO mission.

Organisation (CEO), which also invited the president of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museweni, at that time an ally of Washington.

As from the time Mandela took over, upon a request by Menem, the Argentine Foreign Relations Ministry established contact to organize a presidential visit to Pretoria; the visit had to be canceled in August 1994 because the South African President was having health problems.

Finally, President Menem's wish came true, 24 February 1995, when he became the first Head of State of the Americas to officially visit the brandnew democracy. The meeting immediately brought about a joint communiqué whereby both mandataries expressed their coincidences on various matters on the global agenda and also dealt with the relations between the two countries²³⁸.

Officially, it was reported that the mentioned communiqué was "a thorough cooperation plan, which would become institutionalized after the negotiations of nine agreements covering all aspects of the bilateral relation were concluded" (Jefatura de Gabinete de Ministros, 1996:103). President Menem stated: "Argentina will work to find the form and the means to give support to the Reconstruction and Development Program", which was the foundation stone of the South Africa government²³⁹.

Apart from discourse and communiques, the visit did not bring about concrete results. The visit had not been quite well organized and, perhaps, results were not really sought out. If the Presidential Committee is analyzed, it may be said that many of its members were more interested in sharing those moments with the President than in closing business deals or finding coincidences with the South Africans. This visit may be rather interpreted following the wish of Carlos Menem to occupy center stage, since he very

238. In a joint communique, the Presidents of Argentina and of South Africa expressed their total support to the United Nations, in particular, the Peacekeeping Operations, the Initiative of the White Helmets and the Resolution of the General Assembly on the ZPCSA. They asserted the need to consolidate democracy and economic reforms as well as the convenience of promoting economic and trade co-operation between both countries, to create an atmosphere favorable to reciprocal investments. They also committed to closing negotiations on the promotion and protection of investments and reaching an agreement to avoid paying double tariffs. The Argentine President acknowledged the important support of South Africa to appoint Buenos Aires as the seat of the Permanent Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty.

239. *La Nación*, 1995 "Menem y Mandela firman acuerdos de cooperación" (Buenos Aires) February 25th.

much desired to receive the treatment of an international prestigious leader of the stature of Mandela instead of producing political actions or advancing with trade negotiations on the other side of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, to fully use the opportunity of the presidential visit, the Council for Economic Affairs of the South Africa Embassy held a “Seminar on Investment, Trade and Tourist Opportunities in South Africa” in Buenos Aires, 22 March, with the purpose of intensifying economic relations and invited all the actors that might have an interest in that field²⁴⁰.

Also, forming part of the international reinsertion project of the new government, different top-level delegations were sent to Brazil and Argentina. Vice- Minister for Foreign Relations Aziz Pahad²⁴¹, who was welcomed by the Foreign Minister himself, different officials and the Presidential Secretary²⁴², officially visited Buenos Aires, 27 May 1996; regional and international issues were discussed as well as bilateral relations. To reciprocate, between 31 October and 2 November of the same year, Vice-President Ruckauf travelled to South Africa; he was welcomed by Mandela and by Mbeki, at that time held to be his successor²⁴³. The fact that both parties exchanged ideas concerning bilateral, regional and international issues and on the evolution of the regional integration processes, without actually making progress as compared with former meetings, leads to interpret those trips as protocol instead of politically meaningful, particularly from the point of view of Argentina.

240. The author was able to observe that already established as well as newly- made friends of South Africa had been invited to this seminar.

241. Vice-Minister Pahad, traveling around different Latin American countries, was politically as relevant as the Foreign Relations Minister Alfred Nzo.

242. The South African mission was integrated by the Vice-Director General for Europe and America, Mr. Tebogo Mafole, and by the Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, Mr. Joham Killian, former ambassador of South Africa in Buenos Aires (1991-1995).

243. According to the elections of 1994 and the former Constitution, South Africa had a President, Nelson Mandela, and two Vice-Presidents, Frederick De Klerk and Thabo Mbeki. However, because he dissented with respect to the new Constitution approved in 1996, De Klerk resigned his position that same year.

The vice-President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki²⁴⁴, arrived in Argentina 10 September 1997. Although his discourse was in line with the kind of relationship proposed by Argentina, Mbeki did not fail to discuss the issues from the South African agenda perspective. Following the same ideas as on the South Atlantic co-operation agenda was the visit to Argentina in July 1999 of President Mandela on occasion of the meeting of presidents of the MERCOSUR –and associate countries, Chile and Bolivia– in Ushuaia. Mandela was welcomed in Buenos Aires by President Menem. Three bilateral agreements related to very general issues were signed: an Agreement on Reciprocal Investments Promotion and Protection, a Memorandum of Understanding about Consultation on Shared Interests and an Agreement on Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in the Struggle against Production and Trafficking of Drugs and Illegal Substances²⁴⁵.

It might be said that since democracy returned, bilateral relations with South Africa continued to be stronger, although by slow steps if compared with Brazil, whose government enjoyed great chemistry with the South African counterpart in its foreign policy orientation. In this context, I thought appropriate to resort to the concept of “micro” relations introduced by Escudé (1992). Micro-relations are those relations which are articulated around a plurality of particular problems in charge of a multitude of individual public and private actors and small bureaucratic groups. In the case of Argentina, the growing relations with South Africa were articulated not so much at the level of macro-politics or macro-relations but rather at the level of a web that the private actors have woven, backed by the respective embassies and some bureaucratic groups. In terms of the relations proposed by Argentina, the interpretation would be that the South African interest was directed to the “available supply”; that is to say, there was interest in

244. In his speech before the Argentine Council for International Relations, Mbeki spoke about the importance of co-operation between nations and small economies to face the globalization challenges; he remarked the multilateral instances in which Argentina and South Africa were able to develop joint action: the ZPCSA, the Valdivia Group, the Peacekeeping Operations, the Initiative of the White Helmets and the UNCTAD. He also stressed the official exchanges between Argentina and South Africa; for example, through parliamentary committees, ministers and government officials, which had allowed South Africa to have direct knowledge of the Argentine experience and be better positioned to face up to the South African challenges. Concerning South-South co-operation, he gave particular importance to the co-operation possibilities between the MERCOSUR and the SADC, by enlarging bilateral co-operation in the region (Mbeki, 1997).

245. The Ministry of Home Affairs passed Resolution 1331, in July 1998, whereby tourist and business visas were no longer required of South African citizens. This was a unilateral norm, the counterpart to the South African decision of February 1995.

knowing the Argentine experience concerning the economic reform process; also, there was an interest in increasing bilateral trade. Argentina was rather more oriented to closing deals in the mining and the agricultural and food industry, as can be seen in the description that follows.

In September 1994, the Secretary for Agriculture, Livestock and Fishing of Argentina signed an Inter-institutional Veterinary Agreement in Cape Town, which opened the South African market for Argentine beef. South Africa canceled the requirement of tourist, trade or transit visas for Argentine citizens, 21 February 1995. In the second half of that year, South African authorities from the transport and housing areas visited Argentina and other Latin American countries. The increased intra-South Atlantic relations gave way to closer air contact: to the two weekly flights with Malaysian Airways between South Africa and Argentina, since 30 November 1995, South African Airways added one more weekly flight between those two points, with a stop in São Paulo²⁴⁶. In 1996, former Argentine Ambassador in South Africa, Hugo Porta –who had been replaced by Pedro Herrera– visited that country to discuss the nomination of both countries to be the seat of the 2004 Olympic Games; he held meetings with press, mining and food industry representatives²⁴⁷. Alieto Guadagni, at that time the Secretary for Industry, Mining and Trade, also visited South Africa, 13 and 14 December, to meet businessmen of the mining sector and discuss future possible undertakings²⁴⁸.

From South Africa, a group of advisors from the Public Utilities Ministry visited Argentina, 10 and 11 June, with the purpose of being informed on the Argentine privatization experience; businessmen from the South African Foundation²⁴⁹ interested in the economic reforms and the deregulation process implemented in Argentina also visited the country between 10 and 14 July. Following, seven South African pressmen from the

246. They had been suspended in 1985.

247. That same year, in the context of the National Meeting of Argentine Exporters, a seminar on non-traditional markets was held in Buenos Aires; South Africa along with Australia, New Zealand and India were included. The important place that country held (thirteenth) for Argentine exports was pointed out.

248. Guadagni had already visited South Africa with similar purposes in 1992, but as the Secretary for International Economic Relations.

249. The SAF is an association made up of South Africa's major firms and main multinational companies. Its representatives interviewed Argentine Congressmen, authorities from the Secretary of Mining, Economics and Foreign Relations Ministries and important private businessmen.

most representative media institutions specialized in economics²⁵⁰ came to Argentina from 20 to 24 November. In December, a parliamentary delegation from South Africa, coordinated by the President of the Parliamentary Public Works Committee arrived in Buenos Aires to study public works projects implemented by the Economics Ministry and the governments of different provinces and municipalities and the private sector; they also gathered information related to the production of solar energy in rural areas and the creation of low cost small and medium businesses. In 1997, Pretoria appointed the new ambassador in Buenos Aires: this was a relevant fact which had been pending since the former ambassador had left in August 1995 and a chargé d'affaires had remained in charge; although not officially admitted, the absence of the highest diplomacy representative had been a worrying issue. In the same year in Buenos Aires, the new ambassador welcomed Nadine Gordimer, Nobel Prize for Literature 1991 and human rights advocate for South Africa. Over 1999, Argentina welcomed different South African²⁵¹ visitors; however, the frequency of the exchanges began to decline. This is the reason why only the Head of Argentina's Cabinet was present in Pretoria when the new President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, was sworn in, 16 June 1999.

Apart from the governmental responses to the South African initiatives, the private sector carried out intense activities. Argentina's continued participation in the SAITEX (South African International Trade Exhibition), the most important multi-modal fair in the region, must be mentioned. In November 1994, for the first time, Argentina participated with fifteen companies, and won the silver medal. In October 1995, in the second participation, the bronze medal was obtained. In 1998, Argentina's pavilion gathered thirty-two exporting firms, together with the Bilateral Chamber of Commerce. But in SAITEX '99, only one firm was registered, because

250. Business Report, economics supplement of The Star, the most traditional main English language newspaper; Beeld, principal journal in Afrikaans; Business Day, important journal specialized in economics and business; Sunday Times, of largest circulation on Sundays; South Africa Broadcasting Corporation, the radio and TV monopoly and Financial Mail, the weekly specialized in business and economics.

251. South Africa's Managing Director for Commerce and Industry, Zavareh Rustomjee (16 May), the President of the Human Rights Commission, Nyameko Barney Pytiana (28 August to 4 September), South Africa's Vice-Minister of Agriculture, Professor D.C. du Toit arrived in Buenos Aires on the occasion of celebrating the Meeting of the Cairns Group (August 1999); the Managing Director and Vice-Director of the Nuclear Security Council of South Africa attended the Second Encounter of Regulatory Entities of countries with limited nuclear programs (6 to 8 October). The same year, in Pretoria there was a bilateral meeting on transport services, and a Letter of Understanding was subscribed.

Argentina had changed its participation criterion: after five years with a very good performance in the mentioned fair of general characteristics, it decided to aim at more specific fairs²⁵². All along this period, the embassy organized different meetings for Argentine companies seeking business opportunities in South Africa²⁵³; different exhibitions related to Argentina's economy, investment possibilities and bilateral trade²⁵⁴ were organized to help Argentina be better known at academic and business levels.

Concerning "micro" relations, the increasing academic contacts must be noted; they were reflected in the organization of seminars centered in the analysis of the possible relations between the respective integration proceses, MERCOSUR, and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), which were attended by Argentine officials and diplomatic agents.

Additionally, although during the Menem Administration the multilateral profile was lowered, the bureaucratic policy of the Foreign Relations Ministry carried on with their routine activities concerning the issues and the countries chosen, and participating in selective multilateral Sout-South co-operation. There was actions coordination with some African states in specific multilateral issues –environmental protection, security in the Southern Hemisphere, naval co-operation– in which different sectors of the Foreign Misnistry and other governmental agencies participated actively. The Argentine participation must be mentioned, along with Chile, Uruguay, South Africa and New Zealand, in the Valdivia Group –a group of countries in the warm weather areas south of the Equator– which had been dealing with environmental issues since 1995. Naval co-operation was also relevant, conducted by way of the South Atlas Operations, the Argentine participation in the ZPCSA and the Peacekeeping Operations.

Some reflections on the political-diplomatic relations with South Africa during the Menem Administration can be advanced now; those relations

252. Interview by the author with economic advisor Carlos Wydler, Pretoria, 18 May 1998.

253. The aim was to set up joint ventures to produce refrigerating equipments, exhibition refrigerators and soda beverages vending machines; to explore possibilities of banking activities and associations; to sell sports outfits, cooking oil, bakery goods, office furniture, meat and food porcessed products, iron and steel works, hospital equipment, measuring instruments and agroindustrial products.

254. In 1999, in UNISA (Pretoria) 21 July; at Cape Town University, International Business Graduate School, 26 August; at the University of Stellenbosch, 27 August; in Windhoek, Namibia, 14 October and in Port Louis, Mauritius, 21 October.

exhibit some particular features if compared with the relations with other African countries. Throughout this book, it may have been observed that with South Africa there were mutual impulses up to the time Alfonsín stepped in, when more frequent relations were generated. The diplomatic relations break-off caused an abrupt interruption which consequently brought along the absence of political relations. Trade exchanges went separate ways. Although the break-off may be seen as part of the general strategies of Argentina's foreign policy at that time –international reinsertion and the defense of human rights–, the accelerated re-establishment of diplomatic relations during the Menem Administration finally turned them into a further impulse. Although during his term in office there were more frequent bilateral exchanges at governmental level, relations with South Africa were not part of the foreign policy priorities. It was one more impulse which aimed at attracting investments in the mining sector and selling agricultural and food products; the opportunity to consolidate common policy agendas was missed.

The mentioned impulse, which reached momentum when Menem visited South Africa, in fact was part of Menem's style of building his own image, under the assumption that it was also the country's image: the country deserved to be in the First World. Meeting a leader of the international stature of Mandela would complete the list of personalities Menem –and, therefore, Argentina– could be associated with. Other presidential decisions may also be considered within this framework, such as sending ships to the Gulf or the attempt to mediate in the Middle East conflict. Without really wanting to, Menem made South Africa occupy top position on the agenda for relations with Sub-Saharan Africa.

As final words on the analysis of the political-diplomatic aspects, it may be deemed adequate to make a short mention of the power shift in Argentina and the start of the Fernando de la Rúa Administration, whose inaugural ceremony was attended by the Foreign Relations Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, 10 December 1999. As was remarked in an earlier work by this author (Lechini, 2001: 239-243), “during the first year of Foreign Minister Rodríguez Giavarini in office, there were no substantial changes in the Argentine-South African relations, which showed continuity”. The domestic economic and political crisis, which became deeper as this new administration advanced, led all the government agencies to work almost exclusively on this issue. The Foreign Relations Ministry was not an exception, mainly because its new head, Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini, was also an economist and had been in charge of the economic administration of

the City of Buenos Aires when De la Rúa was the Buenos Aires Mayor. Instead of a foreign policy design, there was continuation of the former administration and the development of a reactive policy *vis-à-vis* the events taking place at that moment. In the case of South Africa, the most important aspect was the mentioned signature of the Project for an Agreement on the Creation of a Free Trade Zone between MERCOSUR and the Republic of South Africa, 14 December 2000, on the occasion when Mbeki and De la Rúa held a bilateral meeting.

STRATEGIC-MILITARY RELATIONS

With the end of the East-West conflict and the policy of alignment with the USA, the Menem Administration changed the orientation of the security agenda by including the concept of cooperative security. The aim was to strengthen relations in the South Atlantic, with strategic-military cooperative connotations, by participating in the already analyzed ZPCSA and military cooperation in the so-called South Atlas Operations, which will now be discussed.

Relations between the Navy Forces of both countries –never interrupted– acquired a lower profile during the period when diplomatic relations were cut, and were later revitalized after re-establishing relations with South Africa in 1991. According to naval sources, by 1992 the Argentine Navy, with the acceptance of the political authorities, was developing a “plan to strengthen collaboration with the countries in the region, including South Africa, with economic and strategic purposes and in accordance with the different levels of the countries involved” (Ferrer, 1993)²⁵⁵. The Navy thought that a strong association with the South Africans would be of great importance for the exploitation of the South Atlantic resources; also, it was relevant to join efforts with other countries in the region and with those with interests in it, such as Great Britain, Nigeria and the USA²⁵⁶.

255. The starting point was the idea that in ten to fifteen years there would be a sea occupation on the part of the countries in search of underwater riches, made possible because the modern advancements of technology would allow the extraction of elements which were formerly not extractable or only within reach of the more highly developed countries. Therefore, those countries not in conditions to be in charge of the findings on the sea platform would run the risk of suffering pressures applied by those who had the capacity and the technology to do so.

256. In a wider geopolitical context, it would have been well regarded by the USA State Department, Canada, France and Israel, countries which supported any serious project to help South Africa end its international isolationism (*La Nación*, 1992 “*Objetivos comunes con la Armada Sudafricana*” [Buenos Aires] October 9th).

In this respect, there are coincidences between Foreign Minister Di Tella's discourse at the United Nations General Assembly and the position of the Navy Chief, Admiral Jorge Ferrer, who, in his visit to South Africa in 1992, closed different agreements related to the control of sea activities, legal protection of that zone, the support to scientific research and its application on the sector²⁵⁷. Similarly, Ferrer maintained conversations concerning the "intention to create a South Atlantic naval co-operation organization which would involve the coastal countries of Africa and of the Americas, like the USA and other countries which would join the initiative"²⁵⁸. Because this possible naval cooperation organization gave way to new speculations about reviving the SATO project²⁵⁹ which had not been created during the last military government, naval sources allegedly reported that this project enjoyed no likelihood because it was obsolete²⁶⁰.

In February 1993, after political-diplomatic relations had been re-established as well as those between the respective Navy Forces strengthened, such contacts turned into actual cooperation; the first joint naval operations ever in history were carried out in Argentine waters²⁶¹. Under the name "Atlasur Operations", they were repeated every other year, including anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and tactical maneuvers, supplies provision and practice at surface and air targets. The first operations were those between Argentina and South Africa, followed by activities in which Brazil and Uruguay participated²⁶².

In "Atlasur I", the Argentine Navy carried out naval operations with its South African peer on the Buenos Aires offshore waters, between 17 and 28

257. *Clarín*, 1992 "Menem aceptaría una invitación oficial para visitar Sudáfrica" (Buenos Aires) September 25th.

258. Conversations held by the author with Admiral Ferrer on the occasion of sharing a round table discussion at a seminar on the South Atlantic, Buenos Aires, May 1997.

259. *La Nación*, 1992 "Ferrer: el futuro de la Armada" (Buenos Aires) November 19th.

260. Interview by the author with top-level Navy officers.

261. The Argentine ports had already been visited officially in 1967 by the frigates "President Pretorius" and "President Kruger" and the logistic vessel "Tafelberg"; nine years afterwards, the hydrographic ship "Proteus" also arrived. The frigate "Libertad" officially visited Cape Town in 1970.

262. South Africa is observer member of South Atlantic Maritime Area, SAMA (AMAS in Spanish) an agreement subscribed in 1967 by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, which aims to achieve co-operation of sea activities. Since June 1996, the South African Navy has been invited by its USA counterpart to participate in the joint naval operations UNITAS along with ships from the USA, South America and Europe.

February 1993²⁶³. Between 17 and 24 May 1995, with Brazil and Uruguay, “Atlasur II” was conducted and naval operations were displayed on the waters across Cape Town. Following, two Argentine warships, the ARA missile corvettes “Parker” and “Espora”, for the first time visited Walvis Bay—Namibia’s most important port, the only deep ocean water port in the region—with the Argentine Ambassador in Zimbabwe present on the occasion. In May 1997, the Chief of the Navy Staff, Admiral Carlos Marrón, visited his South African peer, Vice-Admiral Simpson Anderson, on the 75th anniversary celebration of the South African Navy. In this opportunity, “Atlasur III” was carried out, again with Brazil and Uruguay. The Argentine vessels also stopped at Walvis Bay, Namibia. Finally, in May 1999, “Atlasur IV” took place on Latin American coastal waters. The Argentine ARA corvettes “Parker” and “Rosales”, the Brazilian frigate “Union” and corvette “Jaciguai”, the Uruguayan frigate “Montevideo”, the South African logistic ship “Drakensberg” and the two light missile motorboats “Kok” and “Sethren” participated in these operations.

It must be noted that in this area, a remarkable continuity was achieved by the military agencies; additionally, a Peace Cooperation Agreement was subscribed, 6 October 1997, in Buenos Aires by both Navy Forces, in accordance with Act 25142/99, passed in 1999.

TRADE DIMENSION

Trade between Argentina and South Africa also increased as South Atlantic relations improved. It tripled between the start and the close of the nineties, with a balance favorable to Argentina except for 1993. Exports continued to rise but also fluctuated, like in the former decade, with figures above the US\$ 200 million, except for the years 1990, 1991 and 1993. The incidence of these sales in the exports to Africa was over 20% during all the decade, reaching 35% in 1995. South Africa bought soy cake and by-products, sunflower and cotton oil, gold, wheat and chemical wood paste,

263. February 17, the South African ships arrived at the port of Buenos Aires and February 21, operations were started; February 26, they were ended. The South African Ambassador in Argentina stated that these operations, in terms of magnitude, were among the most important ones the South African Navy had ever taken part in. The Director of the Navy Staff, the second hierarchical authority of the Navy, Vice-Admiral Fausto López, said that it was the task of both Navy Forces to share, on the same scenario, the responsibility for sea safety through joint operations in order to be able to participate in peacekeeping activities, technology exchange and the defense of common interests in the Antarctic (*La Nación*, 1993 “*Integración para lograr el control del Atlántico Sur*” [Buenos Aires] February 28th).

and it sold fuels, mineral oils, foundry, iron and steel, paper and carton, plastics, metallurgic metals, slag and inorganic chemical products.

Although in the first five years of the decade exports multiplied four times, a direct relationship between the mentioned growth and the re-established diplomatic relations cannot be assured, as expressed by the Ambassador Porta²⁶⁴; the rise in 1991 and 1992 was due to the drought that had devastated Southern Africa and had forced those countries to import substantial volumes of agricultural products to be able to meet their food requirements. The figures of 1993 show the case: in that year, the balance of trade was negative for Argentina because exports decreased to the former values while imports continued to rise. Argentine imports also grew importantly during the first three years of the decade, and later the figures were maintained but with fewer fluctuations than was the case with exports. The incidence in imports from South Africa over total trade from Argentina to Africa was remarkable, reaching 92.49% in 1990 and 83.59% in 1990; it later dropped to under 50% during the second five years, with only 19.19% in 2000.

264. Interview by the author with Argentina's Ambassador in South Africa, Hugo Porta, Buenos Aires, 28 August 1993.

Chapter VIII

Brazil's South African Policy: the Post-1994 approach and the results

AS MENTIONED in Chapter IV, Brazil developed an African policy involving concrete actions which, with the passing of time, helped to build a political-diplomatic structure and trade relations with some African states, whenever conditions permitted it. A difficult issue in such circumstances was the relations with South Africa because of the apartheid regime. It was quite similar with Argentina. However, Brazil did not need to implement any noteworthy actions, such as breaking relations with Pretoria, to show its commitment to the African countries and the people of South Africa; it may perhaps have been because the density of the relations carried out did not leave margin for doubting the Brazilian intentionality.

The evolution of Brazil's policy towards South Africa will be dealt with in this chapter; also showing fluctuations in the wider context of the Brazilian-African relations. This policy offered an ever lower profile as relations with the African countries improved and the situation in South Africa worsened. The domestic South African policy was, then, an intervening variable in the evolution of the Brazilian relations with Pretoria, in spite of the trade relations being developed. As was the case in Argentina, the strongest impulse came from South Africa, with its outward policy, which involved strategies and trade components; it brought about non-linear relations which, from the Brazilian viewpoint "show the history of a highly strung dialectics between the values and objectives that inspired the different Brazilian foreign policy makers" (Vilalva y Gala, 2001: 34).

The evolution of the Brazilian foreign policy *vis-à-vis* South Africa depended on a multiplicity of factors in terms of closer or more detached relations, considering the commercial and the international political interests being managed at the multilateral forums. Then, in bilateral relations, until the mid-seventies, Brasilia responded weakly to the South African impulses, which were taken to be ambiguities by some academic experts (Vilalva y Gala, 2001: 55), hesitations (Penna, 2001a), oscillations, contradictions (Saraiva, 1996) or ambivalent attitudes.

The ambiguities and reservations were related to the economic and commercial, the strategic and the ethical concerns. The economic and trade interests followed the national interests, summed up since the thirties as the “pursuit of those elements necessary for development”. With the strategic interests was overlapped the creation of a South Atlantic geo-strategic association. This idea, originally thought out at the High Military Academy, took into consideration both the strategic dimension of the defense of the South Atlantic against the Communist threat and, into the 1970s, the possibilities of expanding the Brazilian interests in Africa, not through ideological confrontation but by means of trade. The ethical concerns were related to the assertion of the humanist values consecrated in the Charter of the United Nations and in the multiracial experience of the Brazilian society, which repudiated the racial discrimination regime in force in South Africa (Vilalva y Gala, 2001).

The policy with South Africa showed fluctuations, the consequence of the difference between the principles and the concrete interests; it was the possible adaptation before clearly defined continued objectives of national development. In its oscillations, Brazil intended to separate its approaches to Black Africa from its traditional friendship with South Africa. Vilalva y Gala (2001: 40) depict it with the image of “two doors opened to Africa: the ‘black’ door and the ‘white’ door”, an idea very well defined in the already mentioned opinions of the Economic Minister Delfim Neto and the Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza. Consequently, as concerns bilateral relations, Brazil held contact with Pretoria but it was made very clear that they enjoyed a commercial nature. When the dilemma Black Africa-South Africa was solved out, the political contacts between the two governments diminished and the commercial activities were also reduced. Trade –which, in the early period had been supported by the state-run structure in accordance with the interest to increase exports– was continued at parallel levels, depending on the synergy of the private actors.

Multilaterally, at the United Nations, Brazil followed the majority of countries condemning apartheid; Brazil offered an image of a multiracial society with no discrimination tradition. In the words of the Minister Juracy Magalhães before the General Assembly in 1996: “Brazil is proud of having been the first country to sign the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, approved at the last Session of the General Assembly” (FUNAG, 1995: 212). Like most other countries, at first, the Foreign Ministry tried not to express a definition related to racial discrimination in South Africa; but, as the crisis worsened and drew more

attention at the United Nations, Brazil's diplomacy hardened but did not yet accept to apply trade and diplomatic sanctions. There was a legal argument that justified this attitude: the principle of non intervention, because Brazil thought that the international pressures brought about by public opinion would be enough to defeat the racial discrimination system; there was also a pragmatic reason: economic and commercial interests.

The Brazilian stance evolved with time, positively, along with international pressure on Pretoria. It may be said there was continuity centered on condemnation of apartheid. This continuity had its nuances, though, because the intensity of the Brazilian criticism increased as the commitments to Black Africa also increased, the international pressure became deeper and trade with South Africa diminished. Like in Argentina, the opposition to South Africa turned stronger because of the illegal occupation of Namibia.

To sum up, Brazil's relations with South Africa were ambivalent for some time. An initial period of ambiguities may be distinguished until 1974-1975. When Itamaraty defined its clear option for Black Africa, broke its alignment with Portugal in Africa and recognized the new states which had become independent from Lisbon, Brazil entered a stage of re-definitions (1975/1985) which pointed to detachment from South Africa, as explicitly declared by President Sarney, although without cutting diplomatic relations. This was the period of the so-called "politics of no policy" with Pretoria, until South Africa opened to democracy in 1994, and a new strategy with political and commercial components was defined.

POLITICAL DIMENSION

The evolution of the Brazil-South Africa relations will now be dealt with following the periods which show the variations from an ambiguous policy to a no-policy definition; later, with democracy in South Africa, diplomatic and trade policies were developed.

As from the Second World War, Brazil held important relations with South Africa and was concerned with the strategic dimension of the South Atlantic; it had a diplomatic delegation in Pretoria since the Dutra government. In 1948, in the post-war context, diplomatic relations were established when the South African Union was well positioned in the international community; it was virtually the only country in the Atlantic region with whom Brazil held direct relations at that time. Matters complicated as from 1948, when the National Party in power began its racist legal-institutional structure, identified with the apartheid doctrine. The new relations with Black Africa –especially with Nigeria and Senegal– raised problems for Brazil, concerning its relations with South Africa.

Despite his position against racism, President Quadros granted South Africa a role in the independent foreign policy, and welcomed an economic mission from Pretoria between 13 and 16 March 1961, with the purpose of increasing trade relations. Trade with South Africa by that time meant 50% over total Brazilian exports to Africa. For the 1964 strategists and the Castello Branco government, South Africa was the only loyal partner in the westernizing mind of the generals at the High Military Academy. The first military government tried to design a special policy for the southern region of the African continent, clearly separating Black Africa from South Africa. As stated by Jaguaribe (1996), Castello Branco’s foreign policy placed Brazil on the side of the USA. During the period of “ideological frontiers”, Brazil was indirectly committed to colonialism in Africa, when backing Portugal and the South African policy.

The Atlantic was a space for the Brazil-Lisbon-Pretoria alliance against the Communist threat to the African countries (Oliveira, 1987). For this reason, there was the idea of creating an Afro-Portuguese-Brazilian community, in which Brazil would occupy a special place as mediator between Portugal and the African territories. The rationale of the fight against Communism placed Brazil close to South Africa. During this period, there were rumors concerning a South Atlantic defense agreement that

265. This expression was taken from Penna (2001b: 81-82), who spoke of “conscious pragmatism” because “on the part of the Brazilian diplomacy, there was an accurate understanding that the relations with South Africa had its foundations in the economic advantages the country would obtain from commercial relations”.

would include the coastal countries of South America, South Africa and, eventually, the USA and England.

The visit that the South Africa Foreign Minister Muller and the Secretary of Commerce and Industry Kotzenberg paid to Brasilia in July 1966 opened a period of increased interaction. But Itamaraty never failed to make clear the undoubtedly commercial nature of the contacts with South Africa. The strategic characteristics of trade were defended; that is to say, the prevailing notion of economic security, according to which security must be subordinated to development²⁶⁶. In this context, Brazil sent a military and a trade mission to South Africa in 1966, which also visited Angola and Mozambique.

With respect to the chances of a strategic and military alliance, Itamaraty had reiterated its former position opposed to a political or military approach to the South African authorities (Vilalva y Gala, 2001). Although South Africa was a central point for the anti-communist crusade, the Brazilian Navy never publicly defended an agreement with that country, as may be observed in the positions explicated by Admiral Flores, who held that the respective Navy Forces were not in condition to close such deals²⁶⁷.

Those rumors would also circulate with both Castello Branco and Costa e Silva and into the eighties²⁶⁸; they had an origin in the South African impulses and the relative acceptance those proposals had in Argentina.

The decline of the Atlantic geopolitical perception and the re-dimensioning of the African policy were the first consequences of the power shift of 1967, with Costa e Silva now at the helm. Although the Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto in March 1968 declared that its government

266. For Castello Branco, in 1964, diplomacy “must also be an instrument destined to accumulate resources for our economic and social development as the means to strengthen national power”. See Mourão and Oliveira (2000: 317).

267. Penna (2001b: 80) points out: “the Navy tried to reach a military alliance keeping in mind the defense of the South Atlantic, or, at least, a military cooperation agreement, the first step of which would be the exchange of information concerning the naval moves in the South Atlantic. This proposal was originated in Pretoria, and the Brazilian Navy showed immediate interest. However, as there was a different standpoint at Itamaraty, it did not prosper”.

268. However, over this decade, the South Atlantic strategic commitments would remain within the framework of the creation of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic of 1986, which excluded South Africa. Finally, this situation was solved in 1994, after the democratic elections and the multiracial government in power in South Africa, with its incorporation to the ZPCSA.

defended all the efforts necessary to fight off racial discrimination in Africa, the Brazilian school ship “Custódio de Melo” paid a visit to Cape Town. A year later, the Foreign Minister held a meeting with his South African peer Muller, 23 March 1969, when Muller traveled to Brazil, on the inaugural flight of South African Airways²⁶⁹.

Minister Muller also visited Argentina, where he met the Defense Ministers of both countries, to discuss the proposal of the South Atlantic Defense Treaty. However, the Foreign Relations Ministers of Brazil and Argentina afterwards denied their countries were interested in a military treaty concerning the South Atlantic. As can be observed, actions did not change as much as discourse did, and were implemented gradually. Even with Costa e Silva in office, the vote was in favor of Portugal and South Africa against the resolutions of the UN that condemned colonialism.

In the early Médici Administration, Brazil’s exports to Africa still included South Africa as the main partner²⁷⁰. Over the seventies, South Africa gradually grew less important and the historical commercial relations with this country were modified. The strengthened relations with other African countries may have been the reason for the change, but also Brazil’s vulnerable energy sector may perhaps have contributed to the gradual detachment from the almost exclusive trade with South Africa; the increasing exchanges with the new South Atlantic partners, mainly with Nigeria, should be taken into consideration as well. Therefore, Brazil had to move forward and make decisions. The first presidential decree limiting trade with South Africa (the arms embargo according to the UN Security Council Resolution) was signed 28 July 1970. At the beginning of 1974, in a visit by Nigeria’s Foreign Relations Minister, a joint communique was issued whereby “apartheid, colonialism and any other form of racial discrimination” was repudiated. Brazil needed to change, as had been mentioned by the Nigerian scholar Joy Ogwu (1981: 9),

“The apparent indifference of most Latin American countries as regards the struggle for liberation was the strongest limitation to improve relations between Nigeria and Latin America. Behind the broad expressions of good

269. With this Johannesburg-Rio de Janeiro-New York flight, the 1966 proposal made by Muller –joining Latin America and South Africa by air– came true.

270. The Brazilian-South African Chamber of Commerce and Tourism was created in 1971, as the evidence that showed South Africa’s interest in keeping those close commercial relations.

will, most Latin American countries held a detached political stance vis-à-vis Southern African issues”.

A NEW CHOICE

The years 1974 and 1975 were the most crucial moments in the relations with Portugal, Africa and South Africa: the Portuguese debacle in Africa was added to the vulnerable energy conditions of Brazil. This is why Penna (2001b: 5) maintains that “it was no sheer coincidence that only after 1974/1975 Brazil had started effective changes in the relations with South Africa”.

From a timid and also lukewarm attitude, Brazil turned into a more severe treatment of the South African issues at the United Nations with respect to bilateral relations. Up to that moment, Brazil had almost automatically followed the USA and the main European nations concerning matters in South Africa and Africa at large; but, after this period, it started specific relations that would later follow Brazil’s own interests, without consulting, subordinating or aligning passively with the “Western world”.

A stronger political attitude was assumed as from this moment. Strategically advancing in building political relations with the African nations and commercial relations with some particular countries, such as Nigeria, was implicit in the changes Brazil implemented in its relations with South Africa. The oil crisis and the threat of a boycott on the part of the oil producing countries influenced Brazil’s mentioned changes.

When Geisel was in power, South Africa was gradually reduced in importance. Bilaterally, the Brazilian diplomacy adopted a well-defined lawful position (non-intervention) and reduced the level of official relations according to “the orientation to keeping a low profile”. But, Itamaraty refused to take more trenchant measures, probably because of the South African investments in Brazil²⁷¹ or out of the wish not to raise more problems if the trouble brought about by the recognition of the independence of Angola is called to mind.

271. The Brazil Anglo American Corporation settled in 1973, and the joint ventures with Brazilian companies, increased South African investments. Consequently, the groups of pressure also increased, even nationally, in favor of closer relations with Pretoria.

From the South African standpoint, Leysens (1992) states that the recognition of the independence of the Portuguese colonies was the first sign for the Department of Foreign Affairs of South Africa concerning the re-orientation of Brazil's Africa policy. Later on, other gestures were produced: the political representation of Brazil in Pretoria was reduced from a Plenipotentiary Minister to a Chargé d'Affaires ad interim; in October 1977 the General Consular Office was closed in Cape Town; in December 1978, Brazil's Foreign Minister announced that President Geisel had given directions to ban official state imports from South Africa. It had also turned ever harder to obtain visas in South Africa to visit Brazil (Leysens, 1992).

According to Abreu (1988: 79), "in all its declarations, the Brazilian diplomacy expected to show the image of a country being a model of anti-racism, with the purpose of winning the sympathy and the confidence of the new independent nations of Black Africa". Nevertheless, although the aim was to gradually reduce South Africa's weight as a commercial partner, trade with Brazil grew significantly between 1978 and 1981. This way, "we must remember that the Brazilian government did not give any official support to economic relations. The business carried out might be considered, from Brazil's position, as strictly private" (Abreu, 1988: 80). In those years, the international pressure against South Africa remarkably increased and placed that country in a rather adverse context of situation. Multilaterally, Brazil backed sanctions, but it still opposed those related to the use of naval, air or ground force. Argentina maintained a similar position multilaterally, but there was a significant difference in bilateral relations. While Brazil detached from South Africa, Argentina came closer: with the military again in power, more flourishing relations with Pretoria reached momentum.

During the Figueiredo Administration, when Saraiva Guerreiro was in office, opposition to apartheid and support to Southern African countries were always mentioned in discourse, joint communiqués, conferences and other official documents of the Brazilian foreign policy. Condemnation of South Africa became more explicit with the "third world discourse" of Foreign Minister Saraiva Guerreiro at the United Nations –demanding the abolition of apartheid in South Africa, the solution to the crisis in Namibia and the suspension of South Africa's military interventions in Angola and Zambia (FUNAG, 1995: 372)– and the presence of President Figueiredo at the United Nations in 1982, as the first Brazilian Head of State who had the floor in a General Assembly debate session. The reservations underlying the relations between Brazil and South Africa disappeared over the last military governments. Then, when in 1981 in Buenos Aires, the South Atlantic naval

cooperation was again discussed by the top-level Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, the USA and South Africa officials, the meeting was only recognized as having been held in “private” (Leysens, 1992: 21), without known outcome. Following Leysens (1992), the last visit paid by Brazil to South Africa, by a group of members of the opposition and of the party in power (*Partido Democrático Social* –PDS–), took place in 1983.

When Foreign Minister Guerreiro traveled to Mozambique in 1980, in a joint communiqué he expressed his “solidarity with the just fight of the people of South Africa”, extended his support to “the struggle of the SWAPO in Namibia” and condemned South Africa’s intervention in the neighboring countries (Leysens, 1992: 18). Therefore, relations between Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa benefitted without having to break relations with South Africa, because the Brazilian diplomats held such an action would be pointless.

DEFINITIONS WITH BRAZIL’S RETURN TO DEMOCRACY

The decision Brazil made concerning relations with South Africa in the mid-seventies guided the path followed by its foreign policy, without relevant alterations until the end of the white racist regime. Meanwhile, after the end of the military regime in Brazil, when Sarney became President, there were protests and strong political demonstrations against South Africa; it was now the time when the South African issue became a challenge to the new democratic image of Brazil –as was the case also in Argentina–. The most illustrative example was Sarney Decree No 91524, dated 9 August 1985, which added new bans to the already existing ones. This mentioned decree banned cultural, artistic and sports relations, including arms and munitions sale or transfer, as well as military vehicles and equipment and police paramilitary equipment, equipment supplies, materials, permissions and patents to produce such materials, as well as air and sea transportation of the mentioned items.

This was a clear manifestation of the official-detachment phase which Brazil was re-asserting and reinforcing against Pretoria. This time, however, the international context favored the Brazilian position because, at that moment, the international pressures on South Africa grew, particularly in the USA and among the European Community members. In these circumstances, Brazil found international backing to officially define a situation that had been already a matter of practice with South Africa. A few

months later, Argentina's democratic government would cut relations with Pretoria, coming clearly away from the policy implemented by the former military regime.

Nevertheless, Brasilia did not deem pertinent to take similar measures –which implied consequences– despite having received suggestions on the matter. The government of the State of São Paulo announced it would request the President to examine the possibility of breaking diplomatic relations. Similarly did the emerging anti-apartheid lobbying groups begun to be heard. In 1988, the national lower chamber representative, Benedita da Silva, from Rio de Janeiro (*Partido de los Trabajadores* –PT– / Workers Party) proposed a constitutional amendment to force the government to cut diplomatic relations with those countries that officially implemented racial discrimination. Her suggestion was turned down because it did not obtain the necessary number of votes (Leysens, 1992).

Quite cautiously, Itamaraty managed the crisis and showed its African interlocutors a low political profile in its relations with Pretoria. The option was not to break relations²⁷², arguing that the delegation in South Africa would serve as a door opening to the understanding of the domestic changes and processes in South Africa, and that its commitment was to a policy of support to the groups fighting off apartheid. This support was evident in the official visits to Brazil, paid in 1987 by the South African Bishop Desmond Tutu and the leader of the SWAPO, Sam Nujoma. Brazil's representation in Pretoria, the Brazilian Embassy in Lusaka and the mission before the United Nations were the instruments used to hold conversations with the anti-apartheid groups, particularly, with the African National Congress. The Sarney Administration demonstrated different ways and means and participated in meetings and programs organized by the SADCC, which indicated the Brazilian commitment to the African project to free Africa of apartheid and of illegally dominating segregation regimes. At the same time, with the ZPCSA initiative, Brazil buried any possible aspiration to militarize the South Atlantic. It was the only country of the Latin American South Cone that did not accept the proposal to create the SATO, because it considered the treaty would be of no avail in times of war without the participation of the USA; it would be harmful in peaceful times before a

272. Some analysts suggest that the Brazilian reticence to breaking off diplomatic relations was originated in the need to preserve the South African investments in Brazil's mining rather than in the commercial interests; providing that the South Africa share over total trade with Africa was already little relevant.

negative reaction of Black Africa, particularly of the former Portuguese colonies, with whom relations were indeed very good.

DEFINING RELATIONS WITH A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA. THE PROJECT OF A STRATEGIC ASSOCIATION

Over the nineties, as pointed out by Mourão (1996: 85),

“to the constraints imposed by the Brazilian diplomacy domestically, limited by the absence of budgetary resources and by the no currency convertibility, must be added “the priorities” imposed by the country in its development process, and the non-existing practice of overcoming the relative persistence of the *chasse gardée* areas [...] Instead of an opportunity niche, for Brazil South and Southern Africa stand as a fertile field full of very varied associations”.

With South Africa now in democracy, as from 1994 Brazil turned from not holding policies²⁷³ to developing a series of actions aimed at increasing possibilities of achieving a mutually beneficial association through reciprocated visits, signing of agreements and growth of bilateral trade.

Already at the start of the decade, following the advances in the domestic South African process, relations with Pretoria were again thought out in relation to the cooperation potentialities, without abandoning the commitment to Black Africa²⁷⁴. The visit that Mandela, leader of the Africa National Congress (ANC), paid to Brasilia, as part of a tour around Latin American countries, probably played in favor of releasing tensions and making progress with a host of measures that accompanied the evolution of the domestic affairs in South Africa. As a result of the abolition of the mentioned racist laws in South Africa, the Brazilian government decided to revoke, in January 1992, the Article 1st of the Sarney Decree of 1985, not allowing cultural, artistic or sports relations, but leaving the rest of the

273. During the South Africa apartheid regime, the Brazilian government never failed to express its rejection of the racist system, as well as never prevented diplomatic and commercial relations with Pretoria

274. From the scholarly circles, Moniz Bandeira in 1993, following the international changes and the South Africa domestic process, said that Brazil should not continue to freeze diplomatic relations with South Africa. Brazil should manage its foreign policy seeking to establish an understanding with South Africa with a view to joining efforts and extending the MERCOSUR economic community on both sides of the South Atlantic. Joining the two continents, based on a Brasilia-Pretoria-Buenos Aires geopolitical triangle, would render enormous negotiating power and pressure when holding conversations with the North (*Correio Braziliense*, 1993).

decree applicable. The interest of Brazil in deepening relations with South Africa was in this way demonstrated, in view of the changes coming ahead. Pretoria responded, in September of 1993, by canceling the demand of a visa for the Brazilian citizens.

At that time, Celso Amorim said: “the trade that is constrained between the two countries may be developed fully”²⁷⁵. When he announced his intention to visit Pretoria, the Foreign Minister stated that there were great prospects for economic, commercial, technical and environmental cooperation which should be explored. When he attended Mandela’s inaugural ceremony, he became the first Brazilian Foreign Relations Minister to visit South Africa.

With the new democratic government in South Africa, Amorim introduced the objectives which would be the guiding actions of Brasilia:

“Brazil is now ready to contribute with its reinsertion in the international community, establishing especial friendship and cooperative relations [...] as a natural consequence of its similarities and complementary areas [...] Bilaterally, the new association will bring along increased trade, reciprocal investment and cooperation in the different areas, especially in agriculture, civil engineering, mining, the electricity and commercial sectors and in alternative energy sources [...] Political cooperation is also growing in importance, taking into account the substantial role played by South Africa on the international markets, its centripetal force inside Africa, its potential leadership in bringing solutions to continental issues [...] Strategically, as the main axis for economic integration of Southern Africa. As a triangular investments center in third countries, for Brazil, South Africa stands for new access to the mediterranean countries of the Sub-continent, Zimbabwe and Zambia among them [...] It means one more alternative to approach Namibia, Angola and Mozambique [...] Also, in terms of its geographical position, it becomes an important bridge to access the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Rim countries”²⁷⁶.

In the opinion of one of the most prominent diplomats of Cardoso,

275. *Correio Braziliense*, 1993 “*Africa do Sul de vera comprar mais do Brasil*” (Brasilia) December 27th.

276. Although Amorim actually attended the sworn-in ceremony, the Brazilian government had to face the criticism because of the absence of President Franco; it was reported that his presence would have served to clear some of the reservations concerning the lukewarm stance of Brazil during the times of apartheid. Amorim 1994 “*Africa da boa esperanza*” in *Jornal do Brasil*, June 13th.

“We need to keep in mind that the positive evolution of the South African situation opens up a new panorama for conversations with Southern Africa. A South Africa built on a multiracial prosperous democracy and a pacified Angola becomes partners of great weight for Brazil [...] The Zone Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic means a promising structure around which it is possible to build a policy to please that part of the African continent”²⁷⁷.

The first transcendental step taken from a political viewpoint was the visit of Foreign Relations Minister Lampreia, to South Africa in 1995; he made an exploratory trip to advance with the creation of a that mission President Cardoso would preside the following year²⁷⁸, announcing for the first time the Brazilian participation in the second naval cooperation of Atlasur Operations, to take place that same year. Cardoso’s visit occurred between 26 and 28 November 1996, and was reported by the Brazilian Ambassador in Pretoria, Otto Maia, as an opportunity Brazil enjoyed, with a new foothold on the continent, to reach the rest of Southern Africa. The President was accompanied by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Mining and Energy, Justice, the Army, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary for Strategic Matters, the President of Palmares Foundation and a group of seventy businessmen who participated in seminars, discussions and meetings with South African industrial representatives. The agenda included signing eight bilateral agreements: visas, fighting against drug-trafficking, air services, cultural and technical cooperation, sea transportation, tariffs and investments protection.

During his official visit, Cardoso reiterated Brazil’s intentions concerning South Africa, and mentioned the two aspects of his strategy: politically, he introduced the possibility of joining efforts in multilateral negotiations to benefit each country’s conditions and the convergent viewpoints with respect to the international order; with respect to the economic and commercial aspects, he pointed to the development of the existing potentialities:

277. De Lima, Paulo Tarso Flecha 1995 “*O mundo á espera do Brasil*” in *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro) January 1st.

278. He said: “relations between Brazil and South Africa have been only a formality over the last fifty years, any initiative having been discouraged. Certain commercial initiatives on a large scale have even been forbidden, as, for example, supplying South Africa Air Force with aircrafts for training [...] Trade between the two countries is far from reaching its full potential, investments are virtually insignificant and the diplomatic and political conversations are only just now being started” (Roelofse-Campbell, 1995).

“One of our key partners must be South Africa. We enjoy similar development conditions and share similar visions on international issues. It is natural, then, that Brazil and South Africa act more closely for the defense of their common interests in international forums. This is one of the reasons why I have come to South Africa. Another reason is to give impulse to the development of our opportunities for bilateral cooperation in all areas [...] Air and road transportation links are already working to intensify the trade flows. Along with trade, there come investments. MERCOSUR offers South Africa the possibility to expand its commercial opportunities [...] We are interested in turning this potential into facts, strengthening our own capacities to be better prepared to participate in the global economy” (Cardoso, 1996).

It should be noted that this presidential visit was preceded, a month earlier, by a seminar organized in Rio de Janeiro, where an important critical mass of Brazilian and South African authorities, diplomats and scholars were gathered to discuss the diagnosis and possibilities of increasing relations. Among the political issues on the agenda was the analysis of the insertion of the respective countries in the globalization process, the mutual aspirations to occupy a place in the Security Council if reforms to the UN Charter advanced in that sense and the assessment of the foreign policies between the two countries and toward Southern Africa. Concerning economic and commercial aspects, the different viewpoints on bilateral and multilateral cooperation between both regions, MERCOSUR and SADC, were discussed, as well as the search for common views on trade and investments issues. Finally, strategic and security issues on the South Atlantic and other matters were dealt with, as, for instance, democracy in unequal societies, media, mining and technological cooperation²⁷⁹.

If a comparison is made between the preparatory steps of the mission, its development and its results afterwards and the visit President Menem paid to South Africa in February a year before, the intentionalities behind both administrations clearly emerge with respect to South Africa: a high political-diplomatic profile and the layout of a trade diplomacy in the case of Brazil, while Argentina exhibited presidential protagonism.

From South Africa’s viewpoint, also there were signs of reciprocal interest. The Cardoso mission had been preceded by the trips to Brasilia of Foreign Minister Nzo in 1995 and of Vice-Foreign Minister Pahad in 1996. In 1997, South Africa sent Vice-President Mbeki and the Industry and Trade

279. The papers presented in this seminar were published in English and in Portuguese (Guimarães, 1996).

Minister Erwin; between 20 and 23 July 1998, Nelson Mandela, President of South Africa, arrived in Brazil. In his speech, Mandela²⁸⁰ spoke about the natural association between the two countries and their roles in the respective regions, the common visions related to international trade, restructuring of the United Nations and the newly emerging South-South cooperation (Roelofse-Campbell, 1999a). Cardoso also remarked the important role both countries played on the Continent:

“[They] are actors of remarkable recognition on the world scenario, with the best credentials to assume greater responsibilities in international affairs. But these credentials would be even better if we were united by a wide and profound association, and if we increasingly held more discussions about the issues on the international agenda” (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1998).

In this opportunity, a memorandum of understanding was signed; a consultation and discussion forum between the two countries was agreed on. Still, ten agreements remained related to environmental, science and technology, justice and technical cooperation areas to be discussed.

The following year, political-diplomatic contacts continued. On this occasion, it was Ambassador Ivan Cannabrava, Undersecretary General for Political Affairs at Itamaraty who traveled. He spoke about the great affinities between the two countries²⁸¹.

For Cannabrava,

“It is quite evident that our countries are the pillars of our respective regions. But bilateral relations will constitute the central axis and there are fundamental areas where we can implement cooperation. For example, we hold the common aspiration to put an end to nuclear armament. Brazil and South Africa have already exchanged ideas and discussed relevant matters related to the revision of the NNPT” (Roelofse-Campbell, 1999b: 48-51).

At the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 10 May 1999, Cannabrava spoke about disarmament (Brazil and South Africa consider that the NNPT is discriminatory, but they participate in it because it is thought to be influential) and environmental issues (South Africa and Brazil share a

280. He laid the foundation stone of the Brazilian National Center for Information and References on Black Culture (*Centro Nacional Brasileiro para Informação y Referencia sobre la Cultura Negra*).

281. To the wide range of possibilities for a great association was added the fact that South Africa's Foreign Relations Ministry identified Brazil as one of its twelve strategic partners – the only one in Latin America–.

joint initiative proposed by Germany and Singapore on the environment)²⁸². It was agreed that the cooperation umbrella would be the Foreign Relations Ministry of the respective countries, with a work schedule to guarantee continuity of all projects. Different inter-sectorial meetings and working groups were created to do the follow-up to this South African initiative.

Finally, it must be noted Minister Lampreia's visit to South Africa, 29 February-3 March 2000, to sign a Technical Cooperation Agreement. The idea was to advance with the negotiations related to the already mentioned MERCOSUR-SADC agreement, despite the fact that the South Africans spoke of a MERCOSUR/SACU (SAIIA, 2000) at that time. The agreement eventually took place the following year, but between MERCOSUR and South Africa.

Although the main partner was South Africa, the idea of including the SADC was quite likely associated with Brazil's intention not to leave out another important country in the region, Angola. The doubts with respect to the supposed economic potentialities of South Africa, with an economy based on gold extraction and export, and Angola's economic potentialities in the final pacifying stage, added to the growing contacts with Namibia and Mozambique (by PLC), may justify a strategy which involved the complete SADC. At that moment, it was possible to consider South Africa as the first step of a diversified-relations policy with Southern Africa at large, by strengthening bilateral relations with the states participating in the different regional agreements, to create a multiplying effect. Quite probably, the greatest benefit of the approach between Brazil and South Africa may have been political. In this respect, there were advances between the two countries in agreeing on common policies, especially at the UN and the WTO, despite the fact that Minister Erwin's project of creating a G-7 of the South would not materialize.

From the South African viewpoint, the year 2000 ended with the visit of the new President Thabo Mbeki to Brasilia and Florianopolis, where, for the second time, a Head of State of South Africa addressed his MERCOSUR peers, demonstrating the diplomatic efforts made by Brazil and South Africa to make the occasion possible. However, it should be noted that President

282. A project was also discussed in order to have access to potable water in urban areas, to find a way to prevent urban pollution, mega-cities, and have access to biodiversity and philogenetic resources.

Mbeki did not lay much emphasis on inter-regional relations; he had traveled as President of South Africa, not as a representative of the SADC. The conflicts and the divergences of those days in the southern region of Africa were, then, made evident.

In a very short time, as can be observed, there were different political actions which carried the relations frequency to a relevant level, away from the former lowest point the relations had reached before 1994. This shows that a policy making process was taking place.

COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

In the period under analysis, trade with South Africa remarkably increased in volume, although sometimes it fluctuated and may be analyzed more flexibly if the trade share with South Africa is compared with the total trade with the Africa countries. In this sense, a growing drop can be observed as from 1970, along with more frequent fluctuations.

With respect to Brazilian exports to South Africa, although in the sixties the volumes were the lowest throughout the period under consideration, the total share of the importing African countries was the highest, reaching 65% in 1962. In the seventies, there was a sharp rise until 1974 (US\$ 45 m); then, over the following years, there was a drop, until 1979 (US\$ 53 m), when the peak of 1974 was climbed up and over, doubling in 1980 and maintaining the same level until 1984. Later on, exports fell over three years and picked up again over the last two years of the eighties, with volumes above the earlier maximum. If the South Africa share is analyzed over the total trade with Africa, the seventies show more relevant percentages (45% average). The trade share started to decline as from 1973, with low erratic percentages (15% average), with still another drop in the eighties (10% average) and a new hike over the last two years of that decade.

As seen from South Africa's standpoint, as quoted by Leysens (1992), between 1966 and 1985, Brazil exported 60% of South Africa's imports from Latin America. Initially, Brazil sold foodstuffs and livestock, cooking oil, animal and vegetable fats, i.e., mainly commodities and agricultural products. In the seventies, industrial products began to be exported, machinery, electrical equipment, timber and textiles among them.

The imports volumes were very low in the sixties, with a trade balance favorable to Brazil until 1975. During the seventies, imports from South

Africa increased remarkably until 1980 (from US\$ 2 m in 1970 to US\$ 200 m in 1980), generating a balance of trade significantly negative for Brazil, who, at that time, would buy 30% of the South African exports to Latin America. The eighties show a higher imports volume from South Africa, in 1980, and a lowest percentage from South Africa over total African imports in 1985; afterwards, South African exports climbed up considerably²⁸³.

Concerning total imports share from Africa, imports from South Africa exhibited high percentages between 1977 and 1980 (32.27% in 1979); later, they declined significantly to 1% in 1985 and began to recover between 1987 and 1989, but with a very low incidence in the total Brazilian imports from Africa. Brazil imported chemical industry products and derivatives, essential metals and derivatives, paper and derivatives and minerals (Leysens, 1992). Although the South African investments were not really relevant in the general context of foreign investment in Brazil, some authors grant them great importance in the framework of the relations with Africa in the seventies, if the turn in Brazil's Africa policy is brought to mind. For instance, Vilalva y Gala (2001) mention that the registered South African investments in the *Banco Central* reached the US\$ 84.6 m with

“the establishment of the Anglo American Corporation of Brasil, in 1973, in strategic sectors of the national economy, such as gold exploration, the production of explosive devices, and the associations with Brazilian companies, such as *Banco Bozzano Simonsen* and *Compañía de Explosivos Valparaíba*, in 1979”.

In the eighties, because of the international pressure, South African investments in Brazil were masked via financial triangulated transactions that the South African firms themselves operated, since boycotts or retaliation were feared. According to Pereira (1987), the Anglo American Corporation controlled 72.3% of the nickel produced in Brazil, 44.6% of niobium, 37.2% of tungsten, 14.4% of phosphates and 3.8% of the silver production in 1987. In 1983, De Beers had started industrial diamond exploration in the Mato Grosso.

While Africa's trade share over Brazil's total trade dropped dramatically since 1986, during the Sarney Administration, imports and exports with South Africa rose, following the increasing trend of Brazil's total trade. This is to be kept in mind because, since 1985, the South African situation grew

283. The decline between 1980 and 1985 was due mainly to the fact that Brazil diminished its dependency on the ortho-phosphoric acid from South Africa (Abreu, 1988: 111).

more complex locally, regionally and internationally, and Itamaraty turned more firmly critical, which should have implied a drop rather than a rise.

Although Brazil had made strong political decisions contrary to the government of South Africa, the private actors involved in trade continued to operate following their vested interests. In other words, trade relations went their own separate ways. Consequently, the rising trend in exports to South Africa in 1988 and 1989 was continued well into the nineties, with sales of over US\$ 300 m in 1997. South Africa's share over Africa's total exports was around 17%, exhibiting an increase with respect to the average of the former decade. Imports also rose remarkably as from 1993, reaching the highest peak in 1996, with US\$ 418 m; then the balance of trade was not favorable to Brazil between 1994 and 1998.

The Brazilian exports to South Africa showed an ever more sophisticated characteristic: different vehicles –cars, tractors– and spare parts (21%); boilers, machinery (12%); electrical appliances (6%); agroindustrial products –tobacco, sugar, soy oil, leather, corn–; chemical products; iron ore. Brazilian imports from South Africa were mainly mineral products, especially coal and other fuels, chemical products, especially phosphoric acid; metals, mainly nickel cathodes, stones and precious metals.

If the above data is analyzed in the context of the dramatic fall that Brazil's trade share with Africa suffered over the nineties (exports went down from an average 5% in the eighties to around 3.05%, and to almost a half in imports), the relevance of the figures is much higher, disclosing the incidence of South Africa in Brazil's foreign trade.

Some contrasts between Brazil's and Argentina's trade with South Africa will be introduced now. Until the nineties arrived, the differences registered in the volumes exported by Brazil and Argentina in their trade with the African countries were not so consistent as with South Africa, where similar figures were shown for some years (between 1983 and 1986). In imports, although Brazil offered much higher figures, definitely, there was a greater incidence in Argentina of South Africa as an African exporter. It should also be noted that, despite the increasing opposition of both countries to the apartheid regime, trade with South Africa continued to grow. Exports went up and imports fluctuated; the highest figures were exhibited by Brazil.

In the nineties, the similarity between Brazil's and Argentina's exports volumes with South Africa increased; the figures were not so very different but were more erratic in the case of Argentina, with figures higher than in 1992, 1995 and 1999. The incidence of exports to South Africa over total exports to Africa by Brazil and Argentina was similar, with a slightly higher share in the case of Argentina. In Brazil's imports from South Africa, instead, a difference can be observed because they were much higher than in Argentina. However, they did not correspond to Brazil's largest African exporter. In effect, the volumes shown by Brazil were much higher and rising than those of Argentina up to 1996, when the maximum peak was reached (Brazil imported US\$418m; Argentina, US\$105m); later on, they dropped until 1999 and again picked up. The Argentine imports, which rose as from 1990 (US\$ 19 m) until 1995 (US\$ 124 m), fell over the last two years. It may be said, then, that both Argentina and Brazil exhibited ambiguous situations; the origin in Brazil may be associated to economic interests while in Argentina the origin was rather strategic. Both countries responded to the impulse coming from South Africa in its search of political-strategic and business partners to neutralize the growing international isolationism.

With a new South Africa in the nineties, both countries turned to Pretoria, finally following the same historical model: Brazil with political and the now added trade diplomacy; Argentina again with impulses linked to the trade aspects. However, it was Brazil that designed a policy with South Africa and the Southern Africa countries, with the ZPCSA initiative and negotiations to reach a Free Trade Area between MERCOSUR and South Africa or the SADC. Argentina only accompanied Brazil with a reactive instead of a proactive policy.

BETWEEN POLITICS AND COMMERCE: CONVERGING INTERESTS. THE MERCOSUR-SOUTH AFRICA FREE TRADE AREA

The final considerations will be referred to the multilateral negotiations related to MERCOSUR/ South Africa cooperation, which today represents the nucleus of the trilateral agenda. An underlying matter permeated all the initiatives, meetings and speeches in the relations that Argentina and Brazil developed with the new democratically elected government of South Africa. The possible relations between MERCOSUR and South Africa, MERCOSUR-SADC (Southern Africa Development Community), or MERCOSUR-SACU (Southern Africa Customs Union), are ever present on the agenda of South

Africa. SADC and SACU are integration processes in which South Africa would play the main role.

Taking into consideration the signature of the Free Trade Agreement between MERCOSUR and SACU, 16 December 2004, in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, I will introduce a brief background to it up to the year 2000, when the project for an Agreement was subscribed between MERCOSUR and South Africa. The good political will of Brazil and South Africa to actually reach cooperation was evidenced; Argentina only just followed that process.

Since South Africa's reinsertion as "a normal state" in 1994, the possibility of a relationship between MERCOSUR and SADC was being discussed in the Brazilian and South African circles. Initially, it was a project with little chance of being part of the respective agendas; but it was gradually more often mentioned in the official discourse, and gained ground in spite of the fluctuations in both areas. Leysens y Fourie (1997) state that the first possibility of strengthening commercial relations between MERCOSUR and what used to be the SADCC was introduced by President Fernando Collor in his visit to four countries in the region, already in 1991. Mourão (1997) reports that the SADC had been invited to participate as observer at the presidential meeting in Ouro Preto, in 1994. In 1995, the proposal was addressed by Brazil's Foreign Relations Minister, Ambassador Luis Felipe Lampreia, to his South African (Alfred Nzo) and Mozambican (Leonardo Dos Santos Simão) peers when they were visiting Brasilia. It was later taken up again by the Director of the Africa and Near East Office at Itamaraty, Minister Pimentel, in a consultative meeting of the SADC in Johannesburg, 1 February 1996, following instructions by the Foreign Minister. In this encounter, Pimentel said: "we are participating in the SADC meeting, whose evolution we closely follow with a view to a future but actual possibility of establishing concrete free trade relations and commitments between MERCOSUR and SADC" (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1996). This was an issue that was also introduced in the resolutions approved by the member countries of the ZPCSA in South Africa that same year, and in Argentina in 1998.

On the African part, in March 1997, the General Secretary of the SADC, Kaire Mbuende, visited the host of MERCOSUR in Montevideo; his trip had been objected under the consideration that it had been out of a personal decision without the support of the representatives of the member countries (Santos, 1999). The SADC-MERCOSUR cooperation was also present in the speeches by the Vice-President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, when he visited Argentina

and Brazil in September 1997, and by President Nelson Mandela in his visit to Buenos Aires and Ushuaia, 24 July 1998, to attend the Summit of Heads of State of the MERCOSUR, as a sign of a relevant political gesture.

In his meetings in South Africa in February 2000, Minister Lampreia held conversations with Alec Erwin, the South African Minister of Industry and Trade, to negotiate a Free Trade Area between MERCOSUR and South Africa²⁸⁴. The fact that the African partner was only South Africa now, instead of the SADC, as had been suggested earlier on, was due to the persistent crisis in this integration process, which prevented it from moving forward with any extra-regional negotiations. At that time, Lampreia invited the Argentine Foreign Minister to evaluate the possibility of participating via MERCOSUR in the Free Trade Agreement Brazil was negotiating with South Africa; it would include all the partners in the integration process, to avoid problems in the common trade tariff²⁸⁵.

This gradual opening of the markets would help to identify the products to be exchanged as the MERCOSUR-South Africa trade did not show enough volume to clearly anticipate the sensitive trade areas of the parties involved. The terms were also considered in order to help accept the schemes of the respective business communities which could, then, have the time to recognize their interests. Consequently, between 14 and 17 June 2000, a South African delegation with representatives from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, from the commercial and industrial private sector, and from the Agriculture Ministry traveled around Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay to explore and gather information on the bilateral relations of South Africa with those countries, with the purpose of formally establishing a Free Trade Zone. The results of the negotiations held were analyzed at the meeting of Heads of State and authorities of the MECOSUR in Florianopolis, when the Project for an Agreement for the creation of a Free Trade Area between MERCOSUR and the Republic of South Africa²⁸⁶ was signed, 14 December 2000, before the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki.

284. Also, with the structuring of an informal group which would involve Egypt, India and Nigeria (tentatively called the G-7 of the South), which could establish common positions at the WTO considering the affinities already demonstrated at the last Seattle meeting.

285. The idea was to deal with the issue in three different stages: initially, a project of an agreement should be signed, defining schedules and negotiating criteria to apply on a later fixed preferential tariffs agreement, to be consolidated in a two-year term. The Free Trade Agreement would crown the process.

286. According to the mentioned agreement, the parties created a commission to negotiate and exchange information concerning the applicable tariffs in each country, bilateral trade and trade with third countries, the respective commercial policies and access to the market of each of the parties involved. They also committed to the encouragement of activities to promote trade,

Despite the fact that this is not included in the period analyzed, which ended in the year 2000, different facts took place over the first five years of the new millenium and must be mentioned, as they led to the signature of a Preferential Trade Agreement between MERCOSUR and SACU. On the one hand, there were meetings of the MERCOSUR-South Africa Negotiating Commission which, although intermittent, facilitated the signature²⁸⁷. On the other, there was the first Joint Trade Mission of the MERCOSUR that visited South Africa in June 2002 and was followed by other sectorial missions afterwards. Finally, the results of the Act of Copacabana, signed in March 2003 by the Presidents of Argentina and Brazil, whereby greater governmental coordination and cooperation would be encouraged with respect to common-interest issues and areas. The concrete result was the dialogue started between the Sub-Saharan Africa Office of Palacio San Martín and the Africa Department at Itamaraty (DAF in Portuguese) to enlarge bilateral cooperation with the Sub-Saharan Africa countries.

Another interesting aspect to deal with is the role of university experts in the promotion of private and governmental relations between the countries involved as a way of developing mutual discussions and knowledge of critical areas. Along with formal trade negotiations, cooperation between the two sub-regions and, more specifically, the SADC-MERCOSUR cooperation, there were also contacts between the academic experts on both sides of the Atlantic, with the support of the respective Foreign Relations Ministries. In this respect, mention must be made of the different seminars that were organized, in which also diplomats and businessmen participated. The most remarkable instance in terms of content and opportunity was the seminar held before President Fernando Henrique Cardoso visited South Africa, organized in Rio de Janeiro in October 1996, by the Institute of International Relations, the Alexandre Gusmão

develop joint actions to carry out cooperation projects in the agricultural and industrial sectors, promote cooperation in the service sector and food products standardization and quality in the animal and vegetable sanity areas.

287. The first meeting was in October 2001; it was only in August 2002 that the second one was possible; a third one took place in December of the same year. Given the asymmetries between the economies of the MERCOSUR countries and the South African economy, activities were virtually frozen in 2003, but they were picked up again when MERCOSUR eventually accepted South Africa's request to have the SACU join the negotiations. Then, in October there was the first MERCOSUR-SACU Technical Negotiations Meeting. Throughout 2004, there were three other meetings where the thorny issues the parties involved did not agree on were solved out, such as safeguard measures, regulations at origin, lists of products and dispute settlement. Finally, 16 December 2004, in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, the Preferential Trade Agreement was celebrated between MERCOSUR and the SACU, along with a Dispute Settlement Protocol and a Memorandum of Understanding.

Foundation, Brazil's Foreign Relations Ministry and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development. This event was attended by different scholars, diplomats, official authorities and businessmen of both countries²⁸⁸. In this seminar, Barber (1996) and Mourão (1996) reported that the contacts between SADC and MERCOSUR were little developed; they also coincided with respect to the growing interest shown by the Brazilian and the South African Foreign Ministries in reinforcing bilateral relations within the framework of the integration processes in both countries.

On the South African side, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) of Johannesburg became the engine for the promotion of academic discussions in favor of intra-South Atlantic cooperation, in November 1997, a seminar called "The Return to South-South Cooperation. The nineties Agenda" was organized. The following year, 27 and 28 October, a debate was organized -sponsored by the embassies of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Chile-, on the issue of "Exploring the South-South Dialogue, MERCOSUR in Latin America and SADC in Southern Africa"²⁸⁹. This seminar was held after the visit President Mandela paid in Ushuaia, 24 July, the first meeting between representatives of MERCOSUR Heads of State and South Africa.

At the mentioned meeting²⁹⁰ organized by SAIIA, Alec Erwin used the figure of a butterfly when talking about South Africa's international and

288. The works presented were later published by Guimarães (1996). Directly related to MERCOSUR-SADC cooperation are the following chapters: Barber (1996: 333-348), Markwald (1996: 479-514), Mourão (1996: 88).

289. The discussions maintained at the seminar were published by Mills and Mutschler (1999).

290. Initially, the mentioned seminar aimed at sharing experiences concerning the advances and the drawbacks of both integration processes -asymmetry of the economies and regional political instability-, the role of the supranational and intergovernmental institutions, macroeconomic liberalization in the integration processes, interpersonal relations and critical issues related to intra and inter-regional trade. Later, the opportunities for inter-blocks cooperation were identified, and there were discussions on whether both processes could be associated despite the different speeds demanded by such processes. The importance of involving businessmen and entrepreneurs to build trade between the regions was also dealt with, because only 1% of the trade with MERCOSUR was with the SADC, where South Africa concentrated 85%. Moreover, the topic on how to enlarge investments -concentrated on mining- was also addressed, as well as the way to cooperate in sectors where the countries of both regions have developed their capacities (meat, hake and wine). It was also discussed how to contact the automotive industries already involved on both sides of the Atlantic and the transfer of technology. Additionally, in relation to the new threats, other possible cooperation areas to combat transnational crime (arms-smuggling, drug-trafficking and money-laundering) were identified; sharing the peacekeeping operations experience was likewise included.

trade relations. With this metaphor, he expressed how he envisaged the international insertion of his country. South Africa needed to concentrate its relations with Europe (the head), to strengthen relations with the whole of Africa (the body), whose potential was immense. The wings would point to the MERCOSUR, to the West; to the East were South East Asia, India and China, although these relations would take longer to develop²⁹¹.

This interest was described by Santos (1999: 205) when she said: “if building relations between the SADC and MERCOSUR stays in course, South Africa is enthusiastic about the MERCOSUR integration model for the SADC”. As this interest in MERCOSUR was also perceived by some Argentine academicians, quite surprisingly, from the argentinian Foreign Service Institute (*Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nación /ISEN*) organized an international seminar 13-15 May 1998, where the Southern Africa/MERCOSUR cooperation was discussed and the need to increase mutual knowledge and advance with cooperation was introduced²⁹².

Finally, according to the Brazilian tradition of organizing academic activities before relevant political-diplomatic meetings, the seminar “Southern Africa and Mercosur: Reviewing the Relationship and Seeking Opportunities” was held 24-25 October 2000, co-sponsored with SAIIA, the Latin American Business Council, the Institute for Economic, Social and Political Studies and the South African Foundation. Although South Africa was mentioned, in fact, only the evaluation of the MERCOSUR-South Africa cooperation was discussed. In practice, this meeting aimed at following up the accomplishments after the seminar in Johannesburg in 1998. Additionally, it was organized after Lampreia’s visit to South Africa, but before Mbeki’s visit to Brazil for the signature of the agreement project, which offered the opportunity to advance in public negotiations, backed by the private actors²⁹³.

291. The author’s notes taken at the mentioned seminar.

292. Roberto Bouzas, Professor at the Institute followed along the same lines in a workshop on “Lessons for the SADC- The ASEAN and MERCOSUR examples”, 20-21 August, organized in South Africa by the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation; the Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Greg Mills also paid a visit between 29 September and 3 October 1999; he was welcomed by the Undersecretary for International Economic Negotiations and the authorities of the Foreign Service Institute.

293. The idea was to build up a common regional interest, solid enough to promote inter-regional cooperation. At the meeting, the discussions had two levels: multilaterally, the wider context of South-South cooperation, like the ZPCSA, the Valdivia Group (Argentina,

At this meeting, Ambassador Botafogo Gonçalves, as the especial representative of Brazil for MERCOSUR, talked about the political will to cooperate, mentioning Florianópolis as the example; he added that since 1998 Foreign Minister Lampreia had promised to continue the conversations with South Africa and the neighboring countries. Among the recommendations, he suggested closer attention should be given to logistics; for example, how to provide services (customs and ports) to promote trade and he suggested carrying on the discussions between academic institutions, the private and public sectors. Some Brazilian academicians, among them Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, did not spare criticism of the butterfly model cited by Minister Erwin; he said the “butterfly’s wings would be asymmetric”, with respect to the greater South African efforts to spread out the eastern wing toward South East Asia²⁹⁴.

In practice, as seen from the MERCOSUR, there is a wide gap between Brazil and Argentina in their relations with Southern Africa/ SADC. Considering the diplomatic relations density, trade and investments, there can be no doubt on Brazilian’s leadership in the South Africa-SADC relations. What should be discussed is whether Argentina would be willing to join Brazil as partner in this initiative, and whether Brazil would be ready to accept. This would very much depend on the combination of political decisions and the interests of the private economic sectors as well as the ability to find complementary areas and join those which may be competitive in order to find a shared insertion.

Australia, Chile, New Zealand, South Africa and Uruguay) and the WTO-Cairns Group (the former-mentioned group plus Brasil, Canada, Colombia, Fidji, Indonesia, Malaysia, Paraguay, Philippines and Thailand, with non subsidized agrarian economies); bilaterally, in the trade and investments areas. At the seminar opening, Minister Lampreia spoke and said it was “essential that governments, financial organizations and academicians draw up a cooperation agenda between MERCOSUR and the SADC”. Author registered in the notes by at the seminar.

294. The issues dealt with revolved around the evaluation of the recent developments in SADC and MERCOSUR, regional integration from a South perspective, globalization and democratic stability, to later examine the shared regional challenges, such as economic reform and strategic matters; finally, relations in view to the future, the possibilities to increase business, trade and investments in a Free Trade Area.

Chapter IX

Argentina and South Africa in the 21st Century. Under the shadow of Brazil

IN THIS NEW CENTURY, we are witnessing changes in the international order. Unipolarism is wearing out and power distribution is sliding from the traditional Western nations to the emerging economies of the South and the East. New coalitions are being formed, such as IBSA²⁹⁵ (association between India, Brazil and South Africa), and groups like BRIC, now BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China, with the recent inclusion of South Africa) start assuming symbolic status and will eventually acquire operational power.

The rise of Brazil on the world stage has given new importance to this emerging country. This has caught the attention of politicians, economists and investors, as well as of the specialized press and the Latin American and international scholars. During the presidency of Lula da Silva –and backed up by his Foreign Relations Minister and Itamaraty, Brazil increased its image on the international scene–. This was part of the continuing policy developed by the previous administrations –which could be traced back to the spirit of the *Río Branco* Baron– and displayed a diversified range of strategies and alliances in what could be called a “game of variable geometry” (Lechini, 2008b).

Supported by governmental and private actors, Brazilian diplomacy is having an impact on the regional and international stages, within a context in which South-South cooperation is presented as a strategy seeking to strengthen the capacities of developing countries to have a say in international governance. Lula’s African policy has been a remarkable aspect of such foreign policy, showing the consolidation of South-South relations.

Moreover, Africa is gaining global strategic importance. Since its independence, African countries have in general shown problematic political and economic performances. However, in the first decade of the 21st century they have started to display positive signs. The processes that unfolded at the

295. IBSA is formed by three middle emerging powers, leaders in their respective regions. It’s a governmental international lobby group acting in the field of diverse international organizations, such as the WTO, UN, WHO and the ILO.

beginning of 2011 in the North of the continent show changes in the political order, with novel consequences for the region and the world. In addition, until the 2008 international economic crisis, the African sub-Saharan countries had been growing, on average, by 5% a year.

The African geo-economic space presents a combination of opportunities that other countries, and mainly the central powers, are using: Algeria, Libya and the Gulf of Guinea Basin in the case of oil, oil explorations in East Africa including Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya and Ethiopia, as well as the methane gas deposits discovered between Uganda, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the Kivu lake. Africa has also been dubbed as the new green border, with the incorporation of new rice areas in Western Africa²⁹⁶ and corn areas in Eastern Africa.

In this context, the post-apartheid South Africa, despite its flaws, stands out as a regional power. It has managed to sustain the stability of its new multi-racial democracy, keep its economic growth at an annual average of 4.5%, and broaden and strengthen its international participation, at both African and global level.

South Africa accounts for over 30% of the African continent's GDP, and its economy has an important influence in the world. In regard to other aspects, it should be noted that it is a partner to IBSA, a trans-regional pressure group created in 2003, and by the end of 2010 it was invited to participate in BRIC –now BRICS– in a sign of appreciation by the middle powers of its capacity as the emerging country of Africa. With a discourse in which South-South cooperation has a privileged place, and trying to avoid be considered as a “big brother”, it has played sub-regionally and continentally through policies including the “Africa Renaissance” or the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development). All this has turned South Africa into an attractive country *per se*. In addition, the country also presents itself as a hub of the sub- region and hard core both at SACU (Southern African Customs Union) and SADC (Southern African Development Community). Between 2006 and 2007, South Africa has been the main foreign investor (90% of the total) in the southern region, thereby showing its aptitude to invest in other countries. At the same time, 2007 finds South Africa as the first receptor of FDI –almost 80%– of Africa South of the Sahara.

296. Please refer to the recent progress achieved by WARDA.

Meanwhile Argentina entered the new century in a complex situation with a domestic crisis that forced successive governments to focus on domestic issues and use foreign policy as a protective net. In its relations with the African States and in a routine-kind policy, Buenos Aires accompanied Brazilian initiatives in the multilateral spheres and maintained a low profile in the bilateral relation, giving priority to the North African partners and to South Africa. Both Brazil and Argentina displayed different modalities (Lechini, 2010a). Itamaraty, developing a multiple strategy in the global, regional and South-South spheres, and Argentina aiming at a commercialist design.

In this context and in view of the changes in the international order and the favourable perspectives for the African continent, it becomes relevant to consider the importance of the bonds with Africa. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to do a follow-up on the Argentine foreign actions in relation to the countries of the African continent during this decade, and show that although Buenos Aires didn't make the same efforts as Brazil did and in general maintained a low bilateral political relation, Argentina –continuing with the policy by impulses– has consolidated along the years a growing selective commercial relation, where South Africa has an outstanding role.

AFRICA RISES ON THE ARGENTINE HORIZON

In the period under study, the relations between Argentina and Africa continued presenting a low profile and many decisions were taken at routine level. This is because Africa is not and has not been an important area in the design of Argentine foreign policy or in its strategies for international insertion. Historically, the African continent was perceived as marginal and homogeneous and its States were the sporadic object of some initiatives, through isolated, discontinued, foreign actions.

This way of perceiving Africa became stronger with the end of the Cold War, which brought a loss of importance for those countries as pieces in the East-West world chess game. The result was the decrease of its power at multilateral fora where they were the majority and could have had more impact. When encompassing and homogenizing, all states were put into a residual category, which prevented that specific policies could be designed for those with particular interests at political and economic level. During this decade, the African countries have remained marginal in the Argentine foreign policy designs. This low profile is reflected in the absence of projects for the region, selective actions guided by “commercialist criteria”,

thus, losing opportunities, since most of the time, the impulse is not generated by Argentina. Connections between the bilateral political-diplomatic relations and the level of exports to the continent were kept as well as a good relation with North African States and the greater importance granted to South Africa.

From the domestic policy perspective, the first years of the decade were complex, and prevented the development of a consistent foreign policy. President Fernando De la Rúa –who had been elected in 1999– could not finish his term and resigned by the end of 2001, which worsened the economic and political crisis of the country. The election by Congress of Eduardo Duhalde as the new president, on 2 January 2002, gave certain stability to the situation. During his government (2002-2003) there were no substantial changes in the general layout of the Argentine foreign policy, especially in regard to non-priority areas like Africa. As from the economic default, the economic-financial crisis made it necessary to devote all energies to negotiations with multilateral credit organizations and re-position Argentina in the world. As from 2003, with the presidency of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and later with Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2011) political governability was achieved, although no great progress was made in the design of international strategies.

Relations between Argentina and the African countries during the presidencies of “the Kirchners” (2003-2010) were framed in the general context of a reactive foreign policy, more linked to domestic repercussions to the gestures made within the international sphere than to a calculated strategy of foreign insertion. Although some differences can be established between both administrations, regional integration within Latin American and the preference for multilateral spaces were the main issues of the foreign agenda.

The Presidency of Néstor Kirchner gave priority to domestic issues, seeking to build and consolidate his political power structure, since he was elected by 22.24% of the vote. His Administration showed a strongly personalized style at national level, with low personal presence abroad. In turn, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, with a more consolidated domestic front, made multiple international trips, showing also a greater presence at multilateral fora. Despite the change of President and Ministers of Foreign Affairs²⁹⁷ and the changes in style –communication and frequency of meetings

297. Rafael Bielsa and Jorge Taiana accompanied Néstor Kirchner; and Jorge Taiana and Héctor Timerman Cristina Fernández. Taiana was Deputy Foreign Minister with Bielsa was

between cabinet ministers and the Head of State– as expected, there is very little change between the two administrations in foreign policy. In both, the relation between the closed circle of the Executive and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy showed little or no understanding. This is the reason why great part of the decisions regarding foreign policy, were not discussed at the *Palacio San Martín*.

Even from the perspective of the Foreign Office, the persistence and non settlement of issues key to the structure and dynamics of the decision-making processes continued being a conditioning factor to any good understanding among the different bureaucratic units that address bilateral and multilateral policies, political relations and commercial relations. It all resulted in isolated, disconnected impulses, of diverse speed and intensity, which stemmed from or were the response to personal initiatives. Despite the low profile relations between Argentina and Africa at the routine level, during both presidencies some actions and activities were implemented, which silently or invisibly helped to create a favourable framework for the development of better relations, such as the initiatives designed to strengthen structures that could facilitate the bilateral relation, to open new embassies or implement agreements²⁹⁸.

The positive agenda of Africa also helped to this, with the decrease of conflicts, greater political stability and the resurgence of its role as provider of raw materials, which gained a new dimension with the strong presence of China in the region. Variations in intensity had to do with the rhythm imposed by the different area directors (DIASA –Sub-Saharan Africa Bureau– and DANMO –North Africa and Middle East Bureau–), the accredited ambassadors to the African continent or to Buenos Aires, active representatives of State agencies and the diverse private players that promote the micro-relations.

In that sense it is worth noting the growing part played by the civil society and –with the increase in trade exchanges and scientific-technological

Minister of Foreign Affairs and allowed certain continuity. Timmerman was Argentine Ambassador to the United States when Taiana was the head of *Palacio San Martín*.

298. Examples of this are the reactivation of agreements that had been signed but had not entered into force or had expired, which is the case of Mozambique and Kenya; or the progress in the negotiations for new agreements with Cameroon, Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia or the re-opening of embassies that at some point had been closed (interview held with Director of Sub-Saharan Africa Minister Ariel Fernández, Buenos Aires, 4 December 2009).

cooperation– the growing participation of sub-national players, NGOs, economic and private agents in international insertion strategies.

THE DOMESTIC APPROACH²⁹⁹

Although the commercial dimension has been the best contact point between Argentina and the African countries, the new value given to Afro-descendants, the progress made in the development of non-discriminatory policies sponsored by the INADI³⁰⁰ and the celebrations corresponding to the Africa Day, have contributed another junction point –at domestic policy level this time– with the so-called sub-Saharan Africa. Although the issue of Afro-descendants is basically limited to the domestic dimension, its repercussions and external connections help show the various dimensions of African problems, and in some cases, they force the State to take a stand (Lechini, 2008).

As mentioned in Chapter I, the “invisibility” of the Afro-descendant population in Argentina responds both to a dominant discourse that stresses the “whiteness” of the Argentine population and minimizes the historical role and existence of the Afro-Argentineans. It is also connected with a system of racial categorization that makes invisible the presence in the society of individuals considered phenotypically black, creating the social category of *negros* for low income half-blood sectors (Frigerio and Lamborghini: 2010).

However, despite this “absence”, between 1980 and 1990, as a result of a confluence of national and international factors, Afro-Argentineans started to show their presence through their struggles against discrimination and racism, cultural claims or need to have access to health and education. Despite the scant support they received, their reduced number and some internal disputes –which prevented a better articulation– a certain level of visibility was obtained, after much effort, to the point a pilot test was sponsored for the inclusion of one question exploring “African descent” into the 2010 National Census.

299. This section was possible thanks to the interview held with Dr Marta Maffia, La Plata, 10 May 2011, as well as to the reading of her unpublished works, which she provided to me (Maffia 2011a; Maffia 2011b; Maffia and Zubrzycki: 2011).

300. *Instituto Nacional contra la Discriminación* (National Institute against Discrimination), created in 1995, has as its main goal “... elaborate national policies and concrete measures to fight discrimination, xenophobia and racism, boosting and carrying out actions to that end”.

In recent years, under diverse collective identifications (blacks, Afro-Argentineans, Afro-descendants, African Diaspora), different formal and informal associations, groupings, centres were formed, and today the range goes from the descendants of the first Africans that arrived in these lands, to the new migration inheritors –Boer South Africans and Cape Verdean of the late 19th century and beginning of 20th century– to the most recent groups (1990-2010) coming from Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon, Ghana, among other countries³⁰¹.

Along with the organized groups, most located in the city of Buenos Aires, the work carried out by the *África Vive* organization allowed its president, Pocha Lamadrid, to contact the Ombudsman (*Defensoría del Pueblo*). This institution provided logistics and advice for the implementation in 2000 of a census that surveyed the blacks with residence in Buenos Aires. This census managed to obtain some detail about the characteristics of the black population in the city, and above all, it became an important element of symbolic claim (Frigerio and Lamborghini: 2009; Lamborghini and Frigerio: 2010). That same year the African-Argentine Coordinating Desk was formed, on the occasion of the preliminary meetings for the III World Conference against Racism that would be held in 2001 in Durban, South Africa, and where the results of the census would be published.

In this context and as part of the post-Durban mentioned actions, in 2003 and 2004 the World Bank –implementing a similar policy in other Latin American countries– convened Afro and African organizations jointly with the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC) (National

301. Besides the Cape Verdeans that founded the traditional immigrant associations *Asociación Caboverdiana de Ensenada* (1927), *la Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos Unión Caboverdiana de Dock Sud* (1932), with the return of democracy and thanks to the mobilization of the civil society, several groups started to form. Some of them are, to name a few: *Comité Argentino y Latinoamericano Contra el Apartheid* founded by Enrique Nadal, in 1986; the *Grupo Cultural Afro*, founded in 1988; the *Casa de la Cultura Indoafroamericana* –created by Lucía Molina in Santa Fe– in 1988; the *Fundación África Vive* established by María Magdalena “Pocha” Lamadrid in 1997, maybe as a result of inter-actions with Miriam Gomes and two black activists living in Canada; IDB consultants, who visited Buenos Aires in 1995 to contact local black activists; the *Asociación de Nigerianos en el Río de la Plata*, in 1996; the *Unión de Africanos del Cono Sur*, founded by Victor Bille in 1999, the *Asociación África y su Diáspora* (created by Carlos Álvarez) in 2004, the *Asociación de Residentes Senegaleses* in 2007, the *Asociación Misibamba, Comunidad Afroargentina de Buenos Aires*, formed also in 2007, the *Asociación Casa Senegalesa*.

Institute of Statistics and Census) to carry out a pilot test, which was implemented in April 2005³⁰².

In 2006, at INADI, two agencies were created –the Civil Society Advisory Council and the Civil Society Afro-descendants Forum– which by incorporating Afro-descendants for the first time, granted them a place inside a national governmental organization. During 2007, the INADI doubled its bet for the benefit of Afro-descendants, organizing in July the “Month of the Afro-Argentine Culture in Buenos Aires” within which the “First Argentine Congress of Afro-descendants” took place, with various workshops about discrimination and Afro-Argentine culture. Held at the National Congress³⁰³, it had the support of the National Secretariat of Culture.

Also in 2006, within the frame of a project financed by the CONICET, a meeting at the *Universidad Nacional de la Plata* (National University of La Plata –School of Natural Sciences and Museum, and Department of Africa of the International Affairs Institute–) was organized to reflect on Afro-Argentines. The convention aimed at building an interphase between scholars and social groups. Professors and researchers, thesis writers, young students belonging to the community of Afro-Argentines and representatives of their organizations were invited³⁰⁴.

Another important event was the “Africa Week” that was organized in 2007, under the name “The African Diaspora in Argentina”. Although these celebrations had been taking place since 2004, this time the objective was to achieve a more inclusive participation: African immigrants, Afro-Argentines and Afro-American cultural workers. It should be underlined that the activity was sponsored by the South African Embassy in Buenos Aires³⁰⁵, with the strong participation of the political counsellor. The Embassy was very

302. The test was carried out in two neighbourhoods, one in the Federal Capital (Montserrat), with the coordination of Miriam Gomes, and the other in the city of Santa Fe (Santa Rosa de Lima), under Lucía Molina.

303. This event was also attended by the First Lady of Angola and the Angolan Ambassador, the President of INADI, the Vice-President of the Honourable Chamber of Deputies, the National Secretary of Culture and representatives of several civil organizations dedicated to the defence of Human Rights.

304. The result of the discussions was expressed in a publication that was launched in 2009 (Maffia and Lechini: 2009).

305. The South African Government through its Embassy was undertaking a mandate from the AU of convening the African Diasporas in Latin America, since the Diasporas were considered the Sixth Region, in Interview with Political Counsellor of the South African Embassy, Victor Rambau, Buenos Aires, 15 March 2007.

interested in supporting activities which would make them more visible, as well as in creating greater communication and inter-activity among the diverse organizations and institutions addressing the Afro issues³⁰⁶.

As it may be perceived, to celebrate the Africa Day on May 25th, the date when the African Union was created, means to commemorate the struggle of the African countries for their liberation from all forms of colonialism and discrimination. The attention given by the Foreign Offices of Latin American states to the celebration of that day contributes to showing how Africans are perceived both at domestic level and in regard to foreign policy. In the case of Argentina, this commemoration has been carried out almost every year, although with varying importance. Amid the ups and downs, in 2009 Foreign Minister Taiana received the members of the African Diplomatic Corp accredited to Buenos Aires –the Heads of Mission of Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Algeria, Angola, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, South Africa and Nigeria– who later participated in the celebration of the Africa Day at the Auditorium of the Ministry.

In the encounter, the Argentine Foreign Minister reaffirmed the need to strengthen the relation with the countries of the continent. Ruling out that the Argentine foreign policy was a “courtesy diplomacy with no content”, Taiana referred to the significance of the trips to Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, “countries that offer important markets for national production, both in regard to traditional products as well as to advanced technology products, such as nuclear and spatial ones”... “We’re going back to sub-Saharan Africa: we will open two new diplomatic offices and we’ll strengthen our

306. In the first organizational meetings, representatives of diverse organizations participated, among them, the *Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos Unión Caboverdiana*; *Organización África Vive*; *Casa de la Cultura IndoAfroamericana*; *Asociación Civil Unión de los Africanos en el Cono Sur*; *Asociación Civil África y su Diáspora*; *Asociación de Nigerianos en el Río de la Plata*; and Residentes Senegaleses in Argentina (at the time an informal organization). After the event in May 2007, the group that continued, after many discussions, decides to form an entity they call *Movimiento de la Diáspora Africana en Argentina* (DIAFAR), which first president was Miriam Gomes, who was followed by Federico Pita. In turn, Gomes started to lead a project funded since 2008 by the *Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo* (AECID) called Support to the Afro-Argentinean population and its base organizations. In July 2010, at Buenos Aires city, the *Espacio de Promoción de Integración e Intercambios con África* (EPIIA) was formed. As the result of interactions, negotiations and joint actions, in November 2010 the *Movimiento de la Diáspora Africana en la Argentina* (DIAFAR) and the *Asociación África y su Diáspora* formed the *Consejo Nacional de Organizaciones Afro de la Argentina* (CONAFRO), which was based on an agreement signed between the two Afro organizations and the Consulting Council of the Argentine Foreign Office.

presence in Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya and Angola”, the highest representative of the Argentine diplomacy announced³⁰⁷. In turn, Deputy Foreign Minister Víctor Taccetti underscored that “the fight against colonialism is a value that deeply links us with the African countries. And therefore, I would like to thank here the sustained support of the States that you represent to our permanent claim to the sovereignty of the Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur, Sandwich del Sur and surrounding maritime spaces”³⁰⁸.

Lastly, it is worth indicating that all this civil society activity and some weak impulses coming from the governmental sectors, contributed to the inclusion, into the Argentine People National Census of October 2010, the question: Are you, or somebody in your household is an Afro-descendant?; or do you have ancestors of Afro-descent or African origin (father, mother, grandparents, great-grandparents)?

THE MULTILATERAL DIMENSION

As from the Argentine crisis, one of the objectives in foreign policy was linked to improving the international insertion, developing greater activism in multilateral fora, of both global and regional levels. Furthermore, a South-South cooperation discourse started to become visible. In that sense, meetings with representatives of African countries increased, especially at the sub-regional level.

The Argentine participation in bi-regional initiatives ASPA (South America-Arab Countries) and ASA (Africa-South America) gave substance to the South-South agenda. The ASPA summit originated in Brasilia (2005) and was strengthened in Doha (2009). The ASA summit had its first meeting in Abuja (2005) and the second in Venezuela (2007). As is usually the case, these summits of Heads of State were preceded by multiple meetings of officials of diverse rank, representing various issue-areas –with an outstanding place for energy cooperation– which created an interesting mesh of relations³⁰⁹.

307. MRECIC, Information for the Press N 146/09, 22 May 2009.

308. Information for the Press N 146, Press Directorate of the Foreign Office: 4819-7375 / 8296 / 7388 www.cancilleria.gob.ar

309. At the last meeting and II Summit of Heads of State and Government of ASA, held in Isla Margarita, Venezuela, on 26-27 September 2007 under the motto “Bridging gaps, opening opportunities” the aim was the promotion of sustained economic growth through energy cooperation and infrastructure development. At this meeting, the so-called “ASA

In regard to the ASPA forum, the I Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers was held in Buenos Aires on 20-21 February 2008, led by Minister Jorge Taiana. Proposals included the development of efficient energy policies, the promotion of environmentally sustainable renewable energies, including the production of bio-fuels and the diversification of power systems³¹⁰. In this context and before the meeting, the official re-opening of the Arab League's mission took place in Buenos Aires (14 February 2008), under the authority of Islamo Oud Munir³¹¹.

Another multilateral meeting point with the Atlantic African countries was the participation in the 6th Ministerial Conference of Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) held in Luanda, Angola, on 18-19 June 2007, which aimed at revitalizing the ZPCSA, created in 1986. In regard to economic-commercial matters, Argentina also sought to negotiate together with the African States in spaces like the WTO, where several documents were submitted together with the NAMA 11 group, the ACP Group (Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific), the African Group and the so-called Small and Vulnerable Economies.

Likewise, and with the purpose of fostering international peace and security, Buenos Aires continued to collaborate with the United Nations in the peace missions deployed in Ivory Coast, Sudan, Western Sahara, Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo.

Regarding African multilateral institutions, Argentine representatives increased their presence, noting that the systemic situation required tightening the South-South dialogue and the coincidences between regional and multilateral agendas. The request submitted before the African Union, the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and the

Strategic Desk" was formed by Nigeria, Cape Verde, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina, and African Union and UNASUR representatives, its objective being to design the 2010-2010 bi-regional development strategy.

310. Meanwhile, on 4 March 2009, Argentine Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana attended the II Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Cairo where he expressed "that the relation with Arab countries is of utmost importance in regard to energy –both nuclear and oil– and trade, noting that trade with the region doubled since the I ASPA Summit, in MRECIC, Information for the Press No 082/09, 30 March 2009.

311. The League of Arab States opened its representation in Buenos Aires in 1958 and in the 80s Argentina gave it diplomatic status. On 31 May 1993 the organization closed its office. However, the re-opening was decided in 2006, after the visit of its General Secretary, Amr Moussa.

SADC to let Argentina obtain the status of observer are proofs of the Argentine's intentions³¹².

THE COMMERCIALIST BILATERAL OPTION

During the last decade, the Argentine bilateral interest was kept focused on countries of Northern Africa, South Africa and to a lesser extent, Angola. Various political consultative meetings and joint commissions were held, giving some continuity to the existing bonds.

Although the region of *Northern Africa* will not be the object of detailed analysis in this work, some relevant facts should not go unmentioned (see Table 2). During the Government of De La Rúa, his Foreign Affairs Minister Rodríguez Giavarini had designed a new trade penetration strategy for the Middle East and Northern Africa, with the visit of businessmen in multi-sectorial missions. He also paid official visits to Algeria, Morocco and Egypt in which treaties were signed with the three countries. This growing commercial relation was not something new, but it needed political signs, which became more significant during the Kirchners' presidencies.

At the beginning of Néstor Kirchner's Administration the preliminary agreements of MERCOSUR-Egypt were signed on 7 July and of MERCOSUR-Morocco, on 26 November 2004 (Lechini, 2008a). The talks that Argentina and Brazil had been holding jointly with these countries led to a strengthening of bonds.

An important chapter of his Administration was the Latin American tour³¹³ of King Mohamed VI of Morocco –which included Mexico, Brazil,

312. For instance, in 2006, Argentine officials participated for the first time in consulting meetings with the Secretariat of SADC (Gaborone, March) and later in the Consultative Conference (Windhoek, April). As from then on, it has had representation and participation at the meetings organized by the regional organization, with for instance the presence of the Argentine Ambassador at the 28th Summit of Heads of State and Government of SADC, which took place in Johannesburg on 16-17 August 2008 or at the Meeting of Heads of State of SACU, in Windhoek, Namibia, in 2010, as representative of the MERCOSUR pro-tempore presidency.

313. His trip served several objectives: a) consolidating relations with Latin American countries, which since the 90s had considered Morocco an open gate to the Arab and African markets; b) promoting the Summit of Heads of State of South America and the Arab countries, which would be held in 2005 in Brazil; c) obtaining the support of Latin America for his plan to consolidate the definitive incorporation of the Western Sahara into his

Perú and Chile—reaching Buenos Aires on 6 December 2004. Meanwhile, from the Argentine perspective, the perfect end was the tour³¹⁴ carried out by President Cristina Fernández, on 16-22 November 2008 around Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. According to Minister of Foreign Affairs Jorge Taiana, the trip was conceived in the context of the international financial crisis, in the face of which “we must go on strengthening the South-South relation between developing countries, because they will play a key role in the future economic-commercial exchange³¹⁵. The tour, framed within the multipolar commercial strategy that seeks diversification and de-centralization of export destinations, was designed to show the region’s importance to Argentina³¹⁶.

Other high level missions to Northern Africa took place in 2004, with the visit of the Secretary of State Jorge Taiana to Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco and of Foreign Minister Rafael Bielsa to Egypt. Meanwhile the Undersecretary of Foreign Policy, Roberto García Moritán led a mission that toured Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, joined by Argentine diplomats and businessmen, and in June 2007, he travelled to Morocco and again to Tunisia³¹⁷.

In contrast with the activity carried out in the Northern African countries and the impulse given to South Africa, the relation with the rest of

kingdom; d) strengthening the bilateral cooperation with Argentina; e) and signing the Frame Agreement between MERCOSUR and Morocco, which was already endorsed by Brazil on 26 November 2004.

314. The delegation was formed by government officials and over 70 businessmen of several provinces, belonging to diverse sectors –foods, metal-mechanic, genetics-veterinary, electric material and CNG, among others– given the economic-commercial character of the tour.

315. MRECIC, Information for the Press N 397/08, 7 November 2008.

316. According to Information provided by the Foreign Office, in the 2002/2007 period, bilateral trade with Algeria increased almost 400%; with Morocco, Argentine sales rose over 215%; Argentine exports to Libya increased over 50%; bilateral trade with Tunisia grew 63.10% –with a favourable balance to Argentina–. MRECIC, Information for the Press N 354/08, 9 October 2008; Information for the Press N 409/08, 18 November 2008.

317. The intensity of actions taken in regard to Africa north of the Sahara was nurtured by regional initiatives. After the visit to Argentina of King Mohamed VI in 2004, relations with Morocco tightened and confirmed it as one of Argentina’s main partners in the African continent. Evidence of this is that Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Mohamed Benaissa travelled in several occasions to Argentina during 2006 and 2007. There were also high-level political meetings between Argentina and Egypt. Others are: Tunisia, during the visit in 2006 of Deputy Foreign Minister Saida Chtioui, when five agreements were signed; Algeria, in the 2009 with the trip of Energy and Mining Minister Chakib Khelil; and Libya (with the visit of Saif Alislam Moammar Alqadhafi –son of President Moammar Alqadhafi–).

Sub-Saharan Africa continued to be low, with some isolated events, such as the increasing contacts with Angola and the jamming in the relation with Equatorial Guinea.

The opening in 2003 of the Embassy of Angola³¹⁸ in Buenos Aires, of the Argentine Embassy in Luanda and the visit of President José Eduardo Dos Santos, in May 2005³¹⁹, show mutual interest in the energy sector, especially the area of hydrocarbons³²⁰ which, together with the farming issue, runs through the whole relation, as it could be observed during the meeting of the first bilateral Joint Commission, in October 2009.

As for Equatorial Guinea, another African oil producing country, in November 2007 its Foreign Minister Pastor Ondo Bilé arrived in Buenos Aires to address different cooperation possibilities –in energy, science, tourism, culture and education. This visit was followed by that of its President, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, on 14 February 2008, which took place in a complex context. Firstly, because he was the first Head of State that President Fernández de Kirchner received after her inauguration, and secondly because of the political history of Nguema³²¹ –considered a dictator by several actors of the international community³²²– although many of them acted on double standards³²³.

SOUTH AFRICA, THE STAR OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

As mentioned, South Africa, in the far south end of the continent, occupied during this decade an important place, from the perspective of bilateral relations and due to the rapprochement with MERCOSUR. The process that started in the nineties was a significant institutional milestone

318. The Angolan economy grew an average of 10% per year between 1989 and 2007. This positive development was more visible between 2004 and 2007, a period when 92% growth was registered. See <http://www.ibriscgq.com.ar/angola/n107/07.pdf>

319. An Economic and Trade Agreement Protocol, a Farming Cooperation Protocol and an Oil Cooperation Agreement were signed, the latter involving the Argentine company ENARSA and the Angolan SONANGOL.

320. The corollary of the encounter was on 19 May, when the Argentine Embassy in Angola was opened.

321. Obiang came to power in 1979 due to a *coup d'état* that ousted his uncle, although authoritarian characteristics remained.

322. Non-Governmental Organizations like Amnesty International and International Transparency were the main promoters.

323. Such is the case of the United States, Spain or Germany, which exchange silent support for oil supplies, among other businesses.

during the De La Rúa's Administration. In Florianópolis, on 14 December 2000, a pre-agreement was signed between MERCOSUR and South Africa, paving the way for a meeting between the Argentine President and his South African counterpart Thabo Mbeki.

With this first step, the Government of South Africa started to propose the extension of the future economic benefits to the member countries of SACU given the impossibility of doing so in the SADC, due to internal problems of that African process.

On the other hand, on 24-28 June 2002, the four partners in MERCOSUR sent to South Africa the first joint trade mission of businessmen to promote their products abroad. This initiative was both a challenge and a "test case" for the process of regional integration, since it offered a window of opportunities that could fulfil a basic goal of MERCOSUR: its insertion to compete in the world. As noticed, the novelty here was the joint Argentina-Brazil efforts in regard to the States of the area, indicating now a "multilateral impulse" in the context of South-South Cooperation.

Although at a slow pace, headway was made in debates and agreements, considering the sensitivities between the parties: the Florianópolis pre-agreement was followed by the signing on 16 December 2004 in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, of a Preferential Trade Agreement between MERCOSUR and SACU, a Protocol for the Solution of Controversies and a Memorandum of Understanding. Finally, after nine long years of negotiations, MERCOSUR and SACU closed an Agreement on 3 April 2009 in Maseru, capital of the Kingdom of Lesotho. This commitment, which needs now to be ratified by the respective legislative bodies so that it may come into force³²⁴, will release over a thousand products of each of the regions.

From the perspective of the bilateral relation, the relevant contacts between both South-Atlantic States were in contrast with the low political profile maintained with sub-Saharan Africa. Although the Western shore initiatives were rather lukewarm and accompanied the Brazilian lead within the MERCOSUR-SACU negotiations, the Eastern shore gave a strong political impulse to it.

324. The document has been signed by the Foreign Ministers of MERCOSUR during their last Summit held in December 2008 in Brazil.

During this period, the South African Government made diverse political-diplomatic gestures that translated into high-level visits, in parallel with the growth of micro-relations. The trip to Argentina of South African Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma on occasion of the command handover to President De la Rúa, was followed in 2000 by the visits of the “Minister of the President’s Office” Essop Pahad to address various aspects of the bilateral relation with Foreign Minister Rodriguez Giavarini, and of Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad, to lead a meeting in Buenos Aires with the Heads of Mission of the South African representations in America. Pahad used the opportunity to hold meetings with Argentine authorities and underscore the huge potential of both countries and their respective regions, considering the increase in business and trade exchange relations, the mutual promotion of private investments and progress made in cultural bonds.

Although the signs given by the South African Government found a less intense response in Buenos Aires, progress continued in the construction of a framework of agreements that strengthened the bilateral relation, facilitating public and private cooperation³²⁵. In 2002, Buenos Aires was visited by a delegation of members of Parliament, a mission of the Ministry of Energy and Mining, the Director for Latin America and the Caribbean of the Department of Foreign Affairs Thomas Wheeler, and in November another delegation of parliamentarians, this time coming from the province of KwaZulu-Natal. In addition, by the end of the year, Foreign Minister Nkozana Dlamini Zuma travelled again to Argentina, this time on a non-official visit, and met with her Argentine counterpart.

In this period, the Memorandum of Understanding that had been signed during the visit of former President Menem to South Africa in 1995 was renovated, and progress was made in regard to the Agreement for the creation of a Bi-national Commission, and a project of Mutual Criminal Assistance was initiated³²⁶.

325. On 6 March 2000, Argentina accepted by Note, the accession of South Africa to the “International Convention on Evidence Collection Abroad in Civil and Trade Matters”, which came into force for both countries on that date. A series of agreements also came into force: the Inter-governmental Cooperation Agreement between the Navies in Peace Time, the Bilateral Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Agreement against Illegal Production and Trafficking of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Drug Abuse and related matters, and the Bilateral Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments.

326. In addition, in a multi-lateral context, in September 2002, the Provisional President of the Senate, Horacio Maqueda, participated in the “Sustainable Development World Summit” in

But notwithstanding the above mentioned weak governmental responses to the South African initiatives, the private sector launched intense negotiations promoting the micro-relations. The participation of a diverse range of players led to an improvement of bi-lateral relationships with Argentina. For instance, there was a remarkable increase in trade missions organized by different Argentine provinces³²⁷ and constant flowing business exchange, especially from the Argentine side³²⁸, and sport exchange. During 2004, South Africa continued furthering its policy of gestures with a new visit of “Minister of the President’s Office” Esoop Pahad in March, who met with Secretary of International Economic Relations and Trade, Martín Redrado, to exchange opinions about the development of negotiations between MERCOSUR and SACU.

Although by then, trade data showed South Africa as a very good partner, political relations did not seem to be quite as important to the Argentine Government. In May 2005, only 12 days before the arrival of

Johannesburg, with the Environment State Secretary and the Foreign Office representative for Environmental Matters Raúl Estrada Oyuela. Meanwhile, on 28-30 April 2003, our officials attended as Observers the Diamond Certification Scheme of Kimberley.

327. The 2000 mission of officials from Salta, Tucumán and Jujuy to Cape Town and Johannesburg; the mission of the Foreign Trade Chamber of the province of Córdoba formed by 15 companies of various fields –dairy, foods, machinery for the foods industry, wine industry, oleaginous plants, farming spares, car spares, energy– that visited Cape Town, Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth; the trade mission of Instituto de Desarrollo Empresarial Bonaerense of Lomas de Zamora formed by car-spare and chemical-pharmaceutics companies.

328. It’s worth mentioning some delegations of Argentine businessmen, which travelled to South Africa at the time: the Italian-Argentine Chamber of Commerce to promote foods and kitchen utensils; Molinos Río de la Plata, offering bulk and bottled vegetal oil; the President of the Argentine-South African Chamber of Commerce; the President of Cia South American Trading Co, offering prepared foods of fresh meat and margarines and consolidating sales of beef cuts to Namibia; the General Manager of Malaysian Airways, who met with the sector of imported leathers, meats and cans. There was also the participation in the WINEX 2000 Wine Festival, an initiative of the Argentine representation, where three wineries participated. On the other hand, also in 2002, Argentina participated in the Wine Congress held in Cape Town, sponsored by the Trade and Wine Organization of which South Africa, Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, Australia, United States and Canada are members. Brazil and Uruguay are observers. On the African side, there were, among others, the visits to Argentina of the general manager of an importing company of electrical appliances and the City Lodge Hotels group, to carry out a survey on the tourism sector. Due to the International Congress of Science and Technology of the Meat Industry held in Buenos Aires, the general manager of the association that represents South African owners of slaughterhouses and meatpacking plants travelled here, with an agenda of work with Argentine meatpacking plants and SENASA authorities. Further, the ANGLOGOLD Mining Group announced an increase of 50% of its investment in the mining sector of our country.

South African President Thabo Mbeki to Argentina, President Kirchner decided to cancel that official visit, for agenda reasons relating to domestic policy. Although South African Embassy officials in Buenos Aires did not make any public statement regarding this regrettable episode, this political gesture could be read as a sign indicating Argentina's priorities in foreign policy. Maybe because of this setback, that year there were no important meetings.

However, it was very relevant the assignment of new ambassadors to the respective capitals, which gave a new boost and greater dynamism to the bilateral relation. In September 2005 South African Ambassador Peter Goosen submitted his credentials and so did Argentine Ambassador Carlos Sersale di Cerisano in January 2006. The increasing synergy and synchrony between both officials –maybe due to the areas where they had worked before– and the energy devoted to their activity –which had the support of their respective Foreign Offices– resulted in growing and blossoming bilateral relations as well as in the acceptance of the proposal for a bi-national commission.

As reported on the Argentine Embassy's "Memoria 2006", the goal was to build a bilateral agenda based on an "associative cooperation" model, structured on a high-level global, inter-regional, regional and bilateral policy consultation and coordination system. The process, initiated in 2005, pointed to strategies such as the promotion of trade, investment and agriculture, cooperation in science and technology, defence, mining, energy, including cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, transport, including air transport, sports and tourism, art, culture, education and the creation of a parliamentarian group on the basis of a thematic agenda. The objective was to "create activities in all sectors to show the feasibility of the cooperation model between the Southern African region and Argentina in particular and the MERCOSUR (and its associated countries) in general"³²⁹. The work the

329. The proposal aims at establishing agendas that can identify investment opportunities and develop the instruments for the facilitation of trade of goods and services of high added-value. By prioritizing science and technology, operational activities based on the concepts of ECDC/TCDC (Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries/Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries) were elaborated, and complementary activities with the Defence Attaché's Office were proposed.

Embassy started to undertake focused on South Africa, although trying not to neglect the other concurrency countries³³⁰.

An important step was the agreement for the Creation of a **Bi-National Commission** (BICSAA) signed by the respective ministers of Foreign Affairs –Rafael Bielsa and Nkozasana Dlamini Zuma– during the 60th United Nations General Assembly. This agreement responded to the acceptance of the South African formula, rather than the Argentinean, which usually works in “joint commissions” that give priority to very specific and excluding matters. The bi-national commission, in turn, is led by the ministers of foreign affairs of both countries, and any matter can be addressed there provided there’s agreement between both parties to include it in the agenda of annual meetings (Jordaan, 2006:47).

The following year, on 3 March 2006, the Bi-National Commission, started to take shape as a result of the first preparatory meeting in Pretoria³³¹. In June of that same year, there was in Buenos Aires a new meeting between Deputy Foreign Minister Roberto García Moritán and Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa Dr Ayanda Ntsaluba, with the active participation of the national director of International Economic Negotiations of Argentina, Néstor Stancanelli, since the main topics were related to trade negotiations. Besides addressing matters of mutual interest –mining, energy, agriculture and infrastructure– shared positions in regard to the direction of trade negotiations at the heart of the WTO were also underscored, where Argentina and South Africa try to coordinate their positions at the G20 and the NAMA-11³³² for a free farming market and an adequate industrial balance that could take into account the need for growth and diversification of developing countries³³³.

330. The Embassy of the Argentine Republic in Pretoria, South Africa, has jurisdiction over Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauricio, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

331. *Diario Buenos Aires*, “Comisión Binacional Argentina y R. de Sudáfrica”, 31 March 2006, on the website: <http://www.diariobuenosaires.com.ar>

332. The NAMA English acronym refers to the Access to the market of non-farming products. The NAMA 11 group represents developing countries that defend a new mechanism to settle conflicts generated by non-tariff barriers that affect the trade of goods. For the group, the current staggering tariff and the increased tariffs in the industrialized countries must be eliminated; just like the protection industrialized countries give to their inefficient sectors.

333. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of Argentina, Information for the Press N 271/06 , 9 June 2006, in the web site: <http://www.mrecic.gov.ar/portal/prensa/prensa.php>

Other details show the growth of the relation during 2006. A mission was sent to South Africa and Botswana by the Secretary of Science, Technology and Productive Innovation with the participation of Dr Lino Barañao. In October, a commission of national deputies for the City of Buenos Aires had an interview with Foreign Minister Dlamini Zuma, other official representatives and civil society members, to assess the impact of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Also in 2006, there was “Agreement between the Government of the Argentine Republic and the Government of the Republic of South Africa for the Coordination of their Maritime and Aeronautic Search and Rescue Services”.

Finally, on 28 February 2007, the South Africa-Argentina Bi-National Commission³³⁴ was inaugurated in Pretoria, headed by the respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs –Jorge Taiana and Dlamini Zuma–; a milestone in their bilateral political relation. At the heart of the commission, different groups met, and various agreements were signed on: Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal and Extradition matters and Bi-national Cooperation in the Sports and Recreational field. Discussions were held on trade and investment, tourism, science and technology –especially regarding the peaceful use of nuclear and space activities– agriculture, mining and parks administration³³⁵. In addition, both Governments reiterated their support to the progress of the MERCOSUR-SACU trade agreement and welcomed the proposal of South African Airways to re-establish air-links with Buenos Aires, what was implemented in April 2009.

During the press conference, Minister Jorge Taiana summarized the interests that join Argentina and South Africa: “to Argentine foreign policy and to the Argentine Government, this visit is very important because relations between Argentina and South Africa are a priority for our foreign policy and a priority for our relations and South-South cooperation. We share the same principles and values. We share multilateralism as a way of settling the issues affecting the international community. We share the respect for international law, for human rights, peace procurement and world stability, the fight for non-proliferation of mass-destruction weapons, the fight

334. Documents available in:
http://www.sudafrica.org.ar/espa/home/informacion_general/bilateral_relations_entre_africa_arg.php
<http://www.embassyofargentina.co.za/userfiles/1251272437-18%20Ing.pdf>

335. During the encounters, there were talks about the opening of the South African market to the Argentine meat, which finally materialized when in July 2007 Thabo Mbeki’s Administration decided the re-opening of the South African market to Argentine exports of beef, both cold and frozen, and the opening to pork, lamb and horse meat.

against terrorism. In the economic field, we are indeed two developing countries. We are working hard, especially in regard to trade and negotiations. We strongly support the NAMA 11 Group inside the Doha Round³³⁶.

On occasion of the bi-national meeting, a seminar on Human Rights was also held, under the title “Argentina and South Africa: a Shared vision on Human Rights” and the “Images of Memory” photographic exhibition was also presented. According to Zuma, both countries have a lot in common in regard to human rights, especially for having experienced similar past situations, which enables them to work jointly. The business private sector also participated in the tour through a multi-sectorial trade mission – biotechnology, farming and electric machinery, chemical and pharmacy-chemical products, foods, educational services, tourism and car spares–. Over 40 companies held around 200 business rounds with positive results.

As agreed during the bi-national commission meeting, on 13 July 2007, Minister of Education, Science and Technology Daniel Filmus and Minister of Science and Technology Mosibudi Mangena signed in Buenos Aires the Minutes for the First Meeting of the Joint Commission on Science and Technology. Stressing that cooperation in the new millennium will be associated with knowledge production; the Argentine minister expressed the importance that South-South relations have for the current Administration. This agreement was the corollary of a bi-national Workshop³³⁷ in which researchers and scientists of both countries shared experiences and knowledge on agriculture, biotechnology, social science, energy and hydrogen economy, nanotechnology and polar investigations. Also, the South African delegation toured many scientific and technologic institutions, such as the Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agraria (INTA), the Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Industrial (INTI), the CONAE and the CONEA.

The good understanding between both embassies and the growth of the bilateral relation resulted in the Second Meeting of the South Africa-Argentina Bi-National Commission (BICSAA II), on 2-3 December 2008, with the presence of Minister Zuma in Buenos Aires. On that occasion, an

336. Press Conference with Minister Dlamini Zuma and Minister Taiana on occasion of the end of the Inaugural Session of the South Africa-Argentina Bi-National Commission at the Presidential Residence –28 February 2007– Pretoria.

337. The workshop took place in Buenos Aires on 10-12 July 2007, within the context of the Scientific and Technological Cooperation Agreement between Argentina and South Africa signed in Pretoria on 16 May 2006.

agreement of cooperation was signed for the Pacific Use of Nuclear Energy and one for inter-institutional cooperation between the directors of national parks of each country.

It's also important to mention the incorporation of a new modality aimed at involving civil society players, especially scholars, in the promotion of Argentine-South African relations. Meetings would take place prior to the bi-national commissions, so as to follow up on the relations and facilitate innovative proposals. The arrangements for the BICSAA II in May 2008 by the South African Embassy in Buenos Aires and the Argentine Foreign Ministry included the organization of the first "Academic Argentine-South African Seminar"³³⁸ and an "Economic Seminar", jointly organized with the local bi-national Chamber of Commerce.

The second seminar took place in Pretoria, on 16-17 July 2009, to add value to the addressed topics relating to "The true potential of relations between South Africa and Argentina: bilateral and multilateral commitment for global impact". The objective was to advance matters of mutual interest. In this case, it was rural and farming developments that contributed to the debate on food security and the assessment of the cooperation potential between both countries. Afterwards, the Argentine Embassy in South Africa organized another seminar on Architecture and Memory, on 28-29 October 2009³³⁹, to accompany a trade mission that travelled to South Africa and Angola.

The South African Ambassador changed in September 2009, when Mr Anthony James Leon replaced Mr Peter Goosen in his position. With a different style, he followed in the path that his predecessor had signalled. During 2010, many visits and exchanges of government officials, legislators and representatives of different Non-Governmental Organizations were recorded in the fields of culture, business, sport and journalism. At governmental level, there were the visits of Secretary of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Victorio Tacceti and General Director of Foreign Policy Ambassador Norma Nascimbene de Dumont. From the other side, South Africa's Deputy Director General for the Americas, Ambassador Nozipho

338 The result of the discussions was expressed in a publication of the Institute for Global Dialogue entitled "Strengthening the Bilateral", Midrand, 2009.

339. Representing Argentina, there were governmental officials, the Memoria Abierta NGO and the School of Architecture of the *Universidad Nacional de Córdoba*. Representing South Africa, there were local NGOs, the directors, architects and specialists of memory sites and archives of the country.

Mxakato-Diseko visited the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs to address bilateral issues within the South-South cooperation context.

From the Embassy in Pretoria and whenever possible, the trips to South Africa were used to let Argentine officials visit other countries in the region, mainly Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique and Angola. For instance, in 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding regarding Cooperation on Science, Technology and Productive Innovation was signed with Namibia. The main topics in the agenda were agriculture, fisheries and national parks. The Argentine Mission was led by the President of INTA, Carlos Cheppi, who went to Windhoek, after visiting the Agricultural Research Institute (ARC) in Pretoria. A first exploratory mission was also carried out to identify technical cooperation areas in Zimbabwe. With regard to Mozambique, in the context of the Memorandum of Understanding between the SECyT and the Ministry of Science and Technology, a permanent policy of scholarships was designed within the FOAR Program. Also, Embassy officials in Pretoria took part in the 3rd Ministerial International Conference on Cooperation for Development with Middle-Income Countries, which took place in Windhoek, Namibia, on 4-6 August 2008.

During this decade contacts between both forces has strengthened the already relevant strategic cooperation. On 4-9 September 2002, the Chief of the General Staff of the Argentine Air Force travelled to South Africa leading a delegation that was to participate in the 80th anniversary of the South African Air Force and to perform air acrobatics with an Argentine Pampa aircraft. The following month, a delegation of 39 high officials of the South African Armed Force and officials of diverse areas of government took part in Buenos Aires Workshops at the National Defence School and visited CAECOPAZ, the National Military School, the Military Navy School in Río Santiago and the National Congress.

To the traditional relation between the armed forces, which was officially formalized in 1993 with the first joint operation, Atlasur I, added the Uruguayan and Brazilian armed forces to develop combined naval manoeuvres, with a bi-annual frequency. During this decade, in 2002, the Atlasur V took place on the South African coasts, close to the naval base of Simonstown, as a result of the Anniversary of its Navy. The Atlasur VI developed in the Uruguayan Exclusive Economic Area, under the planning and command of its National Navy from 29 October to 7 November 2006.

In 2008, Argentina sent two corvettes to South Africa (ARA “*Rosales*” and ARA “*Robinson*”), in addition to a helicopter, Alouette III, to take part in the Atlasur VII. That same year and in coordination with the Defense Attaché’s Office of the Argentine Embassy, arrangements were made for the visit of Frigate ARA “*Libertad*” from 26 April to 2 May 2008, on its first stopover during its 39th Instruction Trip.

To foster the relationship, the Chief of the General Staff of the Argentine Navy, Admiral Jorge Godoy, visited South Africa and an Argentine official participated in the Executive Program of National Defense offered by South Africa. In turn, in 2010, the logistic vessel SAS Drakensberg made an official visit to the Buenos Aires Port during its participation in the VIII Atlasur Exercise, organized by Argentina, and an official of the South African Navy took part in the Antarctic Navigation Course offered by the Argentine Navy.

AN INCREASINGLY INTENSE MICRO-RELATION: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PLAYERS

The visits and meetings that took place during this period expressed an interest in making progress on a common agenda facilitated by the initiatives and good understanding between the respective ambassadors, the work of the Argentine-South African Chamber of Commerce and other sub-national players with an interest in promoting the bilateral relationship.

Since 2006, the Argentine Embassy in Pretoria has worked hard on the promotion and negotiation of bilateral agreements, as a strategy to penetrate through bilateral, triangular and multilateral technical cooperation, supported by the re-opening of the Consulate of Johannesburg³⁴⁰. It should be noted that the value of these agreements is given by their potential to connect both countries’ political and economic decision-makers; they are a means to introduce, disseminate and increase the presence of Argentina through its institutions of excellence: SECyT, INTA, INTI, INIDEP, CONAE, CNEA, National Parks and others.

340. At the start of the decade, and in response to the economic crisis, together with the closing of Argentine embassies in Zimbabwe and Senegal, the general consulate of Johannesburg closed –transferred to Pretoria as a consular section– as well as the office in Cape Town.

On the other hand, in recent years, Argentine companies have advanced on South Africa to explore possibilities, supported by the organization of agendas provided by the Embassy, which played a very proactive role. This included the preparation of market profiles (in 2008 there were 125), the assistance and organization of agendas for two-way missions and the active participation in Fairs and Exhibitions. Argentine representatives in South Africa took care of promoting the country in academic and business fields, lecturing on the economy, opportunities for investment, bilateral trade and new forms of cooperation, as well as showing the different perspectives of Argentina.

The proposal for the private sector is that Argentine companies should invest or associate themselves with South African companies, to achieve better access to both local and regional markets, as well as to public and private tenders. Argentine companies with experience in South Africa include Electrometalúrgica Andina, Techint Technologies-Pyromet, Pescarmona and Arcor. In turn, from the South African side, companies include South African Airlines, Anglo Gold-Cerro Vanguardia, Standard Bank, Con-Aid, Mondi and Alpesca –which has been announcing its withdrawal from the Argentinian market–.

Other actions for trade promotion include the yearly participation of the Embassy with the private sector in several international farming machinery fairs, among them, *Nampo Harvest Day*, the International Farming Machinery Fair –similar to *Expo Agro*, which takes place every year in May, in the district of Bothaville–. This proposal underlines the need to export to South Africa –and from there to the rest of the sub-Saharan region– a package that can contain no-till technology transfer together with machinery adapted to African geographic conditions.

The initiative came up when the Embassy sought to promote the South African market as a destination for Argentine farming technology, and was later followed with the coordination of technical trips hosted by *Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agrícola* (INTA) (National Institute of Agricultural Technology) and with the visit of trade delegations and business missions, and consolidated with the involvement of the *Cámara Argentina de Fabricantes de Maquinaria Agrícola* (CAFMA) (Argentine Chamber of Agricultural Machinery Manufacturers) and the CIDETER Foundation (*Centro de investigación y desarrollo tecnológico regional*.) Regional

Technological Research and Development Centre) in 2010³⁴¹. This micro-relation shows how trade and technical cooperation come together in a project that involves a network of public-private players with converging interests, which favours the sustainability of bilateral joint initiatives (Morasso 2010).

Cooperation is also reflected in the promotion of academic contacts which in the long run could foster specific policies between South Africa and Argentina. This is how links were established between the University of Pretoria and Argentine universities (UBA, UNTREF, UNR), between the University of Stellenbosch and the University of Congress (Mendoza) –to foster cooperation in the viniculture field– between the African Institute of South Africa and the Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI) and UNR. It was precisely at CARI that the South African Embassy signed an agreement to create a Library on Africa in that institution. With the financial help of the embassies of South Africa, Egypt, Morocco and Nigeria, the Documentation Centre for African Studies was inaugurated in Buenos Aires in 2010, starting with a library of over 250 books, specialized documents and journals.

In addition, during 2009, the signing of the cultural cooperation agreement negotiated on occasion of the II BICSAA in 2008 was implemented and specific areas were identified, such as the exchange of experiences, technical capacity and training in the fields of social anthropology, forensic anthropology and architecture. Since those areas included the film, plastic arts and music industries, the South African Embassy sponsored the performance of musicians, tango dancers, Colon

341. The results of this rapprochement process are reflected in three punctual facts: a) The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in 2007 between INTA and the Agricultural Research Council (ARC), a South African governmental agency that has the function of promoting farming and industry contributing to improve life quality and keeping resources, b) The participation of Argentina in NAMPO: as from 2007 missions were organized to NAMPO which went on growing until in 2010 Argentina participated with its own pavilion. In 2011, 17 companies of Buenos Aires, Córdoba and Santa Fe presented their products with the support of Pro-Argentina, the Exportar Foundation, the Foreign Office, three provincial governments, MAGRIBA, CAFMA, AFAMAC, and the sponsorship of Expoagro, Terniun and Standard Bank, c) The signing of a cooperation agreement in 2010 between Expoagro and Grain South Africa, the NAMPO organizing company formed by associated farmers, d) The signing of a charter of intentions to promote No-Till sowing in South Africa by INTA, the Argentine Embassy, CAFMA, CIDETER and Grain South Africa, as the step prior to the celebration of an agreement to develop experimental fields in South Africa as from December 2011.

Opera House's classics and Argentine films and documentary exhibitions to disseminate the Argentine film industry.

Sport was also used as a gateway to South Africa. Various meetings were held with the President of the South African Rugby Union (SARU) to obtain support for the participation of Argentina in the extended Three Nations championship, in the Super 14 and/or in the ABSA/Currie Cup. The *Pumas'* participation was arranged for the Test Match in honour of the 90 years of Nelson Mandela on 9 August 2008, which took place at the Ellis Park of Johannesburg. Also, during 2010, support was given to the participation of UAR *Pampas XV* in the domestic Vodacom Cup championship as well as to the participation of the Pumas in the Seventh Circuit of George.

On the other hand, the Soccer World Cup hosted by South Africa was the reason for the visit of various representatives of the Argentine sports sector, including the National Soccer Team players and the technical and directive authorities of *Asociación del Fútbol Argentino*. As for hockey, the Argentine world champion team *Las Leonas* was invited by the South African Hockey Association to a series of five matches in Bloemfontein.

THE INTERFACE BETWEEN TRADE AND UNIVERSITIES

The interest in promoting information about South Africa and fostering a multi-dimensional rapprochement could also be observed in another unprecedented experience. The Argentine-South African Chamber of Commerce organized in 2008 an open contest for undergraduates of all country universities who were required to show their knowledge about post-apartheid South Africa, as well as about positive changes occurred since 1994³⁴². The prize was a work trip to South Africa in July 2009 and the participation in the second scholars/civil society bilateral meeting, which contributed to feed and strengthen micro-relations.

Later, with the objective of contrasting the research carried out by the universities with the experience gathered by the contest winners that had visited South Africa, in October 2009, the Chamber sponsored two academic meetings that were held at the Universities of Rosario and Entre Ríos, "South Africa in Perspective: Truths and myths". Finally on 17 August 2010, registration finished for a new research contest "Argentina-South Africa: How to maximize relations on the basis of existing bilateral agreements",

342. The contest had the participation of 60 groups of Argentine universities.

also promoted by the Chamber. A total of 25 research works were received, and this time a group from the UNR won the first prize.

A FAVOURABLE TRADE RELATIONSHIP

As mentioned at the beginning, during this decade, the economic-commercial link was the central axis around which relations with African countries turned: the greatest number of meetings of joint commissions and bilateral consultations were held with those States that are important markets for Argentine exports: soy, pellets, corn, wheat, powdered milk, transport vehicles and seamless tubes led the list.

The reason to boost the links with the countries to the North of the Sahara and South Africa can be traced in the trade balances favourable to Argentina. The growth in exports was also the reason why, in parallel, the MERCOSUR advanced negotiations relating to agreements to promote trade with Morocco, Egypt and SACU, the same priority partners of the bilateral relation (see Tables 5-7).

These affirmations find confirmation in that as from 2000 exports to Africa grew constantly. That year exports totalled US\$ 1.085 billion and imports from African countries amounted to US\$ 444 million³⁴³. Back then, exchange with Africa represented 4% of the total of Argentine exports. By 2008, exports increased four fold and came to represent 7% of the total of Argentine sales abroad, for an amount of US\$ 5.103 billion. However, by 2010 there is a drop in exports, to values around 5%. On the other hand, imports for the 2000-2010 period have remained below 1%, reaching their maximum value in 2001 (1.34%) and their lowest in 2010 (0.60%). This fall, mainly in exports of the last two years, can be explained as a consequence of the international economic crisis initiated in 2008 (see Tables 3 and 4).

Egypt and South Africa are Argentina's two main partners in the continent. Between 2000 and 2009, exports to Egypt rose from 348,917,209 dollars to 591,597,501. Meanwhile sales to South Africa rose from 241,309,620 to 665,782,130 dollars, reaching the highest peak in 2008, when both surpassed a billion dollars. It is also important to note that during the first decade of the new century, between 20% and 30% of Argentina's total exports to Africa, had South Africa as their destination.

343. Data provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC) (National Institute of Statistics and Census) of Argentina.

Among African trade partners since 2000, the most significant have been Angola, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Morocco, Nigeria and Tunisia. As for the main products sold by Argentina, exports to Egypt, Libya and Algeria included seamless tubes, uncoated alloy steel for tubing or production of gas or oil wells; to Angola, soy oil; to Libya, beans; to South Africa, soy oil, wheat, grape juice, poultry pieces; and to Egypt, corn, soy and sunflower oil, similar to sales to Algeria.

As for South Africa, it ranks among the first 15 trade partners of Argentina. Bilateral trade falls within the general characteristics of Argentine exports: mainly foods sales and farming manufactures with little added value –food residues and preparations for animals, cereals, fats and oils represent more than 50%. Over 80% of exports are concentrated in five fields and mainly come from the provinces of Santa Fe, Buenos Aires, Córdoba and Santa Cruz. To Argentina, South Africa ranks 12th as a destination for exports.

Imports from South Africa have smaller volume, greater diversification (6 chapters 50%, 20 chapters 50%) and low added-value (mineral products: bituminous coal, phosphates, chrome ores and much diversified rest). To South Africa, Argentina ranks 22nd as a source of imports.

BRAZIL'S STRATEGY IN AFRICA

President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva's Administration (Lechini, 2008) started with impressive measures in regard to African countries and finished in the same way. The new emphasis on African policy sought to show coherence between domestic and foreign policy, responding to the growing domestic demands of Afro-descendants. In the first place, on 10 January 2003, the Federal Law 10,639, which made it compulsory at all school levels to study African and Afro-Brazilian history and culture, was passed. Secondly, on 21 March 2003, it was created a the Special Secretariat for Racial Equality Promotion Policies intended for racial and ethnic groups affected by discrimination, with special emphasis on the black population.

In the foreign dimension, there was the trip to seven African countries³⁴⁴ of Foreign Minister Celso Amorim only four months after Lula's inauguration, and the organization of the Brazil-Africa Forum in the city of Fortaleza, on 9-10 June 2003, with the participation of diplomats, officials,

344. Foreign Minister Amorim visited: Angola, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Ghana.

scholars and businessmen. After two periods of government, Lula finished his Administration with a trip to Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, on 9-10 November 2010, accompanied by President-elect Dilma Rousseff, trying to re-affirm the continuity of the African policy. He also participated in the World Social Forum of Senegal (6-11 February 2011), which was his first trip abroad since the end of his presidency.

In this context, it should be noted that Lula's African policy could not have been so convincing without the history of previous relations, as analysed before. In 50 years, successive Brazilian governments gradually created policies and actions in regard to the African continent. In this new century the African dimension has regained force in a global context where South-South cooperation was given a remarkable position (Lechini 2010b).

Lula travelled 11 times to Africa, made 34 visits to 23 countries: in November (Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa) and December 2003 (Egypt and Libya); in July 2004 (Gabon, Cape Verde and Sao Tomé and Príncipe), in April 2005 (Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Guinea Bissau), in February 2006 (Algeria, Benin, Botswana and South Africa), in October 2007 (Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo, South Africa and Angola), in April (Ghana) and October 2008 (Mozambique), in July 2009 (to take part in the African Union Summit in Libya) and in July (South Africa, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia) and November 2010 (Mozambique).

Also, on official visits, to Brazil came the President of the African Union Commission (UA), Alpha Konaré, the Presidents of Angola, Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Mali, Liberia, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Guinea Bissau, South Africa, Sierra Leona, Namibia, Mozambique, Senegal, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Republic of Congo and Zambia, the King of Morocco, the Deputy President of Ghana and the First Ministers of Sao Tomé and Príncipe and Cape Verde, plus countless visits of ministers and official authorities. In the context of these encounters, 346 international agreements were signed, 67% of the 519 signed between 1960-2010.

Boosted by its own demand for resources, the Brazil-Africa trade grew rapidly with Brazilian exports increasing from US\$ 1,347,098,183 in 2000 to 9,261,599,799 in 2010, and reaching their peak in 2008 with US\$

10,169,567,120³⁴⁵. Meanwhile, imports from Africa registered values of US\$ 2,907,082,676 in 2000 and 11,302,224,181 in 2010, which then led to a trade exchange that was almost a five fold rise, the figures increasing from US\$ 4,254,180,859 in 2000 to US\$ 20,563,823,980 in 2010. Brazil's ten main commercial partners in Africa are: Egypt, South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, Libya, Ghana, Tunisia, Senegal, Kenya and Cameroon³⁴⁶ (see Tables 5-6).

Together with the promotion of bilateral links, Brazil developed an active multilateral strategy. Evidence of this is the MERCOSUR-SACU negotiation, where Brazil was an active participant. The launch of the IBSA Group (with India and South Africa) in June 2003 involved a process of political "concertation" between three emerging powers of the South, with common interests, needs and similar capacities (Lechini and Giaccaglia 2007), which aimed at strengthening their negotiation power at world trade fora, especially in the conformation of the G-20 and the Doha Round. In combination with the MERCOSUR-SACU negotiations, the IBSA dialogue came to complete the Brazilian strategy of promoting an India-MERCOSUR-SACU Tri-lateral Free Trade Agreement, which would supplement on-going negotiations between India-MERCOSUR and India-SACU.

Brazil is making headway in these difficult political-diplomatic and economic-commercial stages playing a regional role as well as that of an emerging power. It keeps alive the flame of the Lusophone culture in the meetings with the CPSC/CPLP countries (*Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa*) and boosts the spirit of the ASA and ASPA Summits.

Cultural and linguistic connections and a renewed Brazilian relationship with its Afro-descendant population have had an influence in making its development model especially attractive to many countries of Africa. Although Brazil's trade with these States shows a slightly negative balance,

345. All cited figures can be found in: *Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior*: <http://www.mdic.gov.br/sitio/>

346. They all consume the diverse production of foods for which Brazil competitively stands out: sugar, wheat, flour, boneless beef, chicken, hens and frozen giblets, gelatin, juice, chocolate and derived products, water-soluble and grain coffee, pepper, rice, snacks, refined soy oil; added to woods and furniture, paper, planes, tractors and motors and generators. On the one hand, the mentioned African countries export to Brazil fertilizers with nitrogen, Portland cement, polyethylene, raw petroleum oil, fuels for the petrochemical industry, vulcanized gum, elastomers, pesticides and natural gas. Also raw and in fibres cotton, carpets and linings; nickel sulphate and chrome and iron sheets; propane and iron residues; leathers and goat leathers and furs and cotton weaves; sheep furs and gum Arabic, sheep leathers and tea.

Brazilian companies' investments are increasing considerably³⁴⁷ –in parallel to its process of transnationalization and its role as an emerging power (Lechini and Giaccaglia: 2010)– with a diversified proposal: mining, oil, cement, finance and medicine.

The Norberto Odebrecht³⁴⁸ building company, one of the ten biggest Brazilian exporters and the most competitive company in the petrochemical and gas sector, started operations in Africa in 1984, with the construction of the Hydroelectric Station of Capanda in Angola, with 24 thousand employees. In Mozambique, since 2005 it has built the open cast coal mine facilities for the Vale Company that will exploit the Moatize project. Odebrecht also mounted the entire infrastructure and signed an agreement to transform the Nacala Air Base into a civil International Airport. In the port of Djibouti, main port of the Red Sea, it is building the Doraleh Containers Terminal. Meanwhile, in Tripoli, it is building two new terminals at the International Airport and the third city motorway ring, and in Liberia it signed a contract with the biggest iron and steel group in the world, ArcelorMittal, to re-build the old railway that used to link the Tokadeh mine with the Buchanan port.

Vale³⁴⁹ do Rio Doce –world leader in the production of iron ore and second greatest producer of nickel– has operations in 38 countries, and in the case of Africa, in Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Guinea, South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo and Gabon. It has projects such as the copper program of Konkola North, in Zambia. Vale has purchased, 51% of the share stake of Sociedade de Desenvolvimento do Corredor do Norte SA (SDCN), of the Mozambique's Insitec SGPS SA, for the shipping of the production resulting from the II phase of the Moatize coal project. In Moatize, it will need to transform 11 million tons of metallurgic coal in energetic coal, which will be shipped along 600 km of railways (Sena-Beira) to the port of Beira. In addition, it also aims at optimizing the Nacala (Mozambique) corridor with investments in railway connections and a new deep water maritime terminal in Nacala.

347. LAPPER, Richard, Brazil accelerates investment in Africa, "Financial Times", Feb 2010: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e9550408-1519-11df-ad58-0144feab49a.html#axzz1D2Csn2yk>

348. See: <http://www.odebrecht.com.br/es/negocios-y-participaciones> Consultada 16/20 of February 2011.

349. Data was extracted from this recommended business informative web page: <http://www.vale.com/pt-br/Paginas/default.aspx>. It was consulted on 4 and 7.Feb.2011.

The Brazilian State-owned oil company Petrobras is also present in Africa. Lula Da Silva announced in 2010 that Brazil would invest 224 billion dollars until 2014 in the construction of ships, research and oil exploration³⁵⁰. Petrobras operates at off-shore blocks in Senegal, Angola (Kwanza and Benguela), Libya (in four blocks, since 2005, with licenses that cover 10,000 square km in the Mediterranean), Tanzania (Mafia basin of the Indian Ocean, which covers 9,250 square km at 300/3,000 metres deep), Equatorial Guinea (with a 50% stake in the L Bloque, which covers 4,250 square km in the Muni River basin), Nigeria (Rio Níger basin) and Congo³⁵¹. At the same time, Petrobras plans to invest 2.8 billion dollars in biotechnology and biofuels in the near future, and although the amount it will send to Africa has not been specified, it has already informed that Mozambique will be the destination of its first investments. Brazil has agreements with some countries, such as Italy, to boost cooperation with Africa in the production of biofuels.

Other big Brazilian company in Africa is Camargo Correia Group, based in São Paulo. The company has very diverse assets, but cement and heavy construction account for 70% of its total income. Between 2007 and 2009 Camargo Correia Cimentos (CCC) invested 270 million dollars in the cement factories of Angola and Mozambique, since Africa is one of the main expansion regions for its construction sector³⁵². With that strategy, the CCC group concentrated in 2010 an investment higher than USD 400 million to build the Angola's cement plant of Lobito with a production capacity of 1,6 million tons per year. The CCC is evaluating new investments in other African countries, especially those in the SADC.

Mendes Júnior³⁵³ –a Brazilian company that operates since 1953 in the heavy construction market of Brazil and abroad– has also performed works in the road and air-port segments in Africa. In 1975, the organization signed the greatest contract of all time in all Africa: that of Mauritania's longest route, which connects the capital of the country (Nouakchott) with the Kiffa

350. *La Prensa*, Buenos Aires, 4 July 2010. See:

<http://www.laprensa.com.ar/Note.aspx?Note=361812>. Consulted on 18 Feb.11.

351. Petrobras sees the handwriting on the wall, (an analysis by Michael Lynch for the Gerson Lehrman Group, in 2007), consulted on 10 February 2011:

<http://www.glgroup.com/News/Petrobras-sees-the-handwriting-on-the-wall-8984.html>

352. Brazil invests in the cement of Mozambique and Angola, in:

<http://www.africafundacion.org/spip.php?article184>

353. See:

<http://www.mendesjunior.com.br/portugues/default.aspx?cmp=empresa/default.ascx>.

Consulted on 21 Feb. 2011. 1

industrial capital, a distance of 600 km. The Nema Airport is also the work of Mendes Jr. in Mauritania. In turn, by the end of 2009, the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (*Fiocruz*) also made investments in Mozambique, building a factory of anti-retroviral medicines.

Furthermore, the *Banco do Brasil SA* and the BNDES (*Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento*) are supporting Brazilian companies' operations in Africa. The *Banco do Brasil* has a privileged investment relationship with Angola and Mozambique, and it has plans to open branches in all Africa³⁵⁴.

To conclude this chapter, based on the image reflected in the mirror and weighting Argentine actions in Africa and South Africa, some reflections are appropriate. In Lula's time, Brazil's African policy expanded, broadened and diversified. Oil producing countries and South Africa are its main partners. Probably the Brazil-South Africa relation is more solid and needs less action than that of Argentina to maintain its prominent position. But in relative terms, South Africa doesn't shine in the Brazilian sky as brightly as in the Argentine one –for being part of IBSA³⁵⁵. South Africa is one of the legs of IBSA, an association that is growing and strengthening within a South-South cooperation frame– although it's the weakest partner in the trilateral relationship. Moreover, in Africa it has more competitors for Brazil's favours (see Table 9) meanwhile the potential with Argentina has not yet fully materialised and the possibility to achieve joint positions at international fora is much more favourable.

LITTLE ADO ABOUT MUCH

As mentioned before, Africa's profile is still low in the designs of Argentine foreign policy, especially in comparison with Brazil's performance. The first decade of the 21st century and Kirchner's Administration have been no exception. Rather, the trend indicates that the bilateral rapprochement with the States to the North of the Sahara and with South

354. PRICE, Laura, *Banco do Brasil Seeks Vale, Petrobras Advice on Africa*, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-12-08/banco-do-brasil-seeks-vale-petrobras-advice-on-africa.html>. Consulted on 10 Feb. 2011.

355. Its operative dynamic includes the meetings of the three Heads of State –Brasilia (2006), South Africa (2007), Delhi (2008) and Brasilia (2010)– and the ministerial meetings, led by the foreign officers of the three countries, the so-called “focal points” that are in charge of the executive direction of the forum and the national coordinators, who are responsible for the activity of the 18 working groups.

Africa is mainly commercial, which is reflected in the issues treated in the bilateral commissions. These encounters underscore the outstanding and constant growth in trade exchanges, as well as examine a diversity of technical cooperation areas, and reiterate the request of African support to the Argentine sovereignty claim over the Malvinas Islands.

During this decade there was an increased participation in multilateral inter-regional political initiatives promoted in Latin America mainly by the Government of Brazil: the revitalization of ZPCSA, ASA and ASPA summits, trade negotiations between MERCOSUR and SACU, Morocco and Egypt. In parallel, the idea of implementing South-South cooperation practises in the scientific-technologic field is gaining visibility in the official discourse. However, these initiatives are not strong enough to promote and consolidate a mesh of micro-relations that could strengthen the macro bi- and multilateral relationship.

In this context, it should be noted that the geo-economic space of sub-Saharan Africa is being neglected. Evidence of this is the case of agriculture, where Argentina has INTA's long tradition, structure and experience for all latitudes and climates, which allows it to offer South-South cooperation in comparatively better terms than other countries with tropicalized agriculture. Africa's Renaissance will need of the energy of private players that can assess agro-industrial technology breakthroughs, and of business groups that can build silos, dams, ports, roads. It will also require the concentrated action of bureaucratic governmental agencies, among them, those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, either at the bilateral (DIASA-DANMO) and multilateral political levels, like the Division of International Cooperation, International Economic Negotiations, of the Undersecretariat of International Trade Negotiations, of the International Economic Centre of Fundación Exportar, to provide the institutional structure that is necessary to optimize Argentina's insertion into Africa.

In comparison with Brazil's case, there's a great distance to go. However, if measured against an efforts-results ratio, much has been done, especially in the fields of trade and private players. Political determination is essential if trade accomplishments are to be complemented with better South-South dialogue and cooperation. Prejudice and ignorance will need to be eradicated to meet the challenge involved in the development of the green revolution in Africa, as announced by many global players, for which Argentina should be prepared.

As for South Africa, the bilateral relation at political/macro level is built already, although it may suffer ups and downs depending on the domestic policy of each country and the often personal decisions of the government of the moment. Its strengthening will depend on the activity of the respective ambassadors as well as on the strategies for international insertion of their respective political projects. In the case of Argentina, South-South cooperation, understood as political solidarity, is now part of the official discourse, although in practice it's not always feasible to coordinate and keep same stance in international coalitions so as to obtain greater negotiation power. Still, progress has been made in technologic and scientific cooperation, where dialogue has just started and there's much to intertwine. Dialogue will facilitate the growth of micro-relationships, where civil society players have countless opportunities to forge links and enhance trade leading to a better understanding of the cross-Atlantic partner. A door has been opened, non-governmental players have a lot to say and governments have new opportunities to show that the proclaimed solidarity can become real.

Conclusions

ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN POLICY toward the African states exhibits a low profile and a pattern dominated by impulses, reflecting the inertia of a process characterized by spasmodic relations. These impulses, initially originated in Buenos Aires, had political-diplomatic, commercial or strategic purposes.

Impulses can be explained through domestic variables. The changes that took place between civilian and military governments –and eventually between democratic ones– caused discontinuity in Argentina's foreign policy, contributing to its instability. Nevertheless, the orientation of the regime did not have a significant incidence in the content of the impulses, which were predominantly commercial, except during the Alfonsín's and Frondizi's Governments, when political purposes overlapped with commercial ones.

Concerning the impulses with political purposes, the rapprochement with the African countries presented two characteristics. Initially, it was linked to the development of an institutional political-diplomatic network - observing the principle of universality, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, which led to the gradual opening of diplomatic representations. As far as the embassies were located in countries that did not enjoy foreign priority treatment, they were left to the good will and initiative of the officials in charge; and, in some cases, valuable opportunities to promote closer bilateral relations were missed. Diplomatic-commercial missions were sent but sporadically and, therefore, no consolidation of the relations was possible. If they happened to be consecutive, there was not a follow up and efforts were wasted. Furthermore, the agreements signed followed the regular models, but the joint commissions seldom met due to the lack of interest, political will or because of the instability on both sides of the Atlantic. The second characteristic of the impulses was their instrumental condition: the policy was directed to getting votes for the defense of Argentina's position related to the Malvinas /Falklands and, eventually, to joining efforts to create a group of countries that could pressure to achieve a more fair international order.

There were trade purposes in almost all impulses, the result of Argentina's need to get new markets. However, the missions sent did not fit

any strategy or trade promotion policy; they mostly overlapped and showed a striking lack of connection among them. The ups and downs in the commercial relations were the outcome of private actors. However, a direct relation between the impulses with diplomatic-commercial purposes and the fluctuations of Argentine-African foreign trade could not be established.

The strategic purposes fitted the Cold War framework and consisted in impulses implemented by the different military governments that prioritized relations with South Africa without any objections to the apartheid regime. The post cold war scenario shows opportunities for co-operation through the ZPCSA and the maritime exercises ATLASUR.

The impulses were reflected in actions. But regrettably, most of the actions implemented did not bring about a critical mass which could help promote the design of strategies for the African countries, because the impulses were isolated, discontinued, and responded to particular objectives.

Taking Brazil as test case helped to make clear the characterization of the Argentine impulses, particularly regarding the role played by Africa in their respective global foreign policy designs. As far as Brazil was concerned, political actions related to the African countries fitted in a foreign policy project, within the context of South-South cooperation.

They were part of an incrementalist policy, given that the Brazilian political actions, even if they could be regarded as impulses, were cumulative and helped to build an African policy.

In Argentina, the impulses were the result of a foreign policy whose formulation and implementation underwent variations. These ups and downs became more obvious on issues of low or no priority, such as South-South relations. The outcome was a sort of erratic relationship with the African states accompanied by a great deal of unreliability. Except for some rare occasions, these countries did not participate in any design; they occupied a marginal place, within the bureaucratic routine of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

When for some particular reason, an African country climbed up in the priorities, it began to participate in the global agenda with a specific interest, such as the defense of human rights or the need to improve international insertion, as was the case during Alfonsín's Administration. Throughout Menem's presidency South Africa allowed him to play an international

center stage role. During the Kirchner's period, some African countries were used to promote business in parallel to a South- South discourse.

Impulses occurred and became more intense not due to a repositioning of Africa in Argentina's agenda, not because of Africa per se, but because they were instrumental to promote other issues. Therefore it can be stated that there is a relation between the level of the impulse and its incidence in an extra-regional agenda, not an African one.

Two typical features can be observed in the evolution of the Argentine-African relations. On one side, a policy by impulses in pursuit of markets and votes. On the other hand, an ambiguous policy, undecided between Africa and South Africa was implemented until the 1986 rupture of diplomatic relations with the racist South African government. This is the reason why, during an initial period, successive Argentine governments held an apparent "equilibrium" policy between "Black Africa" and South Africa, when, in fact, there were strong ties with the white government, especially during the last military regime. Such equilibrium, in the best of cases, occurred during the sporadic missions sent to the African continent, in particular, to the North Africa countries or to those in the western coast.

In spite of the general characteristics mentioned, Argentine-South African relations did not coincide with the pattern that prevailed in the Argentine-African relations. Although South Africa was the object of impulses originated in Argentina, especially as regards initiatives with a trade content (for which Pretoria was always an important partner) there were variations in the political dimension and even greater intensity in the strategic and military aspects. Likewise, the relationship was characterized by mutual impulses due to the insistence of South Africa on gaining new partners in Latin America as its international isolationism increased.

During the successive military governments in Argentina, the combination of the ideological dimension and the strategic aspects engendered good bilateral relations and trade growth, encouraged by the economic diplomacy of those days, despite the apartheid regime in Pretoria. Until Alfonsín took office, the policies implemented concerning South Africa varied according to the interests and the ideological orientation of the groups in power during the different periods under consideration. It was a dual policy; with no consistency between multilateral and bilateral relations.

The orientation of the regime moderately conditioned the profile of bilateral relations. The dual policy was held by the military for the reasons already mentioned, but would be attenuated with the democratic administrations, which would take some political measures contrary to the white government, while still allowing private contacts and military relations.

The Alfonsín Administration marked the difference in the evolution of the Argentine-African relations, with an intense impulse. Had this impulse been continued along with other political actions, it might have generated an African policy. During the 1980s, the African countries occupied “a place” in Argentina’s international reinsertion strategies within the broader South-South relations and the Non-Aligned framework. Foreign Minister Caputo started the design of an African policy.

The project consisted in improving political relations with the African countries both multilaterally and bilaterally; there were also expectations to increase trade under the South-South cooperation umbrella, in addition to the channels already established in North-South cooperation. In this context, Caputo’s African policy did not escape the traditional practices of any decision-making process. Although the design was made at the top level, there were intra-bureaucratic struggles that illustrated the different perceptions concerning the role and the importance of Africa in Argentina’s political and economic areas.

The most significant action in terms of its high profile and as a political gesture was the decision to break off diplomatic relations with South Africa. It was a turning point in Argentine-African political relations. The decision was not an isolated or abrupt occurrence. It was not isolated because it participated in the global agenda: it constituted the Argentine response to two issues. Firstly, recomposing relations with the Non-Aligned movement and secondly defending human rights, both areas in which the intention was to modify the positions held by the former military government. It was not abrupt because it was part of a process in which the final decision took time to be made.

Breaking diplomatic relations, an unprecedented fact in Argentina’s foreign policy, aimed to strike the attention of the African world and of the Non-Aligned countries to the dramatic change in Argentina’s attitude. With this decision, the Argentine government pretended to revert the historical ties with the Pretoria white government and the absence of the African

countries in the Argentine foreign policy agenda. The purpose was to improve Argentina's international insertion in areas that were part of the foreign policy design of Alfonsín's Administration; find support to claim sovereignty over the Falklands/ Malvinas; politicize the discussion on foreign debt, and deal with nuclear disarmament. A striking fact was that the political decision did not improve Argentine-African commercial relations hinder Argentine-South African relations. The absence of articulation between the private actors related to foreign trade and the political agents was, this way, demonstrated.

During Menem's Administration, the systemic changes and the Argentine and African unresolved problems caused the decline of Africa's profile in Argentina's foreign policy, transforming the measures taken by Caputo into a new impulse. In the 1990s, an Argentine strategy *vis-à-vis* the African countries was absent in terms of the low profile of the Non-Aligned countries in the new policy design; the lines followed by the Alfonsín Administration were left aside. The emphasis concerning the reduced bilateral relations also changed: from a political approach carried forward by Alfonsín to an economic one. The priorities, the means and the strategies were also modified. Although the Menem Administration gave its foreign policy an economic orientation and, therefore, focused relations with African countries according to such priorities, a clear policy or strategy for trade promotion policy is not observed. The density of the political-diplomatic dimension was in relation to the direction of Argentine exports: a trade balance in favor of Argentina must be noted, with rising volumes both in imports and exports.

In accordance with the low profile, the political-diplomatic relations were part of the bureaucratic policy routine of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the actions responded to the initiatives of officials interested in promoting closer relations with those countries. What draws the attention in an administration that was reducing contacts with the Third World was the fast recomposition with South Africa in 1991, even before Mandela took office. Nevertheless the consequent intensification of the contacts since 1994, when he was sworn in, led to imagine the possibility of a selective option, as was the case of Brazil, once conditions for the development of cooperative policies had been created. The political gesture of Menem's visit to South Africa also contributed to imagine this country would have a place on Argentina's foreign policy agenda, similar to Brazil's strategic associations.

However, such a political approach was only the product of Menem's desire to have a place in history, meeting with such an emblematic figure as Mandela, and not the result of a new perception. In the best of cases, there was an underlying pragmatic orientation: to attract investment and, additionally, to increase trade through the intensification of micro-relations in accordance with the model that was being implemented domestically. It was just another impulse which, despite the possible growth of commercial relations, did not fit a policy design, since the priorities were supposed to be found elsewhere. Again, relations with South Africa were the result of isolated actions, with increasing density, dependent on the good will of the diplomatic officials but without any relevant political outcome.

Because the foreign policy's economical bias was linked to a financial strategy, and not to an exporting one, the fluctuations in trade relations show it was possible to do good business but in a discontinued fashion, given the lack of a policy design. Bilateral trade volumes rose along with the increasing interest shown by both private national and transnational actors. The explanation is to be found in the kind of exchanged goods: mainly the product of agribusiness. It must be remembered that, at least in the South, international trade is in the hands of large companies, and is therefore independent of the strategy of each country.

In the 21st Century, things did not change much. The African states continued to have a low profile in Argentina's foreign agenda. Connections between the bilateral political-diplomatic relations and the level of exports to the continent were kept, backed by a South-South Cooperation discourse. Buenos Aires accompanied Brasilia's initiatives in the multilateral spheres and maintained a low profile in bilateral relations, giving priority to South Africa and to North African partners. Brazil and Argentina displayed different modalities: Brazil developed a multiple strategy in the global, regional and South-South spheres, while Argentina developed a commercialist design.

In its relations with African countries, Brazil implemented an overarching strategy, despite some fluctuations. This process consolidated and gained continuity because those countries formed part of the global agenda in the context of Brasilia's international insertion project. As in the case of Argentina, during the 1990s the systemic changes, the African crises and an exhausted economic model restricted the means to implement actions abroad, and Brazil gave way to selectivity, prioritizing its African partners according to the interests at stake. Nevertheless, the new South Africa

offered the conditions to develop mutually beneficial associations and the chance to agree on joint multilateral actions, like the association between the MERCOSUR and the SADC countries, although eventually it materialized with the SACU states.

With Lula da Silva, Brazil implemented a more comprehensive African policy. Along with the intensification of bilateral relations, it began to promote a more complex multilateral engineering, to generate a critical mass of conditions allowing the South countries a better positioning vis-à-vis the risks of globalization. Among the actions to be followed, the traditional wager on the strengthening of bilateral relations was combined with the coordination of policies between South American and African countries, generating a two-way road in the context of a renewed South-South cooperation. The actions taken by Lula within the two main bi-regional initiatives, ASPA (South America-Arab Countries) and ASA (Africa-South America), contributed to give more substance to the South-South agenda.

On the other hand, and despite some initiatives and a closer relation with Pretoria, the states of the continent are not among Argentina's foreign policy priorities. In the case of South Africa, the intense activity displayed by the respective embassies and private actors have created the synergy to promote a bottom up impulse which has contributed to the intensification of the bilateral political macro relation. Nevertheless this is not enough to promote and consolidate a mesh of interactions that could strengthen the macro bi- and multilateral relation with Africa

The priorities and the thematic schizofrenia exhibited by countries of the Latin American region in their foreign policies, have prevented the implementation of alternative actions which, at no high cost, could allow them to move forward in mutually beneficial, not yet explored relations. This South-South cooperation could be implemented on the basis of joint or coordinated Brazilian-Argentine actions in relation to the southern African region and to South Africa, with a probable future spill-over effect. In this respect, it would be especially important to advance with the political decision to benefit from intra-MERCOSUR negotiations, agreeing on coordinated activities that could involve the joint use of embassy offices in Africa and the organization of joint missions and joint-ventures, among other possibilities.

The present reconfiguration of forces opens new opportunities to rethink Argentina's national project and international insertion. The crisis of

the 1990s model fanned out a wide range of possible subjects related to the production of knowledge in international matters. In this new century, the automatic and exclusive alignment with the central countries is showing its flaws. The debate of a new development model for Argentina and for the region should not be postponed.

Thus, the present volume does not propose merely to document the weaknesses of Argentina's foreign policy. On the contrary, its objective is to highlight a cluster of different issues that should be addressed. Fresh perspectives for the development of various new research lines of "variable geometry" should be envisioned in a context of an international scenario where regionalization and globalization processes take place.

The countries and areas mentioned in this work belong to different spaces which are still being built: MERCOSUR, PSC, ZPCSA, SADC, SACU, ASA and ASPA, among others. The inter-relation between them may provide new niches and opportunities to complement traditional North-South relations on the basis of weaving a network of different characteristics and scope, in order to build "likemindedness". For Argentina and for Latin America, the international engineering of the 1990s is over; a new model must be thought out. At the very least, a reformulation is proposed, the outright substitution of the model being, in my view, even better. Thus, I hope to contribute with fresh new elements to the building of useful knowledge from a Southern perspective.

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ACRONYMS

ACP: Africa, Caribbean and Pacific

ADB: African Development Bank

ADF: African Development Fund

AFRICA Fund: Action Fund for Resisting Invasion, Colonialism and Apartheid

ANC: African National Congress

ARC: Agricultural Research Institute

ASA: Africa-South America

ASPA: South America-Arab Countries

AU: African Union

BICSAA: South Africa–Argentina Binational Commission

BNDES: *Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento* (Brazilian Development Bank)

BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India and China

BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

CACEX: *Cámara de Comercio Exterior* (Foreign Trade Chamber)

CAECOPAZ: Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz (Joint Training Centre for Peacekeeping Operations)

CAFMA: *Cámara Argentina de Fabricantes de Maquinaria Agrícola* (Argentine Chamber of Manufacturers of Farming)

CARI: *Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales* (Argentinian Council for International Relations)

CIDETER: *Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo Tecnológico Regional* (Regional Technological Research and Development Centre)

COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

CONAE: *Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales* (National Commission on Space Activities)

CONEA/CNEA: *Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica* (National Commission on Atomic Energy)

CONICET: *Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas* (National Council for Scientific and Technological Research)

CPSP: Community of Portuguese- Speaking Countries (*CPLP Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa*)

DANMO: *Dirección de África del Norte y Oriente Medio* (North Africa and Middle East Bureau)

DFA: Department of Foreign Affairs (South Africa) until 2010

DIRCO Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa)

DIASA: *Dirección de África Subsahariana* (Sub-Saharan Africa Bureau)

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

DTI: Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa)

ECCAS: Economic Community of Central Africa States

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

EEC: European Economic Community

ESMA: Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada

EU: European Union

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment

Fiocruz: *Oswaldo Cruz Foundation* (Foundation Oswaldo Cruz)

FLS: Front Line States

FO-AR: *Fondo Argentino de Cooperación Horizontal* (Argentina Fund for Horizontal Cooperation)

FRELIMO: *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Liberation Front of Mozambique)

FTA: Free Trade Area

FTAA: Free Trade Area of the Americas

GATT: General Agreement on Trade and Tariff

GURN: Government of National Unity and Reconciliation

IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IBSA: India, Brazil and South Africa

IMF: International Monetary Fund

INADI: *Instituto Nacional contra la Discriminación* (National Institute against Discrimination)

INDEC: *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos* (National Institute of Statistics and Census)

INIDEP: *Instituto Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo Pesquero* (National Institute of Research and Fishing Development)

INTA: *Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria* (National Institute for Agricultural Technology)

INTI: *Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Industrial* (National Institute of Industrial Technology)

ISEN: *Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nación* (Argentine Foreign Service Institute)

MDICE: *Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior* (Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade)

MERCOSUR: *Mercado Común del Sur* (Southern Common Market)

MONUA: United Nations Observer Mission in Angola

MPLA: *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola)

MINURSO: United Nation Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara

MRECIC: *Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto – Palacio San Martín* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship)

NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement

NAM: Non-Aligned Movement

NAMA: Non-Agricultural Market Access

NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa's Development

NGOs: Non Gubernamental Organizations

NIEO: New International Economic Order

NNPT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

OAU: Organization of African Unity

ONUMOZ: United Nations Operations in Mozambique

PALOP: African Portuguese Speaking Countries (*Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa*)

PKO: United Nation Peacekeeping Operations

PLC: Portuguese Language Community

PTA: Preferential Trade Area

SACU: Southern African Customs Union

SADC: Southern African Development Community

SADCC: Southern African Development Coordinating Conference

SAIIA: The South African Institute of International Affairs

SAITEX: South Africa International Trade Exhibition

SARU: South African Rugby Union

SATO: South Atlantic Treaty Organization

SECEX: *Secretaria de Comércio Exterior* (Foreign Trade Secretary)

SECyT: Secretaría de Ciencia y Técnica (Technological and Scientific Secretary/Bureau)

SWAPO: South West African People's Organization

TCDC: Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries

UAR: *Unión Argentina de Rugby* (Argentina Rugby Union)

UBA: *Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires* (National University of Buenos Aires)

UDF: United Democratic Front

UN/UNO: United Nations

UNAMIR: United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda

UNAVEM: United Nations Angola Verification Mission

UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNEP: United Nations Environment Programme

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund

UNITA: *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)

UNISA: University of South Africa

UNOMIL: United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

UNOMSA: United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa

UNOMUR: United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda

UNR: *Universidad Nacional de Rosario* (National University of Rosario)

UNTREF: *Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero* (National University of Tres de Febrero)

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WAIB: West Africa International Bank

WTO: World Trade Organization

ZPCSA: Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic

Tables

Table 1
 ARGENTINA - AFRICA
 DELEGATIONS SENT AND RECEIVED (1961-2010)

President of Argentina	Year	Representative	Delegation	
			Country of origin	Country of destination
Onganía	1966	Minister of Foreign Affairs Hilgard Müller	South Africa	Argentina
	1969	Minister of Foreign Affairs Hilgard Müller	South Africa	Argentina
Lanusse	1972	Minister of Foreign Affairs Solomon Pratt	Sierra Leone	Argentina
Videla	1977	President Omar Bongo	Gabon	Argentina
	1980	Minister of State for External Affairs Chief Patrick Bolokor	Nigeria	Argentina
Viola	1981	Vice President of the Supreme Military Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Florencio Maye Ela	Argentina	Equatorial Guinea
	1981	Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Honorine Dossou-Naki	Gabon	Argentina
Alfonsín	1984	Minister of Foreign Affairs Martin Bongo	Gabon	Argentina
	1985	Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Dante Caputo . Non-Aligned Countries Ministerial Meeting.	Argentina	Angola
	1986	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Jorge Sábato	Argentina	SADC Countries
	1986	President Raúl Alfonsín and	Argentina	Zimbabwe

	Minister of Foreign Affairs Dante Caputo . Non-Aligned Countries Summit.			
1987	President Mobutu Sese Seko and State Commissioner of Foreign Affairs Ekila Lyonda	Zaire (DRC)	Argentina	
1987	National Assembly President and Vice President	Liberia	Argentina	
1987	President Aristides Pereira and Minister of Foreign Affairs	Cape Verde	Argentina	
1988	President Joaquim Chissano and Minister of Foreign Affairs	Mozambique	Argentina	
1988	Minister of Foreign Affairs Dante Caputo	Argentina	Angola - Cape Verde - Ivory Coast - Gabon - Ghana	
1988	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Tanzania	Argentina	
1988	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Uganda	Argentina	
1988	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Cape Verde	Argentina	
1988	Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation	Benin	Argentina	
1988	Minister of Foreign Affairs Dante Caputo	Argentina	OAU - Addis Ababa	
1988	Secretary General of OAU	OAU- Addis Ababa	Argentina	
1989	President Moussa Traoré	Mali	Argentina	
Menem	1991	Ex President Julius Nyerere	Tanzania	Argentina
	1991	President Joao Bernardo Vieira	Guinea-Bissau	Argentina
	1993	President Frederick De Klerk	South Africa	Argentina
	1994	Vice President Frederick De Klerk	South Africa	Argentina

	1994	Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Di Tella for the assumption of Nelson Mandela	Argentina	South Africa
	1994	Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Di Tella	Argentina	Mozambique
	1995	President Carlos Menem	Argentina	South Africa
	1995	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Joao Miranda	Angola	Argentina
	1996	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad	South Africa	Argentina
	1996	Vice President Carlos Ruckauf	Argentina	South Africa
	1996	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Joao Miranda	Angola	Argentina
	1997	Minister of Foreign Affairs Leonardo Santos Simao	Mozambique	Argentina
	1997	Vice President Tabo Mbeki	South Africa	Argentina
	1998	Prime Minister Ibrahim Keita	Mali	Argentina
	1998	President Alpha Konare	Mali	Argentina
	1998	President Nelson Mandela	South Africa	Argentina
	1999	President Robert Mugabe	Zimbabwe	Argentina
	1999	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Duben Onyla	Nigeria	Argentina
De la Rúa	1999	Minister of Foreign Affairs Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma	South Africa	Argentina
	2000	Minister in the Presidency Essop Pahad	South Africa	Argentina
	2000	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad	South Africa	Argentina
	2000	President Fernando	Argentina	Egypt

De la Rúa and

		Minister of Foreign Affairs Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini		
	2000	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini	Argentina	Argelia
	2000	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini	Argentina	Morroco
	2000	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini	Argentina	Egypt
	2000	Prime Minister, Abderramán Yusufi	Morroco	Argentina
Néstor Kirchner	2004	King Mohamed VI	Morroco	Argentina
	2004	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rafael Bielsa	Argentina	Egypt
	2004	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Taiana	Argentina	Argelia
	2004	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Taiana	Argentina	Morocco
	2004	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Americas, Shadia Farrag	Egypt	Argentina
	2005	President José Eduardo Dos Santos	Angola	Argentina
	2005	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Ali Aboul Gheit	Egypt	Argentina
	2005	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Americas, Sallama Shaker	Egypt	Argentina
	2005	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Harem Seif Al Nasr	Egypt	Argentina
	2006	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation	Morroco	Argentina

		Mohamed Benaissa		
	2006	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Saida Chtioui	Tunisia	Argentina
	2007	Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores y de la Cooperación, Mohamed Benaissa	Morocco	Argentina
	2007	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pastor Ondo Bilé	Equatorial Guinea	Argentina
	2007	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Taina	Argentina	South Africa
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	2008	President, Teodoro Obiang Nguema	Equatorial Guinea	Argentina
	2008	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma	South Africa	Argentina
	2008	President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	Argentina	Argelia
	2008	President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	Argentina	Tunisia
	2008	President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	Argentina	Egypt
	2008	President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	Argentina	Libia
	2009	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Americas Hisham El- Zimaity	Egypt	Argentina

Source: MRECIC -Buenos Aires

Table 2

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN STATES (1824-2010)

LAS HERAS (GOV. OF BUENOS AIRES) (1824-1826)

South Africa

- Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata and the Republic of South Africa, February 2, 1825.

JUÁREZ CELMAN (1886-1890)

South Africa

- Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Criminals between the Republic of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, May 22, 1889.

PERÓN (1945-1955)

South Africa

- Agreement by Reversal Notes related to the Sale of Oilseeds, Union of South Africa (extinct) December 30, 1946.

- Agreement by Reversal Notes to Exchange South African Coal for Argentine Corn (extinct), August 1, 1946.

- Agreement by Reversal Notes establishing Diplomatic Relations, September 10, 1947.

PERÓN (1973-1974)

Central African Republic

- Agreement to Exchange Notes concerning the Granting of a Credit Line of 10 million dollars, June 15, 1974.

MARTÍNEZ DE PERÓN (1974-1976)

Guinea

- General Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation, August 19, 1974.

- Act of the Meeting between the Delegations of Argentina and Guinea, August 19, 1974.

VIDELA (1976-1981)

Congo

- General Agreement on Cooperation, October 28, 1980.

- Act of Meetings and Joint Statements, October 28, 1980.

Equatorial Guinea

- Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, October 24, 1980.

- Joint Statement, October 25, 1980.

Gabon

- Trade Agreement, October 30, 1977.

- Additional Protocol to the Trade Agreement, October 30, 1977.

- Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation, October 30, 1977.

- Joint Statement, October 30, 1977.

- Scientific and Technological Agreement, October 23, 1980.

- Act of the visit of Argentine Delegation to Gabon, October 23, 1980.

- Joint Statement, October 23, 1980.

Ivory Coast

- Trade Agreement, July 10, 1980.

Senegal

- Wheat donation to Senegal under the Food Aid Convention, 1979.

- Trade Agreement, February 25, 1980.
- Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, October 13, 1980.
- Agreement on Cultural Cooperation, October 13, 1980.

Togo

- Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, October 16, 1980.

Zaire (DRC)

- Trade Agreement, October 31, 1980.
- Agreement on Economic Cooperation, October 31, 1980.
- Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, October 31, 1980.
- Agreement on Cultural Cooperation, October 31, 1980.
- Act of the visit of the Argentine Delegation to Zaire, October 31, 1980.

VIOLA (1981-1982)

Equatorial Guinea

- Minutes of the Working Sessions with the Vice President Maye Ela at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 21, 1981.
- Trade Agreement, April 22, 1981.
- Agreement by Reversal Notes to grant a Credit Line to finance the purchase of products from Argentina, April 22, 1981.
- Agreement on Economic Cooperation, April 22, 1981.

Gabon

- Joint Statement, October 16, 1981.
- Final Act of the 1st Meeting of the Economic Argentine-Gabonese Joint Commission, October 16, 1981.

BIGNONE (1982-1983)

Angola

- Trade Agreement between the Government of Angola and the National Board of Grains, February 25, 1983.

Central African Republic

- Declaration of Intention - Technical Cooperation, January 15, 1983.
- Declaration of Intention - Commercial, Economic and Financial Cooperation, January 15, 1983.

Equatorial Guinea

- Financial Agreement between the Central Bank of Argentina and the Bank of Equatorial Guinea, January 20, 1982.

Gabon

- Final Act of the II Meeting of the Economic Argentine-Gabonese Joint Commission, December 17, 1982.

Liberia

- Declaration of Intention, March 2, 1983.

Zaire (DRC)

- Joint Statement of the Argentina-Zaire Joint Commission of Economic and Commercial Cooperation, Scientific and Technical Cooperation and Cultural Cooperation, November 19, 1982.
- Final Act of the 1st Meeting of the Argentina-Zaire Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, November 15, 1982.
- Act of the Argentina-Zaire Joint Commission on Economic and Commercial Cooperation, November 17, 1982.

ALFONSÍN (1983-1989)

Angola

- Protocol, September 5, 1984.
- General Agreement on Economic, Technical, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, April 16, 1988.

Benin

- Agreement to grant a Credit Line to finance the purchase of products from Argentina, December 13, 1984.
- General Agreement on Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation, July 8, 1988.
- Joint Statement, July 8, 1988.

Cape Verde

- Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, 1987.
- Act of the Meeting between the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs, July 12, 1988.

Gabon

- Joint Statement, July 26, 1984.
- Cultural Agreement, July 26, 1984.
- Final Act of the III Meeting of the Economic Argentine-Gabonese Joint Commission, July 27, 1984.
- Argentine-Gabonese Joint Statement, April 21, 1988.

Guinea

- Agreement to grant a Line of Credit for the purchase of products from Argentina, November 26, 1984.

Ivory Coast

- Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, April 8, 1988.

Mali

- Agreements on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, February 17, 1989.
- Joint Statement, February 17, 1989.

Mozambique

- General Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, March 30, 1988.

Nigeria

- General Agreement on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, August 17, 1988.
- Joint Statement on the Conclusions agreed at Talks between Ministers of Foreign Affairs, August 19, 1988.

Zaire (DRC)

- Joint Statement, February 20, 1987.
- Agreement by Reversal Notes to grant a Credit Line of 15 million dollars to the Republic of Zaire, July 4, 1987.

MENEM (1989-1999)**Nigeria**

- Agreement on Bilateral Cooperation on Drugs, 1999.
- Agreement on Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, 1999.

Senegal

- Agreement for the creation of a Joint Commission to the Promotion of Economic, Technical, Scientific, Cultural and Social Cooperation, November 1992.
- Agreement on the Promotion and the Mutual Protection of Investments, November 1992.
- Joint Statement, October 13, 1999.

South Africa

- Agreements on Maritime Traffic Control, Legal Protection of the Activities in the Area and Support for Scientific Research, 1992.
- Interinstitutional Agreement in Veterinary between the Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of Argentina and the Ministry of Agriculture of South Africa, September 9, 1994.
- Joint Statement, February 24, 1995.
- Intergovernmental Agreement between Armed Forces in Time of Peace, October 6, 1997.
- Bilateral Agreement on Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments, July 23, 1998.
- Bilateral Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Combating the Illicit Production and Trafficking of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances, Drug Abuse and Related Topics, July 23, 1998.

- Unilateral Decision of the Government of South Africa to Abolish Visas for Argentinian Tourists and Businessmen, April 28, 1998.

- Ministry of Home Affairs Abolishing Visas for Ordinary Passports of South Africa, July 22, 1998.

- Memorandum of Understanding on Consultations on Matters of Mutual Interest, July 23, 1998.

- Agreement on Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments, July 23, 1998.

Zimbabwe

- Agreement on Veterinary Cooperation, September 13, 1999.

- Agreement on Scientific, Technical and Technological Cooperation, September 13, 1999.

- Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation, September 13, 1999.

DE LA RUA (1999-2001)

Algeria

- Agreement on the Promotion and the Mutual Protection of Investments, October 4, 2000.

- Memorandum of Understanding on Consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, October 4, 2000.

- Agreement of Cooperation between EXPORT-Ar and PROMEX, July 30, 2001.

Egypt

- Agreement on Economic and Commercial Cooperation, June 20, 2000.

Morocco

- Agreement on cinematographic themes, March 14, 2000.

- Agreement of cooperation between INTA and the National Agronomy Research Institute of Morocco, March 14, 2000.

- Commercial Agreement, October 3, 2000.

- Trade Agreement and Cooperation Agreement on Sea Fishery, October 3, 2000.

- Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Cooperation between the Export.Ar Foundation and the Moroccan Center of Export Promotion, October 3, 2000.

DUHALDE (2002-2003)

Algeria

- Agreement on Spatial Activities, July 31, 2002

KIRCHNER (2003-2007)

Algeria

- Commercial Agreement, October 23, 2003

Angola

- Memorandum of Cooperation in Agriculture, July 31, 2004.

- Agreement of Understanding on Matters of Common Interest, May 5, 2005.

- Agreement on Economic and Commercial Cooperation May 5, 2005.

Egypt

- Agreement of Cooperation between ISEN and the Ejecutive Program of Cultural and Educational Cooperation (2005-2008), May 12, 2005.

- Agreement of Cooperation between CEI and the Center for Economical Studies of Egypt, September 8, 2006.

Libya

- Agreement on Animal Health, March 16, 2007.

- Memorandum of Understanding on Political Consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, March 16, 2007.

Morocco

- Memorandum of Understanding on Mining, January 6, 2003.

- Memorandum of Understanding on Industrial Cooperation, January 6, 2003.

- Program of Implementation for de Agreement on Cultural, Educational and Scientific Cooperation (2005-2007), December 4, 2004.
- Agreement of Cooperation in Agriculture, April 17, 2006.
- Agreement of Cooperation in Sports between the Secretary of Sports of Argentina and the Secretary of Youth of Morocco, April 17, 2006.
- Agreement of Cooperation between Ministries of Foreign Affairs, April 17, 2006.
- Agreement of Cooperation on Matters of Equipment, April 17, 2006.
- Agreement of Cooperation between Judiciary Power of Argentina and Supreme Court of Morocco, June 22, 2006.

Mozambique

- Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretary of Science, Technology and Productive Innovation of Argentina and de Ministry of Science and Technology of Mozambique, May 19, 2006.

Nambia

- Memorandum of Understanding on Science, Technology and Innovative Production, July 24, 2007.

South Africa

- Agreement of Cooperation in Agriculture and stockbreeding, April 17, 2006.
- Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, May 16, 2006.
- Agreement for the Coordination of Searching and Rescue, September 8, 2006.
- Agreement on Extradition, February 28, 2007.
- Agreement of Cooperation on Matters of Sports and Recreation, February 28, 2007.
- Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matter, February 28, 2007.
- Memorandum of Understanding between INTA and ARC, November 27, 2007.

Tunisia

- Agreement of Cooperation between ISEN and the *Diplomatic Academy* of Tunisia, May 16, 2006.
- Agreement of Cooperation on Sports May 16, 2006.
- Agreement of Mutual Legal Assistance in Civil and Commercial areas, May 16, 2006.
- Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matter May 16, 2006.
- Agreement on Extradition May 16, 2006.

FERNÁNDEZ DE KIRCHNER (2007 - 2011)

Angola

- Agreement of Cooperation on Superior Education, October 23, 2009.

Algeria

- Agreement of Cooperation on Sports, April 6, 2008.
- Memorandum of Academic Cooperation between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, April 6, 2008.
- Agreement of Cooperation between Télam and Algerie Presse Service, November 17, 2008.
- Agreement of Cooperation on Health and Medical Sciences, November 17, 2008.
- Agreement of Cooperation for Development and Pacific Use of Nuclear Energy, November 17, 2008.
- Additional Protocol on Cultural Cooperation, November 17, 2008.
- Joint Statement between the Ministry of Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services and the Ministry of Energy and Mining, May 21, 2009.

Egypt

- Joint Statement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, November 20, 2009.
- Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Agriculture of Egypt and the Secretary of Agriculture of Argentina on Technical Cooperation, November 20, 2008.

Equatorial Guinea

- Memorandum of Cooperation between the Secretary of Agriculture of Argentine and the Ministry of Agriculture of Equatorial Guinea, February 123, 2008.
- Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Science, Technology and Productive Innovation of Argentina and the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport of Equatorial Guinea, February 13, 2008.

- Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Science, Technology and Productive Innovation of Argentina and the Ministry of Transport, Technology, Mail and Telecommunications of Equatorial Guinea, February 13, 2008.
- Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Education of Argentine and the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport of Equatorial Guinea, February 13, 2008.
- Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services of Argentine and the Ministry of Mining, Industry and Energi of Equatorial Guinea, February 13, 2008.
- Memorandum of Understanding for the strengthening of the cooperation in human rights and good government, February 13, 2008.
- Memorandum of Understanding for the cooperation in the formation of diplomatic resources, February 13, 2008.

Libya

- Agreement on Custom Matters, November 22, 2008.
- Agreement of Cooperation on Scientific Investigation, November 22, 2008.
- Agreement on Economic and Commercial Cooperation, November 22, 2008.
- Agreement of Cooperation for Development and Pacific Use of Nuclear Energy, November 22, 2008.
- Agreement of Cooperation for the Pacific Use of Space, November 22, 2008.
- Agreement of Cooperation in Agriculture, stockbreeding and Maritime Resources, November 22, 2008.
- Amendment of the Agreement of Cooperation on Scientific Investigation (November 22, 2008), June 18, 2009.
- Amendment of the Agreement of Cooperation for the Pacific Use of Space (November 22, 2008) June 18, 2009.
- Amendment of the Agreement of Cooperation in Agriculture, stockbreeding and Maritime Resources (November 22, 2008) June 18, 2009.

Morocco

- Agreement of Cooperation in Justice, June 17, 2009.
- Memorandum of Understanding between INTA and INRA, June 23, 2009.
- Agreement of Cooperation in Defense, December 19, 2009.
- Agreement of Cooperation between Télam and Map, June 17, 2010.
- Agreement of Cooperation between the Ministry of Defense of Morocco and the Argentinean Army, August 04, 2010.

Nigeria

- Memorandum of Understanding between the State of Lagos and the Government of the city of Buenos Aires, October 15, 2008.

South Africa

- Agreement in sports (2008-2010), October 7, 2008.
- Agreement of Cooperation for the Pacific Use of Nuclear Energy, December 03, 2008.
- Additional Protocol about the Protection on Classified Information Exchange according to the Memorandum of Understanding on Defense, November 20, 2010.

Tunisia

- Agreement of Cooperation for the Commercial Promotion and the Transference of Technology in Matters of International Commerce, November 19, 2008.
- Agreement of Cooperation for Agriculture, November 19, 2008.
- Cooperation Programme in the field of Scientific Investigation and Technology (2009-2011), November 19, 2008.

Zambia

- Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Zambia and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Productive Innovation of Argentina, September 18, 2008.

Source: MRECIC - Buenos Aires (www.cancilleria.gov.ar)

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Table 3
ARGENTINE EXPORTS TO AFRICA (2001-2010)
Main Countries (U\$S - FOB)

Years	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Angola	18.233.979	29.384.050	63.879.184	80.881.054	139.262.017	138.458.164	165.981.961	213.165.280	163.733.847	143.935.000
Algeria	158.442.439	116.564.321	207.961.615	450.859.497	452.468.336	537.743.024	765.293.676	891.611.548	709.873.239	1,017,998.000
Ivory Cost	5.923.216	7.470.613	3.594.979	5.297.242	14.423.085	11.682.647	17.227.107	35.585.139	15.515.957	20,648.000
Egypt	346.945.501	405.342.131	446.611.900	598.788.870	558.803.253	324.130.302	577.471.654	1.075.235.422	591.597.501	978,403.000
Ghana	2.268.442	7.193.666	10.368.983	13.176.175	26.138.291	20.514.838	32.366.809	38.215.223	36.685.022	26,405.000
Kenya	43.021.988	16.889.321	7.365.936	78.510.033	25.524.394	15.305.196	50.491.783	92.881.442	22.557.813	6,160.000
Libya	23.940.467	18.350.739	21.776.726	53.600.624	60.223.769	83.792.692	122.532.269	192.437.523	110.359.148	137,849.000
Morocco	117.072.931	98.161.666	175.275.538	210.306.028	199.614.697	232.663.541	353.759.644	491.220.628	123.897.007	237,623.000
Mozambique	15.427.323	11.587.122	18.593.395	48.631.280	31.337.113	35.929.360	59.545.562	55.365.750	19.722.131	44,376.000
Nigeria	60.251.881	73.622.163	70.175.586	97.244.984	108.388.637	158.093.004	302.801.545	190.898.393	94.202.595	80,604.000
Senegal	14.187.346	23.267.738	15.054.292	21.029.659	29.571.356	72.943.273	56.238.410	80.453.882	79.228.811	81,480.000
South Africa	311.874.741	291.941.804	333.366.976	601.407.314	491.402.923	916.535.590	999.620.563	1.009.938.189	665.782.130	883,389.000
Tunisia	83.310.430	92.532.605	101.207.311	114.445.900	111.293.721	132.457.270	166.507.960	349.987.618	110.018.321	123,836.000
Total África	1.275.566	1.278.715	1.566.311	2.573.506	2.455.414	2.943.616	3.980.414	5.073.885	3,060,618	4,022,152

Source: INDEC - Comercio Exterior Argentino - Buenos Aires

Table 4
ARGENTINE IMPORTS FROM AFRICA (2001-2010)
Main Countries (US\$ - CIF)

Countries	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Angola	0	0	50	107	46	14.548	3.229	9.456	0	4.000
Algeria	2.548.324	457.094	98.902	282.319	651.879	15.826.877	19.209.457	337.205	89.450	131.000
Ivory Coast	884.795	779.075	317.745	495.513	1.352.269	1.669.765	1.299.163	2.170.862	761.956	1.474.000
Egypt	7.778.046	1.877.329	6.939.052	18.142.816	3.941.029	15.627.061	39.061.204	125.618.318	53.243.517	33.090.000
Ghana	14.560	75.434	1.154.754	30.792.926	16.474.160	870.421	4	406.313	211.936	349.000
Kenya	441.721	222.156	151.065	177.879	251.037	277.704	406.413	486.535	350.629	253.000
Libya	5.508.267	21.751	0	60	0	7.925.696	5.456.906	17.569.457	15	8.697.000
Morocco	6.563.396	11.075.226	3.187.842	4.925.768	19.593.737	63.410.297	55.751.792	86.703.751	58.785.543	105.698.000
Mozambique	289	2.429.788	46.764	235	0	0	1.303.745	1.881.661	547.943	1,764.000
Nigeria	114.271.321	20.776.474	37.688.622	15.362.036	446.342	589.368	613.031	1.387.448	1.023.309	2.598.000
Senegal	541	2.714	3.665	2.505	2.081.423	4.015	1.237	6.628.753	2.337	9.000
South Africa	123.492.626	32.887.860	53.549.276	90.727.781	108.941.589	118.577.877	131.252.335	220.304.840	100.743.062	141.142.000
Tunisia	5.423.753	9.608.685	13.024.920	15.913.794	6.335.137	9.536.140	13.493.094	33.574.471	8.431.190	4.796.000
Total Africa	271.322.000	87.906.000	122.133.000	180.890.000	168.020.000	283.133.000	271.472.000	499.872.000	231.092.000	336.994.000

Source: INDEC - Comercio Exterior Argentino - Buenos Aires

Table 5
BRAZILIAN EXPORTS TO AFRICA (2001-2010)
Main Countries (U\$S FOB)

State/ Years	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Angola	142.008.853	199.562.411	235.469.291	357.150.788	521.326.869	837.778.648	1.218.235.629	1.974.575.752	1.333.008.513	947.119.243
Algeria	44.787.642	86.852.883	153.705.203	348.533.643	384.343.469	456.723.333	501.249.282	632.486.469	714.191.423	838.751.875
Benin	9.331.417	8.720.265	13.548.176	18.883.364	32.008.121	37.011.501	40.849.604	131.802.766	141.003.542	103.057.830
Cameroon	13.114.975	13.140.487	19.670.831	28.819.047	87.713.528	104.457.024	121.114.920	133.396.298	103.006.013	109.667.924
Congo	4.201.868	5.784.819	13.368.175	21.605.361	35.738.477	34.115.343	48.912.832	68.421.928	49.846.629	44.438.358
Ivory Coast	33.462.969	35.875.431	26.357.684	40.983.049	44.424.398	72.160.356	60.407.146	73.699.683	117.955.530	95.889.625
Equat. Guinea	287.903	3.491.442	2.649.443	3.577.656	6.860.419	10.567.726	34.498.544	41.829.654	45.434.422	47.422.218
Egypt	424.553.649	386.053.503	462.132.733	623.626.705	868.236.333	1.349.482.973	1.238.382.477	1.408.639.245	1.443.980.525	1.967.533.716
Gabon	5.963.326	3.008.315	7.692.382	14.900.832	27.469.297	26.965.944	40.747.310	55.232.640	38.608.245	29.662.358
Gambia	26.861.397	22.070.056	27.173.506	30.950.507	32.474.060	42.258.087	62.752.091	48.488.414	66.081.927	81.071.467
Ghana	23.593.074	57.435.823	104.769.720	169.378.154	218.896.895	216.696.945	320.584.451	344.061.805	231.828.239	317.113.970
Guinea	3.015.313	13.917.858	12.772.110	14.700.705	20.386.685	29.544.698	31.719.771	65.276.952	61.067.840	55.540.790
Kenya	10.241.557	13.896.925	15.425.170	20.265.665	76.378.420	47.744.427	59.148.765	78.695.834	89.429.821	121.363.212
Libya	35.270.528	29.685.099	52.553.852	116.392.329	213.163.276	203.383.996	238.660.545	372.902.825	204.703.600	456.172.851
Morocco	189.203.808	235.009.166	226.505.090	348.988.512	414.165.273	391.575.549	438.074.853	511.108.489	538.018.342	703.985.726
Mauritania	4.877.032	24.244.949	19.540.053	39.692.182	43.674.570	65.222.118	96.531.875	79.434.074	104.666.940	105.847.722
Mozambique	2.743.125	27.976.652	10.792.891	23.310.463	28.245.466	35.212.324	27.300.179	32.387.014	108.118.396	40.377.825
Namibia	2.021.073	3.790.056	9.923.366	11.462.966	12.874.401	12.643.41	16.534.772	22.988.370	52.412.063	19.437.759
Nigeria	416.870.692	507.647.903	469.730.463	505.235.218	953.225.828	1.373.624.268	1.512.357.010	1.535.589.616	1.066.462.807	862.541.036
D.R.Congo	3.814.329	2.384.304	9.172.874	13.034.027	16.881.929	18.523.281	35.137.796	53.437.881	53.786.334	50.819.012
Senegal	19.090.861	28.574.134	56.391.137	74.252.314	129.006.462	74.252.314	158.645.273	174.934.754	135.111.577	134.567.143
South Africa	424.055.007	478.190.730	733.986.967	1.037.166.657	1.371.135.092	1.462.736.565	1.757.857.900	1.754.848.262	1.259.699.806	1.309.974.026
Swaziland	242.651	355.882	398.778	285.246	475.353	317.359	545.701	2.055.391	873.598	2.988.046
Sudan	8.152.795	14.954.935	7.962.374	48.945.151	69.348.105	79.816.039	46.885.912	50.830.561	97.340.079	100.471.636
Togo	1.144.366	3.108.760	7.119.928	15.243.597	27.454.345	30.767.569	37.628.345	40.961.969	66.826.436	69.135.157
Tunisia	53.577.581	66.644.399	56.343.384	112.680.728	108.829.972	150.260.504	169.231.529	221.174.543	137.973.115	217.846.359
Africa Total	1.989.031.346	2.363.340.654	2.862.003.914	4.247.699.268	5.981.353.507	7.455.879.389	8.578.221.741	10.169.567.120	8.692.380.077	9.261.599.799

Source: MDICE - Balança comercial brasileira: Países e blocos econômicos - Brasília

Table 6
BRAZILIAN IMPORTS FROM AFRICA (2001-2010)
Main Countries (U\$S FOB)

State/Years	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Angola	174.837.212	11.629.324	7.551.779	3.580.646	120.231	459.499.620	946.332.224	2.236.426.952	137.760.201	500.753.093
Algeria	1.097.793.670	998.926.068	1.123.047.090	1.944.465.672	2.831.171.145	1.970.701.657	2.236.411.459	2.501.415.208	1.381.741.791	2.361.294.419
Benin	12.146.013	913.886	479.641	905.219	1.783	5.630.275	5.203.279	63.400	0	0
Cameroon	472.346	600.011	962.508	1.307.315	735.412	2.083.295	11.135.087	2.847.307	3.447.310	64.981.214
Congo	73.078.155	51.125.106	63.688.768	582.354	66.100.625	290.663.287	135.824.291	1.385.415	1.487.919	10.807.221
Ivory Coast	18.751.211	24.570.112	41.493.738	14.567.883	17.694.504	34.800.826	62.663.570	100.004.721	80.473.593	57.289.766
Equat. Guinea	10.143.222	4.170.255	10	13.604.204	290.678.306	92.840.200	209.454.673	369.395.201	257.542.786	509.999.481
Egypt	46.983.831	24.798.007	34.618.002	33.489.934	31.123.410	37.766.055	52.764.861	217.903.136	87.780.525	168.816.806
Ghana	664.932	26.898.167	1.514.285	448.738	518.639	1.595.702	2.930.990	10.776.898	18.465.285	8.283.378
Kenya	638.147	144.291	26.0998	11.145	199.716	633.373	3.416.255	5.256.418	1.764.053	878.530
Liberia	19.866	84.711	13	105.065	107.465	123.306	23.461	83.378	290.800	2.374.374
Libya	8.195.657	1.791.640	26.001.968	56.693.045	34.486.418	288.400.652	997.675.054	1.406.153.282	835.074.860	100.862.910
Malawi	1.805.033	712	2.585.702	3.419.148	4.481.185	2.172.755	4.659.084	259.973	4.734.113	3.243.353
Morocco	97.323.006	146.490.261	202.000.279	241.036.838	311.41.366	331.297.285	532.393.045	1.144.141.196	339.079.053	664.919.667
Mozambique	960.012	583.736	4.152.467	14.386	20.313	15.980	37	2.136	2.122.484	2.002.508
Namibia	99.313	2.602	157.817	89.454	18.568	111.822	67.322	65.827	2.013	218.713
Nigeria	1.376.173.566	1.094.550.433	1.521.661.990	3.501.030.240	2.643.015.996	3.918.295.644	5.281.064.357	6.704.379.120	4.760.614.289	5.919.699.799
D. R. Congo	80.575	456.791	223.279	367.789	222.262	132.436.766	174.758.605	3.843.192	4.782.620	13.317.898
Senegal	1.952.236	713.477	132.521	1.303.104	19.928	281.344	357.47776	9.297.093	552.127	395.978
South Africa	285.973.114	181.667.025	202.203.391	268.097.881	341.547.475	434.860.919	522.300.721	774.151.693	433.213.470	753.330.040
Swaziland	413.949	88.333	294.234	289.300	312.220	232.283	424.765	178.162	1.560.698	19.761.683
Sudan	132.622	15.456	31.487	187.321	71.501	81.473	192.954	311.620	44.991	41.624
Togo	3.421.357	639.116	4.269.033	6.934.868	8.598.875	4.829.752	11.120.362	40.734.782	428	6.305.160
Tunisia	33.717.143	38.083.642	42.308.900	74.185.542	58.439.562	81.806.719	121.036.820	216.404.855	105.290.936	124.343.584
Zambia	99	68.000	675.235	8.402.208	1.687.175	1.992.910	7.721.519	4.521.262	2.307.858	2.343.806
Africa Total	3.330.949.802	2.675.612.821	3.291.174.938	6.183.472.779	6.656.664.579	8.110.811.144	11.346.724.972	15.761.124.122	8.465.581.857	11.302.224.181

Source: MDICE - Balança comercial brasileira: Países e blocos econômicos - Brasília

Table 7
ARGENTINA - AFRICA. COMMERCIAL EXCHANGE (2001-2010)

Argentine Exports to Africa										
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total to Africa	1.275.566	1.278.715	1.566.311	2.573.506	2.455.414	2.943.616	3.980.414	5.073.885	3.060.618	4.022.152
World Total	26.542.726	25.650.599	29.938.753	34.575.734	40.386.762	46.546.203	55.980.309	70.018.839	55.669.043	68.500.300
%X Africa/Total	4,81	4,99	5,23	7,44	6,08	6,32	7,11	7,25	5,50	5,87

Argentine Imports from Africa										
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total from Africa	271.322	87.906	122.133	180.890	168.020	283.133	271.472	499.872	231.092	336.994
World Total	20.319.579	8.989.546	13.850.774	22.445.281	28.686.890	34.153.683	44.707.463	57.462.452	38.780.915	56.443.325
% I Africa/Total	1,34	0,98	0,88	0,81	0,59	0,83	0,61	0,87	0,60	0,60

Source: INDEC - Buenos Aires

Table 8
BRAZIL/AFRICA COMMERCIAL EXCHANGE (2001-2010) (In US\$)

Brazilian Exports 2001-2010										
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total to Africa	1.989.031.346	2.363.340.654	2.862.003.914	4.247.699.268	5.981.353.507	7.455.879.389	8.578.221.741	10.169.567.120	8.692.380.077	9.261.599.799
World Total	58.286.593.021	60.438.653.035	73.203.222.075	96.677.498.766	118.529.184.899	137.807.469.531	160.649.072.830	197.942.442.909	152.994.742.805	201.915.285.335
% Africa/World	3,4%	3,9%	3,9%	4,4%	5,0%	5,4%	5,3%	5,1%	5,7%	4,6%

Brazilian Imports 2001-2010										
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total from Africa	3.330.949.802	2.675.612.821	3.291.174.938	6.183.472.779	6.656.664.579	8.110.811.144	11.346.724.972	15761124.22	8465.581.857	11302224181
World Total	55.601.758.416	47.242.654.199	48.325.566.630	62.835.615.629	73.600.375.672	91.350.840.805	120.617.446.250	172.984.767.614	127.722.342.988	181.648.675.604
% Africa/World	6,0%	5,7%	6,8%	9,8%	9,0%	8,9%	9,4%	9,1%	6,6%	6,2%

Source: MDICE - Brasília

Table 9

COMMERCIAL EXCHANGE (2001-2010) ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL WITH AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA
(In U\$S 1000)

Year	Africa				South Africa				% X South Africa/Africa		% I South Africa/Africa	
	Argentina	Brazil	Argentina	Brazil	Argentina	Brazil	Argentina	Brazil	Argentina	Brazil	Argentina	Brazil
	X	X	M	M	X	X	M	M				
2001	1.275.566.000	1.989.031.346	271.322.000	3.330.949.802	311.874.741	424.055.007	123.492.626	285.973.114	24,45	21,32	45,52	8,59
2002	1.278.715.000	2.363.340.654	87.906.000	2.675.612.821	291.941.804	478.190.730	32.887.860	181.667.025	22,83	20,23	37,41	6,79
2003	1.566.311.000	2.862.003.914	122.133.000	3.291.174.938	333.366.976	733.986.967	53.549.276	202.203.391	21,28	25,65	43,85	6,14
2004	2.573.506.000	4.247.699.268	180.890.000	6.183.472.779	601.407.314	1.037.166.657	90.727.781	268.097.881	23,37	24,42	50,16	4,34
2005	2.455.414.000	5.981.353.507	168.020.000	6.656.664.579	491.402.923	1.371.135.092	108.941.589	341.547.475	20,01	22,92	64,84	5,13
2006	2.943.616.000	7.455.879.389	283.133.000	8.110.811.144	916.535.590	1.462.736.565	118.577.877	434.860.919	31,14	19,62	41,88	5,36
2007	3.980.414.000	8.578.221.741	271.472.000	11.346.724.972	999.620.563	1.757.857.900	131.252.335	522.300.721	25,11	20,49	48,35	4,60
2008	5.073.885.000	10.169.567.120	499.872.000	15.761.124.122	1.009.938.189	1.754.848.262	220.304.840	774.151.693	19,90	17,26	44,07	4,91
2009	3.060.618.000	8.692.380.077	231.092.000	8.465.581.857	665.782.130	1.259.699.806	100.743.062	433.213.470	21,75	14,49	43,59	5,12
2010	4.022.152.000	9.261.599.799	336.994.000	11.302.224.181	883.389.000	1.309.974.026	141.142.000	753.330.040	21,96	14,14	41,88	6,67

Source: INDEC - Buenos Aires. CACEX (Banco do Brasil) - Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior. SECEX-Brasília

ARGENTINA AND SOUTH AFRICA FACING THE CHALLENGES OF THE XXI CENTURY

Brazil as the mirror image

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